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2018 DIGILAW 713 (GUJ)

Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. State Of Gujarat

2018-05-10

R.SUBHASH REDDY, VIPUL M.PANCHOLI

body2018
JUDGMENT & ORDER : VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J. 1. This appeal is filed under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent against the oral judgment dated 26.04.2017 rendered by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.1577 of 2017 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition. 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are as under: 2.1 It is the case of the petitioner that he came to be elected as Chairman in the elections of Mehsana District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the Union") in the year 2008. During the period between 2008 to 2011, he discharged his duties diligently. Thereafter, again he came to be elected as Chairman of the Union in the year 2011. However, from 2013 onwards because of the political pressure of the party in power, the State machinery initiated various proceedings against the petitioner and other committee members of the Union by issuing notices under various provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for short) . The petitioner has referred various litigations filed by him and/or by the committee members of the Union against the respondent State Government in the memo of the petition. Relying upon the said proceedings, it is alleged that the respondent authorities have initiated the proceedings in colourable exercise of powers. 2.2 It is further the case of the petitioner that when he was acting as a Chairman of the Union in the year 2013, a request was made by the Mahanand Dairy, Maharashtra to supply the cattle feed to the drought affected areas of Maharashtra. The Members of the Managing Committee of the Union passed the resolution in the meeting dated 29.04.2013 to supply the cattle feed. Accordingly, the same was supplied to the concerned dairy, which was received by the cattle camps in Maharashtra. However, there was non-payment of the said supply which was in the form of relief. It is stated that the respondent authorities considered it a loss to the society and initiated various proceedings for the same. Respondent No.2 directed the District Registrar to file a criminal complaint for the said loss caused to the Union and, therefore, the FIR being C.R. No.I-18 of 2014 came to be registered against the petitioner. It is stated that the respondent authorities considered it a loss to the society and initiated various proceedings for the same. Respondent No.2 directed the District Registrar to file a criminal complaint for the said loss caused to the Union and, therefore, the FIR being C.R. No.I-18 of 2014 came to be registered against the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, has filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code" for short) , before this Court for quashing and setting aside the said FIR. It is further stated that the District Registrar has filed another complaint being C.R. No.I-214 of 2015 with regard to the purchase of the sugar, against which, the petitioner has also filed Criminal Misc. Application No.20342 of 2015 under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the said FIR. It is stated that yet another FIR being C.R. No.I-263 of 2015 is filed against the petitioner in connection with the loss of stock in the Jagudan cattle feed plant. The petitioner, therefore, filed Special Criminal Application No.6597 of 2015 for quashing of the said FIR. It is stated that in the aforesaid proceedings filed before this Court, this Court has granted protection to the petitioner. 2.3 It is the grievance of the petitioner that for the same issue, for which criminal proceedings are initiated against the petitioner, respondent No.3 has initiated the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act by issuing the impugned Show-cause Notice dated 13.06.2016 and by the impugned order dated 13.01.2017. 2.3 It is the grievance of the petitioner that for the same issue, for which criminal proceedings are initiated against the petitioner, respondent No.3 has initiated the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act by issuing the impugned Show-cause Notice dated 13.06.2016 and by the impugned order dated 13.01.2017. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the captioned petition in which the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) That this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to admit and allow the petition; (B) That this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside impugned order dated 13.01.2017 at Annexure-A. (C) That this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside show cause notice dated 13.06.2016 issued by respondent no.2 u.s. 93 at Annexure-B. (D) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to stay the implementation and execution of the order dated 13.01.2017 at Annexure-A in all manner, pending hearing till final disposal of the present petition. (E) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant ad interim relief in terms of above mentioned clause (D), in the interest of justice. (F) That this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to pass such other and further order as the nature and circumstances of the case may require;" 2.4 The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dismissed the petition and, therefore, the present appeal is filed by the appellant original petitioner. 3. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr.Mihir Thakore assisted by learned advocate Mr.C.P. Champaneri for the appellant original petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General Mr.P.K. Jani assisted by learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani for the respondents. 4. Learned counsel Mr.Thakore mainly raised the following contentions: 4.1 That the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order passed by the respondent authorities be quashed and set aside as the respondent authorities have initiated the proceedings under the political pressure and it is nothing but a colourable exercise of powers. K.M. Antani for the respondents. 4. Learned counsel Mr.Thakore mainly raised the following contentions: 4.1 That the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order passed by the respondent authorities be quashed and set aside as the respondent authorities have initiated the proceedings under the political pressure and it is nothing but a colourable exercise of powers. 4.2 The proceedings under Section 93 of the Act can be invoked only when in the course of or as a result of an audit under Section 84, or an inspection under Section 84(8) or an inquiry under Section 86, or an inspection under Section 87 or Section 88, or the winding up of the society, if the Registrar is satisfied on the basis of the Report made by the auditor or the person authorised to make inquiry under the relevant provisions. In the present case, there is no audit under Section 84 or inspection or inquiry under section 86 or liquidation under Section 110 of the Act and, therefore, the initiation of proceedings under Section 93 of the Act is without jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge, therefore, ought to have quashed and set aside the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order passed by the respondent authorities. 4.3 When three different FIRs are registered against the petitioner for all the three issues referred in the Show-cause Notice and when the petitions filed for quashing of the FIRs are pending before this Court and when this Court has granted protection in favour of the petitioner, the respondent authorities could not have initiated the impugned proceedings against the petitioner. 4.4 The impugned Show-cause Notice is issued apparently to cause serious prejudice to the rights of the present appellant in pending proceedings initiated by the District Registrar, Patan and Mehsana. The petitioner is removed from the post of Chairman of the Union under Section 76(B) (1) of the Act and is disqualified to hold the post for a further period, which is challenged by him. The proceedings are pending before the Honourable Supreme Court and, therefore, respondent No.2 issued the Show-cause Notice with malafide intention and ulterior motive. 