JUDGMENT & ORDER : R. Subhash Reddy, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is filed by the original petitioners, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, aggrieved by the order dated 20.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.22653 of 2017. 2. By the aforesaid order, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition filed by the appellants, by relegating them to avail alternative remedy of appeal, as contemplated under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 3. Necessary Facts, In Brief, For Disposal of this appeal, are as under: 3.1 The consortium of banks comprising of Bank of India(BOI) , Punjab National Bank(PNB) , Central Bank of India(CBI), Axis Bank, State Bank of India(SBI) , Rajkot Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. (RNSBL), Bank of Baroda(BOB) and United Bank of India(UBI) with Bank of India as a lead bank of the consortium, from time to time, granted various credit facilities aggregating to an amount of Rs.582, 25, 00, 000/- to M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd., which is the principal borrower. M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd. is a company engaged in the business of trading detergent raw materials, chemicals and other products. The appellants herein, who are guarantors, executed Letter of Guarantee, guaranteeing the due repayment of the said credit facilities availed by the principal borrower. The appellants mortgaged their properties, creating security interest in favour of the banks. When the principal debtor i.e. M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd. defaulted in repayment of loan amount under the credit facility, the member banks of Consortium have classified accounts of M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd. as NonPerforming Assets(NPA) with effective dates as mentioned in the notice dated 3.6.2017 issued under section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. When the appellants failed to discharge their liabilities to the Consortium of Banks, the respondent has taken further steps under the Securitization Act. When the appellants failed to discharge their liabilities to the Consortium of Banks, the respondent has taken further steps under the Securitization Act. 3.2 When further measures were taken under the provisions of the Securitization Act, the appellants, who are the guarantors to the credit facilities availed by principal borrower namely, M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd., have filed the petition with the following prayers, which read as under: "(a) YOUR Lord-SHIPS BE PLEASED to issue any order, direction or writ in the nature of prohibition or any other writ to quash and set aside the impugned demand notice dated 03.06.2017, at Annexure C to this petition, issued by the Respondent bank under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as being illegal, without jurisdiction and without authority of law and to issue any appropriate order, direction or writ in the nature of prohibition or any other writ to quash and set aside the same in the interest of justice. (b) YOUR Lord-SHIPS BE PLEASED to issue any order, direction or writ in the nature of prohibition or any other writ to quash and set aside the entire action and all steps taken by the Respondent bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the Petitioners including the auction notice dated 23.11.2017, annexed at Annexure E(Colly), scheduling the eauction on 27.12.2017 and all subsequent steps as being illegal, without jurisdiction and without authority of law and to issue any appropriate order, direction or writ in the nature of prohibition or any other writ to quash and set aside the same in the interest of justice. (c) YOUR Lord-SHIPS BE PLEASED to stay all steps and action taken by the Respondent bank under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in pursuance of the demand notice dated 03.06.2017, including all further steps such as the eauction scheduled to be held on 27.12.2017 qua the petitioners pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition. (d) YOUR LordSHIPS BE PLEASED to grant ex-parte ad-interim stay in terms of para (c) as stated hereinabove. (e) YOUR Lord-SHIPS BE PLEASED to pass such other and further orders, which may be deemed fit in the interest of justice. 3.3 The learned Single Judge, vide impugned order dated 20.12.2017, by relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank Vs. (e) YOUR Lord-SHIPS BE PLEASED to pass such other and further orders, which may be deemed fit in the interest of justice. 3.3 The learned Single Judge, vide impugned order dated 20.12.2017, by relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366 , Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782 and United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has declined to entertain the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by observing that, the appellants have effective alternative remedy under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 4. Heard Mr. Percy Kavina, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Aditya A. Gupta, learned advocate for the appellants and Mr. K.M. Parikh, learned counsel for the respondent-bank. 5. In This Appeal, Mr. Percy Kavina, Learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Aditya A.Gupta, learned advocate for the appellants has mainly contended that, though the appellants have sought the Writ of Prohibition against the respondent to prohibit proceeding further under the provisions of the Securitization Act, the learned Single Judge has committed error, by relegating the appellants, to appeal remedy under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. It is submitted that, consortium of lender banks appointed M/s PNB Investment Services Limited as their Security Trustee and Deed of Mortgage came to be created on 29.3.2014 in favour of Security Trustee, as such, the respondent cannot be termed as a secured creditor within the meaning of section 2(zd) of the Securitization Act. It is submitted that, as per the Mortgage Deed, it is only the Security Trustee M/s PNB Investment Services Limited, which could be denoted as a mortgagee. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the definition of section 2(zd) the SARAFAESI Act. It is submitted that, when the respondent is taking steps without any authority of law and jurisdiction, the aggrieved person can approach this Court, by seeking a Writ of Prohibition. In such event, availability of alternative remedy cannot be the reason to reject the petition filed, questioning the authority of the respondent in taking steps under the SARAFAESI Act. It is submitted that, when the respondent is taking steps without any authority of law and jurisdiction, the aggrieved person can approach this Court, by seeking a Writ of Prohibition. In such event, availability of alternative remedy cannot be the reason to reject the petition filed, questioning the authority of the respondent in taking steps under the SARAFAESI Act. The learned Senior Counsel has also placed additional material papers in this appeal, which are printouts obtained from the web-site of Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India, to buttress his submission that, charge is created in favour of M/s PNB Investment Services Ltd., which is the Security Trustee. It is submitted that, when there is no charge created to secure repayment of loan in favour of the respondent bank, the respondent cannot initiate proceedings under the Securitization Act. 6. On the other hand, Mr. K.M. Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent bank has submitted that, every contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants can be raised before the appellate authority. He has submitted that, in view of the documents executed in favour of the respondent bank, it cannot be said that the respondent is not a secured creditor, within the meaning of section 2(zd) of the Securitisation Act. It is submitted that, inclusion of word "any other trustee" in clause (v) of Section 2(zd) of the Securitisation Act, 2002 does not take away the statutory and contractual rights of other classes of creditors, as defined in clause (i) of Section 2(zd) of the Securitisation Act, 2002. It is submitted that, interpretation, which is sought to be given by the appellants will run contrary to the true intent, spirit and object of the Securitisation Act, 2002. 7. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent bank in this Letters Patent Appeal, the case of the respondent bank is stated in paras 12 and 13 as under: "12. I humbly submit that on perusal of the Security Trustee Agreement dated 09/10/2013 executed by & between M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd. as Borrower, the Lenders i.e. BOI Consortium and PNB Investment Services Ltd. as Security Trustee, wherein "Secured Parties" includes the lenders and the lender's agent and also includes other lenders as defined on Page No.79 of the Paper book of present LPA. It is interesting to note that Mortgagor No.1 to 5 of Ninth Supplemental Indenture of Mortgage dated 29/03/2014 registered at Sr.No.2167 dated 31/03/2014 are not parties to the Signatory of Security Trustee Agreement dated 09/10/2013 and therefore, Mortgagor No.1 to 5 cannot take shelter of the said Security Trustee Agreement dated 09/10/2013 so as to avoid repayment of Secured Debts to the Res. Bank and have no legal right to take shelter of such Security Trustee Agreement dated 09/10/2013 in support of their various contentions taken in present LPA and therefore also, present LPA deserves to be dismissed summarily and interim relief granted earlier requires to be vacated forthwith. 13. I humbly submit that Clause 5.3.4(c) (u) (Page No.95 of the Paper book of present LPA), which clearly supports case of the Res. Bank than Appellants. I humbly submit that there is a clear proviso in the said clause which clearly supports the action already taken/initiated by Res. Bank against present appellants and therefore also, present LPA deserves to be dismissed summarily. Admittedly, in this case, Res. Bank have already initiated action under the provisions of Securitization Act, 2002 and therefore, Security Trustee shall not be entitle to take measures under the Securitization Act, 2002 as canvassed by Appellants in this LPA. I crave leave of this Hon'ble Court to refer to read over and rely upon the various relevant clauses of Security Trustee Agreement dated 09/10/2013 at the time of hearing of present LPA before this Hon'ble Court in support of the stand taken by Res. Bank in this reply." 8. By taking us to other material on record, it is submitted by Mr. Parikh, learned counsel for the respondent-bank that, in view of the huge credit facilities availed by the principal borrower, when the said borrower has defaulted in repaying the loan amount, the accounts were declared as NonPerforming Assets and necessary measures were taken under the provisions of the Securitisation Act, 2002. It is submitted that, though there is an effective alternative remedy under section 17 of the Securitisation Act, 2002, this writ petition is filed only to curtail the due process undertaken by the respondent under the Securitisation Act. It is submitted that, in view of the detailed findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in this appeal. 9. It is submitted that, in view of the detailed findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in this appeal. 9. The Appellants Herein Are the Guarantors for the credit facilities extended by the Consortium of Banks and the respondent bank is a lead bank. It is the case of the respondent bank that, huge amount is due and all the accounts in the Banks of Consortium were declared as Non-Performing Assets and proceedings are initiated under the Securitisation Act. A perusal of the demand notice issued under section 13(2) of the Act reveals that the appellants were called upon to discharge the liability of all the Consortium Banks for a total sum of Rs.523,60,42,751=65/-. It is not in dispute that, initially, the appellants have executed documents of mortgage in favour of the respondent bank and there are supplementary documents in favour of the Security Trustee. It is the case of the respondent that the word "any other trustee" used in clause (v) of section 2(zd) of the Securitisation Act, 2002 does not take away the statutory and contractual rights of other class of creditors, as defined in clause (i) of Section 2(zd) of the Act. It is also the case of the respondent bank that mortgagor Nos.1 to 5 of Ninth Supplemental Indenture of Mortgage dated 29/3/2014 are not parties to the Security Trustee Agreement dated 9/10/2013. It is their case that, in absence