JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J. 1. This criminal revision has been preferred against an ex-parte judgment and order dated 21.01.2012 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra, in criminal case No. 680 of 2006, Smt. Seema Gupta and Another Vs. Dr. Harendra Kumar Gupta, under Section 125 Cr.P.C., P.S. New Agra, District Agra, whereby the revisionist has been directed to pay Rs. 5000/- per month to the opposite party No. 2, Smt. Seema Gupta and Rs. 3000/- per month to master Manan alias Mohit by way of maintenance. 2. The facts as mentioned in the impugned judgement itself are as follows:- 3. The opposite party No. 2 had married the revisionist in February, 1995 according to Hindu rites, whereafter they started residing on the first floor of K.N. Hospital, bypass road, Agra, where out of wedlock, one child was born on 16.7.1999 in the hospital of the revisionist, who is made opposite party No. 3 and now he was studying in Class 1, in St Georges' College, Agra. Post marriage, the conduct of the revisionist transformed absolutely and started harassing and abusing the opposite party No. 2 and would say that he could not live with one woman as he had various women in his life and that he had been fed up with her. On 22.04.2000, he forcibly ousted the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 after beating them, since thereafter both of them were staying in the house of parents of the opposite party No. 2 with her brothers and mother. The revisionist was an M.B.B.S., D.L.O. M.S., a highly qualified E.N.T. surgeon, who was owner of KN Hospital, Agra from where he had monthly income of about Rs.1,00,000/-. On the other hand, the opposite party No. 2 had no source of income and was compelled to stay with her widowed mother and brothers. There was an expenditure incurred in the form of tuition fees, uniform, school van etc., which was required to be met, for which minimum 3500/- per month was required. In such circumstances the opposite party No. 2 should be provided Rs. 5000/- for herself and Rs. 5000/- for her son, opposite party No. 3, by way of maintenance from the revisionist. In such circumstances the opposite party No. 2 should be provided Rs. 5000/- for herself and Rs. 5000/- for her son, opposite party No. 3, by way of maintenance from the revisionist. 3.1 It is revealed from the impugned order that after service upon the revisionist, written statement was filed from his side and thereafter he became absent, which led the lower Court to proceed ex-parte against him. 4. Further, it is revealed that opposite party No. 2 had filed an affidavit by way of evidence, in which she narrated the same version which has been mentioned above and the same was also supported by a photocopy of birth certificate of opposite party No. 3, proving his birth in KN Hospital and Maternity Home. On the basis of above evidence, the learned lower Court passed the impugned order awarding the above mentioned maintenance to the opposite parties No. 2 and 3. 5. In the memorandum of revision it is stated that the impugned judgement and order is illegal, arbitrary, bad in law against the evidence on record, which has been passed without judicial application of mind. The fact of marriage as alleged by opposite party No. 2 is vague, absurd and fake. There was no marital relationship between the revisionist and opposite party No. 2, hence there was no question of opposite party No. 3 being born out of their wedlock. Earlier, an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was moved by the opposite party No. 2 before Family Court Judge and also an F.I.R. was lodged against the revisionist by her under Sections 495, 323 and 506 IPC, being crime No. 604/2000 at P.S. New Agra, in which charge-sheet was filed under sections 376, 420, 504, 506 and 323 IPC after investigation. Against the said charge-sheet, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 3548/2001 under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the revisionist seeking quashing of the said charge-sheet, which was allowed after consideration by this Court vide order dated 21.11.2003, and the entire criminal proceedings were quashed against him in which following observations were made: "On a conspectus of materials on record and the case diary what is deducible is that Seema, the informant, while working as nurse came closer to the family of the petitioner and developed emotional attachment towards the petitioner without realising that the same ultimately may ruin her life. She allowed the petitioner to have physical relationship with her. The question therefore, arises whether such act would fall within the ambit of ''rape' as defined in section 375 I.P.C. It may be noted, Seema was major at the relevant time and was a consenting party to the aforesaid act. Section 90 I.P.C. which comes under caption "general exceptions" in Chapter IV says that ''consent' which is given by a person under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, cannot be construed as consent. In the case on hand, there was neither any misconception of fact nor consent of Seema was obtained, under misrepresentation by the petitioner to have sexual intercourse with her. Recently, almost a similar case like the present one came before the Apex Court in the case of Uday Vs State of Karnataka: 2003 Cr.L.J 1539. In the said case prosecutrix had given consent for sexual intercourse to the applicant with whom he was in deeply love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. It