4.5 The proceedings under Section 93 can be initiated only after the proved misconduct, misfeasance, misapplication and unlawful retention or misappropriation against any member or officer and not otherwise. The proceedings are pending before the Honourable Supreme Court and, therefore, respondent No.2 issued the Show-cause Notice with malafide intention and ulterior motive. 4.5 The proceedings under Section 93 can be initiated only after the proved misconduct, misfeasance, misapplication and unlawful retention or misappropriation against any member or officer and not otherwise. The allegations in the impugned Show-cause Notice are mere allegations, not based on adjudication, trial or conclusion based on evidence and, therefore, no proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner to held inquiry under Section 93 of the Act. 4.6 Respondent No.2 while issuing the impugned Show-cause Notice has placed reliance upon two reports. The first report is for the period between 01.04.2014 to 31.03.2015 prepared by the Auditor and second report is dated 05.10.2015 of Special Auditor (Milk), Mehsana. Both these reports are not relevant for the three issues enumerated in the Show-cause Notice and, therefore, in none of the reports, any of the competent authorities suggested that the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act be instituted/initiated. 4.7 The issues referred in the Show-cause Notice are actions of Managing Committee of the Union, in which, necessary resolutions have been passed in the meeting. The same has been approved by the General Board of the Union. Therefore, it becomes a collective decision. Thus, for the collective decision, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. 4.8 It is submitted that so far as issue No.1 of the Show-cause Notice i.e. for supply of cattle feed to the Maharashtra is concerned, letter was received from Maharashtra to supply the cattle feed to the drought affected areas in the State of Maharashtra. The Resolution was passed by the Union on 29.04.2013 and, thereafter, supply was made during the period between April to June, 2013. The Union, thereafter, sent a debit note to the Federation. However, the Federation returned the said debit note to the Union. The Union has also sent the debit note to the concerned authority situated at Maharashtra. However, the amount is not received. It is submitted that it is not the case of the respondents that the cattle feed was not at all supplied to the State of Maharashtra and, therefore, when the decision was taken by the Committee in good faith, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. However, the amount is not received. It is submitted that it is not the case of the respondents that the cattle feed was not at all supplied to the State of Maharashtra and, therefore, when the decision was taken by the Committee in good faith, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. 4.9 For issue No.2 of the Show-cause Notice, it is submitted that there is no audit report for the said issue and for verification of stocks, there is no inspection or inquiry. At this stage, it is further submitted that for issue No.2 in the Show-cause Notice itself, finding is recorded by the respondent authorities that the petitioner has permanently misappropriated the amount of Rs.2, 06, 91, 904/-. Thus, it is nothing but a predetermined decision of the respondent authorities, which is not permissible. The petitioner was a Chairman and Member of the Managing Committee of the Union upto 31.03.2015. However, the physical verification of the stock was made on 03.04.2015. On 13.04.2015, a custodian was appointed and, thereafter, in June, 2015 Custodial Committee was appointed. Thereafter, on 15.09.2015, the physical verification of the stock was made, in which, again it is alleged that certain deficiency of stock was found. Thus, for the said deficit, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. 4.10 With regard to issue No.3 of the Show-cause Notice, it is contended that it is alleged in the Show-cause Notice that the petitioner Union has purchased the sugar at a higher rate from the concerned suppliers. During the period between 01.04.2012 to 06.01.2014, irregularities and illegalities have been committed by the petitioner. However, for the said issue also, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. Learned counsel has referred relevant documents produced along with the petition and contended that the rates of good quality of sugar are different. 4.11 It is contended that in absence of any inquiry held by the respondent authorities for the said issue also and in absence of any finding recorded during such inquiry that the petitioner has misappropriated the amount alleged in the Show-cause Notice, no proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner under Section 93 of the Act. 4.11 It is contended that in absence of any inquiry held by the respondent authorities for the said issue also and in absence of any finding recorded during such inquiry that the petitioner has misappropriated the amount alleged in the Show-cause Notice, no proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner under Section 93 of the Act. 4.12 The learned Single Judge has made certain observations which are not even the allegation of the respondents in the impugned Show-cause Notice or in the impugned order and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge on that count also, may be set aside. 4.13 Learned counsel Mr.Thakore has placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (1) Shankarbhai Devjibhai Patel and others Vs. Sabarkantha Jilla Sahakari Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd. and others, (1984) GLH 498 (2) M/s. Siemens Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) AIR (SCW) 6380 (3) Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) AIR (SCW) 7105 4.14 In view of the aforesaid contentions, learned counsel Mr.Thakore urged that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside. Consequently, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner by issuance of the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order, be quashed and set aside. 5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General Mr.Jani opposed this appeal and raised the following contentions. 5.1 That the appellant petitioner had preferred the petition at the stage of issuance of the Show-cause Notice and also challenged the initiation of proceedings under section 93 of the Act for determination of the loss caused to the Union and for which whether the petitioner is liable for the same or not. Thus, at this stage, the petition itself is not maintainable and the learned Single Judge has rightly not exercised the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the scope of judicial review and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage is very limited and, therefore, when the learned Single Judge has declined to exercise such powers, this Court may not entertain this appeal. It is submitted that the scope of judicial review and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage is very limited and, therefore, when the learned Single Judge has declined to exercise such powers, this Court may not entertain this appeal. 5.2 Learned Additional Advocate General has referred the reliefs prayed for in the petition and submitted that the Show-cause Notice dated 13.06.2016 was challenged by the petitioner by filing Special Civil Application No.12257 of 2016 before this Court and this Court had not entertained the said petition and permitted the petitioner to submit his reply. So far as another prayer with regard to questioning the order dated 13.01.2017 is concerned, the said order is passed by respondent No.2 for determining the loss caused to the Union and whether the petitioner is responsible for the same or not and if he is responsible, to what an extent he is responsible for the same. Thus, these proceedings are not determining the rights and liabilities of the parties but respondent No.2 has set the machinery in motion under Section 93 of the Act. Thus, the judicial review of the administrative action, at this stage, is limited. 