JUDGMENT : ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. GMB Ceramics Ltd. (in short ‘GMB’), the appellant in APO 34 of 2016 entered into a Consultancy Agreement dated 29 November, 1986 with Neycer (India) Ltd. (in short ‘Neycer’) for setting up a factory for manufacture of vitreous sanitary ware products. The said agreement was converted into a Collaboration Agreement by an addendum dated 26 June, 1987. Disputes and differences arose between the parties in relation to the said agreement. The agreement contained an arbitration clause for resolution of disputes between the parties. The disputes were referred to Joint Arbitrators nominated by each of the parties. In view of disagreement between the Joint Arbitrators, the matter was referred to the Umpire. Learned Umpire published an award dated 23 June, 1999 for Rs. 1169.63 lacs along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum in favour of GMB. Neycer filed an application under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 being GA No. 4026 of 2000 for setting aside the said award of the Learned Umpire. The said application was disposed of by the learned Single Judge by a judgment and order dated 14 October, 2015. The learned Judge in effect held that the claim that GMB referred to arbitration was for a sum of Rs. 2 crores and any award in excess of that sum cannot be sustained. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, GMB has preferred an appeal being APO No. 34 of 2016. Neycer has also preferred an appeal being APOT 42 of 2016 contending that the Award should have been set aside in its entirety. Both the appeals are taken up for hearing and disposal together. Contention of GMB:- 2. Appearing for GMB, Mr. Ranjan Deb, learned Sr. Counsel submitted that the Collaboration Agreement between the parties provided, inter alia, as follows:- (i) Neycer was to make available to GMB technology, know how expertise including manufacturing process. Engineering data, consumption norms, fire cycles utility requirements and all information necessary for setting up a manufacturing unit for production of vitreous sanitary wares with installed capacity of 7000 tonnes per annum and manufacturing target of 600 tonnes per annum. (ii) Neycer would provide its marketing network and sales infrastructure to GMB. (iii) GMB would have the right to manufacture and sell products using the name of Neycer. (ii) Neycer would provide its marketing network and sales infrastructure to GMB. (iii) GMB would have the right to manufacture and sell products using the name of Neycer. (iv) Neycer would train unskilled labour employed by GMB and would help in selection and training of personnel, technicians and supervisory staff. (v) Neycer was to set up the manufacturing unit and business market of GMB’s products. (vi) Neycer would jointly set up the factory and assist GMB to obtain guaranteed optimum production in terms of both quality and quantity. 3. Mr. Deb submitted that Neycer failed, neglected and/or refused to perform its obligations under the said Collaboration Agreement. As a result, GMB suffered substantial loss and damage. According to Mr. Deb, in view of the breaches committed by Neycer, the said agreement stood terminated. 4. In September 1989, Neycer invoked the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement and nominated its arbitrator. In October 1989, GMB nominated its Arbitrator. In so far the claim of GMB was concerned, the Joint Arbitrators were in disagreement and consequently they referred the disputes and differences to the Umpire. The Umpire passed an award in favour of GMB as indicated above. 5. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the application filed by Neycer, set aside the portion of the award in excess of Rs. 2 crores. Mr. Deb submitted that there was no specific reference of disputes to the Arbitrators. The learned umpire culled out the disputes and differences between the parties from the correspondence exchanged between the parties contemporaneously. On a meaningful reading of such correspondence it would be clear that the parties referred all disputes and differences between them to arbitration. It is not that GMB limited its claim to cost incurred due to overrun of the contract caused by breach of Neycer’s obligations under the Agreement. Hence, the learned Single Judge erred in setting aside the portion of the arbitral award in excess of Rs. 2 crores. We will refer to the relevant correspondence between the parties later in this judgment. 6. Mr. Deb relied on two decisions. The first is a decision of this Court in the case of Juggilal Kamlapat -vs.- N.V. Internationale Crediet-EnHandels Vereeninging ‘Rotterdam’ (alias Rotterdam Trading Co Ltd.), AIR 1955 Cal 65 . The other decision that Mr. 2 crores. We will refer to the relevant correspondence between the parties later in this judgment. 6. Mr. Deb relied on two decisions. The first is a decision of this Court in the case of Juggilal Kamlapat -vs.- N.V. Internationale Crediet-EnHandels Vereeninging ‘Rotterdam’ (alias Rotterdam Trading Co Ltd.), AIR 1955 Cal 65 . The other decision that Mr. Deb relied on was that of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa-vs.