ORDER : M.K. HANJURA, J. 1. These two petitions raise akin and analogous issues and have, therefore, been clubbed together for determination and decision. At the threshold, the facts, as these emerge from the study of both the petitions, require to be delineated. 561-A No. 298/2017: 2. This petition, filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the order dated 16th of June, 2016, of the Court of the learned City Munsiff, Srinagar, passed in a criminal complaint bearing File No. 382/A titled 'Gulzar Enterprises v. Manzoor Ahmad Burza'. 3. The case of the petitioner is that by an order dated 16th of June, 2016, the Court of learned City Munsiff, Srinagar, has taken cognizance of a time barred complaint for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" read with Section 420 of the RPC and, accordingly, issued process against the petitioner. The petitioner is aggrieved of the aforesaid order dated 16th of June, 2016 and the proceedings initiated thereunder on the grounds, inter alia, that the learned trial Court has not conducted any enquiry as required under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance of a time barred complaint. The attestation of the Affidavit is not in accordance with the law and, as such, liable to be discarded. There is nothing on record to spell out the cause of delay nor has the statement of the learned counsel been recorded to inspire confidence for accepting the explanation offered to condone the delay. The order impugned has been passed in a most perfunctory manner, and from the contours of the order, it becomes manifest that delay has been condoned after taking cognizance of the complaint. The contents of the complaint and the statement of complainant have conjointly been adopted for taking cognizance without holding any separate enquiry before condoning delay. The compliant has been filed through counsel and no personal knowledge or awareness about the facts is narrated in the memo of complaint. The trial Court has failed to record any satisfaction about the competence of the counsel to file the complaint on behalf of complainant. The complaint is not filed by the complainant purporting to be the payee nor any power of attorney authorizing the counsel to frame and present the complaint has been relied upon for taking cognizance of complaint. The trial Court has failed to record any satisfaction about the competence of the counsel to file the complaint on behalf of complainant. The complaint is not filed by the complainant purporting to be the payee nor any power of attorney authorizing the counsel to frame and present the complaint has been relied upon for taking cognizance of complaint. The cheques are not shown to be issued towards the liquidation of debt or liability, but shown as having arisen as a result of an un-matured deal regarding the sale of land. There is no determined liability in furtherance of which the cheque is shown to have be issued by the petitioner. Since the matter related to commercial transaction, as such, it was imperative to conduct an enquiry before issuing process against the petitioner. A severe miscarriage of justice has been caused by issuing process against the petitioner in absence of prior enquiry. The offence under Section 420 RPC cannot be tried together with Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act. In this regard, it is stated that the contractual relationship is admitted and it is only the cheques which are alleged to be dishonored. Since no predisposition is shown to have been existing towards the development of contractual relationship before the breach occasioned in the performance of obligations, therefore, as stated, the learned trial Court has erred in taking cognizance for the offence under Section 420 RPC, where dishonest intention is the motivation for inducement. The alleged dishonor of each cheque drawn on different dates constitutes separate offence and by operation of Section 234 Cr. P.C., only three offences within a period of one year can be tried together. The instant case involves four number of cheques of different dates. The bar created under Section 234 of the Code, renders, the proceedings liable to be quashed. The respondent has suppressed the material facts and has tried to mobilize prosecution to enforce an illusory liability. It is stated that it was contemplated to purchase land at Jammu belonging to one Mr. Sunil Kumar Thusoo and a substantial amount was credited into his account. However, the vendor committed a breach in respect of which enquiry is pending before the Crime Branch/Vigilance Organization and the respondent has also participated in the enquiry. It is stated that it was contemplated to purchase land at Jammu belonging to one Mr. Sunil Kumar Thusoo and a substantial amount was credited into his account. However, the vendor committed a breach in respect of which enquiry is pending before the Crime Branch/Vigilance Organization and the respondent has also participated in the enquiry. Incidentally, the deal to purchase the land at Khanmoh for the brother of petitioner also could not materialize and under compelling circumstance the seven post-dated cheques were procured from the petitioner for being drawn in the name of M/s. Gulzar Enterprises (Respondent herein). The petitioner has not received any amount from the respondent, but money has been remitted to the vendor instead of petitioner. There is no settled amount which the petitioner has owned to liquidate, but under duress, the cheques were obtained by the respondent. Since the cheques have not been drawn to liquidate a lawfully recoverable debt or liability, as such, the complaint is not maintainable. 561-A No. 304/2017. 4. This petition, filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the order dated 22nd of June, 2016, of the Court of learned Sub-Judge/Special Mobile Magistrate, Srinagar, passed in criminal complaint bearing File No. 17/A titled 'Gulzar Enterprises v. Manzoor Ahmad Burza'. 