5.3 Merely because different statutory powers are invoked by the statutory authorities under the Act for the alleged irregularity/illegality committed by the Union and/or its office bearers and/or its Chairman for which various litigations are filed before this Court and before the Honourable Supreme Court, that does not mean that the impugned Show cause Notice as well as the impugned order of initiation of proceedings under Section 93 are initiated with malafide intentions. As the respondent authorities are empowered to initiate proceedings under Section 93 of the Act, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the same merely on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner that different powers are exercised by the respondent authorities under the Act and, therefore, the proceedings are initiated with malafide intentions. This Court may not accept this submission. 5.4 Learned Additional Advocate General, thereafter, referred the provisions contained in Section 93 of the Act, the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order and, thereafter, contended that the proceedings are initiated on the basis of a Special Audit Report dated 14.08.2015. This Court may not accept this submission. 5.4 Learned Additional Advocate General, thereafter, referred the provisions contained in Section 93 of the Act, the impugned Show-cause Notice and the impugned order and, thereafter, contended that the proceedings are initiated on the basis of a Special Audit Report dated 14.08.2015. Thus, during the course of audit, if illegalities are noticed, the respondent authorities are empowered to initiate proceedings under the Act and, therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned notice and the impugned order are without jurisdiction. 5.5 Bye-law No.44 of the Union mandates that the Chairman of the Union is having overall control of the Union and, therefore also, for the decision taken in the meeting of the Committee of the Union, the Chairman can be held responsible. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant petitioner that for the collective decision taken by the Committee, only the petitioner cannot be held liable, is misconceived. 5.6 It is submitted that the impugned order dated 13.01.2017 is passed by respondent No.2 by which respondent No.3, District Registrar is appointed as Inquiry Officer to inquire into the loss caused to the Union, for which, to what an extent the petitioner is liable. It is stated that after the inquiry is concluded by the concerned Inquiry Officer and after the order passed under Section 93 of the Act, there is a provision of filing an appeal under Section 153 of the Act and, therefore, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at this stage, is not maintainable and, therefore, rightly not entertained by the learned Single Judge. 5.7 At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out that by interim order dated 03.05.2017 passed in the present Letters Patent Appeal, this Court permitted the respondents to proceed with the inquiry pursuant to the order passed by respondent No.2 only with regard to issue No.1 i.e. the issue of cattle feed supplied to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Milk Federation Limited. This Court has further observed that with regard to the supply of cattle feed, inquiry may be proceeded independently without being influenced by the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and no final order shall be passed until further orders. This Court has further observed that with regard to the supply of cattle feed, inquiry may be proceeded independently without being influenced by the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and no final order shall be passed until further orders. 5.8 Learned Additional Advocate General referred the affidavit dated 28.02.2018 filed by respondent No.3 and submitted that pursuant to the permission given by this Court, respondent No.3 had conducted the inquiry and submitted the report under Section 93 of the Act, a copy of which is produced at Page 247 of the compilation. After referring to the same, it is contended that the Inquiry officer has prima-facie found that the petitioner is held responsible for the loss of Rs.22, 50, 26, 628/- caused to the Union for supply of cattle feed to the Maharashtra State. However, no final order is passed by respondent No.3 because of the order dated 03.05.2017 passed by this Court. Thus, it is contended that during the inquiry, the petitioner is found liable for the loss caused to the Union so far as issue No.1 is concerned. 5.9 For issue No.2, it is submitted that there was a deficit in the stock found during the course of visit made on 15.09.2015. The Confidential Special Report dated 09.10.2015 is referred in respect of the said allegation made in issue No.2 by the learned Additional Advocate General. 5.10 Insofar as issue No.3 is concerned, audit of 2012-13 is referred wherein there is a reference with regard to the irregularities found in the purchase of sugar at a rate higher than the market rate. Thus, it is contended that there is a prima-facie material against the petitioner for initiation of the inquiry under Section 93 of the Act and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the same in this appeal. 5.11 The criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner for three different issues may not be bar for initiation of proceedings under Section 93 of the Act for determining the loss caused to the Union. Both the proceedings are different and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly not accepted the said contention of the petitioner. 5.12 The decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellant are not applicable to the facts of the present case and, therefore, this Court may not entertain this appeal. Both the proceedings are different and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly not accepted the said contention of the petitioner. 5.12 The decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellant are not applicable to the facts of the present case and, therefore, this Court may not entertain this appeal. 5.13 Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Union of India and another vs. Kunisetty Satyanrayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 (2) Jayantibhai Dahyabhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2007) 2 GLR 1126 (3) Vipulbhai Mansingbhai Chaudhary Vs. State of Gujarat and anr., (2017) AIR(Supreme Court) 2340 (4) Decision dated 26.11.2014 rendered by the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No.12136 of 2014 in the case of Abhishek Mundhra Vs. The Additional Director General. 5.14 Learned Additional Advocate General, therefore, urged that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition and the appeal be dismissed. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material produced on record, it is revealed that the petitioner was Chairman of the Union in the year 2013. At that time, a request was made by Mahanand dairy, Maharashtra to supply cattle feed to the drought affected areas of Maharashtra. When the petitioner was Chairman of the Union, 13, 731 metric ton cattle feed came to be supplied to the State of Maharashtra, the price of which was Rs.20, 50, 27, 628/-. There is a reference in the special audit carried out during the period between 2014-15 to that effect. It is revealed that during the period between 1.12.2014 to 31.3.2015, Chartered Accountant and Auditor Shri Harish Kansara has carried out the audit of the Union and he had found certain irregularities in supply of the cattle feed to the drought affected areas of State of Maharashtra. It is not in dispute that the debit note prepared by the Union and sent to the Federation was not accepted by the Federation and it was returned to the Union and the Union has not received the amount for the said supply of the cattle feed. Thus, the issue no.1 in the show cause notice is with regard to the said transaction. Thus, the issue no.1 in the show cause notice is with regard to the said transaction. It is further revealed that the show cause notice came to be challenged by the petitioner by filing Special Civil Application No.12257 of 2016 before this Court and this Court had summarily dismissed the said petition. Thereafter, the petitioner along with the preliminary objections raised contentions on merits before the respondent authority and ultimately the order dated 13.1.2017 came to be passed by the respondent no.2 by which it is decided to appoint District Registrar for conducting the inquiry for the loss caused to the Union and to determine whether the petitioner is liable for the same and if yes, to what extent? 