-Asis Ranjan Mohanty, (1999) 9 SCC 249 . We will revert back to these judgments later. Contention of Neycer:- 7. Mr. Gautam Chakraborty, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for Neycer referred to the same correspondence exchanged between the parties prior to reference of disputes to arbitration as were referred to by Mr. Deb. He submitted that it would appear from the said correspondence that GMB had raised a claim only on account of time overrun. The word ‘overrun’ has been used in nine different letters written on behalf of GMB. Nothing more than Rs. 2 crores was claimed by GMB on account of time overrun till the date of appointment of Arbitrators. GMB could not reserve any claim for a period beyond the date of appointment of Arbitrators. 8. Mr. Chakraborty placed the judgment of the learned Single Judge in extenso. He submitted that GMB’s claim in Schedule E to the statement of claim which was a claim for loss or profit in the sum of Rs. 396.96 lacs was entirely speculative and should not have been entertained by the Learned Umpire. The learned Single Judge also erred in allowing part of the said claim. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the entire arbitral award should have been set aside by the learned Single Judge since there was no evidence on record to support even an award for Rs. 2 crores in favour of GMB. Court’s view:- 9. The short question that falls for determination by this Court is whether or not GMB’s claim before the learned Arbitrators/learned Umpire was restricted to Rs. 2 crores. The Learned Umpire held that the scope of the reference was not restricted to time overrun for which approximately Rs. 2 crore was claimed by GMB. Court’s view:- 9. The short question that falls for determination by this Court is whether or not GMB’s claim before the learned Arbitrators/learned Umpire was restricted to Rs. 2 crores. The Learned Umpire held that the scope of the reference was not restricted to time overrun for which approximately Rs. 2 crore was claimed by GMB. Learned Umpire analysed the correspondence exchanged between the parties contemporaneously prior to reference of the disputes to arbitration and came to the conclusion that all the disputes as pleaded in the statement of claim both before and after amendment, had been referred to arbitration. He held that there is no merit in the contention of learned Counsel for Neycer that the only claim that GMB had is the claim of overrun cost of Rs. 2 crores. 10. The Learned Single Judge differed with the Learned Umpire with regard to the aforesaid point. According to the learned Single Judge, GMB’s claim was restricted to Rs. 2 crores. Thus, it is necessary for us to analyse the pre-reference correspondence between the parties to decide whether the learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion as stated above. 11. A letter dated 9 August, 1989 was written by the Managing Director of GMB to the Managing Director of Neycer which reads as follows:- “Dear Sir, On my return from Madras after having discussions with you on 7th and 8th August, 1989, I received your letter dated 30th July, 1989 in regard to Mr. Umatosh Sarkar. As mutually discussed and agreed in our meeting at Madras, we will not offer him employment on our Roll but take his advice to run the show of the factory until you depute a senior technician of general supervisory level to stay at our factory until the optimum level of production is achieved. In order to avoid delay we would be thankful if you inform us whom you are intending to send so that we may discuss with Mr. R. M. Mehra, one of our Board Members to assess the suitability of the person. Since Mr. Mehra was president of your company for many years, it will be very easy for him to judge the suitability and acceptability of such a person as because it is implied that the person you intend to send will be of your company only having all technical knowledge and competency for general supervision. Since Mr. Mehra was president of your company for many years, it will be very easy for him to judge the suitability and acceptability of such a person as because it is implied that the person you intend to send will be of your company only having all technical knowledge and competency for general supervision. As informed to you, we have already come to the stage of trial production and your quick action on the matter will be of great help to us to come out with our production in the market as because the delay is causing a lot of overrun in the form of interest, depreciation and overheads. During our meeting with Mr. Kale, the Managing Director of NCRL on 03.12.88 and 05.12.88 it was decided then also that a senior technician as described above will be deputed immediately but was not deputed with the result that such delay as already been caused to us to come out with the production which we were contemplating sometime around March, 1989 end.” 12. This was followed by a letter dated 28 August, 1989 written by the Managing Director of GMB to the Managing Director of Neycer complaining that with regard to deputing a senior level man for general supervision of setting up of GMB’s factory, the same had still not been done resulting in overrun cost of Rs. 2 crores. It was also stated that with regard to sale assistance, it was not clear about the help that Neycer would extend to GMB and Neycer was requested to inform GMB as to what sales infrastructure Neycer has got and how Neycer intended to assist GMB. 13. In response Neycer wrote a letter dated 29 August, 1989 stating therein that it was in no way responsible for the cost overrun and that Neycer had fulfilled its obligations under the Collaboration Agreement. 