JUDGMENT : S.R. Brahmbhatt, J. Heard Shri Saurabh Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate, Shri Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Gaurav Mathur, learned advocate for the petitioners and Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Vishal Sevak, learned advocate for the respondent no.6 and Shri Balbir Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Devnath Somnath Shukla, Mr. Hardik Modh, for respondent no.7. 2. In this group of petitions there is a common challenge to the final finding dated 22.07.2017 whereby the respondent no.2 has recommended to the Govt. of India withdrawal of the anti-dumping duty as a result of an exercise undertaken under Mid Term review hereinafter referred to as the MTR for the sake of brevity. This challenge is common in all the petitions whereas in two petitions, there is an additional challenge to the order passed by the respondent no.2 on 22.07.2017 where under the respondent no.2 rescinded and annulled the sunset review on the ground that the sunset review was initiated during pendency of MTR and as the MTR recommendation is available the sunset review is required to be annulled. In SCA No.14202 and 14204 of 2017, the challenge is to the final finding dated 22.07.2017 as well to the order of annulment of sunset review dated 22.07.2017, whereas in SCA No.14203, 14205, 14206 and 14207 of 2017 the challenge is confined to the final finding rendered on 22.07.2017. The product called Soda Ash is common in all these petitions for which the anti-dumping duty was imposed. However, these petitions could be further regrouped into two sub-groups not only on account of challenge to the order of annulment of SSR but also on account of the fact that the anti-dumping duty so far as the SCA no.14202 and 14204 is concerned was imposed upon the soda ash imported from the countries from Peoples Republic of China, European Union, Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Ukraine and USA on which the anti dumping duty was imposed on 03.07.2012 for the period of 5 years, whereas in the rest of the petitions the anti dumping duty on soda ash was imposed from the country like Turkey and Russia and the date of imposition happens to be 18.04.2013. Apart therefrom, there appears to be no further difference or distinction and hence all the matters were heard together and are disposed of by this common order and judgment. Apart therefrom, there appears to be no further difference or distinction and hence all the matters were heard together and are disposed of by this common order and judgment. The reliefs which are prayed for in Special Civil Application No.14204 of 2017 could be considered to be a common reliefs to the extent of final finding dated 22.07.2017 on Mid Term Review as in Special Civil Application No.14203 of 2017, 14205 of 2017, 14206 of 2017 and 14207 of 2017 wherein there was no Sunset Review. Reliefs prayed for in Special Civil Application No.14204 of 2017 reads as under: "A. This Honble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, and quash and set aside Notification No.15/28/2014-DGAD dated 22.07.2017 and Order dated 22.07.2017 rescinding Sunset Review investigation, issued by the Respondent No.2 and annexed as Annexure I and J hereto; and B. Pending hearing and final outcome of this petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to by way of interim and/or ad interim relief stay the operation and implementation of Notification NO.15/28/2014-DGAD dated 22.07.2017 and Order dated 22.07.2017 rescinding Sunset Review investigation, issued by the Respondent No.2 and annexed as Annexure I and J hereto; and C. Pending hearing and final outcome of this petition, this Honble Court be pleased to by way of interim and/or interim relief direct the Respondent No.3 not to act in pursuance of Notification No.15/28/2014-DGAD dated 22.07.2017 and Order dated 22.07.2017 rescinding Sunset Review investigation, issued by the Respondent No.2; and D. Ex parte, Ad-interim and/or interim relief in terms of Paragraph no.21(B) and (C) be granted. E. For Cost; F. Such other and further orders as this Honble Court deems fit and expedient in the facts of the case be passed." 3. The facts in brief, as could be gathered from the memo of Special Civil Application No.14204 of 2017 deserve to be set out as under: 3.1 The petitioner no.1 is a company within the meaning of the provision of the companies Act, 2013 and is engaged inter alia in the business of manufacturing Soda Ash, Sodium Bicarbonate, Ammonium Bicarbonate and Detergent Powder in the State of Gujarat. The petitioner came to be established in the year 1939. The gross turnover of the Petitioner for financial year 2015-16 is Rs.140, 704.31 Lakhs. The petitioner came to be established in the year 1939. The gross turnover of the Petitioner for financial year 2015-16 is Rs.140, 704.31 Lakhs. 3.2 The respondent no.1 is the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India under whose aegis and control the respondent no.2 is functioning. The respondent no.2 is the Designated Authority constituted under the provisions of Rule 3 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" for short) and carries out its duties and functions as provided under Rule 6 of the Rules. The respondent no.2 has issued the impugned Final Findings and passed impugned order dated 22.07.2017. The Respondent no.3 issued Notification dated 03.07.2012, imposing AntiDumping duty on imports of Soda Ash from the Peoples Republic of China, European Union, Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Ukraine and USA The said Notification was to expire on 02.07.2017. During the pendency of the Notification dated 03.07.2012, the respondent no.2 initiated a Mid-Term Review vide Initiation Notification dated 21.07.2015 at the behest of domestic users and importers of Soda Ash. So far as the second sub-group of petitions is concerned, the anti duty dumping on the product called soda ash came to be issued on 18.04.2013 from the import originating in or from Turkey and Russia. The Mid Term Review in respect of the product from the Turkey and Russia came to be initiated on 01.10.2015. 3.3 In the said investigation proceedings, the respondent no.2 on 14.09.2016 issued two Disclosure Statements under Rule 16 of the Rules, whereby the Respondent no.2 concluded that despite continued dumping, there is no injury or likelihood of injury to the Petitioner and the Domestic Industry and, therefore, concluded that AntiDumping Duty is not required to be continued. The said Disclosure Statements were challenged by the Petitioners by way of Special Civil Application No.16428 of 2016 and other allied matters. During the pendency of the said petition, the respondent no.2 on 23.09.2016 issued Final Findings recommending withdrawal of Anti-Dumping Duty. The said Final Findings were also made subject matter of challenge. 3.4 This Court vide order dated 13.12.2016, while admitting the said Petition and confirming interim relief, permitted the respondent no.1 to issue a Notification under Rule 18 subject to the outcome of the said petition. The said Final Findings were also made subject matter of challenge. 3.4 This Court vide order dated 13.12.2016, while admitting the said Petition and confirming interim relief, permitted the respondent no.1 to issue a Notification under Rule 18 subject to the outcome of the said petition. Accordingly, the respondent no.1 issued a Notification No.55/2016-CUS dated 21.12.2016 which was also made subject matter of challenge in the said petition. This Court vide Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2017 allowed the said petition, quashing the Disclosure Statement dated 14.09.2016 and all subsequent notifications based thereon, and remanded the matter back to the Respondent no.2 with direction to complete the entire proceedings within period of 60 days from the receipt of the order. The respondent no.2 was therefore, required to issue a fresh disclosure statement in light of the observations made in the said judgment and in accordance with law within 60 days. 3.5 The respondent no.2 conducted hearing prior to issuance of fresh Disclosure Statement on 25.04.2017, and thereafter on 07.06.2017 issued a Fresh Disclosure Statement. The respondent no.2 has disclosed essential facts as to continue dumping, positive likelihood of recurrence of dumping and injury in case of Anti-Dumping Duties are revoked mid-term. Thereafter, on behalf of the Domestic Industry, post disclosure submission were filed, inter alia, justifying why revocation of duty mid-term would result in continued dumping and injury and that exporters from subject countries would flood the Indian market with dumped imports the moment duty is revoked. 3.6 In the meanwhile, since the period of 5 years was coming to an end on 02.07.2017 in respect of the soda ash product being imported from the group of countries viz. China, Kenya, Ukrain, Europe etc., under Notification dated 03.07.2012, the petitioner and another constituents of the concerned Domestic Industry approached the respondent no.2 for initiating Sunset Review under Section 9A(5) of the Act read with Rule 23 of the Rules. After considering the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the other constituent of the Domestic Industry, the respondent no.2 issued Notification No.SSRo8/2017 dated 16.06.2017 initiating Sunset Review investigation with respect to imports of Soda Ash originating in or exported from subject countries. Such review was, however, made subject to outcome of the pending Mid Term Review investigation whereunder fresh Disclosure Statement dated 07.06.2017 had been issued. Such review was, however, made subject to outcome of the pending Mid Term Review investigation whereunder fresh Disclosure Statement dated 07.06.2017 had been issued. 3.7 Pursuant to the issuance of the Sunset Review Initiation Notification, the respondent no.3 did not issue a Notification under Section 9A(5) for extending the duty for a period not extending one year though the last date for the same effectively was 30.06.2017, since duties were to expire on 02.07.2017 which was a holiday. In the circumstances, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court vide Special Civil Application No.12251 of 2017 and this Court on 30.06.2017 issued notice making it returnable on 03.07.2017. However, later on 30.06.2017, a notification extending duty for one year was issued. Accordingly, vide order dated 03.07.2017, Special Civil Application No.12249 of 2017 was disposed of as not pressed. 3.8 The respondent no.2 was required to decide the Mid-Term Review within 60 days of the judgment and order dated 23.02.2017, the respondent no.2 without seeking any extension of time and after expiry of the period of 60 days has issued the Impugned Final Findings on 22.07.2017. Accordingly, the respondent no.2 has also issued the impugned order dated 22.02.2017 rescinding the Sunset Review Investigation holding that since Mid Term review is decided against the Domestic Industry, the basis of Sunset Review stipulated in Rule 23(1)(b) is removed. 3.9 Being aggrieved by the issuance of the impugned Final Findings and the Impugned Order dated 22.07.2017 by the respondent no.2, the petitioner approached this Court with the present petitions. 4. 3.9 Being aggrieved by the issuance of the impugned Final Findings and the Impugned Order dated 22.07.2017 by the respondent no.2, the petitioner approached this Court with the present petitions. 4. The counsels have argued the matter at length and it is required to be noted that the submissions qua challenge to the final finding as well as the annulment notification made by the counsels in respect of SCA No.14204 and 14202 of 2017 would also cover the challenge to the final finding in other matters as in those matters, on account of being nonexistence of Sunset Review the challenge is confined only to final finding of MTR, hence, the written submissions made by the counsel in respect of both the challenges deserve to be set-out in verbatim as under :- Written arguments of the petitioners I. The Respondent no.2 has exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a gross error of law insofar as it has issued Final Findings dated 22-07-2017 (page no.333) in Mid Term Investigation and annulling Sunset Review Investigation (page no.394) vide order dated 22-07-2017. A. Section 9A(5) of the Act envisages that Anti-Dumping Duty would cease to have effect on expiry of 5 years from date of imposition i.e. 03- 07-2012 and expires on 02-07-2017 for China PR batch. The said provision is mandatory. B. Section 9A(5) also envisages that the Duty imposed under Section 9A may be revoked earlier. Such revocation can be on the basis of a MTR under Rule 23(1A) to the Rules. The said Rule envisages withdrawal of duty pursuant to imposition. By the very nature of the provisions it is apparent that the withdrawal of the duty in an MTR can only be done during the period of 5 years. C. The Final Findings (page no.333) recommending withdrawal are issued on 22-07- 2017 after the expiry of 5 years. D. First proviso to Section 9A(5) envisages a further imposition of duty for a period of 5 years from the date of an order (Rule 18) if such imposition where in a review (SSR) the Central Government is of the opinion that cessation of duty is likely to lead to continuance or recurrence of dumping and injury. Such review is envisaged under Rule 23(1B) and is clearly looking at further imposition and/or continuance and not withdrawal. Such review is envisaged under Rule 23(1B) and is clearly looking at further imposition and/or continuance and not withdrawal. E. SSR intimation on 16-06-2017 (page no.313) was done with a prima facie satisfaction on recurrence of dumping and injury if duty is not continued. Once such review was initiated and the 5 year period was to expire, the Respondent no.2 was required to complete the investigation in SSR rather than continue MTR which was already in fructuous. F. The annulment of SSR by Respondent no.2 is de hors the provisions of Rules. Such annulment is not envisaged at all. Failure of conducting an investigation in SSR and relying on the investigation in MTR which in scope, ambit and objective to be achieved is entirely distinct and in fact contrary to scope, ambit and objective to be achieved in SSR is ex facie illegal. G. Under the second proviso to Section 9A(5) where a review is initiated before the expiry of 5 years but not concluded, the duty imposed can be extended for a period not exceeding 1 year. Such provision clearly pertains to SSR because there is no warrant of extending a duty during pendency of MTR since (I) it would be absurd to extend the duty in a proceeding which is initiated to withdraw it, and (b) an MTR would be an empty formality once the duty ceases to have effect. H. The extension of 1 year granted by notification dated 30-06-2017 is evidently pursuant to SSR and therefore it could not have and cannot be looked as giving a lease of life to MTR. Any interpretation to the contrary would defeat the purpose of the Act and Rules and would be absurd. II. The respondent no.2 has exceeded its jurisdiction and committed gross error of law in changing its conclusions on the basis of essential facts which were declared by it vide Disclosure Statement dated 07-06-2017. A. Rule 16 of the Rules read with Art. 6.9 of WTO agreement clearly shows that the Disclosure Statement is a Statement of essential facts which the Designated Authority finds would become the basis for imposition of definitive measures. Rule 16 of the Rules has been interpreted by this Hon'ble Court in its judgment dated 23-02-2017 in para 31 and 31.2 (page no.184). Disclosure Statement thus contains findings on essential facts though not finding based on essential facts. Rule 16 of the Rules has been interpreted by this Hon'ble Court in its judgment dated 23-02-2017 in para 31 and 31.2 (page no.184). Disclosure Statement thus contains findings on essential facts though not finding based on essential facts. B. The respondent no.2 has in paragraph no.49 (page no.253), paragraph no.65-66 (page no.271), paragraph no.71 (page no.272), paragraph no.77 (page no.276), paragraph no.90 (page no.283), paragraph no.91 (page no.284), paragraph no.92 (page no.285), paragraph no.94 (page no.286), paragraph no.95 (page no.286) and paragraph nos.96 & 97 (page no.286) has given such findings on the essential facts. These findings show that despite duty being in force dumping has continued, Domestic Industry's market share has gone down, imports have doubled, price undercutting is positive, capacities are added in the exporting countries which are more than demand in India, Indian market is price attractive which would lead to diversion to India and in the event of revocation, dumping is likely to get intensified. These findings would not be amenable to any change unless data forming their base changes and would justify continued imposition of duty. For Turkey and Russia [SCA 14205 of 2015, 14203 of 2015 and SCA 14207 of 2015], the Disclosure Statement issued discloses facts that would support continuation of duty. C. In the final findings, without any change in the data both for China PR batch and Turkey batch, the respondent no.2 has altered the conclusions in such a manner that it creates a scenario that the existence of dumping and other conclusions showing likelihood of injury are virtually irrelevant though disclosed. Such exercise stands vitiated on the account of arbitrariness. D. The authority has also relied upon data/information with regard to capacity utilization (paragraph 101 at page 392) and DGCI&S data for the period 2015-16 and 2016-17 in paragraph no.90 (page no.383) of Final Findings which were never shared or disclosed. Both the data pertains to likelihood analysis and it was incumbent on the part of Respondent no.2 to disclose the data before arriving at any findings. Therefore, the action of the Respondent no.2 suffers from the vice of violation of principles of natural justice. E. The respondent no.2 has undertaken Cumulative Assessment in the MTR investigation. Both the data pertains to likelihood analysis and it was incumbent on the part of Respondent no.2 to disclose the data before arriving at any findings. Therefore, the action of the Respondent no.2 suffers from the vice of violation of principles of natural justice. E. The respondent no.2 has undertaken Cumulative Assessment in the MTR investigation. Thus, when POI for China PR batch and Turkey batch is same, Article under investigation identical and essential facts found in respective Disclosure Statements, both issued on 7.6.2017 showing dumping above permissible limit, surplus capacities in exporting countries, price attractiveness of India market and likelihood of intensification of dumping, both investigations are similar and the Final findings in MTR in Turkey batch deserves to be quashed as being vitiated by arbitrariness. III. The emphasis of Respondent no.2 and other respondents on the stand of Domestic Industry that it does not suffer material injury and that it is able to have a manage return on investment more than normal limits is neither relevant nor germane in review investigation. A. Under Rule 23 of the Rules the Authority is required to examine the likelihood of continuance OR recurrence of dumping and injury. Both in MTR and SSR current injury or its absence would pale into insignificance because the focus is on likelihood of continuance or recurrence. Even in a case where there is no injury in present, it may recur after protection is withdrawn. Therefore, the so called admission on the part of the Domestic Industry of not suffering material injury is merely a statement of fact and is so understood by the authority which is evident from the fact that after deciding on material injury in the Impugned Final Findings, the authority begins paragraph no.84 (pertaining to likelihood analysis) as under : "84. However, in a review investigation, the Authority has to determine as to whether the subject goods are continuing to enter or likely to enter the India market at dumped prices and whether injury to domestic industry is likely to recur due to these dumped imports if the duty is removed or varied....." B. The failure of the Respondent no.2 to have examined the impact of investment made by the Domestic Industry (considering that demand in India is growing) vitiates the entire exercise on the account of such failure since the investment made for the expansion has not been considered. In any case, Return on Investment being a percentage of profit vis-a-vis value of assets, appears to be high because the value of assets have become depreciated over the years. C. The Respondents cannot be heard to contend that Domestic Industry must not make investment or to do so at its own peril to bridge the gap between demand and supply and such gaps must necessarily be catered by imports. IV. The failure of Respondent No.2 of concluding the MTR after the period of 60 days prescribed by this Hon'ble court in its judgment dated 23-02-2017 and after the expiry of 5 years it illegal. A. MTR for China PR batch (subject Petition) was initiated on 21-07-2015. For Turkey batch on 1.10.2015. In such MTR both for China PR batch and Turkey batch, Final Findings were issued on 23-09-2016 and Central Government issued a Notification (under Rule 18) on 21-12-2016 within the period of 18 months. Thus, the statutory time limit was complied with. B. This Hon'ble Court vide Judgment dated 23-02-2017 quashed the Disclosure Statement dated 14-09-2016, Final Findings dated 23-09-2016 and Customs Notification dated 21-12-2016 and remanded the matter back to the Authority for issuing fresh Disclosure Statement and Final Findings. In exercise of its powers under Article 226, 60 days period was granted to ensure that an MTR investigation initiated by the Respondent does not end by the order of the Court but reaches its logical conclusion. C. The stand of the Respondent before the Authority was that the 60 day period was sacrosanct (see page 384) the authority, however, has failed to justify such delay and has also not applied for extension within the period of 60 days or even before the expiry of 5 years. Thus, the exercise is vitiated both for China PR bath and for Turkey batch insofar as 60 days period is concerned. D. For China PR batch, the period of 60 days was to end before the expiry of 5 years. Once the 5 year period ended on 2.7.2017, the question of continuing MTR would not remain. V. On a plain reading of Section 9C of the Act read with Rule 18 of the Rules it is apparent that a notification issued by the Central Government pursuant to Final Findings would be an order of determination or an order of review. Once the 5 year period ended on 2.7.2017, the question of continuing MTR would not remain. V. On a plain reading of Section 9C of the Act read with Rule 18 of the Rules it is apparent that a notification issued by the Central Government pursuant to Final Findings would be an order of determination or an order of review. Therefore, the petitioners do not have any alternative or efficacious remedy in respect of Final Findings dated 22-07-2017. In any case, the annulment order dated 22-07-2017. In any case the annulment order dated 22-07-2017 is not in a nature of review of an order of determination or an order of determination under Section 9C of the Act and is therefore, not appealable. In these circumstances the remedy under Article 226 of Constitution of India is the only efficacious remedy available to the petitioners. VI. Moreover, the judgments relied upon by the Respondents do not assist the case of the Respondent. VII. The petitioner therefore, submits that the present petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned Final Findings dated 22-07-2017 and order of annulment of SSR deserves to be quashed and the Authority be directed to commence the investigation for SSR. 5. The Counsel for the Private respondents argued at length contending that the petition is not maintainable and the petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy in terms of Section-9(C) of the Customs Tariff Act and that statutory remedy as held by Delhi High Court and other Court as efficacious alternative remedy, this Court may not entertain this group of petitions. The Respondent No.1 and 2 contended that the Final Findings are recommendatory only and the determination would be by Government, and once the same are accepted the cause of action would arise hence the petitions deserve to be dismissed on account of they being premature. Learned advocate appearing for respondent further submitted that the petitioners were not justified in contending that the respondent no.2 exceeded the time limit and without seeking extension, rendered final finding and annulled sunset review and hence, this exercise of the petitioner is vitiated. The submission of the petitioner is based on the incorrect calculation as the matter was with the Court and the Court ultimately granted time of 60 days. The submission of the petitioner is based on the incorrect calculation as the matter was with the Court and the Court ultimately granted time of 60 days. Unfortunately, within 60 days the final finding could not be rendered but that in itself cannot be said to be so grave as to render the same as nullity as sought to be canvassed by the petitioners. The written submissions of the respondents, produced on record are reproduced in verbatim as under: Written Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.7 in Special Civil Application No. 14204 of 2017 1. The captioned writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the Final Findings ("Impugned Findings") dated 22.07.2017 along with the order dated 22.07.2017 on the ground, amongst others, that the findings have been issued in contravention to the order dated 23.02.2017 of this Hon'ble Court wherein 60 days period was given for issuance of disclosure statement and the final finding. 