JUDGMENT : M.K. Hanjura, J. 1. In this petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 103 of the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the petitioners crave the indulgence of this Court in quashing the order dated 31.12.2014, passed by the Ld. Financial Commissioner (Revenue), in a revision petition bearing file No. 335/FC-AP. The petitioners also implore for the grant of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to disturb their possession in respect of the land that forms the subject matter of the petition on the grounds, inter alia, that the respondent No. 2 herein (the petitioner before the Ld. Financial Commissioner) has abused the process of law with ulterior motives. The judgment passed by the learned Financial Commissioner is illegal. The Shariat Act of 2007 does not apply to the case in hand where the mutations have been attested before a period of more than five decades, and that if such an interpretation is allowed to be given to the Act, thousands of mutations attested under the Customary Law will have to be set aside which will open a Pandora's Box. 2. The facts under the shade and cover of which this petition/has been filed require to be enumerated here and these are that the respondent No. 2 here in this petition filed a revision on 10.07.2013 before the learned Financial Commissioner, J & K, Srinagar, against the mutation Nos. 383 and 608 attested in the year 1946 viz-a-viz the landed estate of Samad Khan situate at Lalpora, Tehsil Tangmarg. Samad Khan was blessed with three daughters namely Sara, Zaina & Mst. Khatija. Samad Khan died more than 70 years before and thereafter the landed property which the deceased Samad Khan was holding at that time was mutated in favour of Mst. Zaina in the year 1946 in the view and presence of Mst. Khatija the mother of the respondent No. 2. Mst. Zaina died in the year 1990 and thereafter the property in question was mutated in favour of the petitioner on 13.08.1994. 3. In order to understand the relation of the parties in the right perspective the pedigree table as it relates to them is delineated herein below: Samad Mst. Zaina (Khana Nisheen) Mst. Sarah (Khana Berun) Mst. Khatji (Khana Berun) Gh. Qadir (Petitioner No. 1) Mohammad Gh. Qadir Mst. Sarwah (Petitioner No. 2) Mst. Haleema Mst. 3. In order to understand the relation of the parties in the right perspective the pedigree table as it relates to them is delineated herein below: Samad Mst. Zaina (Khana Nisheen) Mst. Sarah (Khana Berun) Mst. Khatji (Khana Berun) Gh. Qadir (Petitioner No. 1) Mohammad Gh. Qadir Mst. Sarwah (Petitioner No. 2) Mst. Haleema Mst. Aisha Ali Mohammad Hissam Ud Din Gh. Mohl Ud Din Gh. Mohammad Shah (Respondent No. 2) 4. The petitioners assailed the order passed in the two mutations detailed herein, before the learned Financial Commissioner on the grounds, inter alia that the revision petition filed by the respondent No. 2, is grossly barred and hit by latches and after the gap of 70 years, the settled inheritance of the estate holder, Samad Khan, has been disturbed which is against the principles of natural justice. The family of the petitioners and respondent No. 2 was admittedly governed by Custom which was prevalent at the time of attestation of mutations and according to the customs, only Khana Nisheen daughter could inherit from their father. However, this aspect has not been considered by the respondent No. 1. Both the mutations bearing Nos. 608 and 383 had attained finality and the same had been incorporated in the Record of Rights. Therefore, the record of rights cannot be altered or challenged after the lapse of so many decades. These two mutations pertain to two different Khasra Nos. and even the mutation No. 1723, dated 13.08.1994 with regard to the estate of Mst. Zaina has been attested in favour of the petitioners in accordance with the Custom and this mutation stands unchallenged. The Shariat Application Act, 2007, which came into force in the year 2007, is not at all applicable to the inheritance which is the subject matter of this writ petition. The respondent No. 1 has committed grave error while deciding the revision petition on the basis of the said act. The respondent No. 2 has no cause of action against the petitioners as is evident from the pedigree table that out of 5 sons of Mst. Khatji only the respondent No. 2 has challenged the mutation. Thus, the revision petition seems to be having filed with an intention to extract undue benefit from the estate of the petitioners. The respondent No. 2 has no cause of action against the petitioners as is evident from the pedigree table that out of 5 sons of Mst. Khatji only the respondent No. 2 has challenged the mutation. Thus, the revision petition seems to be having filed with an intention to extract undue benefit from the estate of the petitioners. It is also stated that the respondent No. 1 has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Akhtara v. State of J & K & Ors. 2003 (2) SLJ 599, in which this Court held that no limitation is prescribed for revision petition under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act. However, the said case law does not apply to the present dispute because of the fact that the revision petition is against mutations which were attested way back in the year 1945 and the respondent No. 2 being close relative of the petitioners was all along having full knowledge regarding the possession and title of the petitioners and even after the death of his maternal aunt, Mst. Zaina, in the year 1990 AD, he never asked for inheritance. It was only in the year 2013 that the respondent No. 2 felt aggrieved of the mutations and filed a revision petition in order to get undue benefit of the Shariat Application Act, 2007, In these circumstances, the whole proceedings conducted by the respondent No. 1 are illegal and the order passed is patently erroneous and liable to be quashed. 