14. By a letter dated 4 September, 1989 GMB again complained of nonperformance of Necyer’s obligations under the Collaboration Agreement. The material statements in the said letter are as follows:- “…….. IS IT NOT REALLY VERY SURPRISING THAT A AMAN FOR GENERAL SUPERVISION SHOW YOU HAD AGREED TO BE SENT FOR OUR FACTORY AFTER OUR MEETING ON 3RD AND 5TH DEC., 1988 COULD NOT BE SENT UNTIL NOW. ………. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT YOU WOULD TAKE NECESSARY CARE TO FULFIL YR OBLIGATION AS PER THE COLLABORATION AGREEMENT. IS IT NOT REALLY VERY SURPRISING THAT A AMAN FOR GENERAL SUPERVISION SHOW YOU HAD AGREED TO BE SENT FOR OUR FACTORY AFTER OUR MEETING ON 3RD AND 5TH DEC., 1988 COULD NOT BE SENT UNTIL NOW. ………. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT YOU WOULD TAKE NECESSARY CARE TO FULFIL YR OBLIGATION AS PER THE COLLABORATION AGREEMENT. I THEREFORE STILL STAND ON MY VIEWS THAT THE COST OVERRUN SHOULD DEFINITELY BE CLAIMED FROM YOU BECAUSE IN ABSENCE OF YOUR POSTING A SENIOR LEVEL PERSON FOR OUR GENERAL SUPERVISION OUR PRODUCTION HAS BEEN DELAYED CONSIDERABLY. MOREOVER, Mr. U. SARKAR HAS BEEN COMING WITH A STOP GAP ARRANGMENT AND YOUR OTHER TECHNICIANS COMING TO BALASORE FREQUENTLY HAVE NOT RELINQUISHED YOU FROM THE OBLIGATION FROM PUTTING UP A SENIOR LEVEL PERSON FOR YOUR GENERAL SUPERVSION TO HAVE PROPER CONTROL ON THE DAY TO DAY WORKING. I THEREFORE STILL HOLD NCRL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERRUN…………… WITH REGARD TO SALES ASSISTANCE SINCE YOU DO NOT HAVE ANY SALE INSFRASTCUTURE OF NEYCER AND HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROPOSAL TO US…………………… WE ARE GOING AHEAD ORGANIZING SALES AND HERE ALSO WE FEEL THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PERFOM AS PER CONTRACT AND THEREFORE YOU ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO GET 2 PER CENT COMMISSION AND ALSO FOR CLAIM OF DAMAGE CAUSED TO US……………” 15. This was followed by a letter dated 7 September, 1989 written by Neycer to GMB making counter allegations. It was inter alia stated in the said letter that GMB was entirely responsible for the delay in arrangement of general supervisor. Further, regarding use of brand name GMB would not be entitled to use Neycer’s brand name in view of the numerous breaches made by GMB and obstructions caused in implementation of the contract. In conclusion, it was stated that the best course of action would be to have a meeting to discuss and settle all matters amicably. 16. In response, GMB wrote a letter to Neycer reiterating that the time overrun and other damages had been caused by Neycer’s breach of obligations under the Collaboration Agreement. It was also stated in the said letter that Neycer had failed to perform its obligations under the Collaboration Agreement and therefore, GMB would definitely have a claim against Neycer for time overrun apart from the damages which had been caused to GMB by not providing any sales assistance. It was also stated in the said letter that Neycer had failed to perform its obligations under the Collaboration Agreement and therefore, GMB would definitely have a claim against Neycer for time overrun apart from the damages which had been caused to GMB by not providing any sales assistance. It was further stated in the said letter as follows:- “WHILE OUR CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND OVERRUN IN THIS RESPECT STILL STAND, WE ARE DENINITELY ENTITLED TO USE YOUR BRAND NAME. LASTLY, A STAGE AS COME WHERE WE ARE COMPELLED TO MENTION THAT YOU HAVE ALWAYS ULTERIOR MOTIVE TO SEE HOW GMB DO NOT COME UP FOR WHICH WE HAVE CONVINCED NOTIONS WITH FACTS N FIGURES……..” 17. On 19 September, 1989 Neycer wrote a letter to GMB stating therein inter alia as follows:- “as you are aware, certain disputes have arisen between our company and yourselves regarding the respective rights and obligations under the aforesaid Collaboration Agreement read with the addendum thereto……….from the exchange of such correspondence and your action, including entertaining of an ex-employee or ours, we have to conclude that you are not interested in honouring your commitments under the agreement, but, on the other hand, you only want to secure and utilize the licence which we had agreed to grant you to use our logo as part of the mark of you product for marketing the same. You cannot expect us to grant such a licence in view of your breaches of the Collaboration Agreement and your attempt to claim the right only to the use of the logo as a licensee while giving a go-by to the rest of the agreement……… Inasmuch as the contract between the parties provides for a reference of all disputes to arbitration, we hereby invoke the said clause and we have appointed Retd. Justice P. Rama Rao as one of the Arbitrators and call upon you to nominate an Arbitrator within 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice…………the dispute referred to the said Arbitrators will be the compensation payable to us for the breaches of Collaboration Agreement committed