7. From the record, it is further emerged that when this Court issued the notice in the present appeal, the concerned respondent was permitted to proceed with the inquiry pursuant to the order passed by the respondent no.2 with regard to issue no.1 i.e. the issue of cattle feed supplied to Maharashtra State Cooperative Milk Federation Limited. Pursuant to the said permission granted by this Court, respondent no.3 has carried out inquiry and found that the petitioner is found liable for the loss caused to the Union to the extent of Rs.20, 50, 26, 628/- for supply of the cattle feed to the State of Maharashtra. However, as per the order of this Court, the respondent no.3 has not passed final order with regard to the said issue. 8. At this stage, we would like to refer to the provisions contained in Section 93 of the Act which provides as under: "Section 93: Power of Registrar to assess damages against delinquent, promoters, etc.:- Where, in the course of or as a result of an audit under Sec. 84, or an inspection under sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 84, or an inquiry under Sec. 86 or an inspection under Sec. 87 or Sec. 88, or the winding up of a society, the Registrar is satisfied on the basis of the report made by the auditor or the person authorised to make inquiry under Sec. 86, or the person authorised to inspect the books under sub-sec. (8) of Secs. (8) of Secs. 84, 87 or 88 or the Liquidator under Sec. 110, that any person who has taken any part, in the organisation or management of the society or any deceased, or past or present officer of the society has, within a period of five years prior to the date of such audit, inquiry, inspection or order for winding up, misapplied or retained, or become liable or accountable for, any money or property of the society, or has been guilty of misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the society, the Registrar or a person authorised by him in that behalf may investigate the conduct of such person or persons and after framing charges against such person or persons, and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned and in the case of a deceased person to his representative who inherits his estate, to answer the charges make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate as the Registrar or the person authorised under this section may determine, or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in regard to the misapplication, retention, misfeasance or breach of trust, as he may determine. (1) The Registrar or the person authorised under sub-section (1) in making any order under this section, may provide therein for the payment of the costs or any part thereof of such investigation, as he thinks just, and he may direct that such costs or any part thereof shall be recovered from the person against whom the order has been issued (2) This section shall apply, notwithstanding that the Act is one for which the person concerned may be criminally responsible." 9. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies or a person authorized by him may investigate the conduct of such person or persons within a period of five years prior to the date of the order of audit, inquiry, inspection or order for winding up, who has taken any part in the organization or management of the society so as to verify that whether such person has misapplied, retained or become liable or accountable for any money or property of the society or has been guilty of misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the society. So far as audit, inquiry, inspection or order for winding up is concerned, there is a reference of Sections 84, 86, 87 and 88 since all such basic or primary or prima facie evidence would be available in any such document. Thus, during the course of the audit or inquiry, if any irregularity or illegality is found out, the respondent no.2 is empowered to initiate the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, and from the material placed on record, it is revealed that there is a reference of special audit report dated 14.8.2015, confidential special report dated 9.10.2015 and audit report dated 20.12.2013 covering the three issues mentioned in the show cause notice and therefore it cannot be said that the impugned show cause notice and the impugned order are issued/passed without jurisdiction. Thus, the contention raised by learned senior counsel Mr.Thakore with regard to the same is misconceived and is not acceptable. 10. In the case of Union of India and another vs. Kunisetty Satyanrayana, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 13 and 16 as under: "13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v.Ramesh Kumar Singh, Special Director V.Mohd.Ghulam Ghouse, Ulagappa V. Divisional Commr., Mysore, State of U.P. V.Brahm Datt Sharma, etc. 16. No doubt, in some rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or Show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter." 11. In the case of Jayantibhai Dahyabhai Patel, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed in paragraphs 13, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3 and 20 as under: "13. It may be, that on the facts of the present case, there may be no misapplication or retention of any money or property of the society. However, the action of the petitioner definitely can be termed to be an act of misfeasance. The concept of misfeasance is by now well settled by a catena of decisions. 13.1 In the case of Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd., Vs. However, the action of the petitioner definitely can be termed to be an act of misfeasance. The concept of misfeasance is by now well settled by a catena of decisions. 13.1 In the case of Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd., Vs. P.A. Tendolkar, (1973) AIR(Supreme Court) 1104 in paragraph No.40 the Apex Court has laid down that : S40. It is certainly a question of fact, to be determined upon the evidence in each case, whether a Director, alleged to be liable for misfeasance, had acted reasonably as well as honestly and with due diligence, so that he could not be held liable for conniving at fraud and misappropriation which takes place. Director may be shown to be so placed and to have been so closely and so long associated personally with the management of the Company that he will be deemed to be not merely cognizant of but liable for fraud in the conduct of the business of a Company even though no specific act of dishonesty is proved against him personally. He cannot shut his eyes to what must be obvious to everyone who examines the affairs of the Company even superficially. If he does so he could be held liable for dereliction of duties undertaken by him and compelled to make good the losses incurred by the Company due to his neglect even if he is not shown to be guilty of participating in the commission of fraud. It is enough if his negligence is of such a character as to enable frauds to be committed and losses thereby incurred by the Company. 13.2 In another decision in the case of The Official Liquidator Vs. Raghava Desikachar and others, (1974) AIR(Supreme Court) 2069 the Supreme Court states as to on whom the burden of proving misfeasance rests in the following words : S7. x xx x xx x xx It may be mentioned that misfeasance action against the Directors is a serious charge. It is a charge of misconduct or misappropriation or breach of trust. For this reason the application should contain a detailed narration of the specific acts of commission and omission on the part of each Director quantifying the loss to the Company arising out of such acts or omissions. The burden of proving misfeasance or non-feasance rests on the Official Liquidator. For this reason the application should contain a detailed narration of the specific acts of commission and omission on the part of each Director quantifying the loss to the Company arising out of such acts or omissions. The burden of proving misfeasance or non-feasance rests on the Official Liquidator. 