2. The factual conspectus leading to the captioned petition has been dealt in great detail in the counter affidavit filed by Respondent No.7 and the same is not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. The Respondent No.7 craves leave of this Hon'ble Court to refer and rely upon the said factual averments and the same may be read as part and parcel of the instant written submissions. 3. The submissions made hereinbelow are made without prejudice and in addition to the submissions made in the counter affidavit and the Respondent No.7 craves leave of this Hon'ble Court to read this as a part and parcel of the counter affidavit. SUBMISSIONS The Impugned Findings have been passed in accordance with the statutory provisions and the order dated 23.02.2017 4. It is submitted that Respondent No.2(SIC) vide order dated 23.02.2017 quashed the Disclosure Statement dated 14.09.2016 and Final Findings dated 23.09.2016, and remanded the proceedings back to Respondent No.2 for issuance of fresh disclosure, in consonance with the relevant statutory provisions and in light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that the Impugned Findings issued by Respondent No.2 are in accordance with the specific directions passed by this Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 23.02.2017. 5. It is submitted that the Impugned Findings issued by Respondent No.2 are in accordance with the specific directions passed by this Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 23.02.2017. 5. It is submitted that Respondent No.2, while passing the impugned Findings, has considered the relevant factors for determining injury to the domestic industry and has issued the Impugned Findings in consonance with the provisions of law and the observation made by this Hon'ble Court in its order dated 23.02.2017. 6. It is submitted that Respondent No.2, in the Impugned findings, has categorically dealt with the issue pointed out by the Hon'ble High Court and therefore, the Impugned findings needs no interference by this Hon'ble Court. The chart highlighting the same is produced hereinbelow wherein each discrepancy stated by Petitioner has been replied to and is highlighted: Sr. No. Finding in Disclosure Statement (Page No.228-285) Page No. Final Findings (Page 333-393) Page No. 1 I. DUMPING MARGIN 49. Comparing the aforesaid normal values and export prices as determined, the dumping margin determined for the subject countries during POI and Post POI are as follows, which indicates that dumping has continued even in the post-POI i.e. during the period subsequent to the period of investigation: 252 49. Comparing the aforesaid normal values and export prices as determined, the dumping margin determined for the subject countries during POI and Post POI are as follows, which indicates that dumping has continued even in the post-POI i.e. during the period of investigation. However, the dumping margin during post-POI has come down in respect of all countries except USA where it has increased 353-354 Comments: The disclosure statement is issued by Respondent No.2 under Rule 16 to disclose only the essential facts. It is pertinent to note that Disclosure Statement does not contain any conclusions but merely lays out all the essential information. In the disclosure statement, Respondent No.2 has provided the data/figures to compare the normal value and the export prices to determine the dumping margin for the POI and POST POI, as mandated under Rule 16 of the Anti-Dumping Rules. In the Final Findings, Respondent no.2 has given the final conclusions (page no.353- 354) based on the data/figures provided in the disclosure statement amounts to order of determination, which is within the scope of Rule 17 of the Anti- Dumping Rules. In the Final Findings, Respondent no.2 has given the final conclusions (page no.353- 354) based on the data/figures provided in the disclosure statement amounts to order of determination, which is within the scope of Rule 17 of the Anti- Dumping Rules. Without prejudice, and assuming the conclusions to be wrong, it is submitted that in a writ proceeding under Article 226 before the high court, only the legality of the decision making process can be looked into, and not the correctness of proceedings. The Petitioner, can challenge the correctness by way of an appeal under Section 9C before the Ld. CESTAT. 2 k. Cumulative assessment 56. In this regard the Authority observes that: i. the margins of dumping from each of the subject countries are more than the limits prescribed above; ii. the volume of imports from each of the subject countries is more than the limits prescribed; Demand and Market Share: (As per table) 268 Demand and Market Share: 63. The Authority notes that demand has increased during the POI as compared to the base year. The growth in demand during the POI over base year was 17%. The demand has shown increasing trend during the post POI (April 15-Sept 15) as well. 365 268-269 Comments: In the disclosure statement, Respondent No.2 has disclosed the data pertaining to demand and market share and has compared the same for the base year and the POI. In the final findings, Respondent No.2 has reiterated the fact that there is an increase in demand during the POI as compared to the base year. The Respondent has further, on the basis of the date/figures, given a conclusion, which is as per Rule 17 of the Rules and which cannot have been given in the disclosure statement issued under Rule 16. 367-268 3 L. Volume Effects of Dumped Imports Import Volume and Market Share 64. With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the Authority is required to consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in India. For the purpose of injury analysis, the Authority has relied on the import data procured from DGCIS. With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the Authority is required to consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in India. For the purpose of injury analysis, the Authority has relied on the import data procured from DGCIS. The volume of imports of the subject goods from the subject countries have been analyzed as under:- Particulars UOM 2011-1 Import volume China MT 3307 Trend Indexed 100 EU MT 98968 Trend Indexed 100 Kenya MT 1,58,25 Trend Indexed 100 Pakistan MT 24108 Trend Indexed 100 Iran MT 5276 Trend Indexed 100 Ukraine MT 39913 Trend Indexed 100 USA MT 1 Trend Indexed 100 Subject Countries MT 3,29,82 Trend Indexed 100 Other Countries attracting duties MT 1,10,69 Trend Indexed 100 Other Countries MT 3952 Trend Indexed 100 Total Imports MT 4,44,47 65. The Authority notes that from the subject countries, imports have increased in absolute terms from 3,29,828 MT in the base year to 6,73,706 MT in the POI in consonance with increasing demand in India. Imports from subject countries has shown further increasing trend during post POI as well. 66. While market share of the subject imports have increased, the market share of the domestic industry as well as other Indian producers has fallen during the POI as compared to the base year. However, during the post POI, the market share of the domestic industry has shown a marginal increase. On the contrary, the market share of the subject country in overall demand has increased from 12.55% during the base year to 21.87% during the POI. During the post POI, the market share of the subject countries has shown further increasing trend. 269-270 Import Volume and Market Share: 65. The Authority notes that though there is overall increase in imports from subject countries during the POI as compared to the base year of the injury period, a deeper analysis reveals that out of three major producer subject countries (China, USA and EU two countries namely, China and EU are showing declining trend in imports in the post-POI. Even on overall basis, (i.e. all subject countries taken together) the increase in imports during the post POI is only miniscule 3%. Even on overall basis, (i.e. all subject countries taken together) the increase in imports during the post POI is only miniscule 3%. Comments: Respondent No.2 has disclosed the data pertaining to import volume and marked share and has observed that the imports have increased in absolute terms from 3,29,828 MT in the base year to 6,73,706 MT in the POI in consonance with increasing demand in India. Imports from subject countries has shown further increasing trend during post POI as well. Such disclosure is inline with Rule 16 and does not amount to final determination. In the final findings, Respondent No.2 has reiterated the data and the observation and has concluded that out of three major producer subject countries (China, USA and EU two countries namely, China and EU are showing declining trend in imports in the post-POI. Even on overall basis, (i.e. all subject countries taken together) the increase in imports during the post POI is only miniscule 3%. Such conclusion forms a part of the determination which can be done only under Rule 17. Therefore, there is no violation of natural justice. 378-369 4 Price Undercutting 71. The Authority notes that during the POI as well as post POI, the price undercutting effect of dumped imports is positive in respect of all the subject countries individually except Pakistan and Ukraine for some years and EU for post-POI. However, for subject countries as a whole, the price undercutting is positive during the POI as well as post POI. 271-272 70. The Authority notes that while price undercutting is positive throughout including in POI and post-POI a closer look indicates that price undercutting for China and USA has actually declined during POI as compared to the previous year and for EU, Kenya, Pakistan and Ukraine declined during post-POI as compared to POI. Comments: In the disclosure statement, Respondent No.2 has disclosed the data/figures of the Landed Value and Net sales Realization to determined price under cutting for POI and Post POI and has accordingly observed that price undercutting is positive during the POI as well as post POI for subject countries as a whole. This is in line with Rule 16 wherein the Respondent is mandated to disclose the essential facts. This is in line with Rule 16 wherein the Respondent is mandated to disclose the essential facts. Thereafter, on the basis of those facts, the Respondent has concluded that while price undercutting is positive throughout including in POI and post-POI a closer look indicates that price undercutting for China and USA has actually declined during POI as Compared to the previous year and for EU, Kenya, Pakistan and Ukraine declined during post-POI as compared to POI. Such determination is a function that the Respondent No.2 is required to carry only in the final findings as per Rule17. Therefore, there is no violation of principle of natural justice and thus the impugned Findings require no interference by this Hon'ble Court. 372 N. Examination of other Economic Parameters of Domestic Industry Production, Capacity, Sales and Capacity Utilization 73. From the above information, the Authority notes that the capacity of production of the domestic industry has remained constant during the injury period including the POI. However, both sales and capacity utilization have increased during the POI as compared to the base year in line with increase in demand. Further, the domestic industry was adding further capacities during the investigation period, for which the domestic industry has incurred capital expenditure of Rs.**** crores up to investigation period (capital work in progress in the books of accounts of the domestic industry) and the domestic industry has contended that they have now commenced commercial production on these expanded capacities. However, since the commercial production is claimed to have been commenced post issuance of previous disclosure statement, the Authority has only considered the capital work in progress verified during the course of the investigation. 273 Production, Capacity, Sales and Capacity Utilization: 72. From the above information, the Authority notes that the capacity of production of the domestic industry has remained constant during the injury period including the POI. However, both sales and capacity utilization have Increased during the POI as compared to the base year in line with increase in demand. Comments: It is reiterated that Respondent No.2, as mandated in Rule 16, has provided the data/figures in para 72 of the disclosure statement and has given its observation sin para 73. However, the final determination, as per Rule 17, has been done by the Respondent no.2 in the final findings in para 72. Comments: It is reiterated that Respondent No.2, as mandated in Rule 16, has provided the data/figures in para 72 of the disclosure statement and has given its observation sin para 73. However, the final determination, as per Rule 17, has been done by the Respondent no.2 in the final findings in para 72. It is pertinent to note that such determination is based on the data/figures disclosed in the disclosure statement and therefore there is no question of natural justice. 373 5 O. Magnitude of dumping 77. It is observed from the section pertaining to Dumping Margin above that dumping margins in respect of the imports of the subject goods from the subject countries are positive and substantial during the POI and have remained positive even during post POI 275 O. Magnitude of dumping 77. It is observed from the section pertaining to Dumping Margin above that dumping margins in respect of the imports of the subject goods from the subject countries are positive and substantial during the POI and have remained positive even during post POI. However, the dumping margin during post-POI has come down in respect of all countries except USA where it has increased Comments: Respondent No.2, in para 77 of the disclosure statement, has observed that the dumping margins are positive and substantial during the POI and have remained positive even during post POI. This observation has been given on the basis of the data/figures at para 48. Thereafter, relying on the same data reproduced in para 49. Respondent No.2 has concluded that the dumping margin during post- POI has come down in respect of all countries except USA where it has increased. Such where it has increased. Such Conclusion is arrived at as per Rule 17 which cannot be faulted for being different from the disclosure statement because the disclosure statement is issued only to disclose the essential data and not to give conclusions. 374 6 P. Conclusion on material injury 80. The Authority notes that during injury period, while the capacity of production has remained constant throughout the injury period, the performance of the domestic industry has improved in terms of production, sales volumes, profit, cash profit, return on capital employed and inventory. The market share has declined during the POI as compared to the base year. The Authority notes that during injury period, while the capacity of production has remained constant throughout the injury period, the performance of the domestic industry has improved in terms of production, sales volumes, profit, cash profit, return on capital employed and inventory. The market share has declined during the POI as compared to the base year. During the post POI, the economic parameters has shown continued improvement including increased trend in the market share. Thus, the Authority notes that the economic parameters of the domestic industry do not exhibit any injury suffered by them. Even the domestic industry has admitted that it was not suffering injury during the present period. 275 P. Conclusion on material injury 80. The Authority notes that during injury period, while the capacity of production has remained constant throughout the injury period, the performance of the domestic industry has improved in terms of production, sales volumes, profit, cash profit, return on capital employed and inventory. The market share has declined during the POI as compared to the base year. During the post POI, the economic parameters has shown continued improvement including increased trend in the market share. Thus, the Authority notes that the economic parameters of the domestic industry do not exhibit any injury suffered by them. Even the domestic industry has admitted that it was not suffering injury during the present period. Comments: There is no deviation in the disclosure statement and final findings. The above conclusion of the Respondent No.2 is based on an admission by the domestic industry that there is no injury. 7 90. Present and continued imports The Authority has undertaken analysis of the volume of exports of the subject goods to India from the subject country during the injury period and post-POI period as well. The Authority notes that the volume of the exports from subject countries to India during the injury period and post POI on the basis of DGCI&S data shows increase in imports from 0.329 million MT to 0.694 million MT, as evident from the table above. This enhanced import is taking place at dumped prices since the dumping margin is positive during the post POI as well. The Authority further notes that the market share of the dumped imports has increased over the injury period and the quantum of dumped import has increased further during the post POI. This enhanced import is taking place at dumped prices since the dumping margin is positive during the post POI as well. The Authority further notes that the market share of the dumped imports has increased over the injury period and the quantum of dumped import has increased further during the post POI. The market share of some the subject countries has declined whereas the same has increased for some of the subject countries, thereby indicating inter-se substitution of dumped imports from one source with the dumped imports from other dumped sources. 282-283 Whether there is significant rate of increase of dumped imports into India indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation. 90. The Authority notes that though there is overall increase in imports during the POI as compared to the base year of the injury period, out of three major producer subject countries (China, USA and EU) two countries namely, China and EU are showing declining trend in imports in the post-POI. Even on overall basis, (i.e. all subject countries taken together) the increase in imports during the annualized post POI is only miniscule 3%. To have a more objective prospective analysis the import data for the years 2015-16 & 2016- 17 was also obtained from DGCIU&S by the Authority. The import from China, Kenya and Ukraine has registered constant decline during two years post-POI. In the post POI period the imports from EU & USA have first declined in 2015-16 and then increased again in 2016-17. So the requirement of significance increase in dumped imports into India is not really met with. 382 8 91. Surplus Capacities This parameter for ascertaining the threat of material injury requires evaluation of existing surplus capacities and capacity addition, if any, to explore the possibility of diversion of disposable quantity to Indian market. Domestic industry has claimed that the producers in subject countries are already faced with significant surplus capacities. Further, these producers are exporting the product to a large number of countries, a very significant proportion of which is being exported at a price below the prices in respect of India, thus showing likelihood of diversion of these exports to India in the vent of withdrawal of Anti-Dumping duty. Further, these producers are exporting the product to a large number of countries, a very significant proportion of which is being exported at a price below the prices in respect of India, thus showing likelihood of diversion of these exports to India in the vent of withdrawal of Anti-Dumping duty. While none of the interested parties have provided any verifiable evidence and information with regard to existing surplus capacities, and consequent likelihood/possibility of increased dumped exports to Indian market the domestic industry has furnished copies of his Chemical journal which provides significant information regarding Soda Ash manufacturing in the subject countries viz. existing capacity, existing production, unutilized capacity and capacity expansion etc. As would be obvious from the table below that against India demand of approx. 3 million MT, the unutilized capacity in the subject countries is approx. 