5. The case of the petitioner, herein this petition, is that by order dated 22nd of June, 2016, the Court of learned Sub-Judge/Special Mobile Magistrate, Srinagar, has taken cognizance of an offence under section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act reads with Section 420 RPC and, accordingly, issued process against the petitioner. The petitioner is aggrieved of the aforesaid order dated 22nd of June, 2016 and the proceedings initiated thereunder on the grounds, inter alia, that the learned trial Court has not conducted any enquiry as required under Section 200 and 202 of the Cr. P.C. before taking cognizance of offence involving commercial transaction. The order impugned has been passed in a most perfunctory manner. The compliant has been filed through counsel and no personal knowledge or awareness about the facts is narrated in the memo of complaint; that the trial Court has failed to record any satisfaction about the competence of the counsel to file the complaint on behalf of complainant. The order impugned has been passed in a most perfunctory manner. The compliant has been filed through counsel and no personal knowledge or awareness about the facts is narrated in the memo of complaint; that the trial Court has failed to record any satisfaction about the competence of the counsel to file the complaint on behalf of complainant. The complaint is not filed by the complainant purporting to be the payee nor any power of attorney authorizing the counsel to frame and present the complaint has been relied upon for taking cognizance of complaint. The cheques are not shown to be issued towards the liquidation of debt or liability, but shown to have arisen as a result of an un-matured deal regarding sale of land. There is no determined liability in furtherance of which the cheque is shown to have been issued by the petitioner. Since the matter related to commercial transaction, as such, it was imperative to conduct enquiry before issuing process against the petitioner. The offence under Section 420 RPC cannot be tried together with Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act. In this regard, it is stated that the contractual relationship is admitted and it is only the cheques which are alleged to be dishonored. Since no predisposition is shown existing towards the development of contractual relationship before the breach occasioned in the performance of obligations, therefore, the learned trial Court has erred in taking cognizance of the complaint. Such ingredients are absent as per the contents of complaint, therefore, the cognizance suffers material illegality, as such, the complaint needs to be rejected and the order impugned liable to be quashed. The alleged dishonor of each cheque drawn on different dates constitutes separate offence, as such, cannot be tried together especially when cheating is alleged to be exercised while extending cheques on different dates, therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The respondent has suppressed the material facts and has tried to mobilize prosecution to enforce an illusory liability. It is stated that it was contemplated to purchase land at Jammu belonging to one Mr. Sunil Kumar Thusoo and a substantial amount was credited into his account, however, the vendor committed breach in respect of which enquiry is pending before the Crime Branch/Vigilance Organization and the respondent has also participated in the enquiry. It is stated that it was contemplated to purchase land at Jammu belonging to one Mr. Sunil Kumar Thusoo and a substantial amount was credited into his account, however, the vendor committed breach in respect of which enquiry is pending before the Crime Branch/Vigilance Organization and the respondent has also participated in the enquiry. Incidentally, the deal for purchase of land at Khanmoh for the brother of the petitioner also could not materialize and under compelling circumstance the seven postdated cheques were procured from the petitioner for being drawn in the name of M/s. Gulzar Enterprises (Respondent herein). The petitioner has not received any amount from the respondent, but money has been remitted to the vendor instead of the petitioner. There is no settled amount which the petitioner has owned to liquidate, but, under duress, the cheques were obtained by the respondent, since the cheques have not been drawn to liquidate a lawfully recoverable debt or liability, as such, the complaint is not maintainable. 6. Heard and considered. 7. The rider added to Section 138(C) of the Act provides as under:- Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of three months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within fifteen days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 8. The law is that a complaint under section 138 of the Act must contain the following ingredients, viz. (i) that there is a legally enforceable debt; (ii) that the cheque was drawn from account of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre-supposes a legally enforceable debt; (iii) cheque so issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds. (i) that there is a legally enforceable debt; (ii) that the cheque was drawn from account of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre-supposes a legally enforceable debt; (iii) cheque so issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds. In Section 138 of the Act, the Legislature has clearly stated that for the dishonored cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not met within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under section 138 of the Act will cease and for the recovery of other demands as compensation costs, interest etc., a civil proceedings will lie. Therefore, if in a notice any other sum is indicated in addition to the "said amount" the notice cannot be faulted. 9. The petitioner has taken number of grounds to knock the bottom out of the orders passed in the two complaints by which cognizance has been taken. The main plank of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the trial Magistrate has condoned the delay in filing the complaint in a rough shod manner without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard which is dehors the law. 10. Clause B of Section 142 provides that the complaint has to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (C) added to the proviso to Section 138. It also provides that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. 11. On the face of the provision cited above it is lucid, loud and clear that the complaint has to be filed within a month of the date on which the cause of action arises. 