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2018 DIGILAW 720 (GAU)

H. T. RAMFANGZUAVA v. STATE OF MIZORAM

2018-05-01

M.R.PATHAK

body2018
JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused appellant and Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Mizoram. 2. This Criminal appeal from jail by the accused appellant Sh. H. T. Ramfangzauva is against the Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2017 and the sentence dated 04.08.2017, passed by learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl in Sessions Case No. 93/2015 corresponding to Criminal Trial No. 811/2015 arising out of West Phaileng Police Station Case No. 22/2014, wherein, the said accused person has been sentenced to 10 years of Rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine further sentenced for Simple Imprisonment for another 10 days observing that the detention period of the said accused person as an Under Trial Prisoner shall be set off from the total period of conviction and sentence. 3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this criminal appeal is that on being informed by the PW-4, a Member of the District Child Protection Unit of Mamit District, who was informed about the incident by PW-3, the elder sister of the minor victim girl, Ms. L., PW-2 (name and identity of the minor victim withheld), the Chairman of the District Child Welfare Committee, Mamit District, PW-1 on 15. 11.2014 lodged an FIR before the West Phaileng Police Station stating that the victim Ms. L. while sleeping at night was sexually molested by her own father, the accused appellant herein, by touching her private parts against her will and that the last of such incident had occurred on the night of 14.11.2014. The said FIR was accordingly registered as West Phaileng Police Station Case No. 22/2014 under Sections 376 (2) (f) IPC, read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. The said FIR was accordingly registered as West Phaileng Police Station Case No. 22/2014 under Sections 376 (2) (f) IPC, read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. While investigation the said West Phaileng P S Case No. 22/2014, the Investigation officer visited the place of occurrence, recorded the statement of the witnesses acquainted with the incident including the victim, her sister, the informant and others, got the victim medically examined, obtained her medical report, sent the victim to the Magistrate to record her confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C and obtained the copy of such confessional statement and after conclusion of the investigation, finding sufficient prima facie materials against the accused appellant under Section 376 (2) (f) of the IPC, read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, he filed the charge sheet in the said West Phaileng PS Case vide No. 11/2015 dated 16.04.2015. 5. As the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is exclusively triable by the Special Court under the provisions of said 2012 Act itself, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mamit District, Mamit by order dated 14.05.2015 committed the Criminal Trial No. 12/2015 to the Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, which was re-registered as Sessions Case No. 93/2015 before the said Special Court. After hearing the parties learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl by order dated 11.08.2015, passed in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 came to a finding that the accused person of the case being the father and the victim Ms. L being his biological daughter, the offence committed by the said accused falls under Section 5 (n) of the POCSO Act, 2012 and accordingly, framed charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act against him, which was read over and explained to him in Mizo language which is his own language, to which the accused person pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the trial of said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 proceeded. 6. The prosecution examined as many as 7 (seven) witnesses including the informant, the victim, sister of the victim, social worker under Mamit District Child Protection Unit (DCPU) , the Medical Officer who examined and gave medical report of the victim as well as the concerned Investigating Officer of the case, who were cross-examined by the defense on behalf of the accused person. After completion of recording of prosecution witnesses, the statement of the accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded in which he denied all the allegations made by the prosecution against him and stated before the learned Special Judge that as he was consuming drinks, his eldest daughter complained the matter before the Child Protection Unit, who scolded him and advised him not to take drinks. The said accused person did not lead any evidence from his side to defend him except cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. Considering the above, the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl passed the impugned judgment & order and sentence in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015. 7. It is seen that the accused appellant is a Government employee, who was arrested on 16.11.2014 in said West Phaileng P.S Case No. 22/2014 and later he was released on bail on 02.03.2015 in terms of an order passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl in Bail application No. 184/2015. However, the said accused was re-arrested and forwarded to the jail custody pursuant to the impugned judgment & order dated 25.07.2017 and the order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 and since then he is in jail serving the sentence. 8. Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused appellant by placing the impugned judgment & order and sentence brought to the notice of the Court that the same is without discussing any reasons, without any recording of conviction and that the sentence imposed upon the accused appellant is also without citing the appropriate section and therefore, Mr. Ralte submitted that the impugned Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2017 as well as the order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 passed in said Sessions Case No. 93/2017 being bad in law should be set aside and quashed, acquitting the accused appellant. On the other hand Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that though the impugned Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2017 and sentence dated 04.08.2017 is not in conformity with the provisions of POCSO Act, 2012 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the said Sessions Case No. 93/2017 may be remanded back for fresh consideration of the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, without acquitting the accused appellant at this stage. Submissions made by the learned counsels for both the parties are considered. 