13.3 This Court in the case of Official Liquidator of Dhavalgiri Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chinubhai Khilachand & Ors., (2002) 3 GLR 2738 has summarised the position of law in the following words : S7. Therefore, to bring the charge of misfeasance against the ex-directors it is necessary that specific acts of commission or omission and/or negligence on the part of each Director are pointed out; the loss arising to the Company as a result of such specific act of commission or omission or negligence shall also have to be quantified as the order of recovery from such a director would be based on the said quantification. The liability under the provision though in the nature of tortious liability, it yet is quasi-criminal in nature and it is a particular Director who has caused loss to the Company by his act which would amount to misappropriation, breach of trust, misapplication or retention of monies/properties of the Company who would be called upon to make good such loss. Thus, the onus is on the person who alleges such acts of misfeasance. The onus has to be discharged by cogent, reliable and specific evidence which should prove that the alleged misconduct was willful and amounted to misfeasance with culpable negligence. The meaning of misfeasance is the improper performance of same act which a person may lawfully do. Thus seen, a director while carrying out an activity which he is otherwise empowered to carry out under the law, performs it in such a manner that the same is improper and such impropriety has to be willful so as to cause loss to the Company. In other words, the act of commission or omission or negligence should be with the intent and knowledge to cause loss to the Company and at the same time resulting in personal gain. In other words, the act of commission or omission or negligence should be with the intent and knowledge to cause loss to the Company and at the same time resulting in personal gain. Not all acts which result in loss to the Company can be treated as acts of misfeasance, making a Director liable under Sec. 543 of the Act, because while carrying on business there is every likelihood that loss may be incurred in a transaction or number of transactions. It is only when such loss to the Company results in wrongful gain to the Director in question that it would fall within the scope of provisions of Sec. 543 of the Act. 20. If this be the position in law in relation to an employee simplicitor, the approach in case of misfeasance by a Director, i.e. a person in charge of the management of the affairs of the society, cannot be viewed with any misplaced sympathy or in light of so called unblemished record. Once the fact finding Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed an act which amounts to misfeasance the petitioner is bound to repay the loss to the society and cannot be heard to plead otherwise on extraneous considerations like political malafides and so called standing of the petitioner in the society. Even the quantum of the amount cannot have any relevance for determining whether misfeasance has been committed or not." 12. In the case of Vipulbhai Chaudhary, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held in paragraphs 38 to 44 as under: "38. We shall now deal with the third submission of Chaudhary. The submission in substance is that the acts and omissions which formed the basis of allegations leading to action against Chaudhary under Section 76B are not the individual acts of Chaudhary but the collective acts or omissions of the Committee of the UNION. Therefore, action if at all required must be taken under Section 81 against the entire Committee but not only against Chaudhary. In absence of any action against the Committee, action against Chaudhary is illegal and unsustainable. 39. The text of both the Sections 76B and 81 is already taken note of. Section 81 authorises the super-session of the Committee of a Society. Section 76B authorises action against individual officers of a Society. In absence of any action against the Committee, action against Chaudhary is illegal and unsustainable. 39. The text of both the Sections 76B and 81 is already taken note of. Section 81 authorises the super-session of the Committee of a Society. Section 76B authorises action against individual officers of a Society. In either case, action is required to be taken upon the formation of the opinion by the Registrar[22] that (i) there is a persistent default; or (ii) negligence in the performance of duties; or (iii) commission of an act which is prejudicial to the interest of the Society or its members. 40. Committee of a cooperative society by definition[23] is a body to which "the direction and control of the management of the affairs of a Society is entrusted to" - though under Section 73 of THE ACT, the final authority of every Society shall vest in the general body of members. Section 74[24] declares that the management of every society shall vest in a committee constituted in accordance with THE ACT etc. The Section also declares that the committee shall "exercise such powers and perform such duties" (hereafter collectively-DUTIES) as may be conferred or imposed on it by THE ACT or the subordinate legislation made thereunder. Performance of DUTIES normally obligates a committee to take or desist from taking certain courses of actions. Failure of committee to perform its DUTIES attracts various legal consequences specified under THE ACT. One of the consequences is specified under Section 81. 41. Committee is nothing but a collective name for the conglomeration of the individual officers of the society. An "officer" by definition[25] is either a person elected or appointed under THE ACT, or the subordinate legislation made thereunder to give directions in regard to the business of such society. 42. Committees are inanimate bodies. They function through human agency i.e. the individual members of the Committee. When it is said that a committee failed to perform its DUTIES under THE ACT, it is essentially the failure of the officers of the society collectively. Failure of the Committee to perform its DUTIES necessarily implies failure on the part of the majority (if not the entire body) of the members of the Committee to perform DUTIES which they are obliged to perform under THE ACT in their capacity as the members of the Committee. Failure of the Committee to perform its DUTIES necessarily implies failure on the part of the majority (if not the entire body) of the members of the Committee to perform DUTIES which they are obliged to perform under THE ACT in their capacity as the members of the Committee. Acts or omissions of individual members which are not consistent with the DUTIES of the Committee or individual members entail various legal consequences specified under THE ACT both to the individual members and the Committee. Individual members of the Committee owe DUTIES some of which are required to be performed individually[26] and others in concert with the other members of the Committee. 43. Committee by definition owes a duty to give directions in regard to the business of the society. That DUTY of the Committee in substance is the DUTY owed by the individual members of the Committee collectively. The legality of the directions given depends upon the nature of the various DUTIES to be performed by the Committee. Failure to give directions may also constitute an illegal omission (failure to perform a DUTY) in a given case. In a given case, if a decision taken by the committee is so patently prejudicial to the interest of the society calling for action under Section 81, there is a collective failure of the individual members of the committee to perform their respective duty to give right directions in regard to the business of the society. Registrar is authorised to supersede the committee and appoint an administrator. If such course of action is proposed by the Registrar, it will not be open to an individual member of the committee to argue that he was not a party to such an objectionable conduct of the committee because either he abstained from the decision making process or disagreed with the objectionable course of action taken by the other (majority) members of the committee and therefore, there is no individual culpability on his part. Section 81 of THE ACT authorises collective action against all the members of the committee. The collective failure of the committee in performing its duty is such that warrants super-session of the committee. All individual officers lose their offices irrespective of their contribution to the culpable action of the committee. Section 81 of THE ACT authorises collective action against all the members of the committee. The collective failure of the