was the admitted case that both belong to different castes for which marriage was not possible. Even then, they were regularly visiting each other and had sexual intercourse for about fifteen to twenty times. Ultimately, the prosecutrix became pregnant and when it came to the knowledge of her mother, she disclosed everything. As the appellant backed out of the promise to marry her, she lodged complaint on the basis of which the police registered a case and submitted charge-sheet. The appellant then faced the trial and was convicted under section 376 I.P.C. He preferred appeal before the Karnataka High Court and the same was dismissed. Both trial Court as well as the High Court held that the appellant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix having obtained her consent by fraud and deception. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court challenging the judgement of the High Court. By making in-depth study of the meaning of the word ''consent' by referring to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and various judicial pronouncements, the Court held that the consensus judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she was deeply in love on promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to have been given under a misconception of fact. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court as aforesaid and coupled with the meaning of word ''consent' to the case on hand, I would hold that sexual act which the petitioner allegedly had with Seema was with her free consent and therefore, it does not fall within the meaning of ''rape' as defined in section 375 I.P.C. The remaining offences which stem from the main allegation of rape are also not made out. In view of discussions made above, no case of rape and other offences having been made out, the charge-sheet and consequent proceedings initiated against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. It is accordingly, so ordered." 6. Against the above judgement, SLP No. 1167/2004 was preferred before the Supreme Court, which was subsequently withdrawn and was dismissed as such on 03.01.2005. 7. In counter-affidavit filed from the side of opposite party No. 2 dated 26.05.2014, it is stated that the revisionist had appeared before trial Court and had filed written statement, thereafter he knowingly abstained from the proceedings merely to delay the proceedings of the criminal case No. 680 of 2006. After passing of the said judgement dated 21.01.2012, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 139 of 2012 was filed by her under section 125 (3) Cr.P.C. for recovery of maintenance amount, then the revisionist, in an effort to defeat her right to get maintenance, without filing an application under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. filed the present revision with delay of about 12 months. The revisionist being an influential person, did not allow the proceedings of the criminal case No. 139 of 2012 to go ahead, as a result of which she preferred proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. by filing application No. 25690 of 2013 with a prayer that the Court below be directed to decide the criminal case No. 139 of 2012 expeditiously. The High Court vide order dated 31.07.2013 disposed of the application with the direction to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra to decide the said case in accordance with law without granting undue adjournments, preferably within a period of four months. Thereafter the revisionist filed an application under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. registered as miscellaneous case No. 54 of 2014, in which after her objections, the same was dismissed vide order dated 10.03.2014. Thereafter the revisionist filed an application under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. registered as miscellaneous case No. 54 of 2014, in which after her objections, the same was dismissed vide order dated 10.03.2014. In the said order the lower Court has observed that due to the Criminal Revision No. 1347/2016 being pending before the High Court, the said application under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. was not maintainable. The said application under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. was filed by the revisionist concealing the fact that he had already filed a revision before the High Court. Thereafter again on 13.02.2012, the revisionist filed a miscellaneous case No. 40 of 2014 under section 127 of Cr.P.C., in which the learned Court below had stayed the recovery proceedings without her consent for reference of the matter to mediation Centre. Filing of application under section 127 Cr.P.C. would indicate that the revisionist did admit that the Court below had passed judgement and order dated 21.01.2012. 8. Thereafter, record reveals that in the present criminal revision the Court passed an order on 30.05.2016 to the following effect: "Be that as it may, at this stage, the interim order is modified to the extent that the applicant revisionist shall deposit Rs. 2,25,000/- before the Court below within 5 weeks from date. Further, an undertaking shall also be filed before the lower Court that Rs. 3000/- per month shall be deposited before the Court below towards maintenance of the child commencing 10th of each calender month from July 2016. In the event of compliance, the sum shall be allowed to be withdrawn by the opposite party No. 2 upon usual verification." 