JUDGMENT : SUJOY PAUL, J. 1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order dated 17.05.2017 (Annexure-P/9), whereby the appropriate government has refused to refer the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate Industrial Tribunal. 2. The admitted facts between the parties are that the petitioner filed an application under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Conciliation Officer and after failure of conciliation, a failure report (Annexure P-8) was sent to the appropriate government. In turn, the appropriate government by order dated 17.05.2017 (Annexure P-9) declined to refer the dispute for the reasons stated in the said order. 3. Shri Uttam Maheshwari, learned counsel for the petitioner criticized this order by contending that an industrial dispute exists between the petitioner and the employer. The appropriate government has exceeded its jurisdiction and decided the status of the concerned workmen and touched the merits of the matter. The government cannot undertake the aforesaid exercise and this aspect needs to be decided on merits by appropriate Tribunal upon receiving the reference from the appropriate government. He submits that the appropriate government has reached to a conclusion on merits which was beyond its competence. Reliance is placed on [Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors, (1989) AIR SC 1565]; [Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, (1991) Supp2 SCC 10] and a judgment of this Court passed in W.P. No.3340/2011, [Harprasad Khajuria Vs. Union of India and Others]. 4. Per contra, Shri Devesh Bhojane, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 contended that a conjoint reading of Section 7, 7(A) and Section 10 makes it clear that the impugned order is in consonance with the scheme of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Reliance is placed on Section 10(1)(d) to contend that unless a dispute falls within the ambit of IInd or IIIrd Schedule, it can not be referred for adjudication. He relied on various entries of the said schedules appended to the Industrial Disputes Act and urged that the claim of classification/regularization does not fall within the ambit of said Schedules. 5. Reliance is placed on Section 10(1)(d) to contend that unless a dispute falls within the ambit of IInd or IIIrd Schedule, it can not be referred for adjudication. He relied on various entries of the said schedules appended to the Industrial Disputes Act and urged that the claim of classification/regularization does not fall within the ambit of said Schedules. 5. Shri Kuldeep Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 submits that the conciliation application and subject of failure report as well as impugned order shows that alleged dispute was pertaining to contract labours which does not fall within the ambit of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There was no employee-employer relationship between the members of the petitioner-Union and the respondent No.3. Thus, the reference was rightly declined by the authority. He placed reliance on [Workmen of the Food Corporation of India Vs. Food Corporation of India, (1985) 2 SCC 136 ] to contend that a contract worker is not covered within the definition of "dispute" and, therefore, no fault can be found in the impugned order as per definition of "Workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Reliance is placed on [Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, (2015) 15 SCC 1 ] in support of this contention that the satisfaction of "appropriate government" regarding existence of an industrial dispute is a condition precedent. The said government must be satisfied that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication is a "Workman". In the instant case, since the members of Union were not "workmen" the reference was rightly declined. [Rahman Industires Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2016) 12 SCC 420 ] is relied upon to contend that the earlier judgments of Supreme Court including the one on which reliance is placed by Shri Uttam Maheshwari, namely, Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh was also considered by Supreme Court and the Supreme Court came to hold that only when their exists a dispute for adjudication, it can be referred for adjudication. Reference is made to a Karnataka High Court judgment reported in [Management of Le Meridien Bangalore vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2018) LabIC 725] wherein the same principle was laid down and power of the government under Section 12 was considered in extenso. Reference is made to a Karnataka High Court judgment reported in [Management of Le Meridien Bangalore vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2018) LabIC 725] wherein the same principle was laid down and power of the government under Section 12 was considered in extenso. Lastly Shri Bhargava relied on [G.M. Haryana Roadways vs. Jai Bhagwan & anr, (2008) LabIC 1775] to bolster his submissions that petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. They did not disclose in the body of petition that members were contract workers and for this suppression of fact alone the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 8. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, it is apposite to quote relevant portion of Section 2(k), Section 7, Section 7A and Section 10 of the ID Act, on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the parties. "2(k). "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; **** **** **** 7. Labour Courts.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. **** **** **** 7A. Tribunals.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule [and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act]. **** **** **** 10. Tribunals.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule [and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act]. **** **** **** 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time], by order in writing,-- (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified, in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:" 9. In the light of aforesaid statutory provisions and the judgment cited by both the sides, it needs to be examined whether the impugned order can sustain judicial scrutiny. 