JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. S.C. Chakrawarty, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. R. Sumer, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. K.S. Kynjing, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S.M. Suna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 & 2, Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. C.T. Sangma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 and Ms. P.S. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4. 2. The brief fact of the petitioner’s case in a nutshell is that: “The petitioner as well as the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 being citizens of India belonging to the Khasi Scheduled Tribe of Meghalaya, the petitioner as plaintiff instituted the Title Suit No. 8 of 2011 in the District Council Courts of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (hereinafter referred to as the KHADC for the sake of brevity) against the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 as the defendants, praying for certain declarations and permanent injunction, and in that suit the proforma respondent No. 4 abovenamed was impleaded as a proforma defendant against whom no relief was claimed. The case of the petitioner as the plaintiff in the said Title Suit No. 8 of 2011, is that, the petitioner is the Sordar of the Dympep Village whereof the boundaries had been recorded as far back as in the year 1943 by the respondent No. 3 in connection with the complaint by a resident of the village against three persons who had wanted to erect a boundary stone at Umdiengpoh. Also the most important historical structure of that village is the Dak Bungalow where the British Civil and Military Officers camped during the construction of the old Shillong Cherra Road and the link road from Lad Nongkrem to Khyrim Syiemship via Laitlyngkot. Being responsible for the administration, management and control for the entire village, the petitioner represents the general interest and the welfare of the village, its Dorbar and its people who are mostly cultivators by profession. Being responsible for the administration, management and control for the entire village, the petitioner represents the general interest and the welfare of the village, its Dorbar and its people who are mostly cultivators by profession. The respondent No. 3 issued a Purwana dated the 5th September and 20th October, 1970, in the nature of a public order, indicating the boundary between the Dympep village and the Mawkdok village, for the purpose of clearing up by fire the shrubs and bushes along that line, as per the custom, to prevent spread of accidental forest fires. As this amounted to being a new demarcation of the said boundary with a big portion of Dympep village being transferred to Mawkdok village, the Dympep village lodged a protest by their representation dated 29.10.1970 to the respondent No. 3 and eventually the said impugned Purwana was withdrawn and reversed by the respondent No. 3, restoring the right, title and possession over the disputed land of the Dympep village. The Mawkdok village authorities, that is the respondent No. 1 above named, assailed this decision of the respondent No. 3 in the Political Appeal No. 2 of 1979 before the proforma respondent No. 4, who by the Order dated 02.07.1979 remanded the matter back to the respondent No. 3 for a decision on merits. Subsequently, the respondent No. 3 recorded evidences, heard the parties and rendered a decision dated 18.02.1980 restoring the said disputed land to the Dympep village. Once again the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the proforma respondent No. 4 who, by the order dated 04.09.1984, once again remanded the matter back to the respondent No. 3, on the sole ground that there had been no physical verification of the boundary between the two villages. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 made several attempts for bringing about a compromise which did not work out, and the respondent No. 2 intervened in the matter. Eventually, the respondent No. 3 conducted the physical verification on 13.01.2001 and made an order dated 19.05.2001 whereby the claim of Mawkdok village was accepted. Being aggrieved the Dympep village preferred an appeal to the proforma respondent No. 4 who, by the order dated 19.12.2001, upheld the impugned order. Eventually, the respondent No. 3 conducted the physical verification on 13.01.2001 and made an order dated 19.05.2001 whereby the claim of Mawkdok village was accepted. Being aggrieved the Dympep village preferred an appeal to the proforma respondent No. 4 who, by the order dated 19.12.2001, upheld the impugned order. This was assailed by the Dympep village represented by the petitioner before Honourable The Gauhati High Court by filing the Writ Petition (C) No. 70 (SH) of 2002 and upon motion thereof the Honourable High Court also made an interim order on 05.04.2002. However, this writ petition was dismissed for the non prosecution thereon on 12.07.2005 and the application for restoration thereof along with an application for condonation of delay was also dismissed on 05.02.2010. As Honourable The Gauhati High Court had not given any decision on merits, so, the petitioner instituted the instant suit in the year 2011 praying for a judgment and decree. After the institution of the said Title Suit No. 8 (H) of 2011 by the petitioner, as plaintiff, and endorsement of the same in the Court of the Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Courts, at Shillong, summons were duly issued to the respondents above named, as defendants in the suit, and the respondents numbered 1 and 2 above named, duly appeared and filed their written statements contesting the suit. However, the respondent No. 3 above named, as the defendant No. 3 in the said suit, entered appearance, and, before filing his written statement, he filed an application stated to be analogous to Section 9 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on 21.10.2011, whereby the very maintainability of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the subject matter of the suit was challenged and as such it was prayed that the suit be dismissed or rejected. The Honourable trial