9. Thereafter the revisionist moved a recall application with a prayer for condoning the delay in moving the same on 06.07.2016, for seeking recall of the above-mentioned order dated 30.05.2016, against which the opposite party No. 2 and 3 have filed counter affidavit dated 26.07.2016 opposing the recall and in the said affidavit, a proof was also attached that the opposite party No. 3 was born in presence of Dr. Namita Agrawal in KN Hospital and Maternity Home, Agra. A supplementary counter-affidavit was also filed on 24.07.2017 and thereafter supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has been filed on 07.01.2018, alleging that an amount of Rs. 3000/- per month was being regularly paid for the opposite party No. 3, Master Manan. Namita Agrawal in KN Hospital and Maternity Home, Agra. A supplementary counter-affidavit was also filed on 24.07.2017 and thereafter supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has been filed on 07.01.2018, alleging that an amount of Rs. 3000/- per month was being regularly paid for the opposite party No. 3, Master Manan. It is also stated therein that a declaratory suit No. 2537 of 2017 has been filed on 22.12.2017 by Master Manan claiming attainment of majority. Supplementary affidavit dated 26.02.2015 has been filed by the opposite party No. 2 providing therewith original photographs of her marriage with the revisionist. 10. Heard the arguments of learned counsel for the revisionist Shri R.P. Dwivedi as well as of the learned advocate for the opposite party No. 2 Shri Rakesh Kumar Gupta and perused the record. 11. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that the opposite party No. 2 was never married to the revisionist. A concubine could never claim status of ''wife'. There was no concealment made by the revisionist from opposite party No. 2 that he was already a married man having children. The sexual intercourse between the revisionist and the opposite party No. 2 would be treated to have taken place by consent. Further it is stated that since child, even if he is illegitimate, is entitled for payment of maintenance, he is paying maintenance to the child, i.e. opposite party No. 3. To oust the claim of the opposite party No. 2, he has relied upon the law laid down in Badshah vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Another, (2014) 1 SCC 188 , the relevant paragraphs of which are as follows: "12. No doubt, in Chanmunia, (2011) 1 SCC 141 , the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the matter needs to be considered with respect to section 125 Cr.P.C., by a larger Bench and in Para 41, three questions were formulated for determination by a larger Bench which are as follows: (SCC p. 149) "1. Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether such a presumption would entitle the women to maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C? 2. Whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. having regard to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.? 2. Whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. having regard to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.? 3. Whether a marriage performed according to the customary rights and ceremonies, without strictly fulfilling the requisites of section 7 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. 13. On this basis, it was pleaded before us that this matter be also tagged along with the aforesaid case. However, in the facts of the present case, we do not deem it proper to do so as we find that the view taken by the courts below is perfectly justified. We are dealing with a situation where the marriage between the parties has been proved. However, the petitioner was already married. But he duped the respondent by suppressing the factum of alleged first marriage. On these facts, in our opinion, he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage of his own wrong. Our reasons for this course of action are stated hereinafter: 13.1. Firstly, in Chanmunia case, the parties had been living together for a long time and on that basis question arose as to whether there would be a presumption of marriage between the two because of the said reason, thus, giving rise to claim of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. by interpreting the term "wife" widely. The Court has impressed that if man and woman have been living together for a long time even without a valid marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage entitling such a woman to maintenance should be drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain application under section 125 Cr.P.C. On the other hand, in the present case, respondent 1 has been able to prove, by cogent and strong evidence, that the petitioner and respondent 1 had been married to each other. 13.2. Secondly, as already discussed above, when the marriage between respondent 1 and the petitioner was solemnised, the petitioner had kept respondent 1 in dark about his first marriage. A false representation was given to respondent 1 that she was single and was competent to enter into marital tie with respondent 1. 