by you and your disentitlement to any licence or permission to use the logo. You are also hereby put on notice that failure on your part to nominate an Arbitrator to decide the said disputes and any other dispute that may be raised between the parties will result in our nominee being nominated as sole arbitrator to proceed with the arbitration ………………….” (emphasis is ours) 18. On 6 October, 1989 GMB wrote a letter to Neycer, the material portion whereof is as follows:- “……….WE WILL HENCEFORTH NOT PUT YOUR BRAND NAME ON OUR WARE. THIS WILL CREATE A LOT OF HURDLES FOR US BUT WE WANT TO MINIMIZE THE AREA OF CONFUSION COMPLICATIONS. REG. OTHER PICTORIAL PREPRESENTATIONS ON STATIONARY WE WILL USE IT UNTIL OUR NEW STATIONARY RE PRINTED, AND WHATEVER WARES HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED SO FAR (WHICH ARE NOT VERY MUCH IN QUANTITY) WE WILL SALE THEM WITH YOUR BRAND NAME UNLESS YOU WANT TO STOP SENDING THE SAME TO MARKET. IN WHICH CASE, THE AMOUNT OF THE SAME WILL HAVE TO BE BORNE BY YOU. NOW THE MATTER BOILS DOWN TO OUR CLAIM FOR OVERRUN AMOUNT ONLY FOR WHICH WE WILL DECIDE ABOUR THE NAME OF ARBITRATOR AND LET YOU KNOW IN DUE COURSE…….” 19. This was followed by a letter dated 19 October 1989 written by GMB to Neycer intimating that GMB had appointed Mr. O. P. Jhunjhunwala, Advocate, as its nominee arbitrator for adjudication of its claim “for over Rs. 2 crore in respect of all our losses sustained and is being sustained by us due to various breaches committed and still being committed by you under the said agreement.” 20. On 24 October, 1989 GMB wrote a letter to Neycer, the material portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:- “………………In spite of assurances and discussions held with your Mr. Kale, erstwhile Managing Director, no support or any action was taken by the new management of your company in spite of our repeated reminders and requests…… In view of non-fulfilment and your breaches, as stated aforesaid, the cost of our projects escalated to abnormal high and we were forced to ask for further financial assistance/loan for overrun of over Rs. Kale, erstwhile Managing Director, no support or any action was taken by the new management of your company in spite of our repeated reminders and requests…… In view of non-fulfilment and your breaches, as stated aforesaid, the cost of our projects escalated to abnormal high and we were forced to ask for further financial assistance/loan for overrun of over Rs. 2 crores from financial institutions; for which you are solely responsible and for such overrun of our project we are claiming from you……… Due to your indifference and non-cooperative attitude, we are unable to set up a proper sale organization for marketing our products, and, as such, we are sustaining huge monetary losses, and we reserve our right to claim all losses sustained and to be sustained by us on account of this obligation…… We agree not to use your brand name in our products reserving our rights to claim all damages and compensations from you without prejudice to our rights and contentions in the matter……. Due to several breaches of the Collaboration Agreement committed by you, we have sustained huge monetary losses and are still sustaining losses ……..” 21. In response, Neycer wrote a letter dated 13 November 1989 dealing with all the allegations made in GMB’s letter dated 24 October, 1989. 22. The claims made by GMB in the statement of claim were on six counts as indicated in Schedules A to F to the statement of claim. The statement of claim was subsequently amended. Amended claims are indicated in Schedules A to F to the amended statement of claim. 22. The claims made by GMB in the statement of claim were on six counts as indicated in Schedules A to F to the statement of claim. The statement of claim was subsequently amended. Amended claims are indicated in Schedules A to F to the amended statement of claim. The heads of claim, original amount claimed, amended amount claimed, award given by Learned Umpire against each claim and the findings of the Learned Single Judge regarding each claim may be conveniently summarised in a Tabular form as follows:- SCHEDULES SCHEDULES Original Statement of Claim Amended Statement of Claim Award given by the Ld Umpire Findings of Learned Single Judge “A” [Damages for delay in commissioning] 60.27 Lakhs 61.52 Lakhs 39.15 Lakhs Sustained “B” [Research & Technology Development Expenditure] 15.00 Lakhs 15.66 lakhs (Disallowed) Not Considered “C” [Damages for preventing GMB to use logo GMB Neycer] 350.00 Lakhs 350.00 Lakhs 203.43 Lakhs GMB not entitled to any sum “D” [Damages for N’s failure, neglect & refusal to set up inter alia sales personnel recruitment & dealer’s network & dealer’s network & guidance for marketing policy] 199.43 Lakhs 123.61 Lakhs 123.61 Lakhs Award for Rs. 123.61 Lakhs granted by Ld Umpire accepted “E” [Damage for loss of profit due to delay of 1 year in achieving optimum production which the Company proposed to obtain by Nov. 1990] 187.22 Lakhs 396.96 Lakhs 346.45 Lakhs Award paseed by Ld Umpire for Rs. 346.45 Lakhs accepted. “F” [Claim for Payment of interest on a/c of delay in commissioning plant] 70.81 Lakhs 770.82 Lakhs 456.99 Lakhs Learned Single Judge did not give any finding as according to the Learned Single Judge the claim