JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. - By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the Tribunal [2017 (51) S.T.R. 269 (Tribunal)] whereby Tribunal has disposed of the appeal by observing as under : 3. After hearing the Ld. Departmental Representative, we find that admittedly Section 80 of the Act is invoked by the adjudicating authority and penal proposal stands dropped by observing as under :- "23. The noticees have argued that they were under bona fide belief that they were not liable to service tax therefore it's a fit case waiver of penalty in terms of section 80 of the Act. The issue of suppression of fact and invocability of section proviso to section 73 has already been discussed in preceding para and it has been held that the proviso is rightly invocable. However considering the fact that the noticees are a State Government undertaking and the benefit of evasion of service tax would not go to any private person of company and also that they have already deposited Rs. 68 lakh voluntarily, I am inclined to accept the plea of the noticees that there was reasonable cause for failure to pay tax. It has been held in several cases that even if the proviso to section 73 for extending the period of demand on account of suppression of fact, etc., is invoked the waiver under section 80 can still be given. I therefore extend the benefit of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and waive penalty under Section 76, 77 and 78 of the Act." 4. Tribunal in its number of cases observed that where the penalty under Section 80 of the Act has not been imposed by extending the bona fide belief on the part of the appellant, the extended period would not be invocable inasmuch as the same ingredients are required for invocation of extended period of limitation. Such references can be made in the case of Sankhla Udyog vs. CCE, ST, Jaipur [ 2015 (38) S.T.R. 62 (Tri.-Del.)] as also to the decision in the case of BSNL vs. CCE, Ahmedabad [ 2009 (14) S.T.R. 359 (Tri.-Ahmd.)] 5. We also further note that the appellant is a public sector under taking, being a State Govt. Such references can be made in the case of Sankhla Udyog vs. CCE, ST, Jaipur [ 2015 (38) S.T.R. 62 (Tri.-Del.)] as also to the decision in the case of BSNL vs. CCE, Ahmedabad [ 2009 (14) S.T.R. 359 (Tri.-Ahmd.)] 5. We also further note that the appellant is a public sector under taking, being a State Govt. enterprise, in such a case allegation of wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or deliberate contravention of Rule with an intention to evade the duty payment cannot be made. Tribunal has observed the same in the case of CCE, Allahabad vs. Bharat Yantra Nigam Ltd. [2014 (36) S.T.R. 554 (Tri.-Del.)] " 2. This Court while admitting the appeal on 9-8-2017 [2017 (7) G.S.T.L. J176 (Raj.)] framed following substantial questions of law : "Whether the Learned CESTAT is correct in holding that where relief from penalties is granted by giving the benefit under Section 80 of the Act of 1994 (on the basis of bona fide belief on the part of the assessee, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked for confirmation of service tax demand on the basis of the allegations of wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or deliberate contravention of Rules with an intention to evade the duty payment? "Whether the Learned CESTAT was correct in holding that the ingredients of Section 80 of the Act of 1994 are same as that of the Act of 1994 are same as that of the ingredients which are required for invoking extended period of limitation provided in the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Act of 1994?" 3. Counsel for appellant has taken us to the original order which has been passed by the authority and contended that taking into consideration the conduct of the respondent which is narrated as under : 5. On being asked, M/s. RRECL provided the requisite information vide their letter dated 10-12-2008, 1-9-2009, 22-9-2009 and 4-12-2009 and also submitted a chart as the breakup of various fees received from July, 2005 to November, 2008 wherein they havd shown taxable value and Service Tax outstanding amount as Rs. On being asked, M/s. RRECL provided the requisite information vide their letter dated 10-12-2008, 1-9-2009, 22-9-2009 and 4-12-2009 and also submitted a chart as the breakup of various fees received from July, 2005 to November, 2008 wherein they havd shown taxable value and Service Tax outstanding amount as Rs. 1,34,95,873/- against them, which is as under : Details of Service Tax calculation for the period July, 2005 to 30-11-2008 Particulars 7/5 to 17-4-2006 18-4-2006 to 10-5-2007 11-5-2007 to 30-11-2008 Application Fee WPP 33700000 23395000 29873750 Processing Fees for SPP 0 0 35850000 Application fee for BPP 3675000 1950000 0 Processing fee for BPP 0 0 2657500 Regn. Fees for Hydel project 0 0 50000 Wind Mast Application fees 40000 160000 140000 Ser. Charges (SWH System) 0 0 6000 Gross value 37415000 25505000 65919750 Net Taxable value 33951906 222723628 58668343 ST Rate 10.20% 12.24% 12.36% Service Tax 3463094 2781372 7251407 Total Service Tax payable 13495873/- 6. However, on scrutiny of the balance sheet as supplied by M/s. RRECL, Jaipur it was found that some of the entries were not considered for the purpose of calculation of Service Tax by the noticees. Therefore the correct service tax was calculated as given in the table below : S. No. Head 2004-05 (1-10-2004 