9. Submissions made by the learned counsels for both the parties are considered. 9. It is seen that the learned Special Court though noted the statement of the prosecution witnesses, their cross-examination by the defence and the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C in the impugned Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2017 and sentence dated 04.08.2017 in said Sessions Case No. 93/2017 but, the said Court did not record anything about the conviction nor any reasons for such conviction and fixed the matter on 04.08.2017 for sentence hearing. From the perusal of the order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 passed in Sessions Case No. 93/2017, it is seen that thought the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl in said Sessions Case No. 93/2017 sentenced the accused appellant to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine further Simple Imprisonment for 10 days, setting out the period detention of the said accused during the trial of the case, but the said Court even in the order of sentence did not record the offence under which the accused appellant has been sentenced for 10 years of Rigorous Imprisonment with fine. 10. Conviction and Judgment are not defined in the POCSO Act, 2012. As per Blacks Law Dictionary Conviction means The act of process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty. The judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime. Further, the said Dictionary defines Judgment of Conviction means the written record of a criminal judgment, consisting of a plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication, and the sentence. Moreover, the Blacks Law Dictionary defines Sentence on Criminal Law defines that the judgment that a Court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer. 11. Moreover, the Blacks Law Dictionary defines Sentence on Criminal Law defines that the judgment that a Court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer. 11. Chapter VII of the POCSO Act, 2012 consisting of Sections 28 & 29 relate to Special Court where Section 28 of the Act relates to Designation of Special Courts and sub-Section (1) of said Section 28 provides that - (1) For the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the State Government shall in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate for each district, a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act: Provided that if a Court of Session is notified as a children's court under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special Court designated for similar purposes under any other law for the time being in force, then, such court shall be deemed to be a Special Court under this section. 12. Section 31 of the POCSO Act, 2012 provides for Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court which is read as follows: 31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 13. Chapter VIII of the POCSO Act, 2012 relates to Procedure and Power of Special Courts and Recording of Evidence and sub-Section (9) to the Section 33 of said Chapter VIII provides that "33. 13. Chapter VIII of the POCSO Act, 2012 relates to Procedure and Power of Special Courts and Recording of Evidence and sub-Section (9) to the Section 33 of said Chapter VIII provides that "33. (9) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Special Court shall, for the purpose of the trial of any offence under this Act, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session, and as far as may be, in accordance with the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial before a Court of Session." 14. Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to Trial before a Court of Session consisting of Sections 225 to 237, where Section 225 relates to Trial to be conducted by Public Prosecutor, Section 226 relates to Opening case for prosecution, Section 227 relates to Discharge, Section 228 relates to Framing of charge, Section 229 relates to Conviction on plea of guilty, Section 230 relates to Date for prosecution evidence, Section 231 relates to Evidence for prosecution, Section 232 relates to Acquittal, Section 233 relates to Entering upon defence, Section 234 relates to Arguments, Section 235 relates to Judgment of acquittal or conviction, Section 236 relates to Previous conviction and Section 237 relates to Procedure in cases instituted under Section 199 (2) . Section 235 of the Cr.P.C that relates to Judgment of acquittal or conviction reads as follows: 235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. (1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. (2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360 hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law. 15. Chapter XXVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure consisting of Sections 353 to 365 relates to Judgment and it provides that 353. Judgment. (1). The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open court by the presiding officer immediately after the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. Judgment. (1). The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open court by the presiding officer immediately after the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. (a) By delivering the whole of the judgment: or (b) By reading out the whole of the judgment: or (c) By reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language, which is understood by the accused or his pleader. (2) Where the judgment is delivered under clause (a) of sub-section (I) , the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken down in short hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as it is made ready, and write on it the date of the delivery of the judgment in open Court. (3) Where the judgment or the operative part thereof is read out under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1), as the case may be, it shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open court and if it is not written with his own hand, every page of the judgment shall be signed by him. (4) Where the judgment is pronounced in the manner specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1), he whole judgment or a copy thereof shall be immediately made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of cost. (5) If the accused is in custody, he shall be brought up to hear the judgment pronounced. (6) If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted: Provided that, where there are more accused than one, and one or more of them do not attend the court on the date on which the judgment is to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in order to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce the judgment notwithstanding their absence. (7) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any omission to serve, or defect in serving, on the parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day and place. (8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way the extent of the provisions of section 465. 