JUDGMENT : ASHOK MENON, J. 1. The State is in appeal aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.7884/2012 modifying the confiscation order of a jeep involved in an abkari offence by substituting the confiscation with imposition of a fine of Rs.10,000/-. 2. The facts in brief are thus:- The writ petitioner is the owner-cum-driver of a jeep which was intercepted by the Circle Inspector of Excise, Excise Enforcement and Anti Narcotic Special Squad and his men on 20.3.2010 and found to be transporting 10 litres of Indian Made Foreign Liquor without any valid documents. Crime No.14/2010 was registered for offences punishable under Sections 55(a), 55(i), 33(2) read with Section 63 of the Abkari Act 1077 (Kerala) ('the Act' for brevity). The Deputy Excise Commissioner, after hearing the petitioner, ordered confiscation of the jeep under the provisions of Section 67B2 of the Act vide Ext.P2 order. The petitioner challenged the order before the second respondent-Additional Excise Commissioner vide Ext.P3, in vain, and the confiscation was confirmed vide Ext.P4 order. 3. Aggrieved by the confiscation orders at Exts.P2 and P4, the petitioner approached this Court. The explanation offered by the petitioner was that as owner-cum-driver of the jeep, he had undertaken to transport some household articles and personal effects belonging to one Mr. Sabu and that he had no knowledge about the contents of the articles loaded in the jeep. The contention of the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State was that the petitioner, as owner-cum-driver and the person in charge of the vehicle, failed to discharge the burden cast on him under Section 67C of the Act. After hearing both sides and on perusal of records, it was found by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner being the owner-cum- .driver of the jeep, which is used for eking his livelihood, was to be offered some leniency and the confiscation of the vehicle which is the only means of his livelihood is disproportionate to the alleged offence committed. It is also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had vide Ext.P5 judgment acquitted the accused. The confiscation order at Exts.P2 and P4 was modified substituting the confiscation to imposition of fine of Rs.10,000/- and the respondents were ordered to release the Bank Guarantee on payment of the aforesaid fine. 4. It is also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had vide Ext.P5 judgment acquitted the accused. The confiscation order at Exts.P2 and P4 was modified substituting the confiscation to imposition of fine of Rs.10,000/- and the respondents were ordered to release the Bank Guarantee on payment of the aforesaid fine. 4. State is aggrieved by this judgment of the learned Single Judge and the learned Senior Government Pleader submits that the petitioner himself being the owner-cum-driver of the vehicle was under obligation to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or connivance and that he had taken all reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. The learned Senior Government Pleader relies on the decision in 2008 (2) KHC 952 : 2008 (2) KLJ 692 : 2008 (3) KLT 78 [Shaiju v. Assistant Excise Commissioner and another], in support of his argument and also distinguishes the decision of this Court in 2015 (1) KLT 218 [Ravichandran v. Excise Inspector] and prays that the impugned judgment be set aside and the order of confiscation of the vehicle be restored. 5. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses in the proceedings before the Deputy Excise Commissioner and therefore the confiscation is improper. The learned counsel relies on the decision in 2001 (1) KLT 840 [Lal v. Assistant Excise Commissioner] in support of her argument. The learned counsel also submits that the petitioner’s vehicle was hired by one Sabu for the purpose of transporting his personal effects and household articles and there is absolutely no material to show that the petitioner has knowledge concerning transportation of illicit liquor among those articles and that confiscation cannot be justified. In support of this argument, the learned counsel relies on the decision of this Court in 2015(4) KHC 253 [Rajesh K v. Sub Inspectorof Police,Palakkadand Others]. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Ext.P5 judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kalpetta to prove the innocence of the Writ Petitioner. In support of this argument, the learned counsel relies on the decision of this Court in 2015(4) KHC 253 [Rajesh K v. Sub Inspectorof Police,Palakkadand Others]. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Ext.P5 judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kalpetta to prove the innocence of the Writ Petitioner. On a reading of Ext.P5, it is seen that the learned Sessions Judge had granted benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted them under Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason that MOS 1 to 4 series produced by the prosecution were old and empty bottles and did not have any liquor inside them and therefore the offence under Section 55(a) of the Act is not attracted. There was also no evidence regarding the attempt for intended sale of contraband and hence Section 55(i) also will not be attracted. For non-production of contraband liquor, the accused were also acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 13 read with Section 63 as well as under Section 33 of the Act, since there was no evidence regarding resistance of the seizure of the contraband articles. 