onwards) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 1. Application Fees 30000 50000 150000 100000 1300012 2. Processing fees for solar point plant 0 0 0 1500000 34625000 3. Application Fees Biomass power project 250000 37500 1950000 0 0 4. Processing fees for biomass power plant 0 4580000 0 1632500 2750000 5. Application fees 10/20/25 MW wind farm 6335000 45205000 23395000 17968750 15195000 6. Registration fees 0 0 0 0 50000 7. Extension fees-wind Farm 5085000 1500000 9200000 34765000 0 8. Service charges from MNES/ RVE program-me/Gassifier System/SPV/ VESP/DLS 2500 5725337 8773044 3279150 Total taxable value 11700000 51375000 40420337 64739294 56199162 Service Tax Rates 10.20% 10.20 12.24 12.36 12.36 Service Tax Amount 1193400 5240250 4947449 8001777 6946216 Total Service Tax Payable 26329092 and the observations which are made in Paras 22 to 24 (sic) of the original order of Authority has imposed penalty to the extent of Rs. 2,63,29,092/-, are as under : 21. Further, for the sake of argument we may take the example of goods manufactured and sold by the Government Undertakings or Government Departments which are chargeable to excise duty. For example like Chittaranjan Locomotives manufactures locomotives and pays excise duty. 2,63,29,092/-, are as under : 21. Further, for the sake of argument we may take the example of goods manufactured and sold by the Government Undertakings or Government Departments which are chargeable to excise duty. For example like Chittaranjan Locomotives manufactures locomotives and pays excise duty. They challenged it on the same ground that it is a manufactured by the Government department, hence not liable to duty. They went up to the Revision stage in early 80s' and lost. Further, the C.B.E. and C. vide Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T., dated 23-8-2007 in the case of Department of Post clarified that - (i) Following services provided by Department of Posts are not liable to service tax. - Basic mail services as postal services such as post card, inland letter, book post, registered post provided exclusively by the Department of Posts to meet the universal postal obligations. Transfer of money through money orders, operation of savings accounts, issue of postal orders, pension payments and other such services. (ii) In addition to the services mentioned in above, Department of Posts also provides a number of services such as courier services (Speed Post), insurance services (Postal Life Insurance), agency or intermediary services on commission basis (distribution of mutual funds, bonds, passport applications, collection of telephone and electricity bills), which are also provided by other commercial organizations. Such services are liable to service tax under appropriate taxable services. 22. As regards invocation of extended period the noticee have submitted that extended period is not available to the department as there was no suppression of fact and they were under bona fide belief that they were not liable to pay service tax on the inpugned activities. I find that there has been a deliberate act by the noticee to the suppression the information inasmuch as they did not take registration, did not pay service tax and also did not file any returns. It was only when the department collected information that the evasion was unearthed. Suppression means failure to disclose full information with the intent to evade payment of duty as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Continental Foundation Jt. Venture vs. CCE, Chandigarh-I [ 2007 (216) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.)] . It was only when the department collected information that the evasion was unearthed. Suppression means failure to disclose full information with the intent to evade payment of duty as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Continental Foundation Jt. Venture vs. CCE, Chandigarh-I [ 2007 (216) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.)] . Similarly Hon'ble CESTAT in case of Chemfab Alkalis Ltd. vs. CCE, Pondichery [2010 (251) E.L.T. 264 (Tri.-Chennai)] held : "It cannot be a case of anybody that since all the excisable units are being audited by the department from time to time, the extended period of limitation will not apply in respect of any unit. Such an interpretation would render the relevant legal provision regarding application extended period or time totally redundant and hence cannot be accepted." In case of Union of India vs. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in case the non-payment, etc., of duty is intentional and adopting any means as indicated in the proviso then the period of notice and a priory the period for which duty can be demanded gets extended to five years. From the principle laid down by the Apex Court as well as CESTAT in the above judgments it follows that in case where non-payment of duty/tax in intentional i.e. intent to evade payment of tax by adopting any means as indicated in proviso to Section 73 of Finance Act, 1994 (or [Section] 11A of Central Excise Act, 1944) i.e. Suppression, fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or contravention of any of the provision of the law with intent to evade is present, extended period is invocable. I also rely the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Magnum International [ 2008 (11) S.T.R. 176 ] in which it was held that not filing of return itself is sufficient ground for invoking the extended