JUDGMENT : Intriguing legal questions in this appeal revolve around the interpretation of the terms in Ext.B1, a sale deed. 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, short facts are thus : Appellants are the defendants 1 and 2 in a suit for setting aside documents, consequential injunction and also for partition of certain immovable properties. Deceased Paru is the mother of plaintiff, 2nd defendant and Lakshmikutty. A couple of years before the suit, Lakshmikutty died, leaving behind two children, who are defendants 3 and 4. 1st defendant is the son of 2nd defendant. Parties are members of Hindu Ezhava Community. 3. Plaintiff contended that the plaint A and B schedule properties belonged to deceased Paru. She obtained the property as per a registered document of the year 1121 Malayalam Era (M.E.), corresponding to 1946 AD. After Paru's death, the property devolved on her children. On the death of Lakshmikutty, the daughter of Paru, her rights devolved on defendants 3 and 4. The properties, therefore, are in the joint ownership of the parties to the suit. In the property, a residential building, owned by deceased Paru, is situated, wherein the defendants 1 and 2 are residing. Parties are in joint possession of the properties. 4. Plaintiff has three children. She was residing with her youngest son. Plaintiff was old and was mentally and physically infirm. She was unable to look after her affairs. Defendants 1 and 2 used to visit the plaintiff and they feigned love and affection towards her. Without knowing their real intent, the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence on them. On 15.10.1993 morning, the plaintiff's son had gone for job. His wife was also not present in the house. At that time, the defendants 1 and 2 approached the plaintiff and informed her that they had made arrangements for preparing a document in respect of the common properties. They requested the plaintiff to sign the document as a witness from the Sub Registrar's Office, Chengamanad. Believing their words and reposing confidence in them, the plaintiff went along with defendants 1 and 2 to the Sub Registrar's Office and signed certain documents. She was not made aware as to the nature of the documents. When her son and daughter-in-law came back, the plaintiff informed all the matters to them and on an enquiry conducted thereafter, it was revealed that the plaintiff was caused to execute Ext.A1 sale deed. She was not made aware as to the nature of the documents. When her son and daughter-in-law came back, the plaintiff informed all the matters to them and on an enquiry conducted thereafter, it was revealed that the plaintiff was caused to execute Ext.A1 sale deed. According to the plaint averments, defendants 1 and 2 fraudulently and by misrepresenting facts and also by exerting undue influence on the plaintiff, got Ext.A1 executed. Although she filed a complaint before the police concerned, they directed her to take recourse to a civil remedy. Ext.A1 is a fraudulent document and it does not bind the plaintiff. Therefore, she sought cancellation of Ext.A1 and document No.4645/93 of the same SRO (produced as part of Ext.X1). Along with that prayer, she claimed partition of plaint A and B schedule properties by metes and bounds. A prohibitory injunction against alienation and inducting strangers was also sought for. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement refuting the allegations in the plaint. They contended that deceased Paru had three husbands. Her first husband was Panickassery Achuthan. Lakshmikutty was the daughter born to Paru in that relationship. Paru's second husband was Thandonnikara Achuthan. Plaintiff is his daughter. Thereafter Paru married for the third time Chettikattil Unniri Makotha. 2nd defendant is the son born to Paru through this marriage. They specifically contended that Paru had one child each in all the three marriages. 6. Plaint schedule properties did not belong to Paru. According to the defendants' case, Ext.B1 (Ext.X1) conferred no title on Paru and she had only a life estate over the property. Recitals in Ext.B1 would clearly show that the property absolutely vested in the 2nd defendant. The property was purchased by spending Unniri Makotha's money. As the 2nd defendant is the only child born to Paru through Unniri Makotha, he became the absolute owner of the property after the death of Unniri Makotha and Paru. Neither the plaintiff nor Lakshmikutty obtained any right over the plaint schedule property and therefore, the property is not liable to be partitioned. Allegations in the plaint that Paru was weak and infirm due to old age are denied. She was capable of looking after her affairs and to take proper decisions on understanding the matters. Plaintiff never reposed excessive love, affection or trust on defendants 1 and 2. Allegations in the plaint that Paru was weak and infirm due to old age are denied. She was capable of looking after her affairs and to take proper decisions on understanding the matters. Plaintiff never reposed excessive love, affection or trust on defendants 1 and 2. As members of a family, all of them were cordial to one another. 