10. Admittedly, the claim of the Union is regarding regularization/classification on the permanent post. The reason for rejection by the appropriate Government is as under: "The subject matter of the demand for regularization of contract labour does not fall under either second or third schedule of the ID Act." 11. The singular reason for rejection is that the demand of regularization of contract labour does not fall under either IInd or IIIrd Schedule of the ID Act. The question whether the members of the petitioner-Union were "workmen" or not needs to be examined by the appropriate Tribunal. Interestingly, a similar objection was raised by the employer in the case of Telco Convoy Mazdoor Sangh . Para 12 & 13 of said judgment reads as under: "12. The question whether the members of the petitioner-Union were "workmen" or not needs to be examined by the appropriate Tribunal. Interestingly, a similar objection was raised by the employer in the case of Telco Convoy Mazdoor Sangh . Para 12 & 13 of said judgment reads as under: "12. It is, however, submitted on behalf of TELCO that unless there is relationship of employer and employees or, in other words, unless those who are raising the disputes are work- men, there cannot be any existence of industrial dispute within the meaning of the term as defined in section 2(k) of the Act. It is urged that in order to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, one of the factors that has to be considered by the Government is whether the persons who are raising the disputes are workmen or not within the meaning of the definition as contained in section 2(k) of the Act. 13. Attractive though the contention is, we regret, we are unable to accept the same. It is now well settled that, while exercising power under section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by section 10 of the Act. See Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCR 686 ; M.P. Irrigation Kararnchari Sangh v. State of M.P., (1985) 2 SCR 1019 and Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda Jullundur, (1978) 2 SCR 793 ." 12. This is now settled in industrial jurisprudence that even in cases of contractual employees, the labour Courts are equipped with the power to lift the veil and see the real nature of employment. In other words, where the contract itself is a sham contract or it is merely a smoke screen or camouflage, the labour Court is not powerless to examine the real nature of employment. This aspect can be decided by the labour Court after recording evidence of the parties. Way back, in (Hussainbhai, Calicut vs. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union Kozhikode and Others, (1978) 4 SCC 257 ), the Apex Court poignantly held as under: "5. This aspect can be decided by the labour Court after recording evidence of the parties. Way back, in (Hussainbhai, Calicut vs. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union Kozhikode and Others, (1978) 4 SCC 257 ), the Apex Court poignantly held as under: "5. The true test may, with brevity, be indicated once again. Where a worker or group of workers labours to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for the business of another, that other is, in fact, the employer. He has economic control over the workers' subsistence, skill, and continued employment. If he, for any reason, chokes off, the worker is, virtually, laid off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship ex contractu is of no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, we discern the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, that the real employer is the management, not the immediate contractor. Myriad devices, half-hidden in fold after fold of legal form depending on the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry, the local conditions and the like may be resorted to when labour legislation casts welfare obligations on the real employer, based on Articles 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the Constitution. The court must be astute to avoid the mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be misled by the maya of legal appearance. 6. If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make-believe trappings of detachment from the management cannot snap the real-life bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off." This principle was reiterated by Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India Limited vs. National Union Water Front Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . The reference may be made to para 107 which reads as under: "107. (ii) where the contract was found to be a sham and nominal, rather a camouflage, in which case the contract labour working in the establishment of the principal employer were held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. The reference may be made to para 107 which reads as under: "107. (ii) where the contract was found to be a sham and nominal, rather a camouflage, in which case the contract labour working in the establishment of the principal employer were held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances wherein the Court pierced the veil and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract labour stood prohibited;" In (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 528 ), the Apex Court considered aforesaid judgments and opined that the case of Hussainbhai is neither dissented from nor diluted by Constitution Bench in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. . In (Ram Singh and Others vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 126 ), Dharmadhikari J. speaking for the Bench opined that normally, the relationship of employer and employee does not exists between an employer and a contractor and the servant of an independent contractor. Where, however, an employer retains or assumes control over the means and method by which the work of a contractor is to be done, it may be said that the relationship between employer and employee exists between him and the servants of such a contractor. In such a situation the mere fact of formal employment by an independent contractor will not relieve the master of liability where the servant is, in fact, in his employment. In that event, it may be held that an independent contractor is created or is operating as a subterfuge and the employee will be regarded as the servant of the principal employer. Whether a particular relationship between employer and employee is genuine or a camouflage through the mode of a contractor, is essentially a question of fact to be determined on the basis of the features of the relationship, the written terms of employment, if any, and the actual nature of the employment. The actual nature of relationship concerning a particular employment being essentially a question of fact, it has to be raised and proved before an industrial adjudicator. 13. The pivotal question is whether appropriate government can undertake this exercise? The actual nature of relationship concerning a particular employment being essentially a question of fact, it has to be raised and proved before an industrial adjudicator. 