period under section 73 of the Act. Therefore in the facts and circumstances brought out here the extended period under proviso to section 73 is thus clearly invocable as the noticees have suppressed the material facts with intent to evade payment of Service Tax. 23. As discussed in forgoing paras, I am of the view that the noticees are liable to pay service tax amounting to Rs. 2,63,29,092/- in view of the provisions of Section 73(1) of Finance Act, 1994 along with interest as per provisions of Section 75 of the Act, ibid. 23. As discussed in forgoing paras, I am of the view that the noticees are liable to pay service tax amounting to Rs. 2,63,29,092/- in view of the provisions of Section 73(1) of Finance Act, 1994 along with interest as per provisions of Section 75 of the Act, ibid. 23. The noticees have argued that they were under bona fide belief that they were not liable to service tax therefore it's a fit case for waiver of penalty in terms of section 80 of the Act. The issue of suppression of fact and invocability of section proviso to section 73 has already been discussed in preceding para and it has been held that the proviso is rightly invocable. However considering the fact that the noticees are a State Government undertaking and the benefit of evasion of service tax would not go to any private person of company and also that they have already deposited Rs. 68 lakh voluntarily, I am inclined to accept the plea of the noticees there was reasonable cause for failure to pay tax. It has been held in several cases even if the proviso to section 73 for extending the period of demand on account of suppression of fact, etc., is invoked the waiver under section 80 can still be given. I therefore extend the benefit of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and waive penalty under sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Act. 4. Counsel for appellant has relied upon in the following decisions : 1. Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. Collector of Central Excise, Madras, 1994 (74) E.L.T. 9 (S.C.) , wherein it has been observed as under : Section 11A of the Act empowers the Central Excise officer to initiate proceedings where duty has not been levied or short-levied within six months from the relevant date. But this period to commence proceedings under proviso to the Section stands extended to five years of the duty could not be levied or it was short-levied due to fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, etc. But this period to commence proceedings under proviso to the Section stands extended to five years of the duty could not be levied or it was short-levied due to fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, etc. The proviso to Section 11A reads as under : "Provided that where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty, by such person or his agent, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "Central Excise Officer", the words "Collector of Central Excise" and for the words "six months", the words "five years" were substituted." A bare reading of the proviso indicates that it is in nature of an exception to the principal clause. Therefore, its exercise is hedged on one hand with existence of such situations as have been visualised by the proviso by using such strong expression as fraud, conclusion, etc. and on the other hand it should have been with intention to evade payment of duty. Both must concur to enable the Excise Officer to proceed under this proviso and invoke the exceptional power. Since the proviso extends the period of limitation from six months to five years it has to be construed strictly. The initial burden is on the Department to prove that the situations visualised by the proviso existed. But once the Department is able to bring on record material to show that the appellant was guilty of any of those situations which are visualised by the Section, the burden shifts and then applicability of the proviso has to be construed liberally. When the law requires an intention to evade payment of duty then it is not mere failure to pay duty. It must be something more. That is, the assessee must be aware that the duty was leviable and it must deliberately avoid paying it. The word 'evade' in the context means defeating the provision of law of paying duty. It is made more stringent by use of the word 'intent'. In other words the assessee must deliberately avoid payment of duty which is payable in accordance with law. The word 'evade' in the context means defeating the provision of law of paying duty. It is made more stringent by use of the word 'intent'. In other words the assessee must deliberately avoid payment of duty which is payable in accordance with law. In Padmini Products vs. Collector of Central Excise - 1989 (43) E.L.T. 195 , it was held that where there was scope for doubt whether case for duty was made out or not the proviso to Section 11A of the Act would not be attracted. The appellant is a statutory body. It had taken out licence for concrete as it was being sold to outsiders. No licence was taken out for wood products as according to it it was advised so by the Excise Department itself. It would have been better if the appellant would have examined the officer who was advised not to take licence. But mere non-examination of officer could not give rise to an inference that the appellant was intentionally evading payment of duty. When the appellant was found not to have been making any profit and it had taken out licence for concrete unit then in absence of any other material to prove any deliberate act of the appellant the presumption of reasonable doubt of the appellant cannot be said to have been successfully rebutted. The finding of the Tribunal that there was an intention on the part of the appellant to evade payment of duty, is not based on any material. It was an inference drawn for which there was no basis." 