JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The framing of a Scheme for Management of the Ozhur Vishnu Temple at Malappuram District has obtained the attention of this Court at least twice before ; but this time it throws up certain interesting legal issues, particularly on the statutorily provided alternate remedy against an order of the Commissioner of the Malabar Devaswom Board. 2. The application to frame a Scheme was, in fact, made by respondents 3 to 7 herein earlier and on the allegation that it was not being disposed of by the Deputy Commissioner of the Malabar Devaswom Board, they had approached this Court, along with two others, by filing W.P.(C) No. 25914/2017, which culminated in Ext.P2 judgment, where-under another Division Bench of this Court directed the Commissioner of the Malabar Devaswom Board, who was arrayed as the second respondent therein, to take up the said application and dispose it of within a specified time frame. 3. In Ext.P2 judgment, the learned Division Bench had also directed that necessary orders be passed by the Commissioner, after calling for the files from the Deputy Commissioner of the Malabar Devaswom Board, who was arrayed as the first respondent and after hearing the interested parties. 4. While so, subsequently, on the apprehension that orders were attempted to be issued to oust the petitioners herein from the management of the temple, even pending the finalisation of the Scheme, they approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 10608/2018, in which we had issued Ext.P7 judgment. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners had contended before us in the aforementioned writ petition that the finalisation of the Scheme should be done by the Commissioner only after he is satisfied of the necessity of such a Scheme being framed, taking note of the various allegations and counter allegations between the parties. We had issued Ext.P7 judgment accepting this contention. 5. It now appears that the Commissioner of Malabar Devaswom Board, who is arrayed as the first respondent herein, has issued Ext.P8 order finalising the Scheme and the petitioners allege, inter alia, that this order has been issued contrary to the specific directions in Ext.P7 judgment. 6. We have heard Sri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri.Vinay Mathew Joseph, appearing for the petitioners and the learned standing counsel appearing for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 7. 6. We have heard Sri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri.Vinay Mathew Joseph, appearing for the petitioners and the learned standing counsel appearing for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 7. The learned standing counsel for the Board raises a preliminary objection in this Court entering into the merits of this case by asserting that the petitioner has, against Ext.P8 order, effective and alternate remedies under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short, 'the Act') ; either by invoking the statutory appellate remedy under Section 61 thereof or by filing a Civil Suit as permitted by Section 62 of the Act. He thus forcefully contends that this writ petition is not maintainable. 8. In response to the afore objections regarding locus of the petitioners in maintaining this writ petition, the submissions of Sri.T.Krishnanunni, their learned senior counsel are broadly four fold : (a). For the first, the learned senior counsel contends that since the impugned order, namely Ext.P8, is issued as an original one by the Commissioner under Section 58 of the Act, the petitioners would obtain no statutory alternate remedy against it, because Section 61, which provides for the appellate remedy, only allows an appeal from an order issued under Section 58 to the Commissioner himself. The learned senior counsel reiterates that Section 61 offers an appellate remedy only against an order of an Authority inferior to the Commissioner, since the designated Appellate Authority is the Commissioner himself and therefore, that when the Commissioner issues an original order under Section 58 of the Act, it cannot be assailed under Section 61. (b). For the second, the learned senior counsel asserts that even under Section 62, which normally provides for the remedy of filing a suit against an order like Ext.P8, the petitioners would be incapacitated from invoking the said remedy since, according to him, only an appellate order issued by the Commissioner under Section 61 would be capable of being assailed in a suit under it but not an original order issued by him under Section 58 of the Act. (c). For the third, the learned senior counsel submits that Ext.P8 order is incompetent in law since it has been issued by the Commissioner under Section 58 of the Act, when the power under that Section to issue orders is only vested with the Deputy Commissioner. (c). For the third, the learned senior counsel submits that Ext.P8 order is incompetent in law since it has been issued by the Commissioner under Section 58 of the Act, when the power under that Section to issue orders is only vested with the Deputy Commissioner. He, therefore, asserts that this order has been issued without jurisdiction and hence, that it is no order at all in the eye of law. He thus contends that such an order need not be challenged under the alternate remedy, as is submitted by the Devaswom. (d). Finally, Sri.T.Krishnanunni predicates that Ext.P8 order has not been issued by the Commissioner in the manner as was directed by us in Ext.P7 judgment and it thus has to be construed as being abinitiovoid and therefore, that the availability of an alternate remedy, even if admitted, would not prevent this Court from exercising jurisdiction. 9. On a careful consideration of the afore contentions, we must confess that we find substantial force in the first of the above because, as rightly pointed out by Sri. T.Krishnanunni, since Ext.P8 order has been issued by the Commissioner, the statutory appeal against it under Section 61 becomes impossible. This is because this Section only provides for an appeal to the Commissioner himself and that too from any order issued by the Deputy Commissioner. We, therefore, find in favour of the petitioners on this score. 