5. The learned Financial Commissioner after scanning and evaluating the pleadings of the parties and the material placed before him, came to the following conclusion: "3. The records as well as the written arguments of both the parties were perused. It has been held in a number of cases by the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir that no limitation is provided for filing a Revision petition under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act. The operative part of the judgment of the Hon'ble Court of J & K at Srinagar in OWP No. 495/2005 JA No. 291/2005 in case titled Mst. Akhtara v. State of J & K & Ors. The operative part of the judgment of the Hon'ble Court of J & K at Srinagar in OWP No. 495/2005 JA No. 291/2005 in case titled Mst. Akhtara v. State of J & K & Ors. is reproduced as under: "No limitation is prescribed for filing a Revision petition under J & K Land Revenue Act and thus provisions of Section 3 of J & K Limitation Act are not applicable to such proceedings". 4. So, the contention of the ld. counsel for respondents that Revision is hit by limitation is not material. Now coming to the main aspect of the case, it has been admitted that the deceased estate holder was survived by three daughters but the estate has devolved upon Mst. Zaina (one of the daughters) to the exclusion of the other two daughters as well as estate holder's widow the grandmother of the petitioner. Furthermore in the mutation No. 383, Patwari in his report has described Mst. Khatiji as "Khana Nisheen" and in the pedigree table has shown Mst. Zaina as "Beeruni Khana". But in the order, inheritance is devolved upon Mst. Zaina as a "Khana Nishin" daughter. It is also strange to note that two separate mutations have been attested for devolution of inheritance of the same estate holder in the same estate, which is not permissible. Besides all these irregularities, the Shariat Application Act, 2007, has now come into force and the parties are to be governed by the Muslim Personal Law (where parties are Muslims) and all un-islamic institutions like "Khana Nishin" adoption etc. have lost relevance. 5. In that background, therefore, both the impugned mutations are set-aside and the case is remanded to the Tehsildar concerned for passing fresh orders strictly in accordance with Muslim Personal Law and as per the procedure laid down in Standing order 23-A. Interim order, if any, passed in the matter is vacated. File to be consigned to records after due completion." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein has strenuously and vehemently argued that the mutations have been attested before a period of more than seven decades and in case the order of the learned Financial Commissioner is allowed to operate, it will upset and reverse the position as it prevailed between the parties during this period of more than seven decades. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein has strenuously and vehemently argued that the mutations have been attested before a period of more than seven decades and in case the order of the learned Financial Commissioner is allowed to operate, it will upset and reverse the position as it prevailed between the parties during this period of more than seven decades. He has proceeded to state that all the beneficiaries under these mutations i.e., legal heirs of Samad Khan acted upon these mutations and enjoyed the property and its usufructs and after a long period of 70 years, the respondent No. 2 out of greed filed a revision petition which on the face of it is barred by time. The mutations have been set aside on vague and unjustified grounds. The petitioner in the revision petition; i.e., respondent No. 2 herein pleaded before the learned Financial Commissioner, that the impugned mutations have been passed at the back of the two daughters of the deceased estate holder, thus against the principal of natural justice; that no enquiry has been made by the mutating officer, that the entries in different columns of mutation No. 383 are contradictory; and that two separate mutations have been attested when the property is situated in the same village and the estate holder too is the same. The respondent No. 2 is about years of age and being a co-sharer and a relative of the petitioners herein was well aware of the attestation of these mutations and, therefore, it can by no stretch of imagination, be said that he was ignorant about the attestation of these mutations. It has also been pleaded and argued that a chain of mutations with regard to the landed estate left by late Samad khan have been attested, whereby third party interests have been created from time to time. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioners have no right to challenge the order dated 31.12.2014, before this Court, because the respondent No. 1 had directed the respondents No. 3 to pass a fresh order in accordance with Muslim Personal Law and as per the procedure laid down in the standing order 23-A in the matter. Acting on the order of the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 3 has passed the mutation order No. 3726, dated 13/15.01.2015, rendering the writ petition liable to be set aside. Acting on the order of the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 3 has passed the mutation order No. 3726, dated 13/15.01.2015, rendering the writ petition liable to be set aside. It is also submitted that late Samad Khan had three daughters namely Mst. Zaina, Mst. Sara and Mst. Khatji and all the three daughters and the widow of Samad Khan were entitled to inherit his property in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. The Naib Tehsildar had, however, attested the mutations in gross violation of law and without observing the mandatory rules and the statutory instructions in the matter. In fact, the Naib Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. He, however, passed the mutation orders excluding Mst. Khatji and Mst. Sarwa from inheriting the property of their father. In the report, it had been stated by the Patwari that the answering respondent's mother was a Khana Nisheen daughter and Mst. Zaina had, however, been shown as Khana Nisheen daughter and