9.26 million MT (300.90% of demand in India) and capacity expansion (undertaken already as well as upcoming) is to the extent of 4.55 million MT(147.71%) of demand in India). The Authority further notes that the interested parties have not established absence of sufficient freely disposable, or substantial increase in capacity with the exporters in subject countries. Subject Countries. Particular UOM China Existing Capacity* MT 319,61,000 Existing Production* MT 252,76,000 Unutilized Capacity MT 66,85,000 Capacity Expansion** MT 40,00,000 Total Exports MT 19,42,574 Export Orientation MT 8.00% Export to India*** MT 1,29,466 FOB Export Price to India*** USD/MT 211.92 Export to Third Countries-Volume Total*** MT 18,13,108 Price Lower than India*** MT 1,23,173 Price Higher than India*** MT 16,89,934 Export to Third Countries-Price Total*** USD/MT 217.51 Price Lower than India*** USD/MT 210.51 Price Higher than India*** USD/MT 218.02 283-284 Whether there is sufficient freely disposable or an imminent, substantial increase in capacity of the exporter 91. This parameter for ascertaining the threat of material injury requires evaluation of existing surplus capacities and capacity addition, if any, to explore the possibility of diversion of disposable quantity to Indian market. Domestic industry has claimed that the producers in subject countries are already faced with significant surplus capacities. The domestic industry has furnished copies of his Chemical journal which provides information regarding Soda Ash manufacturing in the subject countries viz. existing capacity, existing production, unutilized capacity and capacity expansion etc. The table below indicates that against Indian demand of approx. 3 million MT, the unutilized capacity in the subject countries is approx. The domestic industry has furnished copies of his Chemical journal which provides information regarding Soda Ash manufacturing in the subject countries viz. existing capacity, existing production, unutilized capacity and capacity expansion etc. The table below indicates that against Indian demand of approx. 3 million MT, the unutilized capacity in the subject countries is approx. 9.26 million MT capacity expansion (undertaken already as well as upcoming) is to the extent of 4.55 million MT. This data however is based on the premise that all Soda Ash manufacturing companies are to operate at 100% capacity utilization which may not actually be the case in reality. Some of the interested parties have even contended that the optimum capacity utilization of soda ash plants is approximately 80% only. The rule for determining likelihood analysis clearly prescribes that the analysis should be based on hard facts and not mere on conjectures or remote possibility. Moreover, the highest capacity addition (40 lac tonnes) i.e. nearly 88% of capacity addition is undertaken by China which has very low export orientation (8%) for this product. The Authority therefore notes that there does not appear to be threat of injury on account of imminent or substantial increase in the capacity of the exporters. Comments: The above findings of the authority are expression on merits and analysis done on the basis of data available. There is no violation of principles of natural justice or illegality in the decision making process. 382-383 9 92. Present and Continued Dumping Price undercutting without anti-dumping duty is positive and significant for all subject countries as a whole. The domestic industry contended that the Authority should determine price undercutting after including freight costs. The price undercutting was determined at the time of original investigations without adding freight and present investigation being only a midterm review of existing Add, it would be appropriate to determine price undercutting without adding freight. However, given positive price undercutting, the applicant and other interested parties have not established that if anti-dumping duties are withdrawn at this stage; the imports would cause significant price undercutting and would not lead to significant suppressing and depressing effect on the prices in the market. The Authority also notes that the domestic industry has heavily contended that exports from a number of subject countries to other countries are at a price materially below export price to India. The Authority also notes that the domestic industry has heavily contended that exports from a number of subject countries to other countries are at a price materially below export price to India. Therefore, if the price undercutting is positive and significant even considering the present export price, the price undercutting would be further positive and significant, if these third countries lower export prices are considered. Volume of Exports to third countries which were at price lower than export price to Indiais 2.23 Million MT amounting to 72.42% of existing demand in India. 284 92. Whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices On analysis of the data it is noted that selling price has increased consistently year on year and accordingly the price depression is clearly absent. There is also no clear trend in so far as price suppression effect on account of dumped import is concerned. While the increase in sales price in 2012-13 has not been in proportion to the rise in landed value of imports it has registered higher comparative growth in the subsequent year. Comments: Respondent No.2 in para 92 of the disclosure statement has observed that the applicant and other interested parties have not established that if anti-dumping duties are withdrawn at this stage; the imports would cause significant price undercutting and would not lead to significant suppressing and depressing effect on the prices in the market. However in the final findings, Respondent No.2, has concluded that there is also no clear trend in so far as price suppression effect on account of dumped import is concerned. Such conclusion has been arrived after consideration of the data/figures disclosed in the disclosure statement and the post disclosure submission. The final findings, having been passed in accordance with Rule 17 of the Anti- Dumping Rules, needs no interference by this Hon'ble Court. 383-384 10 93. Level of inventories The level of inventories available with the producers in subject countries could not be ascertained in view of lack of sufficient cooperation. The applicant and interested parties have however not established that volume of imports would not significantly increase in the event of withdrawal of ADD. 284 93. Level of inventories The level of inventories available with the producers in subject countries could not be ascertained in view of lack of sufficient cooperation. The applicant and interested parties have however not established that volume of imports would not significantly increase in the event of withdrawal of ADD. 284 93. Level of inventories The level of inventories available with the producers in subject countries could not be ascertained in view of lack of sufficient cooperation. Accordingly, this parameter for ascertaining threat of injury/likelihood of injury could not be examined by the Authority. Comments: Respondent No.2, in para 93 of the disclosure statement has disclosed that the level of inventories available with the producers in subject countries could not be ascertained in view of lack of sufficient cooperation. In the final findings, Respondent No.2 has concluded that this parameter for ascertaining threat of injury/likelihood of injury could not be examined due to absence of data. This is merely a conclusion, which is required to be done as per Rule 17. Therefore, the same cannot be vitiated for being arbitrary or illegal. 384 11 94. Export Orientation- Export orientation of all subject countries as a whole comes to 22% for USA, the export orientation is as high as 56%. 285 94. Export Orientation Export orientation of all subject countries as whole comes to 22%. While for USA the export orientation is as high as 56% it is as low as 8% in case of China. Comments: Respondent No.2 has reproduced in para 94 of the disclosure statement in para 94 of the final findings and have only added while concluding that export orientation for China is 8% while concluding the same, Respondent No.2 has not relied on any new data. Therefore, the same is valid and deserves no interference by this Hon'ble Court. 384 12 Price attractiveness of India market 95. The Authority notes that the landed value of imports from the subject countries as a whole is lower than selling price of the domestic industry thus showing positive price undercutting during POI as well as post POI. Further, WTA (World Trade Atlas) data establishes that exports from subject countries to a number of other countries have been found at a price lower than the export price from these countries to India. The volume of such exports is 2.23 Million MT amounting to 72.42% of existing demand in India. Thus, in the vent of the revocation of anti-dumping duties, the India market would be price attractive to the foreign producers. 285 95. The volume of such exports is 2.23 Million MT amounting to 72.42% of existing demand in India. Thus, in the vent of the revocation of anti-dumping duties, the India market would be price attractive to the foreign producers. 285 95. Price attractiveness of India market The Authority notes that the landed value of imports from the subject countries as a whole is lower than selling price of the domestic industry thus showing positive price undercutting during POI as well as post POI. Further, WTA (World Trade Atlas) date establishes that exports from subject countries to a number of other countries have been found at a price lower than the export price from these counties to India. The volume of such exports is 2.23 Million MT amounting to 72.42% of existing demand in India. However, to conclude that on revocation of anti-dumping duty the volume of such low-priced exports would get diverted to the India market would be too farfetched. Such analysis can throw misleading results if the low volume export transaction has been made to India at a relatively higher price. Then the price is related to the grade of the product as well. Moreover, it is not so easy to switch the market just on the possibility of a hike in export price by few notches on account of withdrawal of anti-dumping duty. So, this analysis on this criterion is full of conjectures and subjectivity. Comments: It is pertinent to note that on the basis of the data/figures reproduced in the Disclosure statement, Respondent No.2 has observed that in the event of the revocation of antidumping duties, the Indian market would be price attractive to the foreign producers. In the Final Findings, after reproducing the essential fact in para 94 of the Disclosure Statement, has gone forward and concluded that analysis that on revocation of anti-dumping duty the volume of such low priced exports would get diverted to the India market would be too farfetched and lead to misleading results if the low volume export transaction has been made to India at a relatively higher price. Such conclusion is based on an analysis for final determination, which can be done and concluded only in the final determination, which can be done and concluded only in the final findings, as per Rule 17 of the Anti-Dumping Rules. 384 13 96. Such conclusion is based on an analysis for final determination, which can be done and concluded only in the final determination, which can be done and concluded only in the final findings, as per Rule 17 of the Anti-Dumping Rules. 384 13 96. Level of current and post POI dumping margin The Authority notes that dumping margin in the original investigation as well as the present MTR are positive and the dumping margin in the post POI of the present investigation is also positive. Thus, in the event of revocation of the anti-dumping duties, in most likelihood, dumping may continue and may also get intensified. 97. The essential facts of the investigation, as analyzed by the Authority in the present disclosure statement are being disclosed to the interested parties. The Authority would, after receipt of comments from the interested parties, determine whether there were change in the circumstances and if so whether the changed circumstances, as alleged by the applicant, were of lasting nature, and whether there is sufficient evidence that recurrence of injury to the domestic industry is unlikely in the event of premature withdrawal of the ADD. The essential facts gathered by the Designated Authority during the course of the investigations and as established by the Designated Authority on the basis of information received from various sources are hereby disclosed to the interested parties in order to enable these interested parties to offer their comments on these facts gathered by the Designated Authority. 98. The Authority would conclude on the matter after receiving the comments of the interested parties on this disclosure statement. 285 S. POST DISCLOSURE COMMENTS 96. The post disclosure submissions have been received from the interested parties. Majority of the issues raised therein have already been raised earlier during the investigation and also addressed appropriately. Additional submissions have been analysed as under: 99. Submissions made by the interested parties have been examined as under: viii. As regards the argument that the rule does not state that the likelihood should be examined as per the principles of Annexure II para (vii), the Authority notes that there is no set principles for determining likelihood of dumping and injury. However, the Authority has been applying these provisions for determination of likelihood of injury in review cases. As regards the argument that the rule does not state that the likelihood should be examined as per the principles of Annexure II para (vii), the Authority notes that there is no set principles for determining likelihood of dumping and injury. However, the Authority has been applying these provisions for determination of likelihood of injury in review cases. The decision of the Gujarat High Court clearly states that the threat parameters laid down under the law are to be applied for likelihood examination. Further, the Authority has not restricted its analysis only on the basis of these parameters but has also examined other injury parameters brought out by the interested parties for examination of likelihood of injury to the domestic industry. xi. As regards the argument that the profits made by the domestic industry itself shows no likelihood of injury, the Authority notes that as already evidenced above, there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury. xii. As regards absence of disposable capacities in various subject countries, The authority notes that the domestic consumption in China and European is indeed quite significant. The Authority further notes that the highest capacity addition (40 lac MT i.e. nearly 88% of capacity addition) is undertaken by China which has very low export orientation (8%) for this product. The Authority therefore notes that there does not appear to be threat of injury on account of imminent or substantial increase in the capacity of the exporters. CONCLUSIONS 100. The Authority notes that the present investigation being a midterm review investigation, there should be evidence of likelihood of injury to the domestic industry in order to warrant continuation of duties. The relevant rule for determination of threat of injury/likelihood of injury in Annexure II (vii) of the Indian Anti-Dumping Rules states that “A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances, which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury, must be clearly foreseen and imminent”. 101. The Authority on detailed scrutiny of facts has come to the conclusion that (I) No definite or conclusive trend is noticeable in respect of rate of increase of dumped imports. (ii) There is no depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices caused by the import, leave alone significant depressing or suppressing effect. 101. The Authority on detailed scrutiny of facts has come to the conclusion that (I) No definite or conclusive trend is noticeable in respect of rate of increase of dumped imports. (ii) There is no depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices caused by the import, leave alone significant depressing or suppressing effect. (iii) No examination of the inventories o the product under consideration with the exporters was possible on account of unavailability of this information due to lack of cooperation from the exporters (iv) There seems apparent availability of disposable capacity with the exporting countries but this estimate that capacity addition in China (a country which alone accounts for approx. 88% of capacity addition and has very low export orientation for this product) will increase likelihood of dumped exports to India and that all the Soda Ash plants will operate at approx. 100% capacity utilization is a bit too farfetched and based on unrealistic possibility rather than on verifiable concrete evidence available in the public domain. 102. In view of above the Authority concludes that there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury on revocation of duty and therefore the continuation of anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted. RECOMMENDATIONS 103. The Authority notes that the review investigation was initiated and notified to all interested parties and adequate opportunity was given to the domestic industry, exporters, importers and other interested parties to provide positive information on the aspects of dumping, injury and causal link. Having initiated and conducted the investigation into dumping, injury and the causal link and likelihood of injury in terms of the AD Rules, the Authority does not recommend to continue the antidumping duty imposed earlier on imports of subject goods from the subject countries as recommended vide Notification No.14/17/2010-DGAD dated 17th February, 2012 and imposed by the Central Government vide Notification No.34/2012-Customs (ADD) dated 3rd July, 2012. discontinuation of anti dumping duty under the present Mid-Term Review investigation is recommended with effect from 3.7.2017. Comments: The conclusion in the final findings has been arrived at after consideration of comments filed by parties is in line with the statutory provisions and rules framed thereunder. Such determination, made pursuant to the consideration of the comments filed by various interested parties cannot be termed as illegal and faulty as the same is passed in conformity to the provisions governing antidumping proceedings. Such determination, made pursuant to the consideration of the comments filed by various interested parties cannot be termed as illegal and faulty as the same is passed in conformity to the provisions governing antidumping proceedings. It is submitted that in case such consideration is termed as faulty and, then the exercise would be never ending as the Designated Authority would be obliged to put notice to parties after receiving the comments, record the response, and put further notice on case of any further comments and wait till the parties are satisfied. Further, any party aggrieved by the final findings, has an effective remedy by way of an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 9C of the Act. Therefore, the final findings deserves no interference from this Hon'ble Court. 384, 391, 392 7. Rule 16 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Antidumping Duty on Dumped Articles and For Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995. ("Antidumping rules") mandates issuance of disclosure statement by the Designated Authority disclosing all the essential facts under consideration, forming the basis of its decision while issuing the final findings. Rule 16 is reproduced hereinbelow for reference: "Disclosure of information. - The designated authority shall, before giving its final findings, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for its decision." 8. The aforesaid requirement of issuance of disclosure statement is in line with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement under the WTO, which states as follows: "The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests." 9. It is pertinent to note that Rule 16 of the Anti-Dumping places a procedural embargo upon the Designated Authority to issue a statement containing all the essential factors which shall be considered for arriving at the Final Findings. It may be noted that either under the Rules or under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 ("Act"), there is no requirement, to disclose all the facts but only the essential facts. It is further noteworthy that the disclosure statement per se is not in the nature of determination whether tentative or conclusive and is merely a procedural requirement that the Designated Authority is obligated to follow. 10. It is further noteworthy that the disclosure statement per se is not in the nature of determination whether tentative or conclusive and is merely a procedural requirement that the Designated Authority is obligated to follow. 10. As per the scheme of the Act and the Antidumping Rules, after the issuance of disclosure statement, the Designated Authority, as per Rule 17 is required to issue a public notice recording the final findings, determining whether or not the article under investigation is being dumped or not. The Final Findings of the Designated Authority would determine the following, namely:- a. the export price, normal value and the margin of dumping of the said article; b. whether import of the said article into India, in the case of imports from specified countries causes or threatens material injury to any industry established in India or materially retards the establishment of any industry in India; c. a casual link, where applicable, between the dumped imports and injury; d. whether a retrospective levy is called for and if so, the reasons therefore and date of commencement of such retrospective levy; e. the amount of duty which, if levied, would remove the injury where applicable, to the domestic industry after considering the principles laid down in the Annexure III to the Anti Dumping Rules, 1995. 11. It is important to note that Final Findings issued under Rule 17 of the Anti-Dumping Rules amounts to an 'order of determination or review'. In other words, final findings issued by the Designated Authority, determine the existence of dumping and consequent injury to the domestic industry pursuant to which, the Central Government, by way of a gazette notification, decides to impose the Anti-Dumping duty as per Rule 18 of the Anti-Dumping Rules. 12. Keeping in mind Rule 16 and 17 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, it is imperative to understand the scope of Rule 9C of the Act, so as to determine whether the Impugned Findings issued by Respondent No.2, can be challenged by way of an appeal before the Ld. CESTAT. 13. Section 9C of Act contains the appeal provision wherein an appeal against an order of determination regarding existence, degree and effect of dumping shall be filed before the Ld. CESTAT. 