2. Padmini Productys vs. Collector of C. Ex. - 1989 (43) E.L.T. 195 (S.C.), wherein it has been observed as under : "8. It was an inference drawn for which there was no basis." 2. Padmini Productys vs. Collector of C. Ex. - 1989 (43) E.L.T. 195 (S.C.), wherein it has been observed as under : "8. Shri V. Lakshmi Kumaran, Learned Counsel for he appellant drew our attention to the observations of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad vs. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, Hyderabad (1990) 184 ITR 224 (SC) of the report, this Court observed that in order to sustain an order of the Tribunal beyond a period of six months and up to a period of 5 years in view of the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 11A of the Act, it had to be established that the duty of excise had not been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid, or erroneously refunded by reasons of either fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty. It was observed by this Court that something positive other than more inaction or failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise is required before it is saddled with any liability beyond the period of six months had to be established. Whether in a particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression or contravention of any provision of any Act is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Tribunal, however, had held contrary to the contention of the appellants. The Tribunal noted that dhoop sticks are different products from agarbaties even though they belonged to the same category and the Tribunal was of the view that these were to be treated differently. Therefore, the clarification given in the context of the agarbaties could not be applicable to dhoop sticks, etc., and the Tribunal came to the conclusion that inasmuch as the appellant had manufactured the goods without informing the Central Excise authorities and had been removing these without payment of duty, these would have to be taken to attract the mischief of the provisions of Rule 9(2) and the longer period of limitation was available. But the Tribunal reduced the penalty, Counsel for the appellants contended before us that in view of the trade notices which were referred to by the Tribunal, there is scope for believing that agarbaties were entitled to exemption and if that is so, then there is enough scope for believing that there was no need of taking out a licence under Rule 174 of the said Rules and also that there was no need of paying duty at the time of removal of dhoop sticks, etc. Counsel further submitted that in any event apart from the fact that no licence had been taken and for which no licence was required because the whole duty was exempt in view of notification No. 111/78, referred to hereinbefore, and in view of the fact that there was scope for believing that it was exempt under Schedule annexed to the first notification, i.e., 55/75, being handicrafts, the appellants could not be held to be guilty of the fact that excise duty had not been paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded because of either any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder. These ingredients postulate a positive act. Failure to pay duty or take out a licence is not necessarily due to fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act. Suppression of facts is not failure to disclose the legal consequences of a certain provision. Shri Ganguly, appearing for the revenue, contended before us that the appellants should have taken out a licence under Rule 174 of the said Rules because all the goods were not handicrafts and as such were not exempted under notification No. 55/75 and, therefore, the appellants were obliged to take out a licence. The failure to take out the licence and thereafter to take the goods out of the factory gate without payment of duty was itself sufficient, according to Shri Ganguly, to infer that the appellants came within the mischief of Section 11A of the Act. We are unable to accept this position canvassed on behalf of the revenue. The failure to take out the licence and thereafter to take the goods out of the factory gate without payment of duty was itself sufficient, according to Shri Ganguly, to infer that the appellants came within the mischief of Section 11A of the Act. We are unable to accept this position canvassed on behalf of the revenue. As mentioned hereinbefore, mere failure or negligence on the part of the producer or manufacturer either for doubt as to whether licence was required to be taken out or where there was scope for doubt whether goods were dutiable or not would not attract Section 11A of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there were materials, as indicated to suggest that there was scope for confusion and the appellants believing that the goods came within the purview of the concept of handicrafts and as such were exempt. If there was scope for such a belief or opinion, then failure either to take out a