13.2. Secondly, as already discussed above, when the marriage between respondent 1 and the petitioner was solemnised, the petitioner had kept respondent 1 in dark about his first marriage. A false representation was given to respondent 1 that she was single and was competent to enter into marital tie with respondent 1. In such circumstances, can the petitioner be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and turn around to say that the respondents are not entitled for maintenance by filing the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. as respondent 1 is not "legally wedded wife" of the petitioner? Our answer is in the negative. We are of the view that at least for the purpose of section 125 Cr.P.C., respondent 1 would be treated as the wife of the petitioner, going by the spirit of the two judgements we have reproduced above. For this reason, we are of the opinion that the judgements of this Court in Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530 and Savitaben, (2005) 3 SCC 636 Cases would apply only in those circumstances where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage. In such Cases, she should know that second marriage with such a person is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the consequences thereof. The said judgment would not apply to those Cases where a man marries a second time by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving marriage. That is the only way two sets of judgements can be reconciled and harmonised. 13.3. Thirdly, in such Cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of section 125 Cr. P.C.. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve "social justice" which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of social justice. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society." 12. It was contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that from the above position of law it is absolutely clear that in case, a woman had full knowledge that the person whom she was going to marry, was a married man and that there was no concealment made by the said person who was already married from the said women, who married him, such a woman has to suffer the consequences thereof. In the case at hand the opposite party No. 2 had full knowledge that the revisionist was a married man, being a nurse in his nursing home, therefore she could not be entitled for any kind of maintenance from the revisionist. 13. On the other hand the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has vehemently argued that she was not knowing about the revisionist being married before getting married to him. She was misrepresented by the revisionist that he was unmarried and thereafter only she had married him. In the alternative it was also argued that even if she married him knowingly, her long association with revisionist in live-in relationship and begetting a son, would entitle her to claim maintenance from the revisionist. Reliance is placed by him on a judgment dated November 23, 2016 in Criminal Revision No. (F) 166 of 2015 (O&M), Ajay Bharadwaj vs Jyotsna and others of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in which too an order of interim maintenance was under challenge & deciding the same, it was recorded in the judgment that the Apex Court had also opined that the nature of live-in relationship had to be looked into while determining the entitlement of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. Reducing the interim maintenance it was directed that the Court below was required to give findings on fact, hence without being influenced by the observations made by the Court, the court below should decide the matter on merits. 14. 14. It may be mentioned here that para-20 of Badshah's case (supra), also needs to be quoted, to understand the position of law where there might be live-in relationship or long staying together as husband and wife and its interpretation in respect of claim of maintenance under section 125 of Cr.P.C. which is as follows: "20. Thus, while interpreting a statute the Court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon case which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The Court would also invoke the legal maxim of construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat in such Cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a roadblock in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under section 125 Cr. P.C. such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife." 15. In the case at hand, from the facts it has emerged that the learned Court below did not have opportunity to consider evidence on record from both the sides. The impugned judgment has been passed on the basis of sole testimony of the opposite party No. 2 in the form of an affidavit and whatever was stated by her, has been taken to be true by the learned Court below, because it had no option, as the revisionist had stopped coming to Court to contest the matter after filing the written statement. That clearly suggests that he was avoiding the Court proceedings so that the pronouncement of judgment in the matter could be delayed. That clearly suggests that he was avoiding the Court proceedings so that the pronouncement of judgment in the matter could be delayed. It is also apparent that if the revisionist was of the view that he was aggrieved by the impugned order, the same being an ex-parte judgment, he had remedy available to him, by moving the Court below under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. to get the ex-parte order set aside instead of filing revision before this court. But he had chosen the said path of moving this Court in revision against the impugned judgment only to delay the proceedings. With the statutory remedy being available under section 126 (2) of Cr.P.C., the revision was not maintainable before this Court. When