16. Section 354 of the Cr.P.C provides for language and contents of judgment, which is as follows: 354. Language and contents of judgment. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, every judgment referred to in section 353, - (a) Shall be written in the language of the court; (b) Shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; (c) Shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced; (d) If it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty. (2) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section, of that Code the offence falls, the court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative. (3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. (4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year of more, but the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence, unless the sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the court or unless the case was tried summarily under the provisions of this Code. (5) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead. (6) Every order under section 117 or sub-section (2) of section 138 and every final order made under section 125, section 145 or section 147 shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. 17. As such, reading the provisions of Sections 31 and 33 (9) of the POCSO Act, 2012 with relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Special Courts under POCSO Act, 2012 is required to give judgment following the provisions of the Sections 235, 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C. 18. A three Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court in a criminal matter with regard to "Judgment" in the case of Surendra Singh -Vs- State of U.P., reported in AIR 1954 SC 194 , have observed that for it is the "judgment" which decides the case and affects the rights and liberties of the parties, that is the core of the matter, where their Lordships further held that "10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open Court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there; that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it he vague. All the rest - the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainly about its content and matter - can be cured; but not the hard core, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection. 11. An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open Court. But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the Court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the Court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges may and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts. Those are not the judgment either, however heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open Court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court. That is what constitutes the "judgment"." 19. In the case of State of Punjab -Vs- Jagir Singh, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 277 , the Honble Supreme Court have held that "A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to ones imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." 20. In the case of Iqbal Ismail Sodawala -Vs- State of Maharashtra, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 140 , the Honble Supreme Court have observed that ".The judgment in every trial in any criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced or the substance of such judgment shall be explained in open court either immediately after the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders, and in the language of the Court, or in some other language which the accused or his pleader understands, provided that the whole judgment shall be read out by the presiding Judge, if he is requested so to do either by the prosecution or the defence. Every such judgment shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, be written by the presiding officer of the Court or from the dictation of such presiding officer in the language of the Court, or in English; and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; and shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open court, at the time of pronouncing it and where it is not written by the presiding officer with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by him. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplate that the judgment should be complete in all other respects by the time it is pronounced and all that need be done is that the presiding officer should insert the date and append his signature to it at the time of the pronouncement. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplate that the judgment should be complete in all other respects by the time it is pronounced and all that need be done is that the presiding officer should insert the date and append his signature to it at the time of the pronouncement. The requirement about the completion of the judgment and of its signing at the time of its pronouncement is rooted in the consideration that a copy of the judgment has to be supplied to the accused without delay after its pronouncement. The Code of Criminal Procedure is essentially a code of procedure and like all procedural law, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. At the same time it has to be borne in mind that it is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule of law and rule by whim and caprice. The object of the Code is to ensure for the accused a full and fair trial in accordance with the principles of natural justice. If there be substantial compliance with the requirements of law, a mere procedural irregularity would not vitiate the trial unless the same results in miscarriage of justice. In all procedural laws certain things are vital. Disregard of the provisions in respect of them would prove fatal to the trial and would invalidate the conviction. There are, however, other requirements which are not so vital. Non-compliance with them would amount to an irregularity which would be curable unless it has resulted in a failure of justice." 