entire property of the deceased Samad Khan had been mutated in her name. The answering respondent's mother had never been summoned by the Naib Tehsildar. She had also not been heard as can be seen from the impugned order. The impugned order was not, therefore, a consented mutation order. Otherwise also, the parties cannot confer a jurisdiction on an authority. They cannot legalize what is illegal. The impugned mutations had thus been passed by the Naib Tehsildar in gross violation of law and those were rightly set aside by the respondent No. 4, in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 15 of the Land Revenue Act. It is also relevant to mention here that as per the law as laid down by the court, there is no limitation within which, an error committed, by an authority can be corrected by the Financial Commissioner. In 2003 (21) SLJ 599, this Court has held that even after 60 years, the error can be corrected by the Financial Commissioner in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 15 of the land Revenue Act. Same proposition of law has been reiterated by the court in 12005 (2) SLJ 785 and 2005 SLH 7162. The contention of the petitioners that the mutation orders were set aside after 60 years is, therefore, misconceived and deserves to be rejected. The petitioners or the respondents are not governed by custom. Same proposition of law has been reiterated by the court in 12005 (2) SLJ 785 and 2005 SLH 7162. The contention of the petitioners that the mutation orders were set aside after 60 years is, therefore, misconceived and deserves to be rejected. The petitioners or the respondents are not governed by custom. They are governed by Muslim Personal Law, where any person asserts that he is governed by Custom, the burden to prove custom is on him. The custom must be ancient, if not immemorial and has to be proved and established to have been acted upon for a petty long time. The custom must be invariable, certain and continuous. In the instant case, merely by saying that the petitioners and respondent No. 2 are governed by custom, which was prevalent at the time of attestation of the mutation order and according to custom, only Khana Nsheen daughter can inherit from her father is not enough. At the cost of repetition, it is submitted that the petitioners as well as the respondent No. 2 are governed by Muslim Personal Law and the mutation orders No. 383 and 608 had been attested by the Naib Tehsildar in violation of the Muslim Personal Law which is followed by the parties in matter of inheritance. The respondent No. 1 by passing the order dated 31.12.2014, has not committed any error of jurisdiction, as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, the Financial Commissioner has the powers to revise any order at any time and no limitation is prescribed for filing the revision petition. Therefore, the petitioners before this Court cannot take away the right of the respondent No. 2 in violation of the Muslim Personal Law. In the end it has been argued that the petition of the petitioners entails dismissal and it may be dismissed accordingly. 8. Heard and considered. 9. Testing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties on the above parameters the first Question that strikes one's mind is whether the Law of Limitation does or does not apply to a revision filed before the Financial Commissioner. What can be said in answer to this question is that there are conflicting judicial dictums on the subject. 9. Testing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties on the above parameters the first Question that strikes one's mind is whether the Law of Limitation does or does not apply to a revision filed before the Financial Commissioner. What can be said in answer to this question is that there are conflicting judicial dictums on the subject. Some judicial pronouncements lay down that Section 12 of the Land Revenue Act which includes within its ambit, scope and purview, a revision also, prescribes a period within which a revision can be filed by a party aggrieved of an order passed in a mutation by an officer subordinate to the Financial Commissioner. On the contrary, there are judgments of law which hold that the powers of the Financial Commissioner in revision petitions are unfettered and a revision can be entertained by the Financial Commissioner at any point of time under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act. 10. Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act envisages and encompasses a situation where the Financial Commissioner can exercise suo moto powers in a revision and in this behalf the judicial opinion in some of decided cases is that it is only where the Financial Commissioner exercises the suo moto powers that the law of Limitation does not apply but where a party knocks at the door of the competent authority, i.e., Financial Commissioner by filing a revision, the law of limitation has its application both in vigor and rigor in view of what is postulated and provided under Section 12 of the land Revenue Act. 11. Be that as it may, and assuming, but not admitting that the law of limitation does not apply to a revision petition filed before the Financial Commissioner, the question simplicitor is whether the Financial Commissioner can exercise such a power after a great lull of 70 years approximately from the date of the attestation of the mutations in a case like the present one and the answer to it should be a big "No" in view of the logical interpretation of this aspect of the case by the Supreme Court of India in the law laid down in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District & Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao & others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 , wherein it has been held as under: "12.1 In the decision in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, this Court while adverting to Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late. 12.2 In the decision in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, this Court while dealing with Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 held that though the said Section does not prescribe for any time limit for initiation of proceeding such power should be exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said Section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time. 12.3 In the decision in Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale, this Court while dealing with the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows (SCC pp. 356-57, paras 11-12). "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30-3-1976 is flawed and legally not correct." 