7. On a wrong assertion that the plaintiff had half right over the plaint schedule property, she and her son came forward to assign that right to the 1st defendant. On 15.10.1993, the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 went to the Sub Registrar's Office and with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff had executed Ext.A1 document in favour of the 1st defendant. Allegation that her son and daughter-in-law were not aware of executing Ext.A1 is a false story. She was not compelled to sign any document without making her understand the real state of affairs. Allegations levelled against Ext.A1 are factually and legally unsustainable. Since Ext.A1 is a valid document, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief. Since the property exclusively belonged to the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff or supporting defendants are not entitled to get partition. The suit is liable to be dismissed. 8. After the plaint was amended by incorporating certain facts and seeking a prayer for setting aside Ext.A1, the defendants 1 and 2 filed an additional written statement opposing the amended plaint. 9. Defendants 3 and 4 took a stand supporting the plaintiff's claim. 10. Before the court below, three witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiff and one witness on the side of the defendants. Exts.A1 to A3 and B1 are the documents produced by the contesting parties. Ext.X1 is the document produced on summons. 11. It is seen from the appeal memorandum that pending the appeal, respondents 2 and 3 died and their legal representatives have been impleaded. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the contesting respondents. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants seriously challenged the decision arrived at by the trial Judge. It is vehemently argued that the court below failed to appreciate the pleadings, evidence and attending circumstances to enter a finding that Ext.A1 and another document produced along with Ext.X1, executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant, are vitiated by fraud and undue influence. It is vehemently argued that the court below failed to appreciate the pleadings, evidence and attending circumstances to enter a finding that Ext.A1 and another document produced along with Ext.X1, executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant, are vitiated by fraud and undue influence. According to the learned counsel, these findings, which lead to the division of the plaint schedule properties, are thoroughly wrong. The court below did not grant the relief of injunction claimed. As there is no cross objection raised by the plaintiff, that issue has been concluded. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants would argue that true nature of Ext.B1(Ext.X1) was not considered by the court below. It is the finding of the trial Judge that as per Ext.B1, the property exclusively belonged to deceased Paru and therefore, on her death, her children born through all the three husbands are entitled to a share interest. Per contra, it is the contention of the appellants that Paru had no exclusive right as per the clear terms in Ext.B1 and she had only a life interest along with her husband Unniri Makotha. The property actually vested in the 2nd defendant as he is the only son born to Paru through Unniri Makotha. For the same reason, partition cannot be claimed and Ext.A1 happened to be executed on a wrong notion that Paru had right over the property. Merely for the reason that Ext.A1 was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant, she cannot claim any right over the property. In fact, the well settled proposition of law, that admission will not confer title, if pressed into service, whole plaint claim will fall down. 15. Before dealing with the established facts and circumstances, it will be profitable to extract the relevant dispositive clauses in Ext.B1. This document was executed in the name of Paru by Vypil Veettil Kunjukkutty Amma in her own right and on behalf of her minor children. It can be seen that the property was belonging to Paliyath Tharavad, from where the assignor's mother had derived a tenancy right. It can also be seen that there was a partition in the family of the assignor in which the property was set apart to the assignor and her children. The relevant portion reads as follows : “xxx” 16. It can be seen that the property was belonging to Paliyath Tharavad, from where the assignor's mother had derived a tenancy right. It can also be seen that there was a partition in the family of the assignor in which the property was set apart to the assignor and her children. The relevant portion reads as follows : “xxx” 16. On a plain reading, the extracted portion would show the following aspects : The property was outstanding in the possession of the assignor's family on a tenancy right and they had made improvements thereon. In a family partition, the property was set apart to the assignor and her lineal descendants. While so, the assignor had handed over possession of the land to Paru even prior to the assignment and she had constructed a residential building. All the rights the owners had in the property been sold for a price. The property was sold for paying off certain liabilities of the assignors. The sale consideration was paid by Unniri Makotha, the husband of Paru. Thereafter, it is recited in the document that till the death of Unniri Makotha, he was entitled to take usufructs from the property. Further recitals would show that the property was purchased for the benefit