licence or to pay duty on that belief, when there was no contrary evidence that the producer or the manufacturer knew that these were excisable or required to be licenced, would not attract the penal provisions of Section 11A of the Act. If the facts are otherwise, then the position would be different. It is true that the Tribunal has come to a conclusion that there was failure in terms of Section 11A of the Act. Section 35L of the Act, inter alia, provides that an appeal shall lie to this Court from any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment. Therefore, in this appeal, we have to examine the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal. For the reasons indicated above, the Tribunal was in error in applying the provisions of Section 11A of the Act. There were no materials from which it could be inferred or established that the duty of excise had not "been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of the rules made thereunder. There were no materials from which it could be inferred or established that the duty of excise had not "been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of the rules made thereunder. The Tribunal in the appellate order has, however, reduced the penalty to Rs. 5,000/- and had also upheld the order of the confiscation of the goods. In view of the fact that the claim of the revenue is not sustainable beyond a period of six months on the ground that these dhoop sticks, etc., were not handicrafts entitled to exemption, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the matter to the Tribunal to modify the demand by confining it to the period of six months prior to issue of show cause notice and pass consequential orders in the appeal on the question of penalty and confiscation. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the matter is, therefore, remanded to the Tribunal with the aforesaid directions. This appeal is disposed of accordingly." 3. Collector of Central Excise vs. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, 1989 (40) E.L.T. 276 (S.C.) wherein it has been observed as under : 8. Aggrieved thereby, the revenue has come up in appeal to this Court. In our opinion, the order of the Tribunal must be sustained. In order to make the demand for duty sustainable beyond a period of six months and up to a period of 5 years in view of the proviso to sub-section 11A of the Act, it has to be established that the duty of excise has not been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid, or erroneously refunded by reasons of either fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty. Something positive other than mere inaction or failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any liability, before the period of six months. Something positive other than mere inaction or failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any liability, before the period of six months. Whether in a particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression or contravention of any provision of any Act, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the facts referred to hereinbefore do not warrant any inference of fraud. The assessee declared the goods on the basis of their belief of the interpretation of the provisions of the law that the exempted goods were not required to be included and these did not include the value of the exempted goods which they manufactured at the relevant time. The Tribunal found that that the explanation was plausible, and also noted that the Department had full knowledge of the facts about manufacture of all the goods manufactured by the respondent when the declaration was filed by the respondent. The respondent did not include the value of the product other [than] those falling under Tariff Item 14E manufactured by the respondent and this was in the knowledge, according to the Tribunal, of the authorities. These findings of the Tribunal have not been challenged before us or before the Tribunal itself as being based on no evidence. 4. Continental Foundation JT. Venture vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Chandigarh-I, 2007 (216) E.L.T. 177 (S.C.), wherein it has been observed as under : 11. Factual position goes to show the Revenue relied on the circular dated 23-51997 and dated 19-12-1997. The circular dated 6-1-1998 is the one on which appellant places reliance. Undisputedly, CEGAT in Continental Foundation Joint Venture case (supra) was held to be not correct in a subsequent Larger Bench judgment. It is, therefore, clear that there was scope for entertaining doubt about the view to be taken. The Tribunal apparently has not considered these aspects correctly. Contrary to the factual position, the CEGAT has held that no plea was taken about there being no intention to evade payment of duty as the same was to be reimbursed by the buyer. In fact such a plea was clearly taken. The Tribunal apparently has not considered these aspects correctly. Contrary to the factual position, the CEGAT has held that no plea was taken about there being no intention to evade payment of duty as the same was to be reimbursed by the buyer. In fact such a plea was clearly taken. The factual scenario clearly goes to show that there was scope for entertaining doubt, and taking a particular stand which rules out application of Section 11A of the Act. 5. Uniworth Textiles Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur, 2013 (288) E.L.T. 161 (S.C.), wherein it has been observed as under : 21. The Revenue contended that of the three categories, the conduct of the Appellant falls under the case of "wilful misstatement" and pointed [out] to the use of the word "misutilizing" in the following statement found in the order of the Commissioner of Customs, Raipur in furtherance of its claim : The noticee procured 742.51 kl of furnace oil valued at Rs. 54,57,357/- without payment of customs duty by misutilizing the facility available to them under Notification No. 53/97-Cus., dated 3-6-1997. 