JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant is original defendant No.3, whereas respondent No.1 is original plaintiff and respondents No.2 and 3 are original defendants No.1 and 2. 2. The appellant challenges the order dated 21.8.2010 passed by learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara in Special Civil Suit No.202 of 2008 below Exh.5, where the Court allowed the application preferred by respondent No.1plaintiff. 3. Facts in a capsulized form leading to filing of the present Appeal From Order are as follows: 3.1 It is the case of respondent No.1 plaintiff that an agreement to sell came to be executed in his favour in respect of the land bearing Revenue Survey No.205 at village: Tandalja, Taluka Vadodara at Rs.15 per sq.feet. In pursuance of the said agreement to sell, the present respondent No.1 has paid an amount of Rs.2,30,000/-in cash to respondent No.2 Mahidaben Mustakbhai Patel and respondent No.3 Page Mustak Alibhai Patel. The said agreement to sale is a notarized document and executed in favour of respondent No.1 The said agreement to sell is also registered in the office of the Registrar of Notaries vide Serial No.9514. 3.2 Based on this document, respondent No.1 preferred a suit for specific performance of contract and for cancellation of sale deed executed in favour of the appellant (original defendant No.3) on 27.12.2006. It is the case of the appellant that another Special Civil Suit No.858 of 2001 was preferred by the legal heirs of deceased Ashokbhai Manubhai Patel, wherein also respondent No.3 was one of the party defendants and in the said matter, the Court directed maintenance of status quo. 3.3 Respondent NO.3 preferred Appeal from Order No.422 of 2003 along with Civil Application No.8196 of 2003. The said Appeal from Order came to be transferred to the appropriate Court having jurisdiction vide an order passed on dated 19.7.2005. After the said appeal was transferred to the District Court, the appellant purchased the said land by registered sale deed dated 27.12.2006. The right was also waived by legal heirs of the deceased Ashokbhai Manubhai Patel by executing document on 23.2.2007 in favour of the appellant. 3.4 After the appellant enjoyed the property for one year, another Special Civil Suit No.20 of 2007 was filed by one Mr.Jayesh K. Patel and against respondent No.3 and the present appellant. Interim injunction application Exh.5 was rejected on 21.4.2007. 3.5 Being aggrieved by the said order, Mr. 3.4 After the appellant enjoyed the property for one year, another Special Civil Suit No.20 of 2007 was filed by one Mr.Jayesh K. Patel and against respondent No.3 and the present appellant. Interim injunction application Exh.5 was rejected on 21.4.2007. 3.5 Being aggrieved by the said order, Mr. Jayesh Patel filed Appeal From Order No.174 of 2007 before this Court and this Court vide order dated 7.5.2007 rejected the Appeal from Order and confirmed the order of dismissal of injunction passed below interim injunction application at Exh.5. It is lamented by the appellant that all aspects were brought to the knowledge of the learned Presiding Officer. The aspect of delay in preferring the suit also was harped upon as agreement to sell was executed in the year 2001. The suit came to be preferred only in the year 2008, almost after a delay of 7 years. The impugned order dated 21.8.2010 allowed the interim injunction application below Exh.5 which is being challenged by this Appeal from Order. The request is made to quash and set aside the order passed below Exh.5. 4. This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Shital Patel for the appellant, who has fervently argued before this Court that the learned Presiding Officer has not given any reason, much less any cogent reason for considering the basic ingredients being a prima facie, case to balance of convenience and irreparable loss for grant of interim injunction. He sought to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kishoresing Ratansing Jadeja vs. Maruti Corporation and others in Civil Appeal Nos.2186-2187 OF 2009. 4.1 He further argued that there is delay of 7 years in preferring the suit. This aspect is disregarded by the Court and that itself has brought illegality to the order. Equitable relief again, cannot be granted when person has been indolent, for which he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Veetrag Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd, 1996 (1) GLH 179 has held as under: “8.Even so, in any case, inasmuch as this contract was terminated on 6th December 1993, it was expected of the appellant to move for specific performance at the earliest, if they were serious about the same. The appellants certainly cannot be nonsuited on the ground of limitation inasmuch as their suit is within time. The appellants certainly cannot be nonsuited on the ground of limitation inasmuch as their suit is within time. However, when it comes to grant of equitable relief when the suit is filed after such a lapse of time, it cannot be said that the remedy of interim injunction was the necessary remedy and there was no other remedy available to the party concerned in this behalf. Shri Gupta relied upon the Apex Court judgment rendered in Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahald Singh and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 276 . In paragraph 5 thereof the Courts are cautioned and required to exercise sound judicial discretion. They are required to find out that no other remedy is available to the party concerned and then as stated by the Honourable Supreme Court (and again relied upon by Shri Gupta) in para 20 of the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 ; for approaching a Court of equity, the blameworthy conduct of a person approaching a Court of equity, for obtaining discretionary relief disentitles him for grant of such relief. Para 20 of the above judgment reads as under: “Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd thus: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is funded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is funded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 4.2 The very principle is reiterated by the Apex Court in another decision as further relied upon and as rendered in the case of Janardhanam Prasad vs. Ramdas, 2007 (1) Scale 442 in paragraph 15 as under: “15. Admittedly, fatherinlaw and wife of the Respondent No.1 had been looking after his affairs. They were, therefore, acting as his agents. They would be deemed to have notice of the registration of the document as also the possession of the appellant herein. If they had the requisite notice, in our opinion, the Respondent NO.1., having regard thereto, should have filed a suit for specific performance. In fact they should have done so expeditiously having regard to the discretionary nature of relief he may obtain in the suit. They did not do so. They waited for more than two years from the date of execution of deed of sale. Even if the suit was not barred by limitation on that account, it was a fit case, where the Court should heave refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction u/s. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.” 4.3 He, thus, urged that the Apex Court has emphasized that if someone allows time to lapse, the exercise of discretionary relief in discretionary jurisdiction under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act could not be exercised in his favour. The said suit, since, is filed in the year 2008, after almost 7 years of delay, the Court ought not to have exercised the discretionary relief in favour of respondent No.1. The said suit, since, is filed in the year 2008, after almost 7 years of delay, the Court ought not to have exercised the discretionary relief in favour of respondent No.1. 4.4 He further urged that as per section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the suit of present respondent No.1 plaintiff is deemed to have become infructuous noticed with sale deed executed in favour of the appellant, as the said sale deed is executed before the Sub-Registrar in September, 2006, whereas the suit came to be filed only on 16.5.2008 i.e. almost after a lapse of 21 months. 4.5 He also urged that earlier proceedings of Special Civil Suit No.20 of 2007 have been completely ignored by the trial Court and that also is another ground for this Court to intervene. Moreover, the consideration paid by respondent No.1 is also in cash which also creates serious doubt. 4.6 Affidavit-in-reply has been is filed for and on behalf of respondents No.1 and 3 urging inter alia that Hamidaben Mustakbhai Patel original respondent No.2 has died and respondent No.3 is acting as her husband and is also aware of entire sequence of events. Respondent No.2 executed agreement for sale in favour of respondent No.1 from whom they received a sum of Rs.2,30,000/. It is also contended that agreement to sell in favour of respondent No.1 is valid and legal. Respondent No.1 did not pay the remaining amount towards consideration. Thereafter, they executed sale deed in favour of appellant and the land bearing Revenue Survey No.73.86 sq.metres was sold by respondents for consideration of Rs. 6 lakh only with a view to ensure that the appellant would settle all the claims with respondent No.1 herein. Thus, responsibility was taken by appellant and the land was sold by respondent No.2 to appellant on the condition that the appellant has settled all the claims with respondent No.2 in whose favour the present respondents had executed agreement to sell for consideration of Rs.2,30,000/. It is, thus, according to this respondent, with full knowledge of the appellant that the earlier Banakhat was executed in favour of respondent No.1. The appellant also had managed to get the lawyer and the trial Court had advised not to file the reply. It is insisted that the appellant will have to sort out the issue of title of land in question as it was part of their delay. The appellant also had managed to get the lawyer and the trial Court had advised not to file the reply. It is insisted that the appellant will have to sort out the issue of title of land in question as it was part of their delay. Thus, the sum and substance of the entire affidavit is that the appellant had sold this property after once respondent No.1 failed to make good the payment as stipulated. 5. Ms.Shivangi Rana learned advocate appearing for the learned advocate Mr. Majmudar for the appellant urged that since the appellant was to shoulder the responsibility of pending claims, he has sold the land at a lesser price; otherwise, it would not happen that mandatory consideration decided earlier would speak of more amount than the amount given at the time when the appellant purchased. She also urged further that time is not an essence of the contract. It is urged that issues are already framed on 21.6.2016. Matter is likely to be seen after recordance of evidence, and therefore also, this Appeal From Order, which is pending for the last 7 years need not be entertained. 6. The order impugned, if is examined, the trial Court was actuated by the fact that no written statement is filed by defendant Nos.1 and 2. So far as defence of defendant No.3 is concerned, he had filed written statement before the trial Court and he denied the case of the plaintiff. His defence is based mainly on the ground that Banakhat notarized on 5.5.2001 is false and fabricated as of back date, only to extract money in collusion with defendant Nos.1 and 2. 6.1 It is further urged that Banakhat is not registered in accordance with the provisions contained in the Indian Registration Act, whereas sale deed executed by defendant Nos.1 and 2 on 27.12.2006 is registered under the Indian Registration Act. Earlier registered sale deed in respect of the very land bearing Revenue Survey No.205 is registered on 4.9.2000 in the name of Mustakbhai Patel. Present defendant No.2, is a bona fide purchaser with value without notice. In Civil Suit No.858 of 2001, the order of status quo was granted by the then learned 7th Joint Civil Judge, Vadodara and it has become final by order in Civil Application No.8196 of 2002 and Appeal from Order No.422 of 2003 by this Court. Present defendant No.2, is a bona fide purchaser with value without notice. In Civil Suit No.858 of 2001, the order of status quo was granted by the then learned 7th Joint Civil Judge, Vadodara and it has become final by order in Civil Application No.8196 of 2002 and Appeal from Order No.422 of 2003 by this Court. In Civil Suit No.20 of 2007 also the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara had dismissed the application preferred below Exh.5 on 21.4.2007. 