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2018 DIGILAW 723 (ALL)

SHIV RAJ SINGH v. STATE OF Uttar Pradesh

2018-03-28

NEERAJ TIWARI, RAN VIJAY SINGH

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Neeraj Tiwari, J.—We have heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for State-respondents. Pleadings are exchanged and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is being decided at the admission stage itself. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the orders dated 6.8.2009, 5.12.2009 and 10.9.2010 passed by Superintdent of Police, Lalitpur, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jhansi Range, Jhansi and Additional Director General of Police, Telecommunication, Uttar Pradesh Police Radio Headquarters, Lucknow respectively. 3. The facts of this case in brief are that the petitioner was appointed as constable in civil police on 1.8.1994 and from time to time he was posted at different places. In the year 2008, he was posted at district Lalitpur. However, vide order dated 7.10.2008 passed by Deputy Inspector General (Establishment) Uttar Pradesh Police Headquarters, Allahabad, petitioner was transferred from district Lalitpur to district Sonbhadra. Pursuant thereto he has joined at the transferred place i.e. Sonbhadra on 14.10.2008. In between transfer and relieving i.e. between 7.10.2008 to 13.10.2008, petitioner was placed under suspension under contemplation of departmental proceeding. Suspension order was passed on the allegation of absuing the persons near District Hospital Lalitpur on 9.10.2008 on account of consumption of liquor. On the same day, he was also subjected to medical examination at District Hospital, Lalitpur. In medical report, it is mentioned that he had consumed liquor but was not in an intoxicated position. It is also stated in the medical report that he was fully conscious, talking and behaving normally. Eyes were normal, reactivite to light and could walk on straight line. However smell was found alcoholic. 4. A preliminary enquiry was conducted and on the basis of preliminary enquiry dated 17.10.2008, departmental charge-sheet dated 7.12.2008 was issued to the petitioner by the enquiry officer at Lalitpur. One Mr. Ram Narain, Enquiry Officer/Circle Officer, Narahat, Lalitpur has concluded enquiry and submitted enquiry report dated 25.6.2009 recommending the dismissal of the petitioner from service. After receiving the enquiry report, Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur issued show-cause notice dated 4.7.2009 directing the petitioner to submit his reply within 15 days. It appears that instead of submitting reply, petitioner has submitted a representation on 17.7.2009 and sought time for submission of proper reply, but no reply was submitted by the petitioner. After receiving the enquiry report, Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur issued show-cause notice dated 4.7.2009 directing the petitioner to submit his reply within 15 days. It appears that instead of submitting reply, petitioner has submitted a representation on 17.7.2009 and sought time for submission of proper reply, but no reply was submitted by the petitioner. Thereafter, Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur proceeded to pass an order dated 6.8.2010 dismissing the petitioner from service. 5. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the petitioner has preferred an Appeal dated 27.10.2009 before Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jhansi under Rule 20 of Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (herein after referred as Rules, 1991). Appeal of the petitioner was rejected on 5.12.2009. Against that under Rule 23 of Rules 1991, the petitioner has filed revision before Additional Director General of Police, Telecommunication, Uttar Pradesh Lucknow. 6. The case of the petitioner is that Revisional order dated 10.9.2010 was not provided to him therefore he has filed Writ Petition No. 65252 of 2011 for expeditious disposal of Revision and only thereafter in the month of December, 2011, he was supplied the copy of Revisional order. 7. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, petitioner has preferred Claim Petition No. 848 of 2012 (Shiv Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others) before State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. In the claim petition, State authorities have filed counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit has also filed by the petitioner and ultimately claim petition was dismissed by the Tribunal vide judgement and order dated 7.10.2013. 8. Aggrieved by the orders passed by different Respondents as well as Tribunal, petitioner has preferred present Writ Petition. 9. Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel while assailing the aforesaid orders submitted that for one disciplinary proceeding against an officer at a given point of time, there would be only one disciplinary authority. He has submitted that once the petitioner has been transferred from Lalitpur to Sonbhadra, the Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur could not act as disciplinary authority for the petitioner and it was incumbent upon the Respondents to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to Superintendent of Police, Sonbhadra under whom he was working. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank v. Prem Narain Pande and others; (1995) 6 SCC 634 . 10. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank v. Prem Narain Pande and others; (1995) 6 SCC 634 . 10. He has further submitted that in a disciplinary proceeding, show-cause notice is required to be served after submission of enquiry report and not after determining the proposed punishment by the disciplinary authority. It has also been contended that the disciplinary authority has made up his mind to dismiss the petitioner from service as mentioned in the show-cause notice. In his submission show-cause notice would amount to nothing but merely an eyewash. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Mahesh Dahiya; (2017) 1 SCC 768 . 