10. That said, however, the Act provides for another remedy under Section 62, of filing a suit before a Civil Court. We will presently examine if, as contended by the learned senior counsel, this remedy is also disabled to the petitioners in this case. 11. We notice that the submissions of the learned senior counsel as regards his perceived handicap in invoking the remedy of filing of a suit against Ext.P8, appears to be hinged in the manner in which Section 62(1) is worded. As per this Section, orders issued by the Commissioner under Section 61, with regard to any of the matters specified in Sections 57, 58 or 60, is indubitably amenable to challenge in a civil suit before a Court of competent jurisdiction. As per this Section, orders issued by the Commissioner under Section 61, with regard to any of the matters specified in Sections 57, 58 or 60, is indubitably amenable to challenge in a civil suit before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The contention of the learned senior counsel, however, is that only an order of the Commissioner, issued by him in his appellate jurisdiction under Section 61, could be the subject matter of a suit and that an order issued by him under Section 58, exercising original jurisdiction, cannot be brought under the ambit of such a suit. 12. We are afraid that we cannot accede to this contention going by the manner in which Section 62(1) is drafted, which we deem fit to extract below for quick reference. "62. Suits and appeals - (1) Any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Commissioner- (i) under Section 61, sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and relating to any of the matters specified in Section 57, Section 58 or Section 60; or (ii) under Section 57, Section 58 or Section 60 read with sub-section (1)(a), (2), or (4)(a) of Section 19 may, within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such order by him, institute a suit in the Court against such order ; and the Court may modify or cancel such order, but it shall have no power to stay the Commissioner's order pending the disposal of the suit.” 13. Under sub section (ii) of the afore section, any order passed by the Commissioner under Sections 57, 58 or 60, read with sub sections (1)(a), 2 or 4(a) of Section 19, can be challenged by filing a suit within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of such an order. It, therefore, becomes inescapably evident that even an order issued by the Commissioner as an original one under Section 58, would be capable of being challenged by filing a suit under Section 62(1)(ii) of the Act. This is more so because the Statute provides that when a Deputy Commissioner is not available, the Commissioner can, under Section 19(4)(a) of the Act, exercise all the powers of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 58 also. This is precisely why in the afore extracted Section 62(i)(ii), even orders issued by the Commissioner under Section 58 has been made amenable to challenge in a civil suit. 14. This is precisely why in the afore extracted Section 62(i)(ii), even orders issued by the Commissioner under Section 58 has been made amenable to challenge in a civil suit. 14. That apart, in this particular case, the fact remains that the Commissioner had exercised jurisdiction under Section 58 in obedience to the express directions contained in Ext.P2 judgment of this Court, which was also affirmed by us subsequently in Ext.P7 judgment thereafter. Pertinently, while Ext.P2 judgment was delivered in a writ petition filed by respondents herein, Ext.P7 judgment was delivered in a writ petition filed by the petitioners themselves. Therefore, it would be now very iniquitous and uncharitable for the petitioner to even contend that the Commissioner's order should be seen to be one issued without jurisdiction and consequently that there is no remedy of filing a suit against the same. We cannot, for a moment, countenance these submissions and we are of the view that looking at it from any angle, Ext.P8 order can certainly be challenged by the petitioners in a suit filed under the mandate of Section 62 and in particular, sub clause 2 of the said Section. 15. Once we hold so, the only question remaining before us is whether we would be justified in asking the Commissioner to reconsider Ext.P8 order for the alleged reason that it has not been issued in the manner as directed by us in Ext.P7 judgment or that it be declared as void for such reason. On a reading of our judgment, namely Ext.P7, it is persipicuous that we had only directed the Commissioner to frame a Scheme after being satisfied that such a Scheme is necessary in the totality of all germane circumstances. True, in Ext.P8, there is no specific reference to the arriving of a personal satisfaction by the Commissioner, except stating that the said Authority deems it necessary, "after looking at all the suggestions and objections", to frame a Scheme. True, in Ext.P8, there is no specific reference to the arriving of a personal satisfaction by the Commissioner, except stating that the said Authority deems it necessary, "after looking at all the suggestions and objections", to frame a Scheme. Therefore, even though there is some force, at least prima-facie, in the submission of the learned senior counsel that Ext.P8 should have been issued only after specifically concluding upon the necessity of a Scheme, we do not think that it would be proper or apposite for this Court to hold the said order to be issued without jurisdiction or to intervene in any manner at this moment for the singular reason, as we have already recorded above, that the petitioners have an efficacious alternate remedy under Section 62 of the Act, where-under these contentions can also be raised and pursued. 16. In such view of the matter, we decline interference, not because we have entered into the merits of Ext.P8 but because we hold that the petitioners have an efficacious, alternate remedy available against it. We, therefore, dismiss this writ petition, reserving liberty to the petitioners to invoke their remedy under Section 62 and in particular, sub clause 2 thereof, before a Court of competent Civil jurisdiction, against Ext.P8 order.