14. On a bare perusal of Section 9C of the Act, it is clear that any order of determination is appealable and such appeal shall lie before the Ld. Tribunal. Section 9C of Act contains the appeal provision wherein an appeal against an order of determination regarding existence, degree and effect of dumping shall be filed before the Ld. CESTAT. 14. On a bare perusal of Section 9C of the Act, it is clear that any order of determination is appealable and such appeal shall lie before the Ld. Tribunal. Therefore, in view of the same, final findings issued by Respondent No.2, being an order of determination, are appealable under Section 9C of the Act. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in Shew Kumar Agarwal V. Union of India, (2002) 141 ELT 312 (Cal.) wherein it was held that both the determinations, either preliminary or final, as per Rule 12 or Rule are appealable orders before the CEGAT. 15. Further, the Hon'ble High Court in the judgment of Alemibic Ltd. V. Union of India, (2013) 291 ELT 327 (Guj.), observed that in an appeal under Section 9C before the CESTAT, the challenge is to the final findings issued by the DA and not the Notification issued by the Central Government pursuant to said final findings. In case the final findings are quashed by the CESTAT in appeal, the very basis of the Notification ceases to exist and thus becomes null and void. The relevant observation of the High Court is reproduced hereinbelow: "independently of the above various observations and pronouncements, we prima facie find it more attractive to accept the contention that the Central Government while issuing notification imposing Anti-dumping duty under Section 9A of the Act exercises legislative functions. In essence, by issuance of notification, what is sought to be done is collection of duty. It is true that such duty is not imposed for revenue collection, nevertheless, it partakes the character of compulsory extraction of tax. Whatever be the purpose, it still essentially is in nature of duty. We may recall that Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Any argument that Notification imposing Anti-dumping duty is not a piece of legislation may open a contention that very collection of such duty is without authority of law. We may recall that Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Any argument that Notification imposing Anti-dumping duty is not a piece of legislation may open a contention that very collection of such duty is without authority of law. We may also notice that under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, an appeal is provided against order of determination or review regarding the existence, degree and effect of any subsidy or dumping in relation to import of any article. Essentially therefore, what would be in appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 9C would be the order of determination or review of effect of any dumping and not the notification issued by the Central Government. Of course, if the notification is based on any determination which is found to be erroneous, the imposition of duty may fail on that count. This is not the same thing as to suggest that before the Tribunal decision of the Central Government of issuance of notification of imposition of Anti-dumping duty would be at large. If the functions of the Central Government is held to be a legislative function, as is well settled, no writ could be issued to enact a law." 16. Therefore, in the present case, the Petitioner, in case aggrieved by the impugned Findings passed by the Respondent No.2, have an alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the Tribunal under Section 9C of the Act, wherein apart from merits of the Final Findings, the Petitioner can even raise issues of alleged breach of natural justice and procedural impropriety. Therefore, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court on the ground of availability of alternate remedy at the first instance. Mid-Term Review and the Sunset Review can be conducted simultaneously by the Respondent No.2 17. Rule 23 of the Anti-dumping rules casts a duty on the Designated Authority to undertake Mid-Term review investigation, either suo moto or upon request by any interested party. As per the Rule, it is the statutory duty of the Designated Authority 'to review the need for continuance of anti-dumping duty'. 18. Rule 23 of the Anti-dumping rules casts a duty on the Designated Authority to undertake Mid-Term review investigation, either suo moto or upon request by any interested party. As per the Rule, it is the statutory duty of the Designated Authority 'to review the need for continuance of anti-dumping duty'. 18. The scope of Mid-Term proceedings was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rishiroop Polymers (P.) Ltd. V. Designated Authority and Additional Secretary, (2006) 196 ELT 385 (S.C.), wherein the Hon'ble Court held as follows: "Otherwise also, we are of the opinion that the scope of the review inquiry by the Designated Authority is limited to the satisfaction as to whether there is justification for continued imposition of such duty on the information received by it. By its very nature, the review inquiry would be limited to see as to whether the conditions which existed at the time of imposition of anti-dumping duty have altered to such an extent that there is no longer justification for continued imposition of the duty. The inquiry is limited to the change in the various parameters like the normal value, export price, dumping margin, fixation of non-injury price and injury to domestic industry. The said inquiry has to be limited to the information received with respect to change in the various parameters. The entire purpose of the review inquiry is not to see whether there is a need for imposition of anti-dumping duty but to see whether in the absence of such continuance, dumping would increase and the domestic industry suffers." 19. It is submitted that in a Mid-Term review, the proceedings are carried out to determine whether duty should be revoked earlier than the period of five years of its statutory duration. On the other hand, Sunset Review is initiated under Section 9A(5) read with Rule 23 (1B) of the Anti-Dumping Rules to determine the need for continued imposition of anti-dumping duty, during the 5 year period. 20. On the other hand, Sunset Review is initiated under Section 9A(5) read with Rule 23 (1B) of the Anti-Dumping Rules to determine the need for continued imposition of anti-dumping duty, during the 5 year period. 20. The scope of Sunset Review was also considered in the case of Rishiroop Polymers wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "Under Section 9-A(5), the said initial imposition of anti-dumping duty is ordinarily contemplated to be continued and remain in effect for a full period of five years, at the end of which it would be subject to Sunset Review, the possible consequence of which would be the extension of the operation of the period of anti-dumping duty for another period of five years." 21. It is pertinent to note that neither Section 9A(5) nor Rule 23 place an embargo upon Respondent No.2 from conducting the Mid-Term Review and the Sunset Review proceedings simultaneously. Further, the scope of both the review being different, both the Sunset review and the Mid-Term review can take simultaneously. 22. It is further noteworthy that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rishiroop Polymers held that sunset review is subject to the Mid-term review proceedings. The Hon'ble Court held that: "Under Section 9-A(5), the said initial imposition of anti-dumping duty is ordinarily contemplated to be continued and remain in effect for a full period of five years, at the end of which it would be subject to Sunset Review, the possible consequence of which would be the extension of the operation of the period of anti-dumping duty for another period of five years. This is subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, under which the Designated Authority is empowered to review the anti-dumping duty imposed from time to time." 23. In the present case, the Petitioner, after having realized that there is no injury caused to the Domestic Industry by the dumped exports during the relevant period and there is likelihood of withdrawal of duties, filed the application for the initiation of Sunset Review with the main object of the extending the levy of Anti-Dumping duty, even in absence of any injury to the domestic market. In such a situation, since there was no embargo placed by way of law, Respondent No.2 initiated the Sunset Review making it subject to the outcome of the Mid-Term review. In such a situation, since there was no embargo placed by way of law, Respondent No.2 initiated the Sunset Review making it subject to the outcome of the Mid-Term review. As such, the decision of Respondent No.2, to carry out the Mid-Term Review and the Sunset review simultaneously is well within the contours of law and cannot be said to be illegal and contrary to the provisions of law. Availability of alternative remedy 24. It is submitted that in the present case, the Petitioner has an efficacious alternate remedy under Section 9C of the Act wherein the petitioner can challenge the final findings and raise any other question before the Ld. CESTAT. It is submitted that the Petitioner, in case aggrieved by the impugned Findings passed by the Respondent No.2, has an alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the Tribunal under Section 9C of the Act, wherein apart from merits of the Final Findings, the Respondents can even raise issues of alleged breach of natural justice and procedural impropriety. 25. It is submitted that Rule 23(3) which governs the procedure of Mid-Term Review states that the procedures laid down for original investigation as provided in Rules 6 to 11 and 16 to 20 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the mid-term review proceedings. Meaning thereby, that any Final Findings issued in Mid-Term Review would amount to a 'determination' within the meaning of Rule 17 and therefore would be appealable as an 'order of determination or review' under Section 9C of the Act. 26. In the present case, the impugned Findings, being an order of determination, can be challenged by way of an appeal before the Ld. CESTAT in light of the detail submission in this regard have been made in para 7 to 16 and the same is not repeated herein for sake of brevity. Therefore, in the event of an efficacious alternative remedy being available to the Petitioner, the captioned petition deserves to be dismissed by this Hon'ble Court. 27. It is a settled position of law that principle of law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. Whenever there is an efficacious statutory alternative remedy available, the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under writ jurisdiction. 27. It is a settled position of law that principle of law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. Whenever there is an efficacious statutory alternative remedy available, the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under writ jurisdiction. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of ITO V. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 . 28. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , wherein the court held as follows: "Under the scheme of the Act, there is hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful act complained of. They have the right to prefer an appeal before the prescribed authority under sub-s.(1) of S.23 of the Act. If they are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-s.(3) of S. 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated on a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under s. 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution". The impugned Findings issued by Respondent No.2 are legally valid and deserves no interference 29. It is submitted that in the present case, this Hon'ble Court vide its order dated 23.02.2017 quashed the Disclosure Statement dated 14.09.2016 and Final Findings dated 23.09.2016, and remanded the proceedings back to Respondent 2 for issuance of fresh disclosure statement within 60 days of the judgment, in consonance with the relevant statutory provisions and in light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Court. In this regard, it is submitted that the Court, in the process of using its judicial discretion, cannot limit the statutory time period fixed by the statue. 30. In this regard, it is submitted that the Court, in the process of using its judicial discretion, cannot limit the statutory time period fixed by the statue. 30. Reliance is placed on the judgment of General manager, Department of Telecommunications, Thiruvananthapuram V. jacob and Ors, (2003) 9 SCC 662 wherein, the High Court's order setting aside the acquisition proceedings passed beyond time the judicially granted by the Kerala High Court was challenged by the Department. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held as follows in the said matter held as follows: "Reliance placed on the decision reported in M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty is equally inappropriate and ill conceived. That was a case wherein a learned Judge of the High Court, while setting aside the order passed by the Statutory Authorities under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1961, remanded the case for fresh consideration specifically in the light of an earlier judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha Ayyar V. Authorized Officer, (1971) 1 MadLJ 274. While the remand proceedings were pending before the Authorized Officer, this Court reversed the aforesaid judgment in Authorized Officer V. S. Naganatha Ayyar, (1979) 3 SCR 1121 , and the Authorized Officer decided the ceiling limit in the remit proceedings in terms of the decision of this Court and not as per the directions of the High Court to determine the same in the light of the earlier High Court judgment. It was held in that case that the order of the High Court directing the Authorized Officer to examine the dispute in the light of the earlier High Court decision reported in 89 Madras Law Weekly 69 having become final in the absence of any challenge thereto, despite the reversal of the earlier High Court Judgment by this Court, this Court reversal of the earlier High Court judgment by this Court, this Court observed that even orders which may not be strictly legal become final and are binding between the parties if they are not challenged before the superior Courts. This Court, while rendering the said decision, was concerned with a direction of the High Court to do a particular thing in a particular manner and unless the binding judgment between parties was set at naught to enable the Authority to do it in any other way, it had to be done in the particular manner so directed by the Court or no, at all. So far as the case on hand is concerned, since the Court in the earlier proceedings had intervened at the instance of the respondents the Court was directing the authorities concerned to complete the process within a particular time to avoid further delay and ensure expeditious conclusion of the proceedings. There is nothing to indicate in the order of the High Court stipulating or extending the time for passing the Award, that beyond the time so permitted, it cannot be done at all and the authorities are disabled once and for all even to proceed in the matter in accordance with law, if it is so permissible for the authorities under the law governing the matter in issue. The Court cannot be imputed with such an intention to stifle the authorities from exercising powers vested with it under statute or to have rendered an otherwise enforceable statutory provision, a mere dead letter. Neither from the nature and purport of the earlier orders passed nor from their contents, there is any scope for inferring the imposition of a total embargo upon the competent authorities, to exercise the statutory powers indisputably vested with and available to such authority under the statute, at the time of such exercise." 31. It is a settled principle of law that any direction or order of the court cannot be read so as to stifle any authority from exercising its powers under the statue or deprive a statutory provision of its enforceability, Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anurag Kumar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 9 SCALE 639 , wherein the court observed that in any event, courts cannot give any direction contrary to the Statute or Rules made thereunder in exercise of judicial discretion. 32. In the present case, the statutory time period of 180 days was still available to the Respondent No.2, as is clear from the table hereinbelow: Sr. 32. In the present case, the statutory time period of 180 days was still available to the Respondent No.2, as is clear from the table hereinbelow: Sr. No. Event Date Comment 1 Initiation of Mid Term Review 21.07.2015 To be completed in one year i.e. 20.07.2016. Which can be extended for a further period of 180 days 2 Date of filing of Petition by Nirma before Hon'ble High Court 20.09.2016 31 days from 20.07.2016 consumed out of available period of 180 days. 3 Interim Order of Hon'ble High Court 13.12.2016 Limitation period freezed during pendency of dispute before Hon'ble High Court. 4 Final Judgment of Hon'ble High Court 23.02.2017 5 Order receive by DGAD 30.03.2017 6 Disclosure Statement issued by DGAD 07.06.2017 7 Final Finding issued by DGAD 22.07.2017 8 Last date after 180 days extension 26.08.2017 Balance 149 days calculated from the date of receipt of final judgment of Hon'ble High Court i.e. 30.03.2017 33. From the aforesaid table, it is clear that the statutory time period of 180 days was still available with Respondent No.2 to conclude the Mid-Term Review proceedings. That being so, as per the settled principle of law, the court cannot curtail the statutory time period available to the Respondent No.2. 34. If is further submitted that the antidumping laws in India have been framed keeping in mind the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, 1994. It is pertinent to note that the statutory time period of 180 days, as prescribed under the Anti-Dumping Rules, have been borrowed from Article 5.10 which reads as follows: "5.10 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation." 35. It is settled principle of law that a domestic law is to be read and interpreted in line with the international treaty. Further, the Indian Constitution symbolically attaches importance to international legal obligations when it exhorts the State, in Article 51, to endeavor to "foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." 36. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore Vs. Further, the Indian Constitution symbolically attaches importance to international legal obligations when it exhorts the State, in Article 51, to endeavor to "foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." 36. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore Vs. G.M. Exports, (2015) 324 ELT 209 (S.C.) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles, namely: "(1) Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India is a Directive Principle of State Policy which states that the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. As a result, rules of international law which are not contrary to domestic law are followed by the courts in this country. This is a situation in which there is an international treaty to which India is not a signatory or general rules of international law are made applicable. It is in this situation that if there happens to be a conflict between domestic law and international law, domestic law will prevail. (2) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is passed pursuant to the said treaty, it is a legitimate aid to the construction of the provisions of such statute that are vague or ambiguous to have recourse to the terms of the treaty to resolve such ambiguity in favour of a meaning that is consistent with the provisions of the treaty. (3) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made in furtherance of such treaty, a purposive rather than a narrow literal construction of such statute is preferred. The interpretation of such a statute should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance rather than earlier domestic precedents, being intended to carry out treaty obligations, and not to be inconsistent with them. (4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made to enforce a treaty obligation, and if there be any difference between the language of such statute and a corresponding provision of the treaty, the statutory language should be construed in the same sense as that of the treaty. (4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made to enforce a treaty obligation, and if there be any difference between the language of such statute and a corresponding provision of the treaty, the statutory language should be construed in the same sense as that of the treaty. This is for the reason that in such cases what is sought to be achieved by the international treaty is a uniform international code of law which is to be applied by the courts of all the signatory nations in a manner that leads to the same result in all the signatory nations." 37. Reliance is further placed on the landmark judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum V. Union of India and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 647 , wherein while dealing with the Environment Protection Act, this Court observed: "Even otherwise once these principles are accepted as part of the Customary International Law there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of Customary International Law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall be followed by the Courts of law. To support we may refer to Justice H.R. Khanna's opinion in Addl. Distt. Magistrate Jabalpur V. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) AIR SC 1207, Jolly George Varghese V. Bank of Cochin, (1980) AIR SC 470 and Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. V. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, (1984) AIR SC 667." [at para 15] 38. It is submitted that when the WTO itself prescribes the time limit of 180 days for completion of anti-dumping proceedings, the same cannot be curtailed by Hon'ble Court. As such, the 60 days' time given by the Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated 23.02.2017 can only be read as a direction given by the court for expediting the review proceedings and such a direction cannot curtail the statutory time period available to the Respondent No.2 to conclude the proceedings. 39. It is further submitted that it's a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of court under Article 226 cannot be invoked in order to direct any authority to act contrary to the provisions of law. 39. It is further submitted that it's a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of court under Article 226 cannot be invoked in order to direct any authority to act contrary to the provisions of law. Reliance in this regards is placed on the judgment of Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 453 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law. To enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law and it cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. 