11. He has further submitted that the petitioner has not been properly examined for proving that he had consumed liquor. In fact, the medical report of doctor was not based on blood and urine sample collected from the petitioner but it was given only after physical inspection of petitioner and that was too in his favour. Disciplinary Authorities as well as Tribunal have not considered the medical report which is the sole basis of dismissal of petitioner from service. Hence, it was patently illegal. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matter of Bachubhai Hassanalli Karyani v. State of Maharshtra, 1972 SCC (Cri) 178. 12. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for State has denied the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner by submitting that there is no illegality in not transferring of disciplinary proceeding from Lalitpur to district Sonbhadra for the reason that at the time of incident, the petitioner was posted at district Lalitpur therefore Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur had full jurisdiction to conclude the disciplinary proceeding. He has futher submitted that show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner in accordance with law and the petitioner was given full opportunity to reply the same within 15 days but the petitioner did not avail that. He has further submitted that the petitioner was duly examined by the qualified Government doctor at District Hospital, Lalitpur and in the medical report, it has been clearly mentioned that the petitioner had consumed liquor, therefore contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not properly examined is absolutely incorrect. He has further submitted that the petitioner was duly examined by the qualified Government doctor at District Hospital, Lalitpur and in the medical report, it has been clearly mentioned that the petitioner had consumed liquor, therefore contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not properly examined is absolutely incorrect. He has again submitted that the punishment given to the petitioner is not disproportionate as he is employee of a disciplined force and undoubtedly he had consumed liquor and found absent from duty therefore he has rightly been dismissed from service. 13. We have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 14. First argument of learned counsel for the petitioner was basically based on the judgement of the Apex Court in the matter of Allahabad Bank (supra), where the issue was that one employee of bank while posted at Lucknow, enquiry was initiated against him by Deputy General Manager, Lucknow and before the completion of enquiry proceeding, he has been transferred to Ranchi, Bihar, therefore, bank authorities have transferred the enquiry proceeding to Assistant General Manager, Zonel Office, Patna for completion of enquiry. The case of the petitioner in that matter was that enquiry could be transferred. Hon’ble Apex Court has ruled that after transfer of petitioner, enquiry could be transferred. However, it has nowhere been laid down by the Apex Court that in all eventuiality, if the employee is transferred from one place to another place, enquiry must be transferred to that place. 15. In the present case, it is undisputed that when the incident took place, petitioner was posted within the disciplinary control of Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur and thereafter he has been transferred to district Sonbhadra. It is not in dispute that both authorities i.e. Superintendent of Police, Lalitpur as well as Superintendent of Police, Sonbhadra stand on the same footing under hierarchy of the service and there is no legal or logical reason to transfer the disciplinary proceeding to district Sonbhadra ignoring this fact that the incident took place at Lalitpur where the petitioner was posted at that time, therefore, the judgement of Apex Court in matter of Allahabad Bank (supra) is distinguishable in the present case and argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable. 16. 16. With respect to the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that show-cause notice could only be served after submission of enquiry report and not after the disciplinary authority has made up his mind for proposed punishment. We find that argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner carries full weight in view of paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26, 31 and 32 of the judgement of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Mahesh Dahiya; (2017) 1 SCC 768 , which is reproduced herein below; 23. The basis of coming to the conclusion by both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that Disciplinary Authority has violated the principle of natural justice is based on the fact that although the inquiry report was sent to the writ petitioner by letter dated 2.4.2008, the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already came to the opinion on 25.2.2008 that writ petitioner be punished with major penalty. The Division Bench of the High Court has placed reliance on Union of India v. R.P. Singh. 26. Present is not a case of not serving the inquiry report before awarding the punishment rather the complaint has been made that before sending the inquiry report to the delinquent officer, Disciplinary Authority has already made up its mind to accept the findings of the inquiry report and decided to award punishment of dismissal. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench on the aforesaid premise came to the conclusion that principle of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority. The Division Bench itself was conscious of the issue, as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer\Disciplinary Authority has committed fault i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules as non-supply of the report. The Division Bench itself was conscious of the issue, as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer\Disciplinary Authority has committed fault i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules as non-supply of the report. Following observations have been made in the impugned judgment by Division Bench in para 21: “Having said so, the core question is - whether the inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority has committed fault, i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, i.e. non-supply of inquiry report, findings and other material relied upon by the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to the writ writ petitioner- respondent herein to explain the circumstances, which were made basis for making foundation of inquiry report or is it a case for closure of the inquiry in view of the fact that there is not even a single iota of evidence, prima facie, not to speak of proving by preponderance of probabilities, that the writ petitioner has absented himself willfully and he has disobeyed the directions?” 31. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report by letter dated 2.4.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already formed an opinion on 25.2.2008 to punish the writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice. We are of the view that before making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to submit the representation/reply on the inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. The opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members on 25.2.2008 was formed without there being benefit of comments of the writ petitioner on the inquiry report. The writ petitioner in his representation to the inquiry report is entitled to point out any defect in the procedure, a defect of substantial nature in appreciation of evidence, any misleading of evidence both oral or documentary. In his representation any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further proceedings as per statutory rules. In his representation any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further proceedings as per statutory rules. We are, thus, of the view that there was violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary Authority when opinion was formed to punish the writ petitioner with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the delinquent and before obtaining his comments on the inquiry report. We are, thus, of the view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained. 32. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that present is the case where the High Court while quashing the punishment order as well as Appellate order ought to have permitted the Disciplinary Authority to have proceeded with the inquiry from the stage in which fault was noticed i.e. the Stage under Rule 15 of Rules. We are conscious that sufficient time has elapsed during the pendency of the writ petition before learned Single Judge, Division Bench and before this Court, however, in view of the interim order passed by this Court dated 31.8.2015 no further steps have been taken regarding implementation of the order of the High Court. The ends of justice be served in disposing of this appeal by fixing a time frame for completing the proceeding from the stage of Rule 15.” 17. From perusal of above paragraphs of the judgement, this fact is very much clear that this issue is squarely covered by the judgement of the Apex Court. It is required on the part of disciplinary authority to provide copy of enquiry report alongwith show-cause notice without making his mind for proposed punishment, therefore, order impugned is bad as in show-cause notice dated 4.7.2009, disciplinary authority has already expressed its full agreement with the proposed punishment of dismissal and thereafter issued show-cause notice. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that medical report of doctor with regard to consumption of liquor is not based on blood and urine sample and only physical inspection of the petitioner was carried out which could not be relied upon while imposing the major penalty of dismissal. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that medical report of doctor with regard to consumption of liquor is not based on blood and urine sample and only physical inspection of the petitioner was carried out which could not be relied upon while imposing the major penalty of dismissal. Otherwise also report to the some extent, is in favour of petitioner with the finding that the person has consumed alcohol but was not in intoxicated state. For ready reference, part of medical report is being quoted, herein, below; “On Examination- -Person is fully conscious -Talking normally -Behaves normally -Eyes normal, Reactive to light -Can walk on straight line -Smell of breath Alcoholic Opinion- Person has consumed Alcohol but not in intoxicated state.” 19. On being confronted as to whether blood and urine sample was taken for medical examination or not, learned Standing Counsel could not show from the record that report was given after test of urine and blood sample. Therefore, on such medical report, no major punishment could be awarded. 20. Full Bench of Apex Court in the matter of Bachubhai Hassanalli Karyani (supra) has held that without urine and blood test, no conclusive report could be given for consumption of alcohol. 21. If the argument of learned Standing Counsel that petitioner was not found at the place of his duty and found before Hospital after taking liquor is accepted, even though no case is made out for punishment of dismissal of petitioner as it is disproportionate to the alleged offence committed by him. 22. In view of aforesaid facts and law discussed herein above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 6.8.2009, 5.12.2009 and 10.9.2010 passed by Superintdent of Police, Lalitpur, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jhansi Range, Jhansi and Additional Director General of Police, Telecommunication, Uttar Pradesh Police Radio Headquarters, Lucknow respectively are hereby quashed with liberty to State to proceed in accordance with law to award punishement other than dismissal from the serive. Respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to join his duty and pay him salary on month to month basis.