11. On the face of the provision cited above it is lucid, loud and clear that the complaint has to be filed within a month of the date on which the cause of action arises. Under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the cause of action arises when the drawer of the cheque fails to the amount incorporated therein to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice subject to the rider that if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had a sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the time, the cognizance of the complaint can be taken even after the prescribed period. 12. To appreciate the above aspect in the right perspective, the relevant extracts of the order of the trial Court passed in file No. 382-A require to be scanned and analyzed in the present case and these read as under:- "In the present case the cheques have been dishonored on 11.04.2016 and 15.04.2016 under clauses (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, after the dishonor of the cheques the payee or holder is required to make demand for payment by giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque on the return of the cheque as unpaid. In the present case it is apparent from the notice on record that the notice dated 19.04.2016 was given by the complainant to the accused within the time prescribed under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. Under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, 15 days time is given to the accused for making the payment after receipt of notice, however, no payment was made within 15 days. The complaint has been presented on 16.06.2016. Thus the complaint has been presented beyond the limitation period as such is barred by limitation. Under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, 15 days time is given to the accused for making the payment after receipt of notice, however, no payment was made within 15 days. The complaint has been presented on 16.06.2016. Thus the complaint has been presented beyond the limitation period as such is barred by limitation. The complainant/applicant has averred in the instant application that after issuance of notice on 19.04.2016 the non-applicant/accused did not make the payment of the cheque amount and he could not file the complaint within the statutory period because of the circumstances that the counsel to whom he had handed over the cheques and other documents had misplaced the same due to which he could not file the instant complaint within the statutory period of time as prescribed by the provisions of 138 N.I. Act. The ld. Counsel has relied on the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in 2012 (2) Crimes 502 (J & K) titled "Sushant Bakshi Vs. Manju Ghosh" wherein the Hon'ble high Court of J & K has held that therefore, the issue as to whether or not there was sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the prescribed period of limitation, is a matter essentially between the complainant and the court, and if satisfied, on whatsoever material the complainant may place before the court as to the existence of sufficient cause contemplated by the proviso, the court may take cognizance of the complaint and thereafter deciding on merits, decide on the issuance of otherwise of process against the accused. Thus the cause shown by the applicant/complainant is sufficient and therefore the delay caused is condoned. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case the offence under section 138 N.I. Act is prima facie made out against the accused person. As such the cognizance against the accused for commission of offence under section 138 N.I. Act r/w 420 RPC is taken. Office is directed to issue summons to the accused person for appearance and put up on 18.7.2016." 13. The Ld. Magistrate after putting explicit reliance on the law laid down in the case of "Sushant Bakshi Vs. As such the cognizance against the accused for commission of offence under section 138 N.I. Act r/w 420 RPC is taken. Office is directed to issue summons to the accused person for appearance and put up on 18.7.2016." 13. The Ld. Magistrate after putting explicit reliance on the law laid down in the case of "Sushant Bakshi Vs. Manju Ghosh" reported in 2012 (2) Crimes 502 J & K came to the conclusion that the issue of limitation is a matter essentially between the complainant and the court and accordingly condoned the delay in filing the complaint. The Judgment of law on which reliance has been put by the learned Magistrate is lucid and clear. The court after distinguishing the facts and the law laid down in Vinayak Dongir case on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon in carving out a case in his favour held that the law evolved in that case does not apply in an eventuality like the present one. It will be profitable to reproduce the relevant extracts of the Judgment herein below:- 10. Referring to an earlier decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and Ors., reported as (1995) 1 SCC 42 , Honble Supreme Court of India, observed in P.K. Choudhury vs. Commander, 48 BRTF(GREF), reported as 2008 (2) Criminal Court Cases, 126 (S.C.) as follows:- 11. "In view of the aforesaid decision, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that appellant was entitled to get an opportunity of being heard before the delay could be condoned." 12. As the Honble Supreme Court of India has not dealt with and ruled on the issue that falls for determination in this case, in P.K. Choudhurys case (supra) and had observed as referred to hereinabove, on the basis of what was said in Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongres case (supra), so what was held in Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongres case needs to be noticed to find answer to the issue. 