40. Thus, in the present case, the issuance of the Impugned Findings, passed within the statutory time period of 180 days, cannot be vitiated for being passed beyond the 60 days period granted by this Hon'ble Court. No impediment can be imposed on quasi judicial proceedings by the Courts 41. If a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act. 42. It is noteworthy that in anti-dumping proceedings, the Designated Authority is mandated by the Act and the Rules to determine the lis between the domestic industry on the one hand and the importer of foreign goods from the foreign supplier on the other. Therefore, the proceedings conducted by the Designated Authority is in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. 43. Further, in PTC India Limited V. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 4 SCC 603 , it was observed by the court that whenever a particular statute provides for an appeal against the decision of an authority, then orders/decisions of that authority are quasi-judicial in nature. 43. Further, in PTC India Limited V. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 4 SCC 603 , it was observed by the court that whenever a particular statute provides for an appeal against the decision of an authority, then orders/decisions of that authority are quasi-judicial in nature. Reliance is further placed on Reliance Industries V. Designated Authorities, (2006) 10 SCC 368 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "determination of the recommendation of the DA and the government notification on its basis is subject to an appeal before CESTAT. This also makes it clear that the proceedings before the DA are quasi-judicial." 44. The question whether the action performed by Designated Authority constitutes quasi-judicial function or not was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association Vs. Designated Authority, (2011) 263 ELT 481 (S.C.), wherein, the Hon'ble Court held: "Having examined the scheme of the Tariff Act read with the 1995 Rules on the touchstone of the aforenoted principles, particularly the first principle enunciated in Khushaldas S. Advani, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this is an obvious case where the DA exercises quasi-judicial functions and is bound to act judicially. A cursory look at the relevant Rules would show that the DA determines the rights and obligations of the 'Interested parties' by applying objective standards based on the material/information/evidence presented by the exporters, foreign producers and other 'interested parties' by applying the procedure and principles laid down in the 1995 Rules. Rule 5 of the 1995 Rules provides that the DA shall initiate an investigation so as to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping upon the receipt of a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry; sub-rule (4) thereof empowers the DA to initiate an investigation so motu on the basis of information received from the Commissioner of Customs or from any other source. When the DA has decided to initiate an investigation, Rule 6 requires that a public notice shall be issued to all the interested parties as mentioned in Rule 2(c) of the 1995 Rules, as also to industrial users of the product, and to the representatives of the consumer organizations in cases when the product is commonly sold at the retail level. It is manifest that while determining the existence, degree and effect of the alleged dumping, the DA determines a 'lis' between persons supporting the levy of duty and those opposing the said levy. 53. Further, it is also clear from the scheme of the Tariff Act and the 1995 Rules that the determination of existence, effect and degree of alleged dumping is on the basis of criteria mentioned in the Tariff Act and 1995 Rules, and an anti-dumping duty cannot be levied unless, on the basis of the investigation, it is established that there is : (i) existence of dumped imports; (ii) material injury to the domestic industry and, (iii) a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury. Rule 10 of the said Rules lays down the criteria for the determination of the normal value, export price and margin of dumping, while Rule 11 deals with the determination of injury which according to Annexure II to the 1995 Rules is based on positive evidence and involves an objective examination of both : (a) the volume and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. [see : S&S Enterprise V. Designated Authority & Ors, (2005) 3 SCC 337. It is evident that the determination of injury is premised on an objective examination of the material submitted by the parties. Moreover, under Rule 6(7) of the 1995 Rules, the DA is required to make available the evidence presented to it by one party to other interested parties, participating in the investigation. It is also pertinent to note that Rule 12 of the 1995 Rules which deals with the preliminary findings, explicitly provides that such findings shall "contain sufficiently detailed information for the preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected." A similar stipulation is found in relation to the final findings recorded by the DA under Rule 17(2) of the 1995 Rules. Above all, Section 9C of the Tariff Act provides for an appeal to the Tribunal against the order of determination or review thereof regarding the existence, degree and effect of dumping in relation to imports of any article, which order, obviously has to be based on the determination and findings of the DA. The cumulative effect of all these factors leads us to an irresistible conclusion that the DA performs quasi-judicial functions under the Tariff Act read with the 1995 Rules." 45. Thus, the proceedings being quasi-judicial in nature, no impediment can be imposed on such proceedings by the Courts. It is noteworthy that the quasi-judicial proceedings before the DA involve detailed investigations which involves detailed examination of data. Therefore, the direction of the High Court to pass final findings within 60 days should be read harmoniously keeping in mind the detailed investigative process involved in such investigations and not be construed/interpreted in a manner which hampers the entire decision-making process. Nature of investigation conducted by Respondent No.2 46. According to the WTO, dumping is "a situation where the price of a product when sold in the importing country is less than the price of that product in the market of exporting country." The purpose of anti-dumping duties is to eliminate injury caused to the Domestic Industry by the unfair trade practices of dumping so as to reestablish a situation of open and fair competition in the Indian market, which is in the general interest of country. 47. The laws of Anti-dumping in India are based on WTO Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT, 1994 commonly known as Agreement on Anti-Dumping. According to Article VI of the GATT (1994) then following conditions have to be met before antidumping duties can be imposed. a. Dumping occurs and, b. dumping has caused is threatening to cause material injury to the domestic industry. 48. In pursuance of the said Article VI and the Agreement, both of which India is a signatory, to amendments were made in the Customs Tariff Act in the year 1995. Under the Act, the Government of India in order to protect the domestic industry has power to impose broadly; Anti-Dumping Duty, Countervailing Duty or the Safeguard Duty. Broadly, Anti-Dumping duty is imposed by the Government of India where goods are imported into the country at a dumped price. 49. Under the Act, the Government of India in order to protect the domestic industry has power to impose broadly; Anti-Dumping Duty, Countervailing Duty or the Safeguard Duty. Broadly, Anti-Dumping duty is imposed by the Government of India where goods are imported into the country at a dumped price. 49. Under the Act, Section 9A, inter alia, provides that where any article is exported from any country or territory to India at less than its normal value, then, upon the importation of such article into India, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, impose an antidumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such article. The purpose of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act is to maintain a level playing field and prevent dumping while allowing for healthy competition. The purpose is not protectionism in the classical sense but to prevent unfair trade practices. 50. Section 9B of the act provides for exemption from levy under Section 9 or Section 9A in certain cases while Section 9C gives the right of appeal against the order of determination or review thereof regarding the existence, degree and effect of any subsidy or dumping in relation to import of any article. 51. The Act contemplates the Designated Authority, who is appointed under its provisions, to conduct a detailed investigation into the allegation of dumping of articles before it determines the normal value, export price and the margin of dumping. It is important to note that in undertaking this exercise, the Government or the foreign country exporting the article is required to be informed. 52. Rule 2 of the Anti-Dumping Rules defines various terms. Under Rule 3, a designated authority is appointed who, under Rule 4, is required to investigate the existence, degree, and effect of dumping in relation to import of any article and to submit its findings, provisional or final as the case may be, to the Central Government. The designated authority, under Rules 5 is to initiate an investigation either suo motu or upon receipt of a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry into (i) dumping (ii) material injury to the domestic industry and (iii) where applicable, a causal link between such dumped imports and the material injury. 53. The designated authority, under Rules 5 is to initiate an investigation either suo motu or upon receipt of a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry into (i) dumping (ii) material injury to the domestic industry and (iii) where applicable, a causal link between such dumped imports and the material injury. 53. Rule 6 of the Act prescribes the principles governing the Anti-dumping proceedings wherein as per Rule 6(1) the investigation is to be initiated by issue of a public notice by the Designated Authority. Thereafter, the Designated Authority is required to forward a copy of the notice to known exporters, governments of exporting of countries and industrial users and call for information from such exporters, if needed. Rule 7 deals with confidential information. Rule 8 of the Act provides that the Designated Authority shall satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information supplied by the interested parties and Rule 8 empowers the designated authority out investigation in the territories of other countries, if the circumstances of a case so warrant. 54. Rule 10 of the Rules provides for determination of normal value, export price and margin of dumping wherein the Designated Authority, if the product is being dumped, shall determine the normal value, export price and margin of dumping as per the principles laid down in Annexure I of the Rules. 55. Under Rule 11, the Designated Authority is required to determine the injury to the domestic, taking into account all the relevant facts in accordance with Annexure II of the Rules. Under Rule 12, the Designated Authority can give a preliminary findings, containing detailed information for the preliminary determination on dumping and injury, pursuant to which the Central Government may, under Rule 13, impose a provisional duty, which shall remain in force only for a period not exceeding six months, which may be extended by the Central Government to nine months. 56. Rule 14, empowers the Designated Authority to terminate the investigation under certain circumstances, such as upon receipt of request in writing on behalf of domestic industry at whose instance the investigation was initiated or if it is satisfied in the course of an investigation that there is no sufficient evidence of dumping or injury to the industry justify the continuation of the investigation. Rule 15 authorizes the Designated Authority to suspend or terminate the investigation, if the exporter gives undertaking in writing to revise the prices so that no exports of the articles are made at dumped prices or to revise the price so that injurious effect of dumping is eliminated. 57. Rule 16 of the Anti-dumping rules mandates issuance of disclosure statement by the Designated Authority disclosing all the essential facts under consideration, forming the basis of its decision while issuing the final findings where after, as per Rule 17, the Designated Authority is required to issue a public notice recording the final findings, determining whether or not the article under investigation is being dumped or not. 58. After the issuance of Final Findings, the Central Government, under Rule 18 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, may impose anti-dumping duty, within 3 months of publication of the final findings, which, as per Rule 20, shall take effect from the date of publication in the official gazette or, in case provisional duty was levied, from the date of levy of provisional duty. 59. As per Rule 21, in case the anti-dumping duty imposed by the Central Government on the basis of the final findings of the investigation conducted by the designated authority is higher than the provisional duty already imposed and collected, the differential shall not be collected from the importer and if collected, shall be refunded. 60. As per Rule 23 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995 any anti-dumping duty imposed under the provision of section 9A of the Act, shall remain in force, so long as and to the extent necessary, to counteract dumping, which is causing injury. This provision empowers the Designated Authority to review the need for the continued imposition of any anti-dumping duty, where warranted, on its own initiative or upon request by any interested party who submits positive information substantiating the need for such review. Such review can be undertaken only if a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty. Upon such review, the Designated Authority shall recommend to the Central Government for its withdrawal, where it comes to a conclusion that the injury to the domestic industry is not likely to continue or recur, if the said anti-dumping duty is removed or varied and is therefore no longer warranted. 61. The Rules further provide for initiation of circumvention proceedings and review thereof. 61. The Rules further provide for initiation of circumvention proceedings and review thereof. Annexure I to the Rules lay down the Principles governing the determination of normal value, export price and margin of dumping, Annexure II deals with the principles for determination of injury and Annexure III deals with the principle for determination of non-injuries price. 62. It is submitted that the anti-dumping proceedings requires a detailed technical analysis of various data supplied by the interested parties and involves the analysis of the accounting policy employed, the import export data etc. In other words, the investigation undertaken by the Designated Authority is an analytical economic exercise which requires technical knowledge. 63. Therefore, the finding, being a culmination of deep analysis of various technical and economic factors, requires specialization in and the same cannot be undertaken by the Hon'ble Courts. Reliance in this regards is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. V. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 8 SCC 418 , wherein it was held: "In our judgment, it is well settled that public authorities must have liberty and freedom in framing policies. No doubt, the discretion is not absolute, unqualified, unfettered or uncanalised and judiciary has control over all executive actions. All the same time, however, it is well established that courts are ill-equipped to deal with these matters. In complex social, economic and commercial matters, decisions have to be taken by governmental authorities keeping in view several factors, and it is not possible for courts to consider competing claims and conflicting interests and to conclude which way the balance tilts. There are no objective, justiciable or manageable standards to judge the issues nor such questions can be decided on a priori considerations." 64. It is submitted that the detail analysis pursuant to which the final findings are issued have a socio-economic impact and the Courts cannot be burdened to undertake such exercise. Further, when the function of carrying out the said investigation has been imposed on the Designated Authority by the Act and the Rules, the same cannot be entrusted upon the judiciary as it requires certain expertise, which the courts do not possess. 65. It is submitted that Anti-dumping is an interdisciplinary filed wherein there is an interplay of law and other social sciences. 65. It is submitted that Anti-dumping is an interdisciplinary filed wherein there is an interplay of law and other social sciences. In other words, an Anti-Dumping proceedings, requires both legal and economic expertise and by such interdisciplinary analysis, the findings are issued which have major economic consequence on the domestic as well as the foreign market. As such, while deciding or interpreting law related to such a complex subject, importance must be given to the law and any decision must be taken keeping the legal framework in the background. Reliance in this regards is placed on the judgment of Shivashakti Sugars (Kashipur) Ltd. V. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 8 SCC 418 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "It has been recognized for quite some time now that law is an interdisciplinary subject where interface between law another sciences (social sciences as well as natural/physical sciences) come into play and the impact of other disciplines on Law is to be necessarily kept in mind while taking a decision (of course, within the parameters of legal provisions). Interface between Law and Economics is much more relevant in today's time when the country has ushered into the era of economic liberalization, which is also termed as "globalization" of economy. India is on the road of economic growth. It has been a developing economy for number of decades and all efforts are made, at all levels, to ensure that it becomes a fully developed economy. Various measures are taken in this behalf by the policy makers. The judicial wing, while undertaking the task of performing its judicial function, is also required to perform its role in this direction. It calls for an economic analysis of law approach, most commonly referred to as "Law and Economics" [Richard A. Posner in his book Frontiers of Legal Theory explains this concept as follows: "Economic analysis of law has heuristic, descriptive and normative aspects. As a heuristic, it seeks to display underlying unities in legal doctrines and institutions; in its descriptive mode, it seeks to identify the economic logic and effects of doctrines and institutions and the economic causes of legal change; in its normative aspect it advises Judges another policy-makers on the most efficient methods of regulating conduct through law. The range of its subject-matter has become wide, indeed all-encompassing. The range of its subject-matter has become wide, indeed all-encompassing. Exploiting advances in the economics of non-market behaviour, economic analysis of law has expanded far beyond its original focus on antitrust, taxation, public utility regulation, corporate finance, and other areas of explicitly economic regulation. (And within that domain, it has expanded to include such fields as property and contract law.) The "new" economic analysis of law embrances such non-market, or quasi-non-market, fields of law as tort law, family law, criminal law, free speech, procedure, legislation, public international law, the law of intellectual property, the rules governing the trial and appellate process, environmental law, the administrative process, the regulation of health and safety, the laws forbidding discrimination in employment, and social norms viewed as a source of, an obstacle to, and a substitute for formal law. "Posner also mentioned that this interface between Law and Economics might grandly be called "Economic Theory of Law", which is built on a pioneering article by Ronald Coase [R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960)]. "The "Coase Theorem" holds that where market transaction costs are zero, the law's initial assignment of rights is irrelevant to efficiency, since if the assignment is inefficient the parties will rectify it by a corrective transaction. There are two important corollaries. The first is that the law, to the extent interested in promoting economic efficiency, should try to minimize transaction costs, for example by defining property rights clearly, by making them readily transferable, and by creating cheap and effective remedies for breach of contract...The second corollary of the Coase Theorem is that where, despite the law's best efforts, market transaction costs remain high, the law should simulate the market's allocation of resources by assigning property rights to the highest-valued users. An example is the fair-use doctrine of copyright law, which allows writers to publish short quotations from a copyrighted work without negotiating with the copyright holder. The costs of such negotiations would usually be prohibitive; if they were not prohibitive, the usual result would be an agreement to permit the quotation, and so the doctrine of fair use brings about the result that the market would bring about if market transactions were feasible."]. In fact, in certain branches of Law there is a direct impact of Economics and economic considerations play predominant role, which are even recognized as legal principles. In fact, in certain branches of Law there is a direct impact of Economics and economic considerations play predominant role, which are even recognized as legal principles. Monopoly laws (popularly known as "Antitrust Laws" in USA) have been transformed by Economics. The issues arising in competition laws (which has replaced monopoly laws) are decided primarily on economic analysis of various provisions of the Competition Commission Act. Similar approach is to be necessarily adopted while interpreting bankruptcy laws or even matters relating to corporate finance, etc. The impress of Economics is strong while examining various facets of the issues arising under the aforesaid laws. In fact, economic evidence plays a big role even while deciding environmental issues. There is a growing role of Economics in contract, labour, tax, corporate and other laws. Courts are increasingly receptive to economic arguments while deciding these issues. In such an environment it becomes the bounden duty of the Court to have the economic analysis and economic impact of its decisions. 