12.4 In the decision in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., this Court while dealing with the revisional power under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 held thus : (SCC p. 367, paras 17-19) "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years......." 12.5 In the decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, this Court while dealing with suo motu power of revision under Section 50-B(4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950 held as follows: (SCC pp. 676-77, para 9). "9.........In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisos of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation." 17. In the light of what is stated above we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law. 25. The legal position is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. 26. In one of the earlier decisions of this Court in S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, this Court held that exercise of suo motu power of revision must also be within a reasonable time and that any unreasonable delay in the exercise may affect the validity. But what would constitute reasonable time would depend upon the facts of each case. 27. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud the revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable period and that several factors need to be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should be denied only on the ground of delay. The Court said: (SCC p. 677, para 9). "9...... In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. The Court said: (SCC p. 677, para 9). "9...... In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act)." 28. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal transport, wherein this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrary and interminably. This Court observed: (SCC p. 476, para 28). "28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix, a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words 'at any time' in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the little over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute." 29. In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh, this Court held that in the absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15 years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was impermissible as the delay was unduly long and unexplained. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 588-89, para 6). "6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20, As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 588-89, para 6). "6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20, As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that sub-section (3) provides that such a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20." 30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, wherein the Court explained the legal position as under: (SCC pp. 602-03, para 13). "13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and state claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and the other lapse of time is not attributable to any latches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed." 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercised of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statue that vests such power in an authority. 12. The judicial precedent cited above does not support or reiterate the view that a person who is slack, callous and remiss in rolling the law in his favour at the opportune time can do so after a great deal of time subject to his whims and caprice. If such a situation is allowed to prevail, it will open a flood gate for uncalled litigations which cannot be controlled by the authorities while hearing and determining the revisions. Such a view, that a person filing a revision can do so at his will at any moment of time without spelling out reasons as to why he waited for pursuing the action for such a long time which did not meet the test of reasonability will lead to disastrous consequences. Such a view, that a person filing a revision can do so at his will at any moment of time without spelling out reasons as to why he waited for pursuing the action for such a long time which did not meet the test of reasonability will lead to disastrous consequences. Taking the instant case, as an example it is repeated and reiterated here that, the respondent No. 2 filed a revision petition before the Court under the plea that he did not have the knowledge of the attestation of the mutations which on the face of it seems to be an incorrect version and accounts of events. In case any fraud was played with him he could have filed the revision immediately after attaining the age of majority. The petitioner before the Financial Commissioner, i.e., respondent No. 2 herein, could have assailed the mutations in a revision before the Financial Commissioner earlier in point of time and a lot of water has flown down the Gangas since then. 13. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for the exercise of revisional power, that will not give the authority determining the matter, the teach to unsettle an order after a long time of years. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time as per the law laid down in (2007) 11 SCC 363 and ordinarily it can be exercised within a period of three years and in no case beyond a period of five years even where fraud is alleged. The creation of third party interest in the case, the passage of considerable time, from the date of the attestation of the mutations, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers are the factors that have to be taken into consideration and had to be given due weight while exercising the revisional powers. 14. The creation of third party interest in the case, the passage of considerable time, from the date of the attestation of the mutations, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers are the factors that have to be taken into consideration and had to be given due weight while exercising the revisional powers. 14. Looking at the petition of the petitioners from another perspective that is the application of Shariat Act of 2007 in light of the law laid down by this Court in LPA No. 07/2010 titled "Ahad Sheikh v. Murad Ahmad Shah & others, on which the learned Financial Commissioner has put explicit reliance in carving out a case for the petitioner before him, it needs must be said that the Shariat Act came into force in the year 2007 and it reads as under: An Act to make provisions for the application of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) to Muslims of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Be it enacted by the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature in the Fifty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:- 1. Short title and commencement:- (1) This Act may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007. (2) It shall come into force from the date of its publication in the Government Gazette. 2. Application of Personal Law to Muslims:- Notwithstanding any customs or usages to the contrary, in all questions regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lain, khula and mubaraat, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). 3. Repeal:- The provisions of the Shri Partap Jammu and Kashmir Laws Consolidation Act, Samvat 1977 (1920 A.D.) shall be repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 15. The question whether this Act is prospective or retrospective in nature is no longer res integra. The fact that cannot be lost sight of is that it applies to the suits and the proceedings which were pending as on the date when the Act came into force and it also applies to the suits and the proceedings filed after that. The question whether this Act is prospective or retrospective in nature is no longer res integra. The fact that cannot be lost sight of is that it applies to the suits and the proceedings which were pending as on the date when the Act came into force and it also applies to the suits and the proceedings filed after that. What is to be understood is that the mutation proceedings are summary in nature and a Mutating Officer and the Financial Commissioner are the Quasi Judicial Authorities. The mutation is a fiscal entry. It does not confer any title on any person and it is made for the upgradation of the records. The question of title is open to be decided by the civil Courts and the logic behind the judgment of law cited by the learned Financial Commissioner in his order in incorporating the words "Suits and Proceedings" pending on the date of the operation of the Act or filed thereafter seems to be to give the parties the right to agitate and settle their grievance in the civil Courts. 16. The import of the application of Shariat Act, 2007, makes it abundantly clear that from the date of its promulgation that is the year 2007, all questions detailed in Section 3 have to be decided and determined under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), where the parties are Muslims. The mutations here in this case have been attested a long back, that is, in the year 1946. The judicial precedent cited by the learned Financial Commissioner, in his order, lays in unequivocal terms that the Act will apply to all the suits and proceedings which were pending on the date when the Act came into force as also to tire suits and proceedings filed after its enforcement. The suits and proceedings which have been finally decided would not be affected by the enactment of the Shariat Act, but if such a suit and proceedings will be pending even in appeal on the date when the Act was brought into operation, the application of law to such a case will be the Muslim Personal Law, if the other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled. 17. 17. There is no doubt in saying that the Shariat Act, 2007, will apply to all the mutations that are attested after the enactment of the Shariat Act 2007, but on the plain phraseology of the Act, it will not apply to a mutation which has been attested a long before it came into operation. Suits and proceedings as stated in the judgment encompass within its operation and scope the suits filed before the Civil Courts and the proceedings emanating there from like the execution petitions, appeals or the proceedings initiated in the suit itself. The word "Suit" as defined in the West's Encyclopedia of American law edition 2 is a generic term, of comprehensive significance, referring to any proceedings by one person or persons against another or others in a Court of law in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the law affords for the redress of any injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in Equity. A mutation is a fiscal entry and may be a prima facie proof of the possession of the estate by the person in whose favour it is attested. It does not as is repeated here decide the title which has to be decided by the Civil Court. 18. In view of the proceeding analysis, the petition is allowed, as a corollary to which, the impugned order of the learned Financial Commissioner passed in, Corrected by I.A. No. 01/2018 in OWP No. 27/2015, dated 10.10.2018, for "file No. 290/FC-AP" [file No. 335/FC-AP], dated, Corrected by IA No. 01/2018 in OWP No. 27/2015, dated 10.10.2018, for "28.01.2015" [31.12.2014] is set aside. The private respondents can seek the enforcement of their right in a Civil Court. .