of Paru, her son Balakrishnan (2nd defendant) and any child who would have born to Paru through Unniri Makotha. Further down, it has been restated that Unniri Makotha and Paru were to enjoy the profits from the property and after their death, children born to Paru through Unniri Makotha were to own and enjoy the properties. The point to be decided is about the legal effect of the recitals in Ext.B1 document. Whether the clauses conferred an exclusive right on Paru ? Is the claim of the 2nd defendant, that the absolute vesting as per the recitals in Ext.B1 is in his favour sustainable ? Answer to these questions will decide the destiny of this case. 17. Before referring to the evidence, certain fundamental principles regarding interpretation of deeds have to be appreciated. As per Halsbury's Laws of India, (Volume 9 - 2001 Edition, page 340) 'deed' is defined as follows: A deed is an instrument which either (1) passes an interest, right or property of itself, and creates a binding obligation on some person; or (2) amounts to an affirmation or confirmation of something which passes an interest, right or property. As per Halsbury's Laws of India, (Volume 9 - 2001 Edition, page 340) 'deed' is defined as follows: A deed is an instrument which either (1) passes an interest, right or property of itself, and creates a binding obligation on some person; or (2) amounts to an affirmation or confirmation of something which passes an interest, right or property. At common law, a deed is an instrument which complies with the following requirements: (a) it must be written on parchment or paper; (b) it must be executed in the manner specified below by some person or corporation named in the instrument; and (c) as to subject matter it must express that the person or corporation so named either : (i) makes, confirms, concurs in, or consents to some assurance or some interest in property, or of some legal, or equitable right, title, or claim; or (ii) undertakes, or enters into some obligation, duty or agreement enforceable at law, or in equity; or (iii) does or concurs in some other act affecting the legal relations or position of a party to the instrument or of some other person or corporation. 18. Formal parts of a deed are (1) the words describing the instrument (whether conveyance, settlement, mortgage, or otherwise); (2) the date; (3) the parties' names; (4) the recitals stating the facts on which the act to be evidenced by the deed is grounded; (5) the testatum or witnessing part containing the operative words which express the parties' intention; and (6) the testimonium stating that the parties have executed the deed in witness of what is written in it. 19. The testatum usually contains the following subsidiary formal parts : (a) the parcels or description of the property to be conveyed; (b) the habendum [Habendum clause means the part of an instrument, such as a deed or Will, that defines the extent of the interest being granted and any conditions affecting the grant.] defining the estate or interest to be taken by the alienee; (c) the trusts, if any, imposed on the person taking the legal estate under the deed; and (d) the covenants, if any, entered into by the alienor or alienee. (See Halsbury's Laws of India, same Edition, page 344). 20. (See Halsbury's Laws of India, same Edition, page 344). 20. It is a well settled rule of interpretation of the deeds that the intention of the parties must be gathered from the written instrument read in the light of such extrinsic evidence as is admissible for the purpose of construction. The function of the Court is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words they have used. It has to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument and not what was intended to have been written. This is basically to give effect to the intention as expressed, the expressed meaning being, for the purpose of interpretation, equivalent to the intention. (See Hind Plastics v. Collector of Customs [ (1994) 5 SCC 167 ]). 21. The best interpretation is made from the context. The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties to an agreement has to be gathered from the terms of the agreement construed in the context of the surroundings, antecedent and consequent circumstances. (See Puran Singh Sahni v. Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalini [ (1991) 2 SCC 180 ]; Provash Chandra Dalui v. Bishwanath Banerjee [ AIR 1989 SC 1834 ]. 22. If, however in any particular respect, the intention is clear on the whole instrument, effect will be given to that intention, even though it is not stated in express words. (See Keshav Kumar Swarup v. Flowmore Pvt. Ltd [ 1994 (2) SCC 10 ]). 23. A locus classicus by a Constitution Bench of the apex Court in the matter of interpretation of deeds rendered in Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan [ AIR 1963 SC 890 ] is to be mentioned in this context. The general principle regarding interpretation has been stated thus : The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to be borne in mind that very many words are used in more than one sense and that sense differs in different circumstances. Again, even where a particular word has to a trained conveyancer a clear and definite significance and one can be sure about the sense in which such conveyancer would use it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give the same strict interpretation of the word when used by one who is not so equally skilled in the art of conveyancing. 