of GMB was already satisfied 24. In the award the learned Umpire observed that there can be no doubt that when the terms of reference are clear and specific, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to act beyond the terms of reference. As regards the scope of the reference, i.e., whether it was restricted to GMB’s claim on account of cost overrun or whether it encompassed all the claims made by GMB, in the statement of claim as amended, after analysing the pre-reference correspondence exchanged between the parties which we have adverted to above, the learned Umpire held as follows:- (i) In the instant case, there was no clear or specific reference of disputes. Neither party has produced any letter addressed to the Arbitrator nominated by it referring disputes. The disputes between the parties which were referred to arbitration have to be culled out from the correspondence exchanged between the parties. (ii) The expression ‘overrun amount’ is not specific but very wide. Under the agreement between the parties, the collaborator (Neycer) was required to endeavour to commission GMB’s plant within 18 calendar months from the date of sanction of term loan by financial institutions. (iii) The term loan was sanctioned on 19 May, 1987. Hence, the plant should have been commissioned by 19 November, 1988 which was extended by mutual agreement up to 31 January, 1989. Even by the extended date Neycer failed and neglected to commission the plant which could only be commissioned on 7 December, 1989. Hence, there was a delay of about 11 months in commissioning the plant. During the overrun time period GMB must have incurred overrun costs and suffered damages. The expression ‘overrun amount’ includes within it both costs incurred and damages suffered. (iv) With reference to GMB’s letter dated 19 October, 1989 referred to above, the learned Umpire held that the disputes mentioned in the said letter relate to all losses sustained and were being sustained by GMB due to various breaches committed and still being committed by Neycer. The disputes enumerated in the said letter embraced all claims and disputes as pleaded in the statement of claim including the claim on account of GMB’s deprivation of the use of the brand name or logo. (v) With reference to GMB’s letter dated 24 October, 1989 the learned Umpire held that by the said letter GMB had reserved its right to claim all losses sustained by it on account of breach of Neycer’s obligations under the Collaboration Agreement. (vi) The learned Umpire concluded that all the disputes and claims appearing in the statement of claim, both before and after amendment, had been referred to arbitration. 25. Accordingly, the learned Umpire proceeded to consider each claim of GMB and made his award in respect thereof as would appear from the tabular statement set out above. 26. The learned Single Judge, however, disagreed with the learned Umpire. His Lordship held as follows:- “I have considered the submissions of the learned Sr. Counsels and the relevant documents as well as the Award. The message sent by GMB appointing Mr. 26. The learned Single Judge, however, disagreed with the learned Umpire. His Lordship held as follows:- “I have considered the submissions of the learned Sr. Counsels and the relevant documents as well as the Award. The message sent by GMB appointing Mr. O. P. Jhunjhunwala as its nominee arbitrator for adjudication of claim for over Rs. 2 crores in respect of all the losses sustained and was being sustained by it due to various breaches including those committed and still being committed by Neycer under the agreement. The letter is absolutely clear and specific. There is no scope to put any meaning other than the one that appears from a plain reading of the letter itself. The effort to interpret the words ‘all the losses sustained by GMB’ as embracing all the claims and disputes as pleaded in the claim petition is a rather laboured one. Consequently, it is an error on the face of the Award and an impermissible one. When this message had been sent in October, 1989, the statement of claim was not filed. Therefore, there was absolutely no scope to refer to all the disputes subsequently raised as being covered by the disputes referred to in the earlier letter. .......................... Reading these communications both together and separately, the Court is left with no other alternative but to agree with, even keeping in mind the parameters and scope of restricted interference, the contention of the petitioner that the scope of reference could not be extended beyond what was mentioned in the letter dated October 19, 1989, i.e., Ext. G/71, more so, as it was by this letter that the claimant had appointed its nominee Arbitrator. It is by this letter that the Arbitrator was nominated by the respondent herein for adjudication of their claim for Rs. 2 crores due to various alleged breaches on the part of the petitioner and Rs. 2 crores was quantified as the losses suffered by GMB on all counts. Therefore, there was hardly any scope for the Umpire to exceed the jurisdiction or scope of reference beyond the same. The other claims that the Umpire entertained were obviously outside the scope of the reference and, therefore, beyond his jurisdiction. ......... Thus, from the discussion I hold that