no relief could be obtained soon after filing the said revision, which also was filed after considerable delay and when the opposite party No. 2 moved application for realisation of the maintenance amount under section 125 (3) Cr.P.C. and got an order from High Court for expeditious disposal of the same, he preferred proceedings under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C., to delay the realisation of the said amount of maintenance. It is apparent from record that the said application moved under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the lower Court only on the ground that a revision was already pending before this Court in the same matter. The question involved in the present case, as argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist is, whether the opposite party No. 2 married the revisionist or not? Whether she had married the revisionist despite knowing the fact that he was already married and having children, or whether the revisionist had concealed these facts from the opposite party No. 2 before getting married to her? Whether the opposite party No. 2 had given birth to opposite party No. 3 from the wedlock of revisionist and opposite party No. 2? If opposite party No. 2 fails to prove that she was legally wedded wife of the revisionist, whether on the basis of long live-in relationship between them, she was entitled to maintenance under law? Whether opposite party No. 2 had no income to support herself and her child? Whether the revisionist had sufficient income, out of which some amount could be awarded by way of maintenance to be paid to the opposite party No. 2 and 3? If yes, how much? Whether opposite party No. 2 had no income to support herself and her child? Whether the revisionist had sufficient income, out of which some amount could be awarded by way of maintenance to be paid to the opposite party No. 2 and 3? If yes, how much? All these questions are matters of fact, findings on which could be given only after evidence adduced by both the parties. It may not be overlooked that the learned counsel for the revisionist, during arguments has admitted that the opposite party No. 3, even though illegitimate child, was entitled to maintenance and he was accordingly being paid an amount of Rs.3000/- per month, which although is being controverted by the opposite party No. 2 that such an amount has not been paid in full till date. This would also require a finding from the Court below as to whether the entire amount which has become due under the impugned order has been paid to the opposite party No. 3 or not? No findings on facts may be given by this Court under the revision jurisdiction, because that is the domain of the trial Court. Whatever case laws are being relied upon before this Court by the parties need to be taken into consideration by the Court below, for arriving on the findings on aforesaid questions. Even the findings which are recorded by this Court in proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C., whereby charge-sheet, mentioned above, was prayed to be quashed, should not influence the learned Court below while arriving on findings in the present case. 16. This Court finds that the proceedings under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. initiated by the revisionist before the Court below were dismissed on the ground that the present revision was pending in this Court. 16. This Court finds that the proceedings under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. initiated by the revisionist before the Court below were dismissed on the ground that the present revision was pending in this Court. Therefore, if this revision is dismissed, there would be no hurdle before the Court below in entertaining an application under section 126 (2) of Cr.P.C., if moved by the revisionist for getting the impugned order, which is ex-parte, set aside, if the same is found to be covered under law, subject to taking into consideration the delay in moving the same, which could be compensated with adequate cost and in case the impugned order is set aside by the lower Court and an opportunity is given to the revisionist to adduce evidence and thereafter the matter is decided on merits after giving opportunity to both the sides, subject to ensuring that adequate amount is directed to be paid by way of interim maintenance to the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3, that would serve the purpose of justice in the present case. The learned Court below may do well to take into consideration that a long time has been lost since the filing of the application under section 125 Cr. P.C., for which it could direct the revisionist to compensate the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 adequately in terms of money. It is a social legislation the objective of which is to take care of helpless wife, children and other family members. 17. Therefore, this revision deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed with cost with liberty to the revisionist to proceed under section 126 (2) Cr.P.C. as held above. In case such an application is moved by the revisionist, the same shall be entertained by the Court below and disposed of in accordance with law, keeping in mind the observations made by this Court in the body of this judgment. This Court expects that the Court below shall not take more than three months in finally concluding the entire maintenance issue positively, without allowing any undue adjournments to either side.