24. In the case on hand, the questions arising are whether the 2nd defendant derived exclusive title over the property by virtue of Ext.B1 or did the property vest with deceased Paru and the 2nd defendant together or the vesting was only in the name of Paru ? Learned counsel for the appellants contended that ultimate vesting of the property took place in the name of 2nd defendant and children, if any, born to Paru through Unniri Makotha. Admittedly, Paru gave birth to the 2nd defendant only in the marital relationship with Unniri Makotha. It is therefore contended that the 2nd defendant became the absolute owner of the property included in Ext.B1. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the initial dis-positive clauses in Ext.B1 would clearly establish vesting of the property in the name of Paru, although certain terms and conditions inconsistent with the earlier clauses have been mentioned later, as such clauses are of no legal consequence. Hence, Paru became the absolute owner of the property and after her death, all her three children derived right over the property. In order to understand the legal principles regarding the documents with conflicting terms in the testatum, the following principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ramkishorelal's case (supra) will have to be borne in mind : Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible; it is only when this is not possible, e.g., where an absolute title is given in clear and ambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void. 25. After surveying all the binding precedents, this Court in Indira Motor Service Thana & Others v. Panakkat Nazaruddin & Others [ 2015 (4) KLJ 357 ] has laid down the following principles : 12. First and foremost principle is that whenever a document is couched in a language which is clear and definite and no doubt arises in its application to the facts, there is no need to resort to the rules of interpretation. Rules of interpretation of deeds are intended to ascertain, to the extent possible, the exact meaning of a document which is not clear and definite. Many a time, language proved to be an imperfect vehicle for expressing thought and intention. The rules of interpretation or canons of constructions are the products of real life experiences of Judges and Jurists. Prime purpose of interpretation of a document is to ascertain the intention of the parties manifested at the time when the document was executed. To ascertain the intention of the parties, the document must be considered as a whole. It is from the whole of the document, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, that the general intention of the party or parties is to be ascertained. Attempt must be made to gather the intention of the parties from the exact words used in the deed. To ascertain the intention of the parties, the document must be considered as a whole. It is from the whole of the document, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, that the general intention of the party or parties is to be ascertained. Attempt must be made to gather the intention of the parties from the exact words used in the deed. When the words used in a deed are in their literal meaning unambiguous and when such meaning is not excluded from the context and is sensible with respect to the parties at the time of executing the deed, such literal meaning must be taken. Where, the words used in a deed, if taken in its literal sense lead to absurdity and inconsistency, then an interpretation to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency should be made. It is also a settled principle that when the intention of the maker or makers of a deed cannot be given effect to in its full extent, effect is to be given to it as far as possible. Where the intentions are sufficiently clear from the deed itself, mis-recital in some part of the deed cannot vitiate it. Anything expressly mentioned in the deed excludes another view impliedly possible. 13. As far as possible, effect is to be given to all words used in a document. This is yet another important principle in the interpretation of deeds. A document should be construed in its entirety. Further, if possible, it should be construed so as to give effect to every word employed therein. The court is not at liberty to discard a word, if some meaning can be ascribed to it. Normally, the words employed in a deed should be taken in its ordinary sense, unless there are indications to do otherwise. It is also an important rule that plain words should be given plain meaning. 