Court of the Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court, at Shillong, duly heard the parties to the suit, through their respective counsels, on the said petition dated 21.10.2011, filed by the respondent No. 3, as the defendant No. 3 in the suit, and was pleased to make the order dated 21.12.2012 whereby the prayer of the defendant No. 3 that is the respondent No. 3 above named was rejected and he was directed to file his written statement on the next date. The respondent No. 3 above named thereafter filed an appeal stated to be under the rules 28 and 29 of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, as amended, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the Court of the Judge, District Council Court, Khasi Hills at Shillong, assailing the said order dated 21.12.2012 of the trial Court in the Title Suit No. 8 of 2011, and that appeal was registered and numbered as the Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2013. The Honourable Court of the Judge, District Council Court, KHADC, at Shillong, upon hearing the parties, was pleased to finally dispose off the said Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2013, by the impugned Judgment dated 27.05.2016, whereby it was held, inter alia, that the trial of the subject matter of the said Title Suit No. 8 of 2011 by the civil courts was barred in law whereupon the civil courts had no jurisdiction to try the matter and, as such the plaint was to be rejected in accordance with the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Being highly aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and having no other equally efficacious remedy available the humble petitioner above named is filing this instant petition”. 3. The learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that a Title Suit No. 8 of 2011was filed before the Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong where the defendant No. 3 in the said suit did not file their written statement inspite of giving ample opportunity. Thereafter, the matter was decided without the written statement. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong an appeal was preferred before the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong, who after hearing both the parties passed the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2016 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2013, wherein the learned Appellate Court observed that the civil court has no power to exercise the jurisdiction over the boundary dispute of the Elaka as it is govern by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Elaka) Act, 1991, which came into force in the year 2006. The learned Sr. The learned Sr. counsel also contended that the matter of jurisdiction is to be decided not only on the basis of law, but the Court should also take into consideration the question of facts. He also further contended that the Elaka Act, 1991 is not applicable as the cause of action arose before the enforcement of the Elaka Act, 1991and relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors v. Vikram Cement & Ors: (2008) 14 SCC 58 Para 76 and 77. Para 76 and 77 are reproduced herein below for ready reference: “76. This Court dealing with the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 (prior to the amendment Act of 1976) in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 , stated: (AIR pp. 502-03, para 18) "18. ……. Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court; not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit". “77. The Law Commission also considered the question and did not favour the tendency of deciding some issues as preliminary issues. Dealing with Rule 2 of Order 14 (before the amendment), the Commission stated; "This rule has led to one difficulty. “77. The Law Commission also considered the question and did not favour the tendency of deciding some issues as preliminary issues. Dealing with Rule 2 of Order 14 (before the amendment), the Commission stated; "This rule has led to one difficulty. Where a case can be disposed of on a preliminary point (issue) of law, often the courts do not inquire into the merits, with the result that when, on an appeal against the finding on the preliminary issue, the decision of the Court on that issue is reversed, the case has to be remanded to the Court of first instance for trial on the other issues. This causes delay. It is considered that this delay should be eliminated, by providing that a court must give judgment on all issues, excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or where the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force". 4. On contra, the learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 submits that initially a writ petition was moved before the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court sometime in the year 2002 and disposed of in the year 2005 for default. The learned Sr. counsel also submits that mere filing of the writ petition does not mean that the cause of action is prior to the Elaka Act, 1991 which came into force in the year 2006. He further submits that the Court is empowered to dismiss a plaint on the face of the plaint itself, for which the written statement is not necessary. On support of his submission, the learned Sr. counsel relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Aggarwal v. Haryana Financial Corporation & Ors: (2015) 4 SCC 371 Para 16 and submits that the Appellate Court of the District Council has rightly passed the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2016 referred above. Hence, the instant petition may be dismissed. Para 16 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below for ready reference: “16. An application for rejection of the plaint can be filed, if the allegations made in the plaint taken to be correct as a whole on its face value show the suit to be barred by any law. Hence, the instant petition may be dismissed. Para 16 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below for ready reference: “16. An application for rejection of the plaint can be filed, if the allegations made in the plaint taken to be correct as a whole on its face value show the suit to be barred by any law. The question as to whether a suit is barred by any law or not would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, for deciding this question, only the averments made in the plaint are relevant. Since the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and try the civil suit goes to the very root of the case and hence it can be raised at any time by the defendant by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. Indeed, this principle of law is well settled”. 