13. The pivotal question is whether appropriate government can undertake this exercise? In catena of judgments, including Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh , it was held that the "appropriate government" is not equipped with any judicial power while deciding to refer or not to refer an industrial dispute. Pertinently, in Rahman Industries Pvt. Ltd on which reliance is placed by Shri Bhargava, the same principle is reiterated. It is profitable to quote para 3 of this judgment, which reads as under: "3. We find force in the submission made by the learned counsel. In the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), it is not as if the Government has to act as a post office by referring each and every petition received by them. The Government is well within its jurisdiction to see whether there exits a dispute worth referring for adjudication. No doubt, the Government is not entitled to enter a finding on the merits of the case and decline reference. The Government has to satisfy itself, after applying it mind to the relevant factors and satisfy itself to the existence of dispute before taking a decision to refer the same for adjudication. Only in case, on judicial scrutiny, the Court finds that the refusal of the Government to make a reference of the dispute is unjustified on irrelevant factors, the court may issue a direction to the Government to make a reference." 14. The definition of "industrial dispute" is very wide and includes any dispute or difference between employer and employer or between employers and workmen or even between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or even with non-employment or terms of employment. Shri Bhojne contended that in view of Section 10(1)(d) of ID Act, only such disputes can be referred for adjudication which are covered under II or III Schedule under the ID Act. I do not see any merit in the said contention. A careful reading of clause (d) shows that it talks about reference of dispute to Tribunal or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute. The clause (d) is into two parts. I do not see any merit in the said contention. A careful reading of clause (d) shows that it talks about reference of dispute to Tribunal or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute. The clause (d) is into two parts. First part talks about reference of dispute whereas the remaining part talks about any matter which may be connected with the dispute and for said kind of matters, it is mentioned that it may be specified in IInd or IIIrd Schedule. This is trite law that the word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive. See Principles of Interpretation of Statute by Justice G.P. Singh (page 477 12th Edition). Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 2(k) and 10(1) (d) shows that the appropriate government can refer an industrial dispute for adjudication even if it is not covered under IInd or IIIrd Schedule. Any other interpretation will make the use of word "or" meaningless. This is trite law that when a provision is clear and unambiguous it must be given effect to irrespective of consequences. See (Nelson Motis vs. Union of India and another, (1992) 4 SCC 711 ). Thus, as per the text and in the context "or" is used, I am constrained to hold that power of appropriate government is not confined to refer the dispute only when it is covered by IInd or IIIrd Schedule. 15. This writ petition is filed against the order of "appropriate government". The main dispute was filed before the Conciliation Officer, wherein the Union has categorically mentioned about the nature of employment of the concerned workmen. Against rejection order, the matter traveled to this Court. Since in the basic dispute/application for conciliation the status of concerned workmen was disclosed, I am unable to hold that in the light of judgment of G.M. Haryana Roadways this petition can be thrown overboard for suppression of fact. Needless to mention that this Court is not deciding the status of the members of petitioner-Union and appropriate industrial tribunal is best suited to decide this issue. In (S.J.S. Business Enterprises(P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 166 ), the Apex Court held that general rule of denial of relief in cases of suppression of material facts would be of no effect when suppression of fact is not a material one. 16. In (S.J.S. Business Enterprises(P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 166 ), the Apex Court held that general rule of denial of relief in cases of suppression of material facts would be of no effect when suppression of fact is not a material one. 16. In the case of Prabhakar the Apex Court opined that the satisfaction of "appropriate government" whether the dispute referred is relating to workmen or not is a condition precedent. There cannot be any dispute about this legal preposition. But the question is when the petitioner and the employer have taken a diametrically opposite stand on this aspect and this aspect cannot be decided on administrative exercise of power, whether appropriate government can decline to refer the dispute In my considered opinion, the appropriate government cannot reject the reference when the parties are at loggerheads on the question where employees fall within the definition of "workman" and for this purpose the evidence is required to be adduced. The same principle is enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh and by this Court in Harprasad Khajuriya . 17. Apart from this, the matter may be viewed from another angle. The impugned rejection order assigns singular reason which is reproduced hereinabove. The reason for not referring the dispute is not that the members of Union do not fall within the ambit of "workman". Indeed, it is held that regularization of contract labour does not fall within the ambit of Schedules of ID Act. At the cost of repetition, in my view, the definition of "industrial dispute" is wide enough and as per Section 10(1)(c) such dispute can be referred for adjudication even if it does not fall within IInd or IIIrd Schedule of the ID Act. The appropriate government did not form any opinion that no industrial dispute exists nor it formed any specific opinion in the impugned order that members of petitioner-Union are not workman. This is trite law that validity of an order of statutory authority is to be judged on the grounds/reasons mentioned therein and it cannot be substituted by filing return/counter affidavit. A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of [Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 ] opined that order of statutory authority is not like an old wine which may give strength by afflux of time. A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of [Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 ] opined that order of statutory authority is not like an old wine which may give strength by afflux of time. The relevant portion of said judgment reads as under: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in Ms mind, or what he intended to, do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to effect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older:" 18. In entirety, in my considered opinion the appropriate government has exceeded its authority and entered into the merits of the case by holding that the demand of regularization of contract labour is not covered under the ID Act. Resultantly, the order dated 17.05.2017 is set aside. The appropriate government is directed to refer the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate Tribunal within 45 days from the date of production of copy of this order. 19. Petition is allowed. No cost.