26. In the light of the above legal principles, I shall interpret the recitals in Ext.B1. It is explicitly mentioned in the aforementioned recitals that the property had been delivered to Paru anterior to the assignment and she was residing in a house constructed in the property. Further recitals would show that consideration for the sale was obtained from Unniri Makotha and property was given in possession to Paru. It is explicitly mentioned in the aforementioned recitals that the property had been delivered to Paru anterior to the assignment and she was residing in a house constructed in the property. Further recitals would show that consideration for the sale was obtained from Unniri Makotha and property was given in possession to Paru. In this context, it is relevant to note that in the Indian context, consideration for a sale can be moved even from a third party to a document. In other words, there is no rule that Paru herself should have paid consideration for acquiring title to the property and consideration paid by her husband Unniri Makotha is legally sufficient to confer a title on Paru. 27. Subsequent clauses in the document would show that Unniri Makotha was authorized to take profits from the property during his life time. Very important clause in the document is that the property had been assigned for the benefit of Paru, her child Balakrishnan (2nd defendant) and children, if any, born to Paru in the marital relationship. This clause creates a definite vesting of the property in the name of Paru and Balakrishnan (2nd defendant). Admittedly, no child was born to Paru through Unniri Makotha. From the recitals in Ext.B1 it is highly probable that Unniri Makotha, who paid the consideration for the sale, must have intended to benefit his wife Paru and his son Balakrishnan (D2) since he must have been cognizant of the fact that Paru had two other children in her former marriages. Therefore, I am of a definite view that the property had been vested in Paru and Balakrishnan jointly as per the clear terms in Ext.B1. 28. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that by virtue of Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (in short, the T.P. Act) once the property had been vested in the name of Paru by the initial clause, it was legally impermissible to divest the estate and make a further vesting in the name of Paru and 2nd defendant. I am afraid, the T.P. Act per se is not applicable to the given case. Admittedly, the property was falling within erstwhile Travancore Sate. I am afraid, the T.P. Act per se is not applicable to the given case. Admittedly, the property was falling within erstwhile Travancore Sate. It has been clearly held by a Division Bench of this Court in Krishna Menon v. Madhavan [AIR 1976 Kerala 62] and a Full Bench in Lakshmi Pilla v. Easwara Pillai [AIR 1977 Kerala 148] that the provisions of the T.P. Act were made applicable in respect of lands situate in Travancore area only and from 1.7.1955. Ext.B1 (Ext.X1) is of the year 1946. Therefore, at a time when Ext.B1 was executed, the provisions of the T.P. Act were not applicable to the land in question. It has been held in the aforementioned decisions that although the provisions in the T.P. Act did not apply proprio vigore, they could be applied as principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Therefore, it cannot be said that the recitals in Ext.B1 should be subjected to a scrutiny with reference to the provisions in the T.P. Act. If the principles of justice, equity and good conscience are applied to the facts herein, it can only be found that Ext.B1 conferred joint title on Paru and Balakrishnan (D2). 29. It has to be borne in mind that the parties deposed before the trial court are incompetent to testify the actual events transpired at the time of executing Ext.B1. Admittedly, 2nd defendant was a minor at the time of Ext.B1. Plaintiff has no case that she had any personal knowledge about the execution of Ext.B1. It is therefore clear that one will have to gather intention of the parties from the recitals in the document itself and also from the attending circumstances. 30. Notwithstanding the dispute raised against Ext.A1, it has to be noticed that the 1st defendant took assignment of the plaintiff's share in the property, admitting her title. Even though the defendants raised a contention that they were mislead by the representations made by the plaintiff and her son, which resulted in execution of Ext.A1, the fact remains that the recitals in Ext.A1 amount to an admission of the plaintiff's right over the property. That document was immediately preceding the suit. It is seen further from the recitals in Ext.A1 that the property exclusively belonged to Paru and on her death, it devolved on the plaintiff and 2nd defendant in joint right. That document was immediately preceding the suit. It is seen further from the recitals in Ext.A1 that the property exclusively belonged to Paru and on her death, it devolved on the plaintiff and 2nd defendant in joint right. As per the terms in the document, the plaintiff and 2nd defendant, each acquired half right over the property. These assertions are factually and legally incorrect for the reason that if the property belonged to Paru, then, on her death, it should devolve on her three children, including deceased Lakshmikutty. However, the 1st defendant, by taking an assignment from the plaintiff, has ceded to the fractional right of the plaintiff. True, the plaintiff has attacked the document on other grounds, which, I shall deal with in the subsequent paragraphs. 31. As mentioned above, the legal principles relating to the interpretation of documents take me to an irresistible conclusion that Ext.B1 was an assignment taken by Paru for herself and on behalf of the 2nd defendant and by virtue of the terms in Ext.B1, both of them had derived equal right in the property. 