claim of the respondent should have been restricted to Rs. 2 crores as the overrun cost. The other claims that the Umpire entertained were obviously outside the scope of the reference and, therefore, beyond his jurisdiction. ......... Thus, from the discussion I hold that claim of the respondent should have been restricted to Rs. 2 crores as the overrun cost. The Umpire exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the claims beyond it........” 27. Thus, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that GMB was not entitled to raise any claim in excess of Rs. 2 crores before the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Judge sustained the learned Umpire’s Award or Rs. 39.15 lacs on account of damages for delay in commissioning GMB’s plant. GMB’s claim of Rs. 15.66 lacs on account of Research and Technology Development expenditure which had been disallowed by the Learned Umpire was not considered by the learned Single Judge. The Learned Umpire’s award of Rs. 203.43 lacs on account of damages for Neycer preventing GMB to use the logo GMB-Neycer was set aside by the learned Single Judge. The Learned Umpire’s award of Rs. 123.61 lacs on account of damages for Neycer’s failure, neglect and refusal to set up, inter alia, sales personnel recruitment and dealers’ network and guidance for marketing policy was upheld by the learned Single Judge. As regards GMB’s claim on account of damages for loss of profit due to delay of one year in achieving optimum production, the learned Umpire had awarded Rs. 346.45 lacs. However, the learned Judge held that the said amount in its entirety cannot be allowed under Schedule E since Rs. 1,62,75,910/- (Rs. 39,14,910+123.61 lacs) has already been allowed under Schedules A and D respectively. ‘Therefore, the remaining portion of the total permissible claim of Rs. 2,00,00,000 minus Rs.1,62,75,910 i.e., Rs. 37,24,090/- is allowed under Schedule E’. Thereafter, the learned Judge went on to hold:- ‘After finding the total amount of damages that can be awarded in favour of the claimant has been satisfied, the other claims need not be gone into.’ 28. Before we proceed further, it may be helpful to recount the law laid down by the Apex Court in relation to an application under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The said Sections are set out hereunder:- “S.30. Grounds for setting aside award. Before we proceed further, it may be helpful to recount the law laid down by the Apex Court in relation to an application under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The said Sections are set out hereunder:- “S.30. Grounds for setting aside award. An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) That an arbitrator or umpire has mis-conducted himself or the proceedings; (b) That an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35; (c)That an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. S. 33. Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.” In the case of Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. -vs.- Union of India AIR 1989 SC 777 , the Apex Court held that when a court is called upon to decide the objections raised by a party against an arbitral award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited, as expressly indicated in the Arbitration Act, and it has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal and examine the correctness of the award on merits. A Court while examining the objections taken to arbitral award is not required to examine the correctness of the claim on merits. It is not open to the Court to examine the correctness of an award on a reappraisal of the evidence. In the case of M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. -vs.- The Govt. Of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 890 , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., speaking for the Division Bench observed that an Arbitrator in deciding a dispute under a contract is surely bound by the contract. However, the court cannot substitute the decision of the arbitrator as to what was meant by the contract, once that decision is conceded to the arbitrator. Of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 890 , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., speaking for the Division Bench observed that an Arbitrator in deciding a dispute under a contract is surely bound by the contract. However, the court cannot substitute the decision of the arbitrator as to what was meant by the contract, once that decision is conceded to the arbitrator. At paragraphs 35 and 36 of the reported judgment it was held as follows:- “35. In the instant case, the High Court seems to have fallen into an error of deciding the question on interpretation of the contract. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error. It may be stated that if on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a possible view through perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court in the manner done by the High Court in the instant case. 36. In light of the above, the High Court, in our opinion, had no jurisdiction to examine the different items awarded clause by clause by the arbitrator and to hold that under the contract these were not sustainable in the facts found by the arbitrator.” In Associated Engineering Co.