21. Another three Judges Bench of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Rama Narang -Vs- Ramesh Narang, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 513 have held as follows: "12. Chapter XVIII relates to trial before a Court of Session. Sections 225 to 227 relate to the stage prior to the framing of charge. Section 228 provides for the framing of charge against the accused person. If after the charge is framed the accused pleads guilty, Section 229 provides that the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. However, if he does not enter a plea of guilty, Sections 230 and 231 provide for leading of prosecution evidence. Section 228 provides for the framing of charge against the accused person. If after the charge is framed the accused pleads guilty, Section 229 provides that the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. However, if he does not enter a plea of guilty, Sections 230 and 231 provide for leading of prosecution evidence. If, on the completion of the prosecution evidence and examination of the accused, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence with which he is charged, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal. If the Judge does not record an acquittal under Section 232, the accused would have to be called upon to enter on his defence as required by Section 233. After the evidence-in-defence is completed and the arguments heard as required by Section 234, Section 235 requires the Judge to give a judgment in the case. If the accused is convicted, sub-section (2) of Section 235 requires that the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. It will thus be seen that under the Code after the conviction is recorded, Section 235 (2) inter alia provides that the Judge shall hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. The trial, therefore, comes to an end only after the sentence is awarded to the convicted person. 13. Chapter XXVII deals with judgment. Section 354 sets out the contents of judgment. It says that every judgment referred to in Section 353 shall, inter alia, specify the offence (if any) of which and the section of the Indian Penal Code or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. Thus a judgment is not complete unless the punishment to which the accused person is sentenced is set out therein. Section 356 refers to the making of an order for notifying address of previously convicted offender. Section 357 refers to an order in regard to the payment of compensation. Section 359 provides for an order in regard to the payment of costs in non-cognizable cases and Section 360 refers to release on probation of good conduct. Section 356 refers to the making of an order for notifying address of previously convicted offender. Section 357 refers to an order in regard to the payment of compensation. Section 359 provides for an order in regard to the payment of costs in non-cognizable cases and Section 360 refers to release on probation of good conduct. It will thus be seen from the above provisions that after the court records a conviction, the accused has to be heard on the question of sentence and it is only after the sentence is awarded that the judgment becomes complete and can be appealed against under Section 374 of the Code. 15. Under the provisions of the Code to which we have already referred there are two stages in a criminal trial before a Sessions Court, the stage up to the recording of a conviction and the stage post-conviction up to the imposition of sentence. A judgment becomes complete after both these stages are covered. Under Section 374 (2) of the Code any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge may appeal to the High Court. Section 384 provides for summary dismissal of appeal if the Appellate Court does not find sufficient ground to entertain the appeal. If, however, the appeal is not summarily dismissed, the Court must cause notice to issue as to the time and place at which such appeal will be heard. Section 389 (1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does order in Section 389 (1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Section 357 or Section 360 of the Code? Obviously the order referred to in Section 389 (1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. Since the order of conviction does not on the mere filing of an appeal disappear it is difficult to accept the submission that Section 267 of the Companies Act must be read to apply only to a final order of conviction. Such an interpretation may defeat the very object and purpose for which it came to be enacted." 22. The Honble Apex Court in the case of Yakub Abdul Rajak Memon & Others -Vs- State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 13 SCC 1 have held that "Generally a judgment must be complete and it must have points for determination, decision thereon and reasons for such a decision. The basic requirement for such ingredients appears to be that the superior court (appellate/revisional) may be able to examine as to whether the judgment under challenge has been rendered in accordance with law and particularly, based on evidence on record. So, the purpose of recording reasons is to facilitate the superior court to examine the correctness of the judgment of the courts below." 23. Referring the judgments of the Federal Court in the Cases of Hori Ram Singh -Vs- Crown, reported in (1939) 1 FCR 159 : AIR 1939 FC 43, S. Kuppuswami Rao v. R., reported in (1947) 9 FCR 180 : AIR 1949 FC 1, their Lordships in the said case of Yakub Abdul Rajak Memon (supra) have held that Judgment indicates the termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of the accused and judgment is to be rendered in strict adherence to the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code (Criminal Procedure Code) . 24. In the said case of Yakub Abdul Rajak Memon (supra) the Honble Supreme Court have held that "89. In view of the provisions of Section 354 of the Code, it is necessary that every judgment must contain: (1) the points for determination; (2) the decision thereon; and (3) the reasons for such decision. Where the reasons given by the trial court are such as cannot be supported by the evidence on record, they are not reasons for the decision. Where the reasons given by the trial court are such as cannot be supported by the evidence on record, they are not reasons for the decision. To constitute a legal appreciation of evidence, the judgment should be such as to indicate that the court has applied its mind to it. Every portion of the judgment must indicate application of mind by the court to the evidence on record. The reason for the decision is an important ingredient of a judgment. Compliance with the law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real, for it is this part of the judgment alone which enables the higher court to appreciate the correctness of the decision, the parties to feel that the court has fully and impartially considered their respective cases and the public to realise that a genuine and sincere attempt has been made to mete out even-handed justice. Reasons form the substratum of the decision and their factual accuracy is a guarantee that the court has applied its mind to the evidence in the case. Where the statement of reasons turned out to be a mere hollow pretension of a baseless claim of application of mind by the court, the judgment is robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits its claim to be termed as judgment in the eye of the law." "97. It is clear that "judgment" is a formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declare in a judicial way in open court. In other words, it is a declaration of the mind of the court at the time of pronouncement. It is also clear that passing sentence without recording the judgment would amount to illegality. Pronouncing sentence before completing the judgment, that is, before preparing the essential part makes the sentence illegal and vitiates the conviction." 