13. I would, therefore, refer to what was said by their lordships in Vinayak Dongres case. It reads thus:- "In our view, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the delay, if any, for launching the prosecution, could not have been condoned without notice to the respondents and behind their back and without recording any reasons for condonation of the delay. It reads thus:- "In our view, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the delay, if any, for launching the prosecution, could not have been condoned without notice to the respondents and behind their back and without recording any reasons for condonation of the delay. However, having come to that conclusion, it would have been appropriate for the High Court, without going into the merits of the case to have remitted the case to the trial court, with a direction to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh after hearing both sides. The High Court however did not adopt that course and proceeded further to hold that the trial court could not have taken cognizance of the offence in view of the application filed by the prosecution seeking permission of the Court to file a supplementary charge sheet on the basis of an incomplete charge-sheet and quashed the order of the CJM dated 21.11.1986 on this ground also. This view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case is patently erroneous." 14. Perusal of the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinayak Dongres case, reveals that the judgment was delivered by the Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the question of law that needs determination in this case had not fallen for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The contentions, which have been raised by the learned counsel for the parties in this case, were not the contentions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner may not, therefore, be relevant to determine the issue canvassed at the Bar. 15. Thus getting no support from the judgments referred to above, the issue needs to be determined on its own merit. 16. Before dealing with the issue in question, another ancillary issue too would need consideration viz. whether taking cognizance of a Complaint, barred by time, without hearing the accused, violates the principles of Natural Justice. 17. To deal with the issue, regard needs to be had to the provisions of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It reads thus:- "[142. Before dealing with the issue in question, another ancillary issue too would need consideration viz. whether taking cognizance of a Complaint, barred by time, without hearing the accused, violates the principles of Natural Justice. 17. To deal with the issue, regard needs to be had to the provisions of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It reads thus:- "[142. Cognizance of offence -- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause-of-action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (c) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.] 18. A plain reading of the proviso appended to Section 142(b) of the Act may not contemplate affording opportunity of hearing to an accused before taking cognizance of a Complaint for commission of the offence contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of the Act, in a Complaint made after the period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Act. 19. All that the proviso indicates is that the Complainant is required to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the Complaint within the prescribed period. 20. Therefore, the issue as to whether or not there was sufficient cause for not making the Complaint within the prescribed period of limitation, is a matter essentially between the Complainant and the Court, and if satisfied, on whatsoever material the Complainant may place before the Court as to the existence of sufficient cause contemplated by the proviso, the Court may take cognizance of the Complaint and thereafter deciding on merits, decide on the issuance or otherwise of process against the accused. 21. 21. Hearing the accused before taking cognizance of a Complaint on a question as to whether or not delay merited condonation does not appear to have been intended by the legislature. This is additionally so because taking cognizance on a time barred Complaint, may not, as such, offend any such right of the accused for which opportunity of hearing to him may be conceived, in law. 22. Even otherwise the purpose of providing for a speedier remedy against dishonoured cheques, would loose its efficacy, in case, the accused were to be heard before taking cognizance of a Complaint, for such a course would lead to a full-fledged enquiry before the issue of process, which may frustrate the very purpose for which Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been incorporated as penal offence for dishonour of cheques. 23. Not only that, the position in law being settled that an accused is not entitled to hearing before issuance of process, no opportunity of hearing to him at a stage prior thereto may be conceived of. Yet another reason which justifies the above view is that an accused does not come into picture unless the process was issued against him and even after the issuance of process, he has no right to question the legality or otherwise of the process issued by the Court, before the Magistrate, unless the case reaches the stage, where he would be required to enter upon the defence. It is at this stage that he would be at liberty to take all such defences, as may be available to him to defeat his prosecution and punishment. While dealing with cases under the Penal Laws, the procedure prescribed for the trial thereof, takes care of the principles of Natural Justice and no further additional right, not contemplated by the procedure, may, therefore, be warranted, for such a course would amount to rewriting the procedure prescribed by law for trial of the Penal offences. 24. For all what has been said above, it, therefore, becomes apparent that the law may not contemplate hearing an accused before taking cognizance or issuance of process against him. 25. 24. For all what has been said above, it, therefore, becomes apparent that the law may not contemplate hearing an accused before taking cognizance or issuance of process against him. 25. Therefore, with utmost respect to the views expressed by the other High Courts of the Country, decision whereof were referred to by the petitioners learned counsel, I have not been able to subscribe to the view that refusal to provide opportunity of hearing to an accused in a time barred Complaint before entertaining the Complaint and issuance of process offends the principles of Natural Justice. This is so because opportunity of hearing may not be conceived for each and every action against the opposite party. Such an opportunity may be required only when non-affording of opportunity would violate any existing right of the person sought to be proceeded against. The right of Personal Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India may be curtailed by the procedure prescribed by law. The procedure already in vogue, takes care of the right of Personal liberty of the accused and in this view of the matter when Section 142 of the Act, does not in terms contemplate hearing to an accused before taking cognizance of a time barred Complaint, no additional right of hearing may be conceded to the accused. 