-vs.-Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 232 , the Apex Court observed that an Arbitrator’s function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. He cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled outside the bounds of the contract he has acted without jurisdiction. But if he has remained inside the parameters of the contract and has construed the provisions of the contract, his award cannot be interfered with unless he has given reasons for the award disclosing an error apparent on the face of it. If the Arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the award, that is an error within its jurisdiction. In the facts of that case, however it was held that the Umpire had out-stepped the confines of the contract and had decided the matter strikingly outside his jurisdiction. If the Arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the award, that is an error within its jurisdiction. In the facts of that case, however it was held that the Umpire had out-stepped the confines of the contract and had decided the matter strikingly outside his jurisdiction. In Paradip Port Trust & Ors.-vs.-Unique Builders, (2001) 2 SCC 680 , the Apex Court observed that from several decisions of the Apex Court and the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is clear that generally an award passed by the Arbitrator is considered binding between the parties for the reason that the parties select the arbitrator and powers of the Court to set aside the award are restricted to cases set out in Sec. 30 of the Act. The jurisdiction of Courts including High Courts is not independent of the statute. The arbitrator’s award is final both on facts as well as law. There is no appeal from his verdict. However, an award can be set aside only in situations specified in Secs. 30 and 33 of the Act. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Annapurna Construction, (2003) 8 SCC 154 , the Apex Court observed, inter alia, that if an arbitrator has travelled beyond the contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction, whereas if he has remained inside the parameters of the contract, his award cannot be questioned on the ground that it contains an error apparent on the face of the record. 29. Let us first take the point of scope of the arbitral reference. It is not in dispute that there was no specific reference of disputes by either of the parties when they nominated their respective Arbitrators. In other words, specific heads and amounts claimed under each head were not enumerated in the letters whereby Arbitrators were nominated. Hence, in our opinion, the learned Umpire rightly held that the disputes that formed the subject matter of the reference would have to be gathered from the pre-reference correspondence exchanged by and between the parties. We have set out the relevant portions of such correspondence in this judgment for the sake of convenience. We have no doubt in our mind that the scope of the reference was not restricted to overrun amount of Rs. 2 crores. We have set out the relevant portions of such correspondence in this judgment for the sake of convenience. We have no doubt in our mind that the scope of the reference was not restricted to overrun amount of Rs. 2 crores. To that extent, we are in disagreement with the learned Single Judge and His Lordship’s finding to that effect is set aside. 30. In our view, all the disputes and differences between the parties were referred to arbitration. This would be clear from Neycer’s letter dated 19 September, 1989 referring ‘the said disputes and any other dispute that may be raised between the parties’ to arbitration. Further, we agree with the learned Umpire that the term ‘overrun amount’ is one of very wide connotation. It would include within its ambit all kinds of loss and damage sustained by an aggrieved party by reason of overrun of a contract caused by breach of obligation of the other party to a contract. As aforesaid, the way we read the pre-reference correspondence exchanged between the parties is different from the way in which the learned Judge read the same. Our reading is the same as that of the learned Umpire. Further, the way in which the learned Umpire construed the correspondence between the parties, cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary or unreasonable. It is surely a plausible manner of reading the correspondence between the parties as a whole. It is trite law that so long as the meaning given by an Arbitrator/Umpire to a document or a series of documents is a plausible one, the Court will not interfere and substitute such meaning with its own understanding of such documents even if the Court differs from the Arbitrator or Umpire. The Court in exercise of an application under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not act as an Appellate Court. 31. Although a point was taken by Neycer in the pleadings filed by it before the Arbitral Tribunal that GMB’s claim in excess of Rs. 2 crores is not within the scope of the reference, Neycer resisted the entire claim raised by GMB on merits by adducing evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal. Having contested all the claims raised by GMB on merits, in our view, it is not open to Neycer to contend that GMB’s claim was restricted to Rs. Crores. 