committee in performing its duty is such that warrants super-session of the committee. All individual officers lose their offices irrespective of their contribution to the culpable action of the committee. Even in such cases of the failure of the committee to perform a DUTY owed by it, it may not be necessary to supersede the entire committee (in a given case) if it can be ascertained that the failure occurred due to culpable act or omission of an individual member of the committee and other members though acquiesced, did not have any culpable motives. In a given case an act or omission of the committee may also constitute a failure of the performance of duty on part of each individual member of the committee, who contributed to such failure of duty. Law can provide for action to be taken against each of the members of the committee. In such a case whether it is compulsory to take action against all the members who contributed to the culpable action is a matter which depends upon the scheme and tenor of the law. Sections 76B and 81 provide for such a courses of action. The Registrar is conferred with a discretionary power to take action against officers/members of the Committee individual or against the Committee collectively. It is essentially for the Registrar to make an assessment whether on the facts and circumstances of each case either action is to be taken against the committee or an individual officer or both. The decision of the Registrar taken in exercise of such discretionary power would not be amenable to challenge on the ground that the Registrar failed to take action under both Sections 76B and 81 unless the individual member against whom action is proposed pleads and proves mala fide. Individual members cannot complain that since the Registrar is not proposing action collectively against the committee, he could not initiate action against individual members of the Committee. 44. In substance, THE ACT envisages joint and several action against the officers in their capacity as members of the committee. While Section 81 is designed to deal with the dereliction of the duties by the committee as a body, Section 76B deals with the dereliction of duties of the individual members of the committee. 44. In substance, THE ACT envisages joint and several action against the officers in their capacity as members of the committee. While Section 81 is designed to deal with the dereliction of the duties by the committee as a body, Section 76B deals with the dereliction of duties of the individual members of the committee. The Registrar is invested by THE ACT with the discretion to choose the proper course of action depending upon the situation. The argument of Chaudhary is not that the Registrar abused his discretion. The submission is that it is not permissible for the Registrar to resort to action only under Section 76B. We reject the submission." 13. In the case of Abhishek Mundhra, the Madras High Court has observed and held in paragraphs 13, 17 and 19 as under: "13. As noticed above, the impugned show cause notice has been challenged on two grounds, firstly by contending that it is without jurisdiction and secondly that the authority pre-judged and pre-decided the issue and no useful purpose would be served by responding to the show cause notice. On the question of jurisdiction, the learned Senior counsel referred to Section 124 of the Act and submitted that to exercise the power under Section 124, there are twin requirements namely, the prior approval of the officer of customs not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Customs has to be obtained and other being such approval should be by an Officer of Customs. The contention is that the respondent being an Additional Director of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence is not an Officer of customs. That apart, there is nothing to show that prior approval has been obtained from the Officer of Customs not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner, therefore, the show cause notice is vitiated for want of jurisdiction. To support such arguments, the definition of proper officer as defined under Section 2(34) is pressed into service and by relying on the decision in the case of Sayed Ali & Anr., it is submitted that only such officers of customs, who have been assigned specific functions would be proper officers in terms of Section 2(34) of the Act. To support such arguments, the definition of proper officer as defined under Section 2(34) is pressed into service and by relying on the decision in the case of Sayed Ali & Anr., it is submitted that only such officers of customs, who have been assigned specific functions would be proper officers in terms of Section 2(34) of the Act. After the decision was rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sayed Ali & Anr., on 18.02.2011, Section 28 of the Act underwent an amendments by Customs (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2011, firstly on 08.04.2011, then again on 16.09.2011. By virtue of the amendment, subsection (11) was inserted to Section 28. Thus, the objection, which is being raised based on the decision in the case of Sayed Ali & Anr., is no longer available in the light of the insertion of sub-section (11) to Section 28. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would state that such amendment inserting sub-section (11) to Section 28 was for the purpose of exercising the power under the said provision and would not empower the respondent to exercise power under Section 124 of the Act. 17. On the second issue with regard to the allegation that the show cause notice has prejudged the issue, it is a pre-meditated notice and foreclosed the materials rights, the learned Senior counsel referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited and Siemens Ltd., to contend that the Writ Petition is maintainable and even though the show cause notice is answerable to the Joint/Additional Commissioner of Customs, yet the defect cannot be cured. 19. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited and Siemens Ltd., have referred to the show cause notices which were subject matter of the case and on facts came to the conclusion that the authority has virtually pre-decided the matter. As pointed out earlier even though in the impugned show cause notice, the expression admittedly has been used in more than one place, those words alone cannot be read to interpret the impugned show cause notice as being pre-conceived or pre-meditated. As pointed out earlier even though in the impugned show cause notice, the expression admittedly has been used in more than one place, those words alone cannot be read to interpret the impugned show cause notice as being pre-conceived or pre-meditated. The allegations in the show cause notices have to be read in its entirety and if done, the true picture emerges and it can be clearly deciphered that the respondent has sought to bring on record, all the statements recorded from all the notices and all persons, who were examined on more than two occasions. Therefore, the decisions relied on by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable on facts and does not render support to the case of the petitioner." 14. In the case of Shankarbhai Devjibhai Patel, the learned Single Judge of this Court as observed in paragraphs 29 and 30 as under: "29. In the instant case, even according to the Cooperative Department, the petitioners cannot be accused of harbouring dishonest intention when they spent the amount in question. They have done everything openly. They never thought that this would amount to misconduct. Even the Government nominees were present in the meeting and in their presence the decisions were taken. They bona fide believed that the funds collected for the purpose of Silver Jubilee of the Society could be utilised for the purpose of distribution of gifts amongst the members" of Managing Committee and some staff members. They bona fide believed that as per the provisions of bylaw 42 sub-clause(6) , the amount accumulated in the customers' bonus fund could be allowed to be spilled over to another year and could be distributed amongst the customers later on. None of them is held guilty for devouring the funds of the society for private gain. No unjust or improper motive is proved or even suggested. 30. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the finding arrived at by the Investigating Officer and the Tribunal that the expenditure incurred was not in accordance with the provisions of Sections 65 and 66 of the Act may be correct. But is it sufficient to hold that such an action would amount to misconduct inviting action under Section 93 of the Act? The action under Section 93 of the Act presupposes something more than bona fide mistakes. But is it sufficient to hold that such an action would amount to misconduct inviting action under Section 93 of the Act? The action under Section 93 of the Act presupposes something more than bona fide mistakes. Simply non-observance of the provisions of a statute is not sufficient. In the instant case taking the case of the Co-operative Department, at the highest it comes to this. "The petitioners are honest and efficient. They are persons with integrity and of serviceable nature. But they have not followed certain provisions of the Act and the Rules strictly. When they committed this lapse it did not occur even to the Government nominees that that something improper or irregular was being done. Moreover, that which is held to have been irregular or improper was being done by many societies in the State. Such practice was in vogue so much so that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was required to issue a circular pointing out to different societies that such expenditure was not proper." Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that since the expenditure incurred was not in accordance with the provisions of Sections 65 and 66 of the Act, without there being anything more to suggest unjustness or impropriety, it would amount to misconduct inviting action for surcharge under the provisions of Section 93 of the Act. There is no element of dishonesty. There is no element of wanton disregard of the provisions of the Act and Rules. There is nothing to suggest gross negligence or wilful negligence. Even negligence is not suggested. All that is suggested is bona fide mistake in over exuberance and hence failure to observe the provisions of law strictly. In this view of the matter, the lower authorities were clearly wrong in invoking the provisions of Section 93 of the Act. The lower authorities are clearly wrong in holding that the petitioners were personally liable for the amount spent by the Society for the purchase (and distribution) of wrist-watches and wall clocks for distributing the same to the members of the Managing Committee. Similarly the lower authorities grossly erred in holding that the petitioners were liable for the expenses incurred in connection with the purchase and distribution of stainless steel utensils to the members of the Society and to some staff members." 15. Similarly the lower authorities grossly erred in holding that the petitioners were liable for the expenses incurred in connection with the purchase and distribution of stainless steel utensils to the members of the Society and to some staff members." 15. In the case of ORXY Fisheries Pvt. Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court as observed in Paragraphs25, 28 and 29 as under: "25. Expressions like "a reasonable opportunity of making objection" or "a reasonable opportunity of defence" have come up for consideration before this Court in the context of several statutes. 28. It is no doubt that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceeding become an idle ceremony. 29. Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against. In the instant case, from the underlined portion of the show cause notice it is clear that the third respondent has demonstrated a totally close mind at the stage of show cause notice itself. Such a close mind is inconsistent with the scheme of Rule 43 which is set out below. The aforesaid rule has been framed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 33 of the Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972 and as such that Rule is statutory in nature." 16. In the case of M/s Siemens Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held in paragraphs 10 and 13 as under: "10. The aforesaid rule has been framed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 33 of the Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972 and as such that Rule is statutory in nature." 16. In the case of M/s Siemens Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held in paragraphs 10 and 13 as under: "10. Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr., (1987) AIR(Supreme Court) 943, Special Director and Another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Another, (2004) 3 SCC 440 and Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 Scale 262 , but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle, viz, when a notice is issued with pre-meditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the courts directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield any fruitful purpose [See K.I. Shephard and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 ]. It is evident in the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the counter affidavit as also in its purported show cause. 13. A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also the statements made before us in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, we are satisfied that the statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of the appellant. If in passing the order the respondent has already determined the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the realm of a show cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable." 17. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be said that ordinarily no writ lies against the issuance of the show cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable." 17. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be said that ordinarily no writ lies against the issuance of the show cause notice. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against mere show cause notice is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects rights of any parties unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show cause notice or after holding inquiry, the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. A mere show cause notice does not affect the rights of anyone. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing the show cause notice. However, in some very rare and exceptional case, the High Court can quash the show cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or wholly illegal. In the present case, the appellant-petitioner has failed to point out that the impugned show cause notice and the impugned order of appointing officer for conducting inquiry under Section 93 of the Act is without any jurisdiction or the same are wholly illegal. 18. From the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Vipulbhai Mansingbhai Chaudhary, it can be said that it is essential for the Registrar to make an assessment whether on the facts and circumstances of each case either action is to be taken against the Committee or an individual officer or both. The decision of Registrar taken in exercise of such discretionary power would not be amenable to challenge on the ground the Registrar failed to take action under both Sections 76B and 81 of the Act unless the individual member against whom action is proposed pleads and proves malafide. The individual members cannot complain that since the Registrar is not proposing action collectively against the Committee, he could not initiate action against individual members of the Committee. The individual members cannot complain that since the Registrar is not proposing action collectively against the Committee, he could not initiate action against individual members of the Committee. The Act envisages joint and several action against officers in their capacity as members of the Committee. 19. Keeping in view the said decision, if the facts of the present case are examined, it is revealed that the respondent no.2 in the order dated 13.1.2017, while appointing the Inquiry Officer has specifically observed that for deciding the issues mentioned in the show cause notice, prima facie, monetary loss worth Rs.41, 83, 68, 951.0 ps. has been caused to the Union and for deciding the exact loss caused to the Union and for the said loss, whether the petitioner is held responsible and if yes to what extent is to be decided by the Inquiry Officer. 