44. We may hasten to add that is by no means suggested that while taking into account these considerations, specific provisions of law are to be ignored. First duty of the Court is to decide the case by applying the statutory provisions. However, on the application of law and while interpreting a particular provision, economic impact/effect of a decision, wherever warranted, has to be kept in mind. Likewise, in a situation where two views are possible or wherever there is a discretion given to the Court by law, the Court needs to lean in favour of a particular view which sub-serves the economic interest of the nation. Conversely, the Court needs to avoid that particular outcome which has a potential to create an adverse effect on employment, growth of infrastructure or economy or the revenue of the State." 66. Therefore, in the present case, there is no occasion for interference, where the provisions of law have been duly complied with by Respondent No.2. Further, the time limit if 60 days granted by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 23.02.2017 is to be interpreted in line with provisions of law. On giving it such an interpretation, it is clear that the 60 days period was granted by the Hon'ble Court merely to expedite the proceedings. Further, the time limit if 60 days granted by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 23.02.2017 is to be interpreted in line with provisions of law. On giving it such an interpretation, it is clear that the 60 days period was granted by the Hon'ble Court merely to expedite the proceedings. The same cannot be read as a restriction placed on Respondent No.2 to perform its statutory function having major legal and economic significance. 6. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the petition reply and the annexures. It would be most expedient to set out few indisputable aspects emerging therefrom in order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties. (1) On 3.7.2012, the respondent no. 1 i.e. Union of India issued notification imposing Anti - Dumping duty on the basis of the findings by the Designated authority on import of product called Soda - Ash originating and being exported from Peoples Republic of China, European Union, Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Ukraine, USA. The said duty is for 5 years and at the end of 5 years i.e. 2.7.2017, had there been no further extension etc. the same would expire. This fact pertains to SCA No.14202 of 2017 and 14204 of 2017. (2) On 18.04.2013, similar notification imposing antidumping duty on the basis of the sunset review came to be issued on Soda-Ash originating importing from Turkey and Russia and the same was to be in force for a period of 5 years i.e. upto 17.04.2018. (3) On 21.7.2015, Mid-Term Review came to be initiated by the respondent no.2 in view of the duty imposed vide notification dated 3.7.2012. (4) On 01.10.2015, Mid-term review was initiated by the respondent no.2 in respect of the duties imposed vide notification dated 18.04.2013. (5) On 14.9.2016, respondent no. 2 issued Disclosure Statement under Rule 16 of the Rules. (6) This Disclosure Statement came to be challenged by some of the petitioners by way of SCA No. 16428 of 2016 and other allied matters. (7) On 23.9.2016, respondent no. 2 issued Final Findings under Rule 17 of the Rules. Those findings were also made part of the challenge in the proceedings of SCA No. 16428 of 2016. (6) This Disclosure Statement came to be challenged by some of the petitioners by way of SCA No. 16428 of 2016 and other allied matters. (7) On 23.9.2016, respondent no. 2 issued Final Findings under Rule 17 of the Rules. Those findings were also made part of the challenge in the proceedings of SCA No. 16428 of 2016. (8) On 13.12.2016, this Court while admitting said SCA No. 16428 of 2016, modified interim relief by permitting respondent no.1 to issue notification under Rule 18 but made it subject to the outcome of the petition and it was directed that till final outcome of the petition, notification, if any, issued may not be acted upon. (9) On 21.12.2016, respondent no. 1 i.e. Union of India, issued notification No.55/2016-CUS withdrawing the Anti-Dumping Duty however such notification was kept in abeyance till final outcome of the SCA No.16428 of 2016. This notification was also made part of the challenge in SCA No.16428 of 2016. (10) On 27.01.2017, SLP filed against the order dated 12.12.2016 is dismissed. (11) On 23.2.2017, this Court allowed the SCA No.16428 of 2016 and passed following operative order: "Para-40: For the foregoing reasons, the petitions succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The impugned disclosure statements dated 14.09.2016 in all these petitions are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the subsequent notifications notifying final findings as well as subsequent notifications issued by the Central Government under rule 18 of the rules are also quashed and set aside. The proceedings are restored to the file of the designated authority, who shall issue fresh disclosure statements, in consonance with the relevant statutory provisions and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The designated authority shall complete the entire exercise, including the issuance of final findings, within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Rule is made absolute accordingly in each of the petitions, with no order as to costs." (12) On 30.3.2017, it appears that the respondent no.2 received the copy of the said judgment on 30.3.2017. (13) On 01.04.2017, 18 months period for review investigation qua Turkey batch would have ended. (14) On 18.04.2017, the respondent no.2, pursuant to the direction issued by this Court in the aforesaid matter, held hearing in on 25.4.2017. (13) On 01.04.2017, 18 months period for review investigation qua Turkey batch would have ended. (14) On 18.04.2017, the respondent no.2, pursuant to the direction issued by this Court in the aforesaid matter, held hearing in on 25.4.2017. (15) On 21.04.2017, as per the judgment of this Court dated 23.02.2017 the Domestic industry responds to email for hearing seeking information and documents. (16) On 02.05.2017, it appears that written submissions were filed on behalf of the Domestic Industry. (17) On 17.05.2017, pursuant to hearing rejoinder submissions filed on behalf of the Domestic Industry. (18) On 30.05.2017, 60 days period, granted by this under judgment and order dated 23.02.2017, ended. (19) On 7.6.2017, the respondent No.2 issued fresh Disclosure Statement and as submitted by the petitioners, the respondent no.2 recorded its findings qua continuation of dumping pausing threat of material injury and likelihood of occurrence of dumping in the eventuality of duty being withdrawn. (20) On 16.6.2017, on the basis of the application filed by the petitioners and others domestic industries, the respondent no. 2 issued a notification initiating Sun Set Review (SSR) in respect of the import of Soda Ash originating in and exported from the Peoples Republic of China, European Union, Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Ukraine, USA for further period of 5 years. (21) The satisfaction for issuing the notification and initiating the SSR is recorded by the respondent no. 2 in para-D of the order. (22) The petitioner appears to have filed proceedings in the form of SCA No. 12251 of 2017 for seeking direction from the Court for issuing necessary notification for extending the Anti-dumping Duty in view of the initiation of SSR. The said notification came to be issued and the petition came to be withdrawn. (23) On 30.6.2017, the notification extending duty in view of the SSR came to be issued. The concluding wording thereof are reproduced hereunder: "Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the Subsection (1) and Subsection (5) of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act read with Rules 18 and 23 of the Anti Dumping Rules, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the notification of the Govt. The concluding wording thereof are reproduced hereunder: "Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the Subsection (1) and Subsection (5) of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act read with Rules 18 and 23 of the Anti Dumping Rules, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the notification of the Govt. of Indian, in the Ministry of Finance, (Department of Revenue) No. 34/2012-Customs (ADD) dated 3 rd July, 2012, published in the Gazette of India, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i) vide number G.S.R. 528 (E) dated the 3 rd July, 2012, namely:- In the said notification, in paragraph 2 and before the explanation, the following shall be added, namely- 3. "Subject to the final decision of the Hon'ble Court High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application Nos. 16426 of 2016 and 16428 of 2016, this notification, unless revoked earlier, shall remain in force upto and inclusive of the 2nd July, 2018" Thus, the Anti Dumping Duty came to be extended till 2.7.2018. (24) On 3.7.2017, the Special Civil Application as it is stated hereinabove being SCA No. 12251 of 2017, which had been filed for seeking appropriate relief qua extension of duty came to be disposed of as not pressed on account of the issuance of aforesaid notification dated 30.6.2017. (25) On 07.07.2017, MCA No.2027 of 2017 is filed by the Respondent no.2 for extension of time of 60 days and the same was registered on 21.07.2017. (26) On 22.7.2017, the respondent no.2 issued final findings, recommending withdrawal of Anti Dumping Duty in Mid Term Review (MTR). (27) On 22.7.2017, the respondent no. 2 also issued an order rescinding the SSR giving rise to some of the petitioners for filing the present group of petitions. 7. Against the aforesaid backdrops of the facts and submissions, now let us examine the contentions in light of the pleading of the parties as they are set out in the petitions and reply affidavits. 8. The petitioners have contended that the respondent no.2 exceeded his jurisdiction and committed gross error of law in issuing final finding dated 22.07.2017 in Midterm investigation and has also committed grave error in annulling Sunset Review investigation without there being any authority and justification whatsoever vide order dated 22.07.2017. 8. The petitioners have contended that the respondent no.2 exceeded his jurisdiction and committed gross error of law in issuing final finding dated 22.07.2017 in Midterm investigation and has also committed grave error in annulling Sunset Review investigation without there being any authority and justification whatsoever vide order dated 22.07.2017. The petitioner's contention is based upon the provision of the Section-9A of the Custom Tariff Act and Rule 23(1A) of the Rules, petitioners submitted that the scheme of law as could be seen from the aforesaid provisions would clearly indicate that the MTR is required to be completed within statutorily stipulated period of one year and with an extension of six months in case of special circumstances and not beyond that. The MTR in the instant case, had commenced on 21.07.2015 in a case where soda ash being imported from Republic of China , USA European Union Ukrain etc and for Turkey and Russia batch of countries on 01.10.2015, The review should have been over within one year therefrom or at the best within further period of six months therefrom. That is totally in all 18 months time could be granted to the Designated Authority by Government of India. The Court's direction in the judgment and order dated 23.02.2017 in earlier proceedings being SCA No.16426 of 2016 and other allied matters also did not grant larger time to the authority except 60 days from the receipt of the order for completing the entire exercise. The respondent authority especially respondent no.2 unfortunately could not complete the exercise within the said time nor did it care to obtain extension of time from this Court or even from Government of India as nothing has come on record to show that Government of India granted any time. And when there was Court's order Government of India also could not have granted any extension. Thus the time limit of 60 days was over on 30.05.2017 and thereafter, the extension application came to be filed being MCA No.2027 of 2017, which is contended to have been filed only on 21.07.2017. 9. An affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2 contains inter alia submission that the order dated 23.02.2017 of this court was brought to the notice of respondent no.2 only on 30.03.2017 and the process was required to be completed by 30.05.2017. 9. An affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2 contains inter alia submission that the order dated 23.02.2017 of this court was brought to the notice of respondent no.2 only on 30.03.2017 and the process was required to be completed by 30.05.2017. The request for extension of time was already prayed for since the review was time consuming process requiring detailed scrutiny an examination of facts by taking into account the submissions and counter submissions of all the interested parties as also giving opportunity to all the stakeholders to meet the end of principle of natural justice. Thus the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2 does not contain anything more in respect of the final finding not being passed or declared within the stipulated time limit of 30.05.2017. 10. The counsel for the private respondents especially respondent no.7 submitted that in fact, the order passed by the respondent no.2 does not suffer from any infirmity of the same being passed after the prescribed time limit. The counsel for the respondent no.7 placed heavy emphasis upon his explanation of time which is incorporated in the paragraph no.32 of the written submission, which this Court has reproduced hereinabove. On the basis of that chart, the counsel for the respondent no.7 contended that the MTR which had commenced on 21.07.2015 was to be over by 20.07.2016. The investigation thereunder could be extended by further period of 180 days. The petitioners had filed earlier round of petitions on 20.09.2016 and it was said that 31 days from 20.07.2016 were consumed of 180 days available. The period from 13.12.2016 to 23.02.2017 is pleaded to be time freezed as the said time was consumed in the Court proceedings and thereafter, the disclosure statement, issued on 07.06.2017 and final finding issued on 22.07.2017 are issued well within time. Thus, the respondent no.7 has attempted to indicate as to how the final finding cannot be treated to be rendered beyond the time limit prescribed by the Court and the statute. 11. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 after having made submission in respect of the final findings statement being well within time based upon his calculation depicted hereinabove in tabular form, also contended that the authority especially respondent no. 11. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 after having made submission in respect of the final findings statement being well within time based upon his calculation depicted hereinabove in tabular form, also contended that the authority especially respondent no. 2 had a larger time available for rendering the final findings and this court in its judgment dated 23.2.2017 in earlier round of litigation could not have curtailed the time by directing the respondent no. 2 to complete the entire proceedings and render the final findings within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. To support his submission, the counsel for the respondent no. 7 has placed relied upon the observation of the Supreme court in case of General Manager department of Telecommunications Thiruvananthapuram Vs. Jacob s/o, Kochuvarkey Kalliath (dead) By Lrs. and others, (2003) 9 SCC 662 . The counsel for the respondent no. 7 further contended that the court's direction cannot stifle any authority in its exercise of power of deciding the matter as per the statutory time limit. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 for supporting his aforesaid submission placed reliance upon the observation of the Supreme Court in case of Anurag Kumar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 9 SCALE 639 . 12. The counsel appearing for the respondent no.7 relied on WTO agreement on implementation of Article-VI of GATT 1994 and it was submitted that it was 180 days as prescribed under the anti-dumping rules had been borrowed from article 5.10 and the counsels has set out the said article in his written submissions which have been reproduced hereinabove. He also placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in case of GM Export that the international law and Agreements between the Countries are to be respected and the Court will have to take due notice thereof. The learned counsel appearing for respondent no.7 in support of the said contention cited decision of the Supreme Court in case of Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum Vs. Union of India and others, and para also reproduced hereinabove, in para 38 of its written submission the counsel for respondent no.7 submitted that the time limit cannot be curtained by this Court. The learned counsel appearing for respondent no.7 in support of the said contention cited decision of the Supreme Court in case of Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum Vs. Union of India and others, and para also reproduced hereinabove, in para 38 of its written submission the counsel for respondent no.7 submitted that the time limit cannot be curtained by this Court. He also relied upon the decision of Supreme Court 1996 4 SCC 453 that Articles 226 and 227 are designed to effectuate the law and the same cannot be invoked to direct the authorities to act contrary to law. 13. Respondent no.7 further contended that the Court cannot impose any impediment in quasi-judicial proceedings. The reliance was also placed upon the decision in case of British India Ltd. Vs. it was submitted that the High Court's direction to pass final finding within 60 days should be read harmoniously with the requirement of detailed investigation process involved in the investigation. The same therefore be treated as mere directory only. 14. It is required to be noted at this stage that the respondent no.2 who has been said to have rendered final finding on 22.12.2017 i.e. beyond the time limit prescribed by the Court does not come forward with any of such submissions which have been canvassed on behalf of the respondent no.7 the respondent no.2 in the affidavit in reply filed on its behalf has pleaded that the application for extension of time made and it rests there. As against this, the respondent no.7 attempted to persuade the Court to hold that the final findings rendered were within the time and on that basis uphold the same. The propositions of law that the Court cannot issue direction contrary to law, that court would not stifle or impede the statutory authorities' power to decide the matter within the time limit prescribed nor would the Court hamper even remotely the adjudicatory process, if it is in accordance with law, cannot be disputed. The judgments cited also support the said view. The judgments cited also support the said view. However, the Court is unable to agree and accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent no.7 that this court while disposing of the earlier set of petitions vide its order dated 23.02.2017 could not have issued any direction for completing the procedure within 60 days period from the receipt of the order nor are we in a position to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 that the final finding dated 22.7.2017 could be said to have been rendered within the prescribed statutory time limit. 15. The learned counsel for respondent no.7 attempted to project, based upon his own calculation, that the rendering of final finding dated 22.7.2017 was within time but if we advert to the relevant provisions of Act, Rules and the actual dates and development it would become absolutely clear that the final finding could not be said to have been issued within the prescribed time limit. The MTRs in two batches came to be initiated on 21.07.2015 and 01.10.2015 respectively. The following details in tabular form clearly depict that final Findings issued on 22.07.2017 were issued much beyond the prescribed time limit. First Batch consisting of PR of china, European Union, Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Ukrain etc. Second Batch comprises Turkey and Russia 3.7.2012 Date of Notification imposing Anti Dumping duty on Soda Ash from the aforesaid countries. 18.4.2013 Date of Notification imposing Anti Dumping duty on Soda Ash from the aforesaid countries. 2.7.2017 expiry of 5 years period of the notification 17.4.2018 expiry of 5 years period of the notification 21.7.2015 MTR initiated 1.10.2015 MTR initiated 20.7.2016 1 year period from initiation of MTR 1.10.2016 1 year period from initiation of MTR 21.1.2017 18 months i.e. maximum outer limit to complete MTR 1.4.2017 18 months i.e. maximum outer limit to complete MTR 23.2.2017 High Court granted 60 days time from the date of receipt of the order. 23.2.2017 High Court granted 60 days time from the date of receipt of the order. 30.3.2017 Respondent claims to have received the order on 30.3.2017. 30.3.2017 Respondent claims to have received the order on 30.3.2017. 30.5.2017 the expiry of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. 30.5.2017 the expiry of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. By this date the final finding was required to be rendered. 30.3.2017 Respondent claims to have received the order on 30.3.2017. 30.3.2017 Respondent claims to have received the order on 30.3.2017. 30.5.2017 the expiry of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. 30.5.2017 the expiry of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. By this date the final finding was required to be rendered. By this date the final finding was required to be rendered. MCA No. 2027 of 2017 in SCA 16426 of 2017 was preferred on 21.7.2017 for extension of time but no orders were obtained and is still pending. MCA No. 2027 of 2017 in SCA 16426 of 2017 was preferred on 21.7.2017 for extension of time but no orders were obtained and is still pending. 22.7.2017 final finding issued by the authority after period of 53 days time elapsed from the outer limits fixed by the court for rendering the final finding i.e. 30.5.2017. 22.7.2017 final finding issued by the authority after period of 53 days time elapsed from the outer limits fixed by the court for rendering the final finding i.e. 30.5.2017. 