8. It has to be understood that the standard of proof required for conviction in a criminal case is very high and the prosecution is bound to prove beyond any semblance of doubt that the accused is guilty. But in a confiscation proceedings initiated under Section 67B of the Act, such standard of proof is not required. A reading of Section 67C would indicate that the burden is on the accused, and the owner of the vehicle has to prove that he had taken sufficient care to see that his vehicle is not used for committing an offence under the Act. In the decision in Shaiju (supra), referring to section 67B of the Act and the effect of acquittal of the accused in the criminal case, it is held as thus: “6. From the above, it can be seen that the section opens with a non obstante clause and it also provides that irrespective of whether prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence or not, the authorised officer may exercise his power of confiscation. From the above, it can be seen that the section opens with a non obstante clause and it also provides that irrespective of whether prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence or not, the authorised officer may exercise his power of confiscation. Legislature has used the non obstante clause and specifically provided that the section will have overriding effect on the other provisions in the Act, so that the Authorised Officer is entitled to proceed with confiscation proceedings de hors the other provisions of the Act. Thus the powers under S.67B are independent of the penal provisions contained in the Abkari Act. Therefore, it is evident that irrespective of whether the accused is prosecuted or not for the offence involved and irrespective of its outcome, in view of the non obstante clause contained in S.67(B), a vehicle involved in an abkari offence is liable for confiscation.” 9. In Sub Inspector of Police, Cherpulassery and Others v. K. Rajesh, reported in 2017 (4) KHC 917 : 2017 (4) KLT 374 : 2017 (4) KLJ 444 , it is held by the Division Bench of this Court thus: “The conditions to be satisfied by the owner of the vehicle proving the requirements to get the benefit of S.67C(2) are: (i) That the involvement of the vehicle was without the knowledge of the owner, (ii) That the involvement of the vehicle was without the knowledge of the Agent, (iii) That it was without the knowledge or connivance of the persons in charge of the vehicle, and (iv) Each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such misuse. In other words, the expression used in the Statute is not with the conjunction 'or' but 'and'. The owner has to satisfy all the four requirements simultaneously, so as to get the benefit of this provision. It is not enough, if the owner satisfies that he was not having any knowledge with regard to the transportation of the contraband in the vehicle. He has also to satisfy with reference to above referred instances in relation to his agent, if any, and also the person who was in charge of the vehicle.” 10. It is not enough, if the owner satisfies that he was not having any knowledge with regard to the transportation of the contraband in the vehicle. He has also to satisfy with reference to above referred instances in relation to his agent, if any, and also the person who was in charge of the vehicle.” 10. In the instant case, as revealed from the seizure mahazar and the occurrence report produced at Annexures A and B, it is adequately clear that the accused had made an attempt to prevent their apprehension by throwing tyre and other articles on the road to cause obstruction, while they were being chased by the Excise officials, and when they were ultimately apprehended, sufficient quantity of liquor was found to be in their possession. The petitioner cannot pretend to be ignorant of what was happening while the vehicle he was driving, was chased by the Excise officials. Had he been an innocent carrier of household articles as claimed, there was no need for him to create any obstruction or resistance to subject his vehicle for inspection. The very fact that the petitioner and his co-accused Sabu had created resistance to their apprehension by the Excise officials, indicates that the petitioner was aware of carrying contraband articles in violation of the Act. The decision in Lal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is not applicable to the case in hand because it is not a case where the petitioner had requested for cross examination of the witnesses and that the authority had denied that opportunity. There is nothing to show that any such request was made. The confiscation orders at Exts.P2 and P4 would indicate that the petitioner was heard before the order of confiscation was made. The petitioner cannot wash off his hands from the liability under Section 67B of the Act. Since it was a conscious act on the part of the petitioner, there is absolutely no need for any leniency to be shown. May be the jeep is the means of his livelihood. But the fact that he has consciously used the jeep for transporting illicit liquor in contravention of the Act indicates that he was prepared to make ill gotten wealth. May be the jeep is the means of his livelihood. But the fact that he has consciously used the jeep for transporting illicit liquor in contravention of the Act indicates that he was prepared to make ill gotten wealth. There is absolutely no need for any interference with the confiscation order and we do not agree with the finding of the learned Single Judge in modifying the orders of confiscation. The Writ Appeal is, therefore, allowed setting aside the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and the orders of the departmental authorities at Exts.P2 and P4 are restored. The appellants are at liberty to proceed against the vehicle or enforce the Bank Guarantee if it covers the value of the vehicle at the time of initial detention. Appeal stands allowed. No costs.