7. The trial Court was more impressed by the fact that the order passed below application Exh.5 in Civil Suit NO.858 of 2001 became final upto the High Court and furthermore the order passed below application Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.20 of 2007 also has been upheld by this Court and, therefore, it held that defendant No.3 has prima facie case on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 27.12.2006. And, is also declared as bona fide purchaser of the suit land. 8. The Court also held prima facie that the claim of the plaintiff on the strength of the notarized Banakhat dated 5.5.2001 is to be decided on recording of evidence and considering the merit of the matter, both the parties are required to be directed to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land till the final disposal of the suit. Accordingly, application Exh.5 preferred by plaintiff is partly allowed against the defendants. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants are directed to maintain the status quo so far as ownership and possession of the suit property is concerned till final disposal of the suit. 9. It is rightly, of course, pointed out by learned advocate Mr. Patel the aspect of delay in preferring Civil Suit is not discussed by the Court below. However, what is vital, at this stage, is as to whether the Court has made any patently erroneous and illegal order, going to the root of the matter, which deserves the interference in this Appeal from Order. 10. Patel the aspect of delay in preferring Civil Suit is not discussed by the Court below. However, what is vital, at this stage, is as to whether the Court has made any patently erroneous and illegal order, going to the root of the matter, which deserves the interference in this Appeal from Order. 10. It emerges from the record that out of total sale price decided between plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to which dispute is concerned, the suit land in relation to which the agreement to sell had been already entered into between the original plaintiff, respondent No.1 and original defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein, respondent No.1 herein had paid part of the sale consideration and initiated action for execution of the registered sale deed after about 6 years. The registered sale deed in favour of respondent NO.1 also appears to have been cancelled on 27.12.2006 by respondent No.3 and, thereafter, the registered sale deed has been effected in favour of the present appellant. The question before the trial Court was as to whether respondent No.1 original plaintiff had any legal right, title or interest, which needed protection at an interim stage. It is quite apparent that after once the registered sale deed was effected in favour of respondent No.2, who parted with the suit land in favour of the appellant. 11. Thus, the trial Court had suspended its own order for a period of 20 days to avail the wisdom of this Court. This Court initially continued with the suspension and, thereafter, while admitting the appeal, confirmed the same. Hence, no stay or order of status quo is in operation. 12. The background in which the original plaintiff had approached the Court seeking interim relief, in the opinion of this Court, the Court below ought to have regarded the question of preferring the suit belatedly. Indisputably, the suit has been preferred after 7 years. No reason is putforth for such a delay, if there are other two suits preferred against both respondents No.2 and 3 and if the High Court also had found some substance in the say of these persons, that ipso facto would not validate the case of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. Indisputably, the suit has been preferred after 7 years. No reason is putforth for such a delay, if there are other two suits preferred against both respondents No.2 and 3 and if the High Court also had found some substance in the say of these persons, that ipso facto would not validate the case of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. The appellant had purchased the property assuming that he was in knowledge of the agreement to sell, which was effected in favour of respondent No.1, although there are no such details available to fall back upon, he has the right, title or interest in respect of the suit property under the law, which would have far more weight age and the trial Court ought to have recorded the fact that for long 7 years the persons, who has not been vigilant towards their own right, approached the Court of equity and had chosen to put forward the right of interim relief. Even if there was a prima facie case, the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the present petitioner original defendant No.3, who had got the registered sale deed in his favour. The possession also was handed over by the original owner pursuant to the said registered sale deed. It is to be noticed that so far as earlier litigation i.e. Special Civil suit No.858 of 2001 is concerned, it was by the legal heir of deceased Ashok Patel where respondent No.3 was a party and the Court terminated the order of maintenance of status quo. Respondent No.3 preferred Appeal from Order, which was transferred to the Court having jurisdiction i.e. the District Court and the appellant purchased the said land and the legal heirs of the deceased Ashok Patel waived their rights in favour of the present appellant. Therefore, earlier grant of status quo would have no bearing on the present litigation. 13. All in all, order of interim relief granted by the trial Court is quashed and set aside allowing this Appeal. It is needless to say that the Special Civil Suit No.202 of 2008 when proceeded with the recordance of evidence, none of the observations and findings of this Court will have any bearing on the issue and the same shall be decided by the Court independently in accordance with law. It is needless to say that the Special Civil Suit No.202 of 2008 when proceeded with the recordance of evidence, none of the observations and findings of this Court will have any bearing on the issue and the same shall be decided by the Court independently in accordance with law. Any further dealing on the part of the appellant will also be subject to the outcome of the suit, which would also include the right to claim damage by respondent No.1, if eventually he succeeds in the suit.