16. The provision of Article 5.10 of WTO agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 also makes it incumbent upon all the concerned to take a note that investigation shall be completed within one year of initiation and only in special circumstances the period could be extended but that too for not more than 6 months totaling 18 months we propose to reproduce the same at the cost of repetition to lay sufficient emphasis upon the time being essence of the provision. "5.10 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation." Thus, the language employed by the author of the said agreement and signatory countries also made it incumbent upon all the concerned to bear this time limit in mind. Therefore, when this Court in its order dated 23.02.2017 granted further time of 60 days the same was required to be adhered to strictly as the said time limit was in consonance with the precious principle of law that time taken in adjudication would not prejudice the parties. Therefore, when this Court in its order dated 23.02.2017 granted further time of 60 days the same was required to be adhered to strictly as the said time limit was in consonance with the precious principle of law that time taken in adjudication would not prejudice the parties. The aforesaid discussion would clearly indicate that the provision of the WTO agreement and the Article of GATT of 1994 and the provision of Rule 23 of the Rules would leave no manner of doubt to indicate that the 18 months' time limit is mandatory and is required to be adhered to, by all the concerned. The Court therefore, vide order dated 23.2.2017 granted time only upto 60 days taking everything into consideration and therefore, the same was required to be adhered to strictly by the authority. 17. The learned counsel for respondent no.7 was not justified in attributing liberty to the respondent no.2 which it never had in continuing with the proceedings of investigation beyond the time limit prescribed as neither the statutory provisions nor the Court could permit further and larger time contrary to the spirit and letters of the provision of Article 5.10 of WTO agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the provisions of Act and Rules framed for implementing the said avowed objective. The Counsel for the respondent no. 7 is not incorrect in his submission that time taken in Court proceedings is necessarily required to be excluded while computing the period of 18 months. But there cannot be any automatic exclusion else the Legislature and Statute would have provided for the same, and in absence of any such provisions of exclusion the only way open to the authority was to seek extension from the Court. The filing of mere extension application cannot be treated as extension of time and the Authority could not have proceeded further grating time unto itself. Thus there was no scope in the respondent no.2 to grant time unto itself without there being any extension by the Court for continuing with the review and render final finding beyond the time limit prescribed. 18. Thus there was no scope in the respondent no.2 to grant time unto itself without there being any extension by the Court for continuing with the review and render final finding beyond the time limit prescribed. 18. It is required to be noted that the respondent no.2 appears to have applied for extension but the said application is only dated 21.07.2017 i.e. much after the expiry of time limit if we revert to the our calculation set out hereinabove then the time limit granted to respondent no.2 was over on 30.05.2017 and after the period of 52 days an application for extension of time was made which on the face of it would show that the same could not have been made the way it was made. And without awaiting any order on the next date i.e. on 22.07.2017 the authority has rendered final finding which in our view was clearly beyond the time limit prescribed by the statute as well as this court rendering the entire final finding vitiated. 19. The counsel for the petitioners also contended that the respondent no.2 could not have had any justification for continuing with MTR at the fag end of 5 years' period especially when at least in first batch of countries the Sunset Review was initiated though the same was made subject to final outcome of the MTR. The counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the respondent no. 2 did not have any authority to continue with MTR looking to the scenario of time and the stage after the issuance of the Sunset Review at least in first batch of countries. The petitioners counsel further submitted that the final findings were issued after the initial 5 years period was over meaning thereby, there was no question of any MTR when the initial period of 5 years had been over, therefore in that view of the matter also the respondent no. 2 could not have continued with the investigation so far as MTR is concerned. 20. The counsel for the private respondents contended that there is no embargo on respondent no.2 in continuing with MTR and Sunset Review simultaneously. The provision of section 9A and the Rules especially Rule 23 would clearly indicate that the simultaneous investigation in MTR and Sunset Review could be undertaken. 21. 20. The counsel for the private respondents contended that there is no embargo on respondent no.2 in continuing with MTR and Sunset Review simultaneously. The provision of section 9A and the Rules especially Rule 23 would clearly indicate that the simultaneous investigation in MTR and Sunset Review could be undertaken. 21. We are of the view that the peculiar facts of the present case indicate that the respondent no. 2 ought to have appreciated that the time taken in rendering the final finding in the MTR resulted into publishing the same only after the initial period of 5 years was over and therefore the extension of the duty in itself could not have been treated as giving life to MTR. We hastened add here that when this court taking into consideration the pendency of litigation in earlier round of litigation granted 60 days' time under the order and judgment dated 23.2.2017, then the same ought to have scrupulously been adhered to by the respondent no. 2 and in any case respondent no. 2 could not have gone beyond the same period of MRT concerned and therefore, we are of the clear view that time taken in rendering the final finding in MTR has resulted in vitiating the same and the same cannot be therefore, validly relied upon for any further action by the concerned. We hasten to add here that this is in the case of Antidumping Duty notification of 2013 in the batch of China and USA etc countries so far as the other batch of Turkey and Russia are concerned the period of five years was getting over only 17-04-2018. But even in their case also the maximum outer time limit of 18 months for rendering final finding on MRT remained which has rendered the Final findings in their case also vitiated and without any authority of law. 22. The petitioners counsel has further contended the respondent no. 2 has committed gross error of law in changing its conclusion on the basis of the essential facts declared under the disclosure statement dated 7.6.2017. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that Rule 16 of the Rules read with Article 6.9 of WTO agreement clearly shows that the disclosure statement is statement of essential facts which the designated authority finds for the recommending imposing of definite measures. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that Rule 16 of the Rules read with Article 6.9 of WTO agreement clearly shows that the disclosure statement is statement of essential facts which the designated authority finds for the recommending imposing of definite measures. Rule 16 of the Rules had been interpreted by the Court in its judgment dated 23.2.2017 and greater emphases have been laid upon the observation of the court in para-30 and 31.2. 23. The counsel for the petitioners has invited court's attention to the following paras of the discloser statement - 49, 65, 66, 71, 77, 90 to 97 and submitted that these findings on the essential facts show that despite Anti Dumping duty in force, the dumping has continued and the domestic industry's market share has gone down, imports have doubled, price under cutting is positive, Exporting industries in exporting countries have enhanced their capacities, Indian market is price attractive. These findings would not be amenable to any change unless data forming their basis is changed or altered so far as the Turkey and Russia in those petitions. The disclosure statement supports the aforesaid findings. 24. The counsel for the petitioner invited court's attention to the final finding in respect of China PR batch and Turkey Batch and submitted that respondent no. 2 has altered the conclusion and it creates the scenario as if the likelihood of injury on account of dumping is irrelevant though disclosed. Thus on merits the counsel has assailed the findings on the ground that the conclusions would not have been changed without any material placed on record. 25. The counsel for the petitioners also invited court's attention to relevant paras and submitted that the data from DGCI&S for the period 2015-16 and 2016-17 in the final finding in para-90 were never shared or disclosed. The counsel for the petitioner further submitted that these data pertain to likelihood analysis and it was incumbent upon the respondent no.2 to disclose the data before arriving at any finding. Thus, it was contended that there is a clear breach of principles of natural justice by the respondent no. 2. The counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the respondent no. 2 and other respondents have taken into consideration the aspect so far as domestic industries are concerned, which could not have been relevant for the investigation purpose. 26. Thus, it was contended that there is a clear breach of principles of natural justice by the respondent no. 2. The counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the respondent no. 2 and other respondents have taken into consideration the aspect so far as domestic industries are concerned, which could not have been relevant for the investigation purpose. 26. The counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the private respondents have taken a stand before the respondent no.2 as could be seen from page no. 384 that the period given by the court of 60 days was sacrosanct and authority was required to adhere to it strictly however now, in the present proceedings they have taken a diametrical opposite stand and canvassed the submission that said period cannot be said to be mandatory. 27. The counsel for the petitioner invited court's attention to following submissions to support his contention qua - responded no. 2 being not justified in rendering the final finding and same is not tenable in law. 12. The Petitioner states that though the Respondent No.2 was required to decide the Mid Term Review within 60 days of the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2017, the Respondent No.2 without seeking any extension of time and after expiry of the period of 60 days has issued the Impugned Final Findings on 22.7.2017. In such Final findings, the Respondent No.2 has committed a volteface from the findings of essential facts in the Disclosure Statement dated 7.6.2017 and recommended withdrawal of duty and recession Sunset Review. The Petitioner states that the following shows how the Respondent No.2 has either changed its findings on essential facts while issuing the Impugned Final Findings and/or relied on extraneous information/material which were not disclosed in the Disclosure Statement. a. While considering Dumping margin the Respondent No.2 has without any rationale found that during Post Period of Investigation (POI) there is a reduction the Dumping margin qua imports from China PR, European Union (EU) and USA. Such conclusion is entirely unwarranted when dumping margin in the POI itself is positive an the only legal requirement is whether dumping has continued or is likely to recur. Such conclusion is entirely unwarranted when dumping margin in the POI itself is positive an the only legal requirement is whether dumping has continued or is likely to recur. [Page No.17] b. While considering the trends in imports over the injury period, Respondent No.2 has selectively compared POI(2014-15) figures with Post POI (Apr 2015 to Sept 2015 Annualised) figures, whereas the Respondent no.2 is required to consider both POI and Post POI figures with the base year i.e.2011-12. Even otherwise, the decline in dumped imports from China and EU in Post POI compared to POI is marginal and is not sufficient to hold absence of likelihood. In so far as USA is concerned, there is actually an increase. The finding that there is a miniscule increase of 3% in imports during post POI is also given on a comparison with POI figures and not Base year figure where the increase is more than 100 percent. c. While considering Price Undercutting in paragraph no.69 of the Impugned Final Findings, the Respondent No.2 has wrongly compared POI figures with Post POI figures for EU, Kenya, Pakistan and Ukraine. Even for China PR and USA, the Respondent No.2 has lost sight of the fact that dumping margin is positive. d. While considering production, Capacity, Sales and Capacity Utilization of Domestic Industry under paragraph no.72, the Respondent no.2 has completely ignored the Post Disclosure submissions of the Domestic Industry and has ignored the data pertaining to investments made and capacities added. Such approach is wholly unwarranted since by virtue of [page-18] Judgment and Order dated 23.2.2017, the Respondent no.2 was directed to issue a fresh Disclosure Statement. Thus, the matter was restored to the file of the Respondent No.2 at the stage of investigation and not any posterior stage for it claim that no further investigation could be done. e. While considering the impact of present and continued imports in paragraph no. 90 of the Impugned Disclosure Statement, the Respondent No.2 has curiously departed from the facts disclosed in paragraph no.90 of the Disclosure Statement and has relied upon data for the period of 2 years Post POI. Such data was not in consideration at the time of issuance of Disclosure Statement nor was the Domestic Industry put to notice about such data or its proposed effect. f. While considering surplus capacities in Subject Countries in paragraph no. Such data was not in consideration at the time of issuance of Disclosure Statement nor was the Domestic Industry put to notice about such data or its proposed effect. f. While considering surplus capacities in Subject Countries in paragraph no. 91 of the Impugned Final Findings, the Respondent No.2 has, though having found in the Disclosure Statement on the basis of his Chemical Journal that unutilised capacity in Subject Countries is approximately 300% demand in India and the Interested parties have failed to substantiate the absence of such surplus capacities, has concluded that such surplus capacities is based on conjecture and that China PR does not have export orientation despite a finding that imports from China PR have increased from 100 (indexed in Base year to 3798 (indexed) in POI. [Page-19] g. While considering the effect of present and continued dumping in paragraph no. 92 of the impugned Final Findings, the Respondent No.2 has without giving any basis or reasons ignored a clear finding of fact given in the Disclosure Statement that price undercutting is positive and Interested parties have failed to discharge the onus that withdrawal of duty will not cause price undercutting and the same shall not have suppressing and depressing effect. Instead, the Respondent No.2 has stated that the trend is unclear. h. While considering the level of inventories in paragraph no.93 of the Impugned Final Findings, the Respondent no.2 stated its inability to consider such parameter due to alleged lack of cooperation by exporters. However, the Respondent No.2 has completely failed to consider that absence of this data implied absence of cooperation from the exporters and the fact that the need for withdrawal of duty is not established by the interested parties. The Respondent no.2 has failed to understand and obligations with the parties and has considered this as an obligation of the domestic industry. i. While considering the Export Orientation in paragraph no.94 of the Impugned Final Findings, the Respondent No.2 has wrongly found that China PR's export orientation is only 8% by not considering that (a) the Chinese producers are having significant unutilised capacities, (b) despite having unutilised [page-20] capacities and production beyond domestic consumption, the Chinese producers were adding 40 lacs MT capacities, which cannot be absorbed in the domestic market, given existing surplus production. j. While considering the Price Attractiveness of Indian market in paragraph no.95 of the Impugned Final Findings, the Respondent No.2 has failed to appreciate that in a Likelihood Analysis the very existence of an attractive market in a scenario where exports from Subject Countries to other countries' is at a price lower than export price of Subject countries to India is sufficient. There is no warrant to consider an actual shift of such articles to India in a Likelihood Analysis. k. In its findings on submissions, in paragraph no.99, the Respondent No.2 has decided that there is no likelihood of injury to the Domestic Industry and since sufficient disposable surplus capacities do not exist in Subject countries, there is no threat of injury to the Domestic Industry. The finding is flawed." 27.2 Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record the comparison statement, which are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference : Comparison of Disclosure Statement and Final Findings 28. In respect of aforesaid submissions of the petitioners, the respondents have contended that the continuation of MTR could not have been said to have been in any manner contrary to provisions of law. The MTR and Sunset Review in China batch countries could have been proceeded simultaneously. The authority has also made it specifically clear that initiation of Sunset Review in case of China Batch countries would be expressly subject to final outcome of the MTR and hence the petitioners were not justified in contending the same in the present proceedings. 29. The respondents have also submitted that the disclosure statement is not supposed to contain all the details and facts as sought to be canvassed by the petitioners. The disclosure statement is only supposed to contain the essential facts. The conclusion aspect in the final finding statement therefore cannot be said to be have been based upon on altered facts as sought to be canvassed by the petitioners. 30. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 invited the court's attention to table set out hereinabove indicating comparison between the two statement i.e. disclosure statement and final findings statement and based thereupon contended that the conclusion in final finding cannot be said to be violative of provisions of law. 31. 30. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 invited the court's attention to table set out hereinabove indicating comparison between the two statement i.e. disclosure statement and final findings statement and based thereupon contended that the conclusion in final finding cannot be said to be violative of provisions of law. 31. The counsel for the respondent no.7 has invited Court's attention to the elaborate affidavit in reply indicating that how the contention of the petitioners are answered, but close perusal thereof also would in our view not answer the essential requirement of the law to be undertaken by the respondent no.2 for arriving at a proper finding called final finding for recommending withdrawal. The fine difference and distinction is unfortunately missed by the authority. The authority was holding MTR as provided under Rule-23(1)(a) and as observed by the Supreme Court in case of Rishirop the authority was required to examine the requirement of continuing of duty and has to record its clear finding qua non-injury to the domestic industry or not likely to occur the same or recur the same in case of the anti-dumping duty removed. The counsel also invited court's attention to procedure prescribed in the Rule and submitted that respondent no. 2 has adhered to it scrupulously and no interference is called in final finding. 32. We are of the view that the counsel for the petitioners is justified in contending that the respondent no.2 could not have rendered conclusion in final finding after having recorded essential facts and finding in disclosure statement indicating continuation of dumping and other aspects. It would be most expedient herebelow to set out the interpretation of Rule 16 and 17 by this Court in earlier round of litigation in the decision rendered on 23.2.2017. "31.1 Insofar as the interpretation of rule 16 of the rules is concerned, the learned counsel for the respective parties have placed reliance upon the decisions of the WTO Panel and appellate body of the WTO relating to the interpretation of Article 6.9 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (ADA). Article 6.9 says that the authority shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Article 6.9 says that the authority shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Additionally, Article 6.9 also provides that such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests. 31.2 In WTO Panel Report, WT/DS414/R in China Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the fourth respondent, it has been observed that in order to apply definitive measures at the conclusion of anti-dumping investigations, an investigating authority must find dumping, injury and a causal link. Therefore, the essential facts underlying the findings and conclusions relating to these elements form the basis of the decision to apply definitive measures and should be disclosed. It is further observed that the disclosure requirement applies to the essential facts under consideration, rather than the essential facts that should reasonably be considered in resolving the claim. The purpose of Article 6.9 is to allow parties to defend their interests. In order for this to be meaningful, the actual facts under consideration are the relevant facts to be disclosed, so that omissions or the use of incorrect facts can be challenged. 31.3 In WT/DS-337/R in European Communities Anti-dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway, on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners, a WTO Panel has observed that the word fact is defined variously as Truth; reality and A thing known for certain to have occurred or to be true; a datum of experience and A thing assumed or alleged as a basis for inference and Events or circumstances as distinct from their legal interpretation and expressed the view that essential facts to be disclosed under Article 6.9 may qualify under any of these meanings of the word fact. The purpose of disclosure under Article 6.9 is to provide the interested parties with the necessary information to enable them to comment on the completeness and correctness of the facts being considered by the investigating authority, provide additional information or correct perceived errors, and comment on or make arguments as to the proper interpretation of those facts. Article 6.9 requires disclosure of essential facts that are under consideration and which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Article 6.9 requires disclosure of essential facts that are under consideration and which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. This requirement is not necessarily satisfied by the disclosure of the investigating authorities conclusions on issues of fact that must be resolved before a decision to apply definitive measures is taken. The Panel considered that essential facts under consideration which form the basis of the decision whether to apply definitive measures are the body of facts essential to the determinations that must be made by the investigating authority before it can decide whether to apply definitive measures. That is, they are the facts necessary to the process of analysis and decision-making by the investigating authority, not only those that support the decision ultimately reached. 