20. Thus, with a view to conduct inquiry in connection with the loss caused to the Union and for that purpose, whether the petitioner is liable and to what extent, order is passed and therefore at this stage, it cannot be said that the respondent no.2 has initiated the action only against the petitioner and not against the other members. If during the course of inquiry, the other members are found responsible, the respondent no.2 may proceed against them also. However, as per bye-law no.44 upon which the reliance is placed by learned AAG, the Chairman has over all control of the Union and therefore we see no substance in the submission canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that proceedings are initiated only against the petitioner and therefore the same be set aside. 21. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner on the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of ORXY Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Siemens Ltd. are concerned, we cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case. However, the Madras High Court in the case of Abhishek Mundhra, after considering both the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held in the facts of the said case that the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the authority has virtually pre-decided the matter. However, the Madras High Court in the case of Abhishek Mundhra, after considering both the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held in the facts of the said case that the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the authority has virtually pre-decided the matter. It is further observed that expression 'admittedly' has been used in one or more place in the impugned show cause notice but such words alone cannot be read to interpret the impugned show cause notice as being pre-conceived or pre-meditated. The allegations in the show cause notice have to be read in its entirety. 22. In the present case, we have gone through the averments made in the impugned show cause notice and in the impugned order dated 13.1.2017 and from the contents of the same, we are of the view that the respondents authority has not issued the show cause notice or passed the impugned order with premeditation and not decided the issues as alleged by the petitioner. On the contrary, before initiating the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act, show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner and after considering the reply and the objections, the order dated 13.1.2017 came to be passed appointing the concerned District Registrar for conducting the inquiry whether the petitioner is liable for the loss caused to the Union or not and to what extent. Thus, there is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner with regard to the said issue cannot be accepted. 23. The decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shankarbhai Devjibhai Patel upon which the reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellant petitioner would not render any assistance to him in the facts and circumstances of the present case as discussed hereinabove. 24. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that for all the three issues stated in the impugned show cause notice, three different FIRs are filed against the petitioner and therefore for the same subject matter, the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act would not lie. However, the said submission is also misconceived. 24. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that for all the three issues stated in the impugned show cause notice, three different FIRs are filed against the petitioner and therefore for the same subject matter, the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act would not lie. However, the said submission is also misconceived. It is required to be noted that criminal proceedings initiated under Section 93 of the Act are civil in nature and for determining the loss caused to the Union for which whether the petitioner is liable or not and if he is held liable, for recovery of the said loss from the petitioner where as in the criminal proceedings, if ultimately charge levelled against the petitioner is proved, he can be held guilty and he can be sent to prison for committing the alleged offences. Thus, nature of both the proceedings are different. 25. Another contention raised by the petitioners is that the impugned Show cause Notice is issued with malafide intention and under the political pressure of the party in power. In support of the said contention, the petitioners have placed reliance upon various orders passed by this Court in different petitions filed by the petitioners and/or the Union or the office bearers of the Union. In the memorandum of the petition, the petitioners have narrated the history of previous litigations by and against the petitioners and/or Union. Even if the petitioners or Union have succeeded in all or any of such litigations, it cannot be said that it would give rise or cause to the petitioners to get the impugned Show cause Notice quashed, irrespective of their alleged default stated in the Show cause Notice. Merely because different actions are taken under different provisions of the Act by statutory authority, it does not mean that such steps are taken under political pressure with malafide intention. Thus, we are of the view that only on this ground, the impugned Show cause Notice issued by respondent No.1 cannot be quashed and set aside." 26. The another contention is raised by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that learned Single Judge has at some places recorded incorrect findings and recorded a scam of Rs.1000 crores, however, such allegations are not levelled in the impugned show cause notice or in the impugned order passed by respondent no.2. The another contention is raised by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that learned Single Judge has at some places recorded incorrect findings and recorded a scam of Rs.1000 crores, however, such allegations are not levelled in the impugned show cause notice or in the impugned order passed by respondent no.2. However, we are of the opinion that even if some factual error is committed by the learned Single Judge in recording certain findings but if the ultimate conclusion is correct, then any observations not properly recorded may not be a ground for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Any observations and findings recorded by the learned Single Judge shall not come in the way of the petitioners at the time of deciding the issue involved in the impugned show cause notice and impugned order passed by respondent no.2. 27. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended on merits of the issues which are referred to in the impugned show cause notice. However, at this stage, we cannot go into merits of such issues and give finding whether the defence taken by the appellant is correct or not. 28. Another contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent no.3-Shri S.N.Joshi, District Registrar cannot act as a competent authority to proceed further for inquiry under Section 93 as per the impugned order passed by respondent no.2 because he is complainant in FIR being C.R.No.I-18 of 2014. However, the learned Single Judge observed in the impugned order that during the course of the hearing, learned AAG Mr.Jani has already disclosed and placed on record a copy of the order dated 8.2.2017 passed by respondent no.2 whereby respondent no.2 has already handed over the inquiry as per the impugned order to Mr.I.J.Munia, District Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Panchmahal district. Thus, in view of the said development, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant with regard to appointment of respondent no.3-Mr.S.N.Joshi for inquiry under Section 93 of the Act cannot be accepted. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by learned Single Judge dismissing the petition. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by learned Single Judge dismissing the petition. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed. However, it is clarified that the concerned respondent shall carry out the inquiry under Section 93 of the Act without being influenced by any of the observation made by the learned Single Judge or observations made in this order. Consequently, Civil Application also stands dismissed.