of there being parties to the Security Trustee Agreement dated 9/10/2013, mortgagor Nos.1 to 5 cannot take shelter of the Security Trustee Agreement. It is their case that, in absence of there being parties to the Security Trustee Agreement dated 9/10/2013, mortgagor Nos.1 to 5 cannot take shelter of the Security Trustee Agreement. Further, it is apt to extract the definition of "secured creditor", as defined under section 2(zd) of the Securitisation Act, 2002, as under: "2(zd) secured creditor" means (i) any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions holding any right, title or interest upon any tangible asset or intangible asset as specified in clause (l) ; (ii) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or financial institution; or (iii) an asset reconstruction company whether acting as such or managing a trust set up by such asset reconstruction company for the securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may be; or (iv) debenture trustee registered with the Board appointed by any company for secured debt securities; or (v) any other trustee holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution, in whose favour security interest is created by any borrower for due repayment of any financial assistance." Definition of section 2(zd) is substituted by Amending Act 44 of 2016. After amendment, the definition of "secured creditor" reads as under: ""secured creditor" means any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions and includes (i) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or financial institution; or (ii) securitisation company or reconstruction company, whether acting as such or managing a trust set up by such securitisation company or reconstruction company for the securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may be; or (iii) any other trustee holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution, in whose favour security interest is created for due repayment by any borrower of any financial assistance." 10. From the above definition, "secured creditor" includes any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions holding any right, title or interest upon any tangible asset or intangible asset as specified in clause (l) . It is the plea of the respondent that, in view of the definition clause, they still continue as "secured creditor". It is the plea of the respondent that, in view of the definition clause, they still continue as "secured creditor". It is also the case of the respondent that, in view of the documents executed in favour of the respondent bank, they continue to hold the charge of the properties, which are created as security interest to secure the loan advanced to the principal debtor, i.e. M/s Ardor International Pvt. Ltd. In view of such contentious issues, which are raised, we are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that there is no reason to entertain the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when there is an effective alternative remedy by way of appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, under section 17 of the Securitisation Act. It is time and again held that, unless there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction to the authority, who initiated proceedings, no writ can be issued by way of prohibition, interdicting the authorities in prohibiting further. When the appellants rely on certain documents in support of their case, such documentary evidences also can be produced before the appellate authority. 11. In the case of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even the post section 13(4) stage also can be challenged by way of appeal before the appellate forum. 12. In the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4) , which would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, d providing for an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 13. In the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 17 of the judgment as under: "17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. 13. In the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 17 of the judgment as under: "17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) . The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasijudicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute." 14. It Is True That, There Are Exceptions To allow to bypass the remedy of appeal in specified circumstances, where there is a total lack of jurisdiction or when the proceedings initiated are in violation of principles of natural justice. It Is True That, There Are Exceptions To allow to bypass the remedy of appeal in specified circumstances, where there is a total lack of jurisdiction or when the proceedings initiated are in violation of principles of natural justice. Having regard to the contentious issues raised by the parties, we are of the view that, it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by the respondent lack inherent jurisdiction. Further, it is also not a case of violation of principles of natural justice to allow to bypass the remedy available by way of appeal before the appellate authority. The remedy available under section 17 of the Securitisation Act is a statutory remedy under the special Statute, scope of which is larger, which enables the parties to lead the evidence, by going into facts, which are not in the domain of writ jurisdiction. Further, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge, the rule of alternative remedy has to be applied with great rigour in disputes arising out of commercial matters. 15. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, we are of the view that, there is no error committed by the learned Single Judge so as to interfere with the order dated 20.12.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No.22653 of 2017. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is devoid of merits and is dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. However, we make it clear that all the issues, which are raised in the appeal, are left open to be decided by the appellate authority, in the event of any appeal is preferred, questioning the order passed by the respondent bank. In such event, the issues, which arise for consideration, to be decided independently, uninfluenced by the order passed by this Court. Consequently, Civil Applications also stand disposed of.