25. In other words, it is a declaration of the mind of the court at the time of pronouncement. It is also clear that passing sentence without recording the judgment would amount to illegality. Pronouncing sentence before completing the judgment, that is, before preparing the essential part makes the sentence illegal and vitiates the conviction." 25. In the case of Prem Kaur -Vs- State of Punjab & Others, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 653 , the Honble Supreme Court have held that the trial court should decide the case giving adherence to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that the provisions of the said Code provide for a particular procedure and style to be followed while delivering a judgment in a criminal case and such format includes a reference to the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision and held that "As pronouncing a final order without a reasoned judgment may not be valid, having sanctity in the eye of the law, the judgment must show proper application of the mind of the Presiding Officer of the court, and that there was proper evaluation of all the evidence on record, and the conclusion is based on such appreciation/evaluation of evidence. Thus, every court is duty-bound to state reasons for its conclusions. A decision does not merely mean the conclusion — it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the conclusions. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be laid down that the court must give reasons for reaching its conclusions." 26. With regard to the case in hand, it is seen that though the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, 2012, by the impugned judgment and Order dated 25.07.2017 and sentence dated 04.08.2017, as passed in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015, mentioned the deposition of the various prosecution witnesses, both evidence in chief as well as their cross-examination and also the statement of the accused appellant made under Section 313 Cr.P.C., but it has not disclosed anything about the arguments made by the prosecution and the defence before the Special Court; the points for determination; the decision thereon; recording of acquittal or conviction of the guilty of the crime with which he was charged and the reasons for such decision. 27. 27. Moreover, in the impugned order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 passed in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015, the learned Special Court did not specify the provision under which the accused appellant has been sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- without stating the reasons for reaching the said conclusions that too without recording any conviction and without specifying the particular offence for his such punishment. 28. With regard to the case in hand, the learned Special Court was dealing with a heinous crime of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the provisions of the POCSO Act, 2012, that was allegedly committed by the own father with his minor daughter, which requires to be effectively addressed. But from the impugned judgment & Order dated 25.07.2017 and the order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 it is seen that the learned Special Court passed the same without complying with the requirement of the statutory provisions as laid down in the POCSO Act, 2012 as well as in the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby the learned Trial Court dealt the matter injudiciously and indiscreetly, leading to miscarriage of justice, which is a non est in the eye of law, where the appellate Court cannot determine the legality, correctness and propriety of the same. In any event, the learned Special Court has clearly contravened the imperative provisions contained in Sections 235 and 353 of the Criminal Procedure Code by passing the sentence without recording the judgment in the case as per established law and thereby acted illegally. 29. For the reasons above, the impugned judgment & order dated 25.07.2017 and the order of sentence dated 04.08.2017 passed by learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl passed in said Sessions Case No. 93/2015, being bad in law, cannot sustain and accordingly it is set aside and quashed, remanding the same to said Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl for its fresh disposal by writing a fresh judgment, recording the findings, in accordance with law, giving the reasons for reaching its conclusions, on the basis of evidence and material already available on record, with the observation that the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial shall passes such judgment in the said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 on or before 14th July, 2018. 30. 30. However, it is made clear that as this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merit of the case, learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl while disposing the said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 shall not take into consideration of any such observation made in this order. 31. Considering the entire aspect of the matter, the accused person of said Sessions Case No. 93/2015 may be released on fresh bail by the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl on such terms and conditions as the said Court deems fit and proper, securing his presence in the said Sessions Case, on the dates fixed. 32. The Registry of this Court shall return the LCR pertaining to the Sessions Case 93/2015 to the learned Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, along with a copy of this Order forthwith, by a Special Messenger and shall obtain necessary acknowledgment in that regard. 33. The service rendered by both, Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused appellant as well as by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mizoram, Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, in adjudicating this appeal are appreciated. On raising his bill, the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority, Aizawl shall pay an amount of Rs. 7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred only) to Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae, appeared on behalf of the accused appellant towards his hearing fee, at an early date. 34. Accordingly, this criminal appeal stands allowed, to the extent above.