22. We are not persuaded to agree that this observation by the Commissioner, unfounded on any material fact or evidence, points to a finding of collusion or suppression or misstatement. The use of the word "wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of the Appellant by gauging its actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (pp 1599) defines "wilful" in the following manner : Wilful. Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly; deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass.... An act or omission is "wilfully" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done.... 23. In the present case, from the evidence adduced by the Appellant, one will draw an inference of bona fide conduct in favour of the Appellant. The Appellant laboured under the very doubt which forms the basis of the issue before us and hence, decided to address it to the concerned authority, the Development Commissioner, thus, in a sense offering its activities to assessment. The Appellant laboured under the very doubt which forms the basis of the issue before us and hence, decided to address it to the concerned authority, the Development Commissioner, thus, in a sense offering its activities to assessment. The Development Commissioner answered in favour of the Appellant and in its reply, even quoted a letter by the Ministry of Commerce in favour of an exemption the Appellant was seeking, which anybody would have found satisfactory. Only on receiving this satisfactory reply did the Appellant decide to claim exemption. Even if one were to accept the argument that the Development Commissioner was perhaps not the most suitable repository of the answers to the queries that the Appellant laboured under, it does not take away from the bona fide conduct of the Appellant. It still reflects the fact that the Appellant made efforts in pursuit of adherence to the law rather than its breach." 6. Sankhla Udyog vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and S.T., Jaipur, 2015 (38) S.T.R. 62 (Tri.-Del.), wherein it has been observed as under : "6. As may be observed, the adjudicating authority has clearly stated that there was interpretation of law involved and he extended the benefit of Section 80 of Finance Act, 1994 for not imposing any penalty. It clearly shows that the ingredients required for invoking extended period are not present in this case. Indeed in the entire adjudication order there is no word as to how the extended period is invocable. As such we find that the extended period is not invocable in this case." 7. Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad vs. Bharat Yantra Nigam Ltd., 2014 (36) S.T.R. 554 (Tri.-Del.), wherein it has been observed as under : "We have considered the submissions of the learned DR and have gone through the records of this case. The respondent as holding company of their subsidiary companies as mentioned above, are monitoring their performance regularly and take timely corrective actions in case of slippages, provide technology upgradation plan, research and development plan, customer's project execution plan, etc., in order to diagnose the operational problems and provide solutions in time. The services being provided by the respondent are clearly covered by the definition of "Management Consultancy Services" under Section 65(65) of the Finance Act, 1994. The services being provided by the respondent are clearly covered by the definition of "Management Consultancy Services" under Section 65(65) of the Finance Act, 1994. We do not agree with the findings of the Additional Commissioner that there is no service provider and client relationship between the respondent and their subsidiaries, as the respondent as holding company and their subsidiary are independent entities. We find that same view has been taken by a Coordination Bench of the Tribunal in case of CST, Mumbai vs. Essel Corporate Services Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2014-TIOL-832-CESTAT-MUM . In view of this the impugned order setting aside the service tax demand is not correct. However, since the respondent are a public sector undertaking, the longer limitation of the case, the allegation of wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or deliberate contravention of the Rules to evade the payment of service tax, cannot be made against the respondent. Therefore, the service tax demand would be confined only to normal limitation period. In view of the circumstances of the case, the penalty also has to be waived by invoking Section 80." 5. We are of the considered opinion, the decision which was relied upon by the Tribunal was never challenged by the department and in view of the consistent practice that the decision which has been accepted by the department should be accepted for every assessee. 6. In that view of the matter, the issues are answered in favour of assessee and against the department. 7. The appeal stands dismissed.