26. It is, therefore, held that the accused is not entitled to hearing before a Court may consider taking cognizance of a time barred Complaint for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 27. The submissions made by the petitioners learned counsel are, therefore, found untenable, hence rejected. This would not, however, mean that time barred Complaints can be entertained as a matter of course and without complying with the provisions of the proviso appended to Section 142(b) of the Act, which, in unambiguous terms, requires the Court to record satisfaction that the complainant had sufficient cause for not making the Complaint within the period prescribed under Section 142. 28. The satisfaction contemplated by the proviso is not an idle formality and the Court taking cognizance has to specifically say, opening its mind and spelling out reasons to support its view as to whether or not the complainant had succeeded in making out sufficient cause, which had disabled him/her to file the Complaint within the prescribed period. 29. 28. The satisfaction contemplated by the proviso is not an idle formality and the Court taking cognizance has to specifically say, opening its mind and spelling out reasons to support its view as to whether or not the complainant had succeeded in making out sufficient cause, which had disabled him/her to file the Complaint within the prescribed period. 29. Keeping the above legal position in view, I would now proceed to examine as to whether or not the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate's order was sustainable. Perusal of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrates order reveals that neither has he hinted at condoning the delay in filing the Complaint nor has he spelt out any reason justifying condonation of delay in filing the Complaint in his order, although the complainant had indicated reasons that had delayed the filing of the Complaint. 30. While entertaining a time barred Complaint, the Court is required to consider the complainant's request in the light of his/her statement on oath and any other material placed by him/her on records, before considering on entertaining or otherwise of the Complaint and issuance of process against the accused. 31. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has not complied with the requirement of the proviso appended to Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and thus, erred in passing a mechanical order of issuing process against the petitioner without applying his mind on the complainants plea seeking condonation of delay in filing the Complaint. 14. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the facts of the instant case, the learned Magistrate has not made even a murmur in the order aforesaid to describe the events on the basis of which he came to the conclusion that there is a sufficient cause to condone the delay except for stating that the issue of limitation as contemplated and provided by the proviso added to section 142 of Negotiable Instrument Act is essentially a matter between the court and the complainant. He has passed a mechanical order without stating as to what was the material before him on the basis of which he derived satisfaction to condone the delay in filing the complaint. The satisfaction contemplated by the proviso is not an ideal formality but requires an application of mind spelling out the need to direct the condonation of delay. He has passed a mechanical order without stating as to what was the material before him on the basis of which he derived satisfaction to condone the delay in filing the complaint. The satisfaction contemplated by the proviso is not an ideal formality but requires an application of mind spelling out the need to direct the condonation of delay. The material on record has to be scanned, assessed and analyzed so as to find out whether the complainant has, or has not, a sufficient cause for not knocking at the portals of the Court within the period stipulated under section 142 Negotiable Instrument Act, which has not been done in the instant case. Therefore, it can be said that in unambiguous terms that the learned Magistrate has failed to pass the order in tune and in line with the mandate of the proviso added to Section 142 of Negotiable Instrument Act. The order impugned on the face of it is an example of per in-curium attitude of dealing with the matter. 15. Viewed in the above context the petition of the petitioner, succeeds and accordingly the order dated 16.06.2016 passed by Ld. Magistrate City Munsiff, Srinagar is set aside. The record of the trial court be sent back to the learned Magistrate who shall proceed further in the matter in accordance with the law and decide the application seeking the condonation of delay by a speaking order. Nothing said herein before shall, however, be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. As far as the other pleas raised in the petition these can be agitated before the Court below in case the Court decides and settles that the delay in making the complaint can be condoned. 16. As regards the other complaint bearing No. 17/A, no irregularity appears to have creeped in passing the order impugned. The contention of the petitioner that the complaint has been filed by the counsel and not by the complainant is not borne out from the perusal of the material on record. The complaint has been signed both by the petitioner as well as his counsel and, therefore, the order passed by the trial Court in it does not call for any interference. The complaint has been signed both by the petitioner as well as his counsel and, therefore, the order passed by the trial Court in it does not call for any interference. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ingredients of the offence U/s. 420 RPC are different and distinct to Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act can be looked into by the trial Court at the appropriate stage.