31.4 The Appellate Body of WTO in WT/DS-454/AB/R, WT/DS460/AB/R, in the context of scope of information that must be disclosed, has explained that Article 6.9 covers facts under consideration, that is, those facts on the record that may be taken into account by an authority in reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive anti-dumping duties. Thus, the essential facts referred to those facts that are significant in the process of reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive measures. Such facts are those that are salient for a decision to apply definitive measures, as well as those that are salient for a contrary outcome. An authority must disclose such facts, in a coherent way, so as to permit an interested party to understand the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive measures. The Appellate Body was of the view that disclosing the essential facts under consideration pursuant to Article 6.9 is paramount for ensuring the ability for the parties concerned to defend their interests. 31.5 Thus, while Article 6.9 does not prescribe a particular form for the disclosure of the essential facts, it does require in all cases that the investigating authority disclose those facts in such a manner that an interested party can understand clearly what data the investigating authority has used, and how those data were used to determine the margin of dumping. The disclosure statement, therefore, contains the intermediate findings and conclusions of the designated authority on the essential facts which would form the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive measures and not final conclusions on whether or not definite measures are required to be applied. In the opinion of this court, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the disclosure statement should contain the conclusions of the designated authority on those essential facts which would form the basis for its decision as to whether or not to apply definitive measures and not its conclusions on the basis of those essential facts. The conclusions on the basis of the essential facts are to be recorded in the final findings, viz., whether or not on the basis of such facts definitive measures are required to be applied. The contention that the disclosure statement is in the nature of a draft order, therefore, does not merit acceptance, inasmuch as, a draft order would also contain conclusions on whether or not definitive measures are required to be applied." 33. It would be most appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of law and the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court and various High Courts and in the light thereof, the merits of impugned Final Finding as well as the Order rescinding the SSR are required to be examined. Section 9A. Anti-dumping duty on dumped articles – (1) Where any article is exported by an exporter or producer from any country or territory (hereafter in this section referred to as the exporting country or territory) to India at less than its normal value, then, upon the importation of such article into India, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, impose an anti-dumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such article. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,- (a) margin of dumping in relation to an article, means the difference between its export price and its normal value; (b) export price, in relation to an article, means the price of the article exported from the exporting country or territory and in cases where there is no export price or where the export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported articles are first resold to an independent buyer or if the article is not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as may be determined in accordance with the rules made under subsection (6); (c) normal value, in relation to an article, means- [i] the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like article when [destined for consumption] in the exporting country or territory as determined in accordance with the rules made under sub-section (6); or [ii] when there are no sales of the like article in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or territory, or when because of the particular market situation or low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country or territory, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the normal value shall be either- (a) comparable representative price of the like article when exported from the exporting country or territory to an appropriate third country as determined in accordance with the rules made under sub-section (6); or (b) the cost of production of the said article in the country of origin along with reasonable addition for administrative, selling and general costs, and for profits, as determined in accordance with the rules made under sub-section (6): Provided that in the case of import of the article from a country other than the country of origin and where the article has been merely transshipped through the country of export or such article is not produced in the country of export or there is no comparable price in the country of export, the normal value shall be determined with reference to its price in the country of origin. [1A] Where the Central Government, on such inquiry as it may consider necessary, is of the opinion that circumvention of anti-dumping duty imposed under sub-section [1] has taken place, either by altering the description or name or composition of the article subject to such antidumping duty or by import of such article in an unassembled or disassembled form or by changing the country of its origin or export or in any other manner, whereby the anti-dumping duty so imposed is rendered ineffective, it may extend the anti-dumping duty to such article or an article originating in or exported from such country, as the case may be.] [2] The Central Government may, pending the determination in accordance with the provisions of this section and the rules made thereunder of the normal value and the margin of dumping in relation to any article, impose on the importation of such article into India an antidumping duty on the basis of a provisional estimate of such value and margin and if such anti-dumping duty exceeds the margin as so determined,- (a) the Central Government shall, having regard to such determination and as soon as may be after such determination, reduce such antidumping duty; and (b) refund shall be made of so much of the antidumping duty which has been collected as is in excess of the anti-dumping duty as so reduced. [2A] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2), a notification issued under sub-section (1) or any antidumping duty imposed under sub-section (2), shall not apply to articles imported by a hundred per cent, export-oriented undertaking unless,- [i] Specifically made applicable in such notification or such impositions, as the case may be; or [ii] the article imported is either cleared as such into the domestic tariff area or used in the manufacture of any goods that are cleared into the domestic tariff area, and in such cases antidumping duty shall be levied on that portion of the article so cleared or so used as was leviable when it was imported into India. Explanation.- For the purpose of this subsection, the expression hindered per cent export-oriented undertaking shall have the meaning assigned to it in Explanation 2 to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944). Explanation.- For the purpose of this subsection, the expression hindered per cent export-oriented undertaking shall have the meaning assigned to it in Explanation 2 to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944). (3) if the Central Government, in respect of the dumped article under inquiry, is of the opinion that- (i) there is a history of dumping which caused injury or that the importer was, or should have been, aware that the exported practices dumping and that such dumping would causer injury; and (ii) the injury is caused by massive dumping of an article imported in a relatively short time which in the light of the timing and the volume of imported article dumped and other circumstances is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the anti-dumping duty liable to be levied, the Central government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, levy antidumping duty retrospectively from a date prior to the date of imposition of anti-dumping duty under sub-section (2) but not beyond ninety days from the date of notification under that sub-section, and notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, such duty shall be payable at such rate and from such date as may be specified in the notification. (4) The anti-dumping duty chargeable under this section shall be in addition to any other duty imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force. (5) The anti-dumping duty imposed under this section shall, unless revoked earlier, cease to have effect on the expiry of five years from the date of such imposition: Provided that if the Central Government, in a review, is of the opinion that the cessation of such duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, it may, from time to time, extend the period of such imposition for a further period of five years and such further period shall commence from the date of order of such extension. Provided further that where a review initiated before the expiry of the aforesaid period of five years has not come to a conclusion before such expiry, the anti-dumping duty may continue to remain in force pending the outcome of such a review for a further period not exceeding one year. Provided further that where a review initiated before the expiry of the aforesaid period of five years has not come to a conclusion before such expiry, the anti-dumping duty may continue to remain in force pending the outcome of such a review for a further period not exceeding one year. (6) The margin of dumping as referred to in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) shall, from time to time, be ascertained and determined by the Central Government, after such inquiry as it may consider necessary and the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for the purposes of this section, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing such rules may provide for the manner in which articles liable for any antidumping duty under this section may be identified and for the manner in which the export price and the normal value of and the margin of dumping in relation to, such articles may be determined and for the assessment and collection of such anti-dumping duty. (6A) The margin of dumping in relation to an article, exported by an exporter or producer, under inquiry under sub-section (6) shall be determined on the basis of records concerning normal value and export price maintained, and information provided, by such exporter or producer : Provided that where an exporter or producer fails to provide such records or information, the margin of dumping for such exporter or producer shall be determined on the basis of facts available.] (7) Every notification issued under this section shall, as soon as may be after it is issued, be laid before each House of Parliament. (8) The provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and the rules and regulations made thereunder, including those relating to the date for determination of rate of duty, assessment, non-levy, short levy, refunds, interest, appeals, offences and penalties shall, as far as may be, apply to the duty chargeable under this section as they apply in relation to duties leviable under that Act." "Rule 16 : Disclosure of information.- The designated authority shall, before giving its final findings, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for its decision. Rule 17 : Final findings.- (1) The designated authority shall, within one year from the date of initiation of an investigation, determine as to whether or not the article under investigation is being dumped in India and submit to the Central Government its final finding – (a) as to,- (i) the export price, normal value and the margin of dumping of the said article; (ii) whether import of the said article into India, in the case of imports from specified countries, causes or threatens material injury to any industry established in India or materially retards the establishment of any industry in India; (iii) a casual link, where applicable, between the dumped imports and injury; (iv) whether a retrospective levy is called for and if so, the reasons therefore and date of commencement of such retrospective levy: Provided that the Central Government may, [in its discretion in special circumstances] extend further the aforesaid period of one year by six months: Provided further that in those cases where the designated authority has suspended the investigation on the acceptance of a price undertaking as provided in rule 15 and subsequently resumes the same on violation of the terms of the said undertaking, the period for which investigation was kept under suspension shall not be taken into account while calculating the period of said one year, (b) recommending the amount of duty which, if levied, would remove the injury where applicable, to the domestic industry [after considering the principles laid down in the Annexure III to these rules] (2) The final finding, if affirmative, shall contain all information on the matter of facts and law and reasons which have led to the conclusion and shall also contain information regarding- (i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying countries involved; (ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes; (iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the normal value; (iv) Considerations relevant to the injury determination; and (v) the main reasons leading to the determination. (3) The designated authority shall determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the article under investigation: Provided that in cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of articles involved are so large as to make such determination impracticable, it may limit its findings either to a reasonable number of interested parties or articles by using statistically valid samples based on information available at the time of selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated, and any selection, of exporters, producers, or types of articles, made under this proviso shall preferably be made in consultation with and with the consent of the exporters, producers or importers concerned : Provided further that the designated authority shall, determine an individual margin of dumping for any exporter or producer, though not selected initially, who submit necessary information in time, except where the number of exporters or producers are so large that individual examination would be unduly burdensome and prevent the timely completion of the investigation. (4) The designated authority shall issue a public notice recording its final findings. Rule 23: Review.- (1) Any anti-dumping duty imposed under the provision of section 9A of the Act, shall remain in force, so long as and to the extent necessary, to counteract dumping, which is causing injury. (1A) The designated authority shall, review the need for the continued imposition of the antidumping duty, where warranted, on its own initiative or upon request by any interested party who submits positive information substantiating the need for such review, and a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty and upon such review, the designated authority shall recommend to the Central Government for its withdrawal, where it comes to a conclusion that the injury to the domestic industry is not likely to continue or recur, if the said antidumping duty is removed or varied and is therefore no longer warranted. (1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) or (1A), any definitive anti-dumping duty levied under the Act, shall be effective for a period not exceeding five years from the date of its imposition, unless the designated authority comes to a conclusion, on a review, initiated before that period on its own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry, within a reasonable period of time prior to the expiry of that period, that the expiry of the said anti-dumping duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury to the domestic industry. (2) Any review initiated under sub-rule (1) shall be concluded within a period not exceeding twelve months from the date of initiation of such review. (3) The provisions of rules 6, 7, 8, 9/10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 shall be mutatis mutandis applicable in the case of review." Thus, the contention of the petitioners considered in light of the provisions of aforesaid and the interpretation of Rule 16 setout hereinabove rendered in the decision of 23.2.2017 would indicate clearly that the respondent no.2 could not have rendered the final finding and conclusion without their being any substantial change set out warranting the same in the final finding. 34. The petitioners counsel contended that the petitioners do not have any efficacious alternate remedy for maintaining the challenge as they have laid in this group of petitions. The counsel for the petitioners relied upon the provision of Section-9A, 9C and the relevant rules to indicate that the said provisions and the final finding and annulment order impugned in this group of petitions would not leave any manner of doubt to say that there exists no alternative efficacious remedy in form of Section-9C of the Customs, Excise and [Service Tax] Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the CESTAT'). 35. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos.1 and 2 invited Court's attention to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of respondent no.2 and contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed as the same is premature. The counsel for the respondent no.1 and 2 invited court's attention to the contention as mentioned in the memo of the affidavit in reply that the petitioner has approached the court at a stage when there is yet no order on the final findings. The govt. The counsel for the respondent no.1 and 2 invited court's attention to the contention as mentioned in the memo of the affidavit in reply that the petitioner has approached the court at a stage when there is yet no order on the final findings. The govt. of India was yet to make any order on the final findings which were impugned in these petitions and therefore, the petitions being premature and same is required to be dismissed. The affidavit in reply contains reference to the Supreme Court decision case of Saurashtra chemical SLP 8203-8212 of 2000 decided on 11.05.2000 to indicate that the final findings of the designated authority are only recommendatory in nature and in appeal lies only against the determination by the central government. The affidavit in reply on behalf of respondent no.2 in para-7 contains the excerpts of the Supreme Court observation. 36. The private respondents and their counsels contended that the petitions are required to be dismissed on account of availability of alternative efficacious remedy under section 9C of CESTAT. The counsel for the respondent no.7 laid emphasis upon the observation of the Supreme Court in case of Shew kumar Agarwal Vs. Union of India (Division Bench of Calcutta High Court), (2002) 141 ELT 312 to support his contention that the alternative efficacious remedy u/s. 9C is available The observation of Calcutta high court in above case in our view cannot help respondents in justifying its contention qua alternative remedy in form of provisions of section 9C, the challenge in the instant case is essentially on account of the lack of jurisdiction in the respondent no.2 extraneous consideration going into the consideration process and hence, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the alternative remedy ground would not be available to the respondent, in our view the Calcutta high court's decision is required to be viewed in the context of submission canvassed on behalf of the petitioner and one can safely say that the same would have not applicable to the case on hand. 37. This Court is of the view that facts of the case are decisive factors to decide question of alternative and efficacious remedy. 37. This Court is of the view that facts of the case are decisive factors to decide question of alternative and efficacious remedy. The reliance placed upon the observation of this court in case of Alembicis of no avail to the respondents as the said judgment is in respect of the court's direction which was sought by the petitioner therein to seek writ of mandamus to the Govt. of India to accept the recommendation of imposing duty by the Govt. of India and the Govt. India stand that the recommendations are not binding. Therefore, this judgment also would be of no avail to the respondents. 38. The respondent nos.1 and 2 relied upon ITO V. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 & Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 . 39. We are unable to accept the submission of respondent nos.1 & 2 and other respondents qua petitions deserve to be relegated to the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 9C of the Customs and Tariff Act. The facts of the present case would indicate that there is no order passed by the govt. of India as there was a stay order by this Court and when the govt. of India's order is not challenged the decision rendered in case of Saurashtra Chemical, (2000) 118 ELT 305 supra, and relied upon by the respondent no.1 and 2 would clearly indicate that the recommendation of the authority can't be said to be providing any cause for appeal. At the same time, looking to the nature of the findings and the fact the process is adjudicatory, this Court is of the view that the challenge in the petition in some of the petitions are such as could be maintained only in writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution. 40. At the same time, looking to the nature of the findings and the fact the process is adjudicatory, this Court is of the view that the challenge in the petition in some of the petitions are such as could be maintained only in writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution. 40