32. Now I shall deal with the challenge against Ext.A1 and another document contained in Ext.X1, bearing registration No.4127/1993, SRO Chengamanad. At the outset, I should find that document No.4127/1993 executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant cannot be assailed for the simple reason that from the forgone discussions, it will be evident that the 2nd defendant has derived a right over the property by virtue of Ext.B1 assignment deed. Therefore, he had every right to make an assignment in respect of his fractional right over the property in favour of his son, the 1st defendant. Hence, challenge against that document is legally unsustainable. 33. Ext.A1 document was executed by the plaintiff on 15.10.1993. The suit was laid on 21.12.1993. It is the case of the plaintiff that she was made to believe by the defendants 1 and 2 that she was only witnessing a document relating to the family properties. Due to old age and undue influence exerted by the defendants, she could not understand the nature and character of the document. Admittedly the parties are close relatives. The plaintiff was aged 65 years as per Ext.A1 and the plaint. From her signatures in the original plaint, it can be seen that the plaintiff was only semi literate. Due to old age and undue influence exerted by the defendants, she could not understand the nature and character of the document. Admittedly the parties are close relatives. The plaintiff was aged 65 years as per Ext.A1 and the plaint. From her signatures in the original plaint, it can be seen that the plaintiff was only semi literate. She could put her mark in the plaint and document. She deposed in the chief examination in terms of the plaint averments. It is her assertion in the witness box that she was completely unaware as to what papers she was made to sign. She signed the documents as instructed by the 2nd defendant. She further deposed that she was physically weak and was wearing a hip belt at that time as she was suffering from severe damage to her vertebra. Ext.A2, proved by PW-1, is a gift deed executed by her mother Paru and the 2nd defendant in her favour. That was in the year 1971. It is seen from Ext.A2 that a portion of property covered by Ext.B1 had been gifted by the above persons in favour of the plaintiff out of love and affection. This document also reveals acknowledgment of Paru's right by the 2nd defendant. Despite cross-examination, the case of the plaintiff that she did not consciously or intentionally execute Ext.A1 could not be shattered. 34. PW-2 is the son of plaintiff. He also asserted that PW-1 did not execute Ext.A1 after understanding the consequences. PW-2 stated that his mother was reeling under various ailments on account of her old age. In cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that he was not aware as to the actual events transpired at the time of executing Ext.A1. 35. DW-1 is the 4th defendant. She is the daughter of deceased Lakshmikutty. She exhibited ignorance as to the recitals in Ext.B1. On scanning through her testimony, I find no reason to hold that her testimony improved the case of any of the parties. It is pertinent to note that neither the 1st defendant nor 2nd defendant testified before the court to support Ext.A1 document. In this backdrop, on an analysis of Ext.A1 and the circumstances relating to its execution pleaded and proved, I find that the court below is perfectly justified in finding that Ext.A1 was not executed by the plaintiff really understanding the nature and character of the document. In this backdrop, on an analysis of Ext.A1 and the circumstances relating to its execution pleaded and proved, I find that the court below is perfectly justified in finding that Ext.A1 was not executed by the plaintiff really understanding the nature and character of the document. But the court below committed a mistake in moulding the relief. It did not explicitly mention that Ext.A1 is liable to be set aside. That mistake has to be corrected. I find ample materials to find that Ext.A1 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 2nd defendant is a product of fraud and undue influence. Hence, it is hereby set aside. 36. Upshot of the discussions is that although the court below granted reliefs to the plaintiff, it was not in a legally recognizable form. Hence, the decree needs to be modified in the following manner : In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Ext.A1 sale deed executed by the plaintiff in the name of 1st defendant is found to be obtained by exerting undue influence and committing fraud as to nature of the document. Therefore, Ext.A1 is set aside. As per Ext.B1, the property devolved on deceased Paru and the 2nd defendant, Balakrishnan in equal rights. After Paru's death, her half share in the property devolved on the plaintiff, 2nd defendant and deceased Lakshmikutty, who is survived by defendants 3 and 4. Therefore, the property shall be divided into six equal shares and out of which, one share shall be allotted to the plaintiff and one share shall be allotted to the defendants 3 and 4 together. Four shares shall be allotted to the 2nd defendant. The property assigned by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant will have to be adjusted from the share interest of the 2nd defendant in the property. The parties are at liberty to file an application for passing a final decree. The suit is adjourned sinedie. The cost of the suit shall come out of the estate. All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.