5. The learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 & 2 also express the same view and prayed that the petition may be dismissed as the matter involves purely a boundary dispute. So, the civil court has no jurisdiction. He also relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in the case of U Lokendra v. U Driwell Myntry, the heir of Kendro, Ranick & Ors: ALR 1970 Assam & Nagaland 242 Para 7 and 9. Para 7 and 9 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below for ready reference: “7. The principal point for decision in this appeal, therefore, is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In order to appreciate this submission, it is necessary to find out the nature and character of the present suit. As set out earlier, although the suit is for declaration of the right, title and interest in respect of the suit property, yet the basis of the claim is undoubtedly by virtue of the plaintiff's exercising the rights and powers as a Siem of Jirang State. This fact clearly emerges from paragraph 1 of the plaint. Dr. Medhi contends that this is a right to property and as such a suit of civil nature cognizable by a civil court. It is difficult to appreciate this submission in view of the dispute between the two Siems regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the two Siemships. This fact clearly emerges from paragraph 1 of the plaint. Dr. Medhi contends that this is a right to property and as such a suit of civil nature cognizable by a civil court. It is difficult to appreciate this submission in view of the dispute between the two Siems regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the two Siemships. Such a territorial jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the civil court and such a dispute cannot be equated with a suit of civil nature”. “9. Turning to the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, we find under Paragraph 2(4) the administration of an autonomous district, in so far as it is not vested under the Schedule in any Regional Council, shall be vested in the District Council and under Paragraph 3 (1) the District Council has power to make laws with respect to the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen (Para 3 (1) (g)). Under Para 3(1) (g) the District Council has promulgated the United Khasi- Jaintia Hills Autonomous District, (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959 (Act, 11 of 1959), hereinafter called “the Act” which received the assent of the Governor of Assam on 16th October, 1959. Under section 2 (g) of the Act, “Elaka” means “any administrative unit in the District specified Appendices I, II and III or any other administrative unit to be constituted and declared as such by the Executive Committee”. Executive Committee is the Executive Committee of the District Council. In Appendix I, Nongkhlaw Siemship appears as item 12 and in Appendix II, Jirang heads that list. Hence these two Siemships amongst others are recognized as duly constituted under the above Act. Since fixation or alteration of boundary of Siemship will inevitably affect an “Elaka” and an „Elaka? is nothing but an administrative unit which may be constituted and declared by the Executive Committee, when it is necessary, under section 2 (g), any dispute regarding the territorial boundary of two contiguous Siemships is within the exclusive competence of the Executive Committee of the District Council. This conclusion follows from the provisions of the Sixth Schedule read with those of the Act, noticed above”. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 has not forwarded any submission. 7. This conclusion follows from the provisions of the Sixth Schedule read with those of the Act, noticed above”. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 has not forwarded any submission. 7. I have perused the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2016 passed by the learned Judge, District Council Court, Shillong in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2013 and found that the learned Court below has taken care of the issue of jurisdiction and referred to Section 5(1) of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Elaka) Act, 1991, wherein it is clearly mentioned that if a boundary dispute arises between two or more villages of the same Elaka, the dispute shall be referred by the village or villages concerned to the Chief and his Durbar for decision. The learned Court below also reproduced Section 5(2) of the said Act which reads as under: “An appeal against any order and decision of the Chief and his Durbar under Sub-Section (1) above, shall be preferred by the aggrieved party or parties, by a petition to the tribunal constituted by the Council for the purpose and the decision of the tribunal shall be final”. 8. After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as on perusal of the impugned judgment referred above, it is an undisputed fact that the main issue involve is a boundary dispute between the villages. If it is so, Section 5(1) of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Elaka) Act, 1991 as well as Section 5(2) of the said Act is applicable. It is also a fact that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any point of time, whether before the written statement or after the written statement. Therefore, I do not find any scope to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2016 passed by the learned Judge, District Council Court, Shillong in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2013. 9. Registry is directed to return back the Lower Court case record to the concerned Court along with a copy of this judgment and order. 10. Civil Revision Petition is dismissed and stands disposed of. 11. No order as to costs.