32. 2 crores is not within the scope of the reference, Neycer resisted the entire claim raised by GMB on merits by adducing evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal. Having contested all the claims raised by GMB on merits, in our view, it is not open to Neycer to contend that GMB’s claim was restricted to Rs. Crores. 32. Hence, we are of the firm view that there was no reason for the learned Judge to restrict the award under Schedule E to Rs. 37,34,090/- while in principle upholding the learned Umpire’s award of Rs. 346.45 lacs on that count. 33. We also find no justification in the learned Judge disallowing the learned Umpire’s award of Rs. 203.43 lacs on account of damages for preventing GMB to use the logo GMB-Neycer. The learned Umpire has discussed the said claim in great details and analysed the evidence, both oral and documentary in respect of the said claim with great care. A Court hearing an application for setting aside an arbitral award does not have the power to reappraise the evidence before the Arbitrator/Umpire. So long as there is some evidence on the basis of which an award has been made, the Court shall not go in the sufficiency or otherwise of such evidence. Only if an award is based on no evidence at all, the court would be justified in interfering. We have carefully gone through the award of the learned Umpire and we are of the considered view that the same is supported by evidence. It is not for the court to enquire into the veracity or adequacy of such evidence. 34. Mr. Deb relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Juggilal Kamlapat-vs.-N. V. Internationale Crediet-En-Handels Vereeninging ‘Rotterdam’ (alias Rotterdam Trading Co Ltd.), (supra). It was held in that case that where no specific sum is claimed and the particulars of the claim are not given in the statement of claim the arbitrators may be guilty of misconduct if they make an award for a definite sum of money without calling for particulars of the claim and without giving opportunity to the other party to meet the specific case. In that case the petitioner who was challenging the arbitral award before the High Court had contended that there was no pre-existing dispute with regard to the quantum of damage prior to the date of reference before the arbitral Tribunal and the Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to decide the quantum of damage. Such contention was negated by the Learned Judge. It was held that the correspondence exchanged between the parties prior to the reference showed that there was a dispute between the parties with regard to breach of contract and consequently damages. The jurisdiction of the Arbitrator was therefore attracted and the Arbitrator was competent to assess the damages. The claim for a definite sum of money is not a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Indeed, on a general submission the Arbitrator could determine and assess even prospective damages arising after the date of the submission. 35. In State of Orissa -vs.- Asis Ranjan Mohanty (supra), it was held that if subsequent claims raised by the claimant pertain to the disputes which were in existence at the time when the arbitration clause was invoked and were within the scope of arbitration clause and reference, the same can be raised. Additional claims raised by the claimant subsequently could be considered by the Arbitrator. 36. These two decisions support the view we have taken regarding arbitrability of all the disputes and claims raised by GMB in the arbitration proceeding. 37. In view of the aforesaid, we find no reason to interfere with the award of the Learned Umpire. Mr. Chakraborty, Learned Sr. Counsel, appearing for Neycer argued in his appeal that even the sum of Rs. 2 crores should not have been sustained by the learned Single Judge as there was no evidence to support such claim. We are unable to accept such submission as we have already indicated that in our view the learned Umpire’s award cannot be said to be based on no evidence. 38. No case has been made out by Neycer that the Learned Umpire mis-conducted himself or the arbitral proceedings or that the Arbitral Award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. No ground for interference with the Award has been made out. 39. In the result, GMB’s appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order is set aside to the extent it interferes with the award of the Ld. Umpire. No ground for interference with the Award has been made out. 39. In the result, GMB’s appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order is set aside to the extent it interferes with the award of the Ld. Umpire. The Ld. Umpire’s award is upheld. Neycer’s appeal stands dismissed. 40. APO 34 of 2016 and APOT 42 of 2016 are accordingly disposed of. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 41. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities. Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. - I Agree. Later: After the judgment is delivered, prayer is made on behalf of Neycer for stay of operation of this judgment and order for a period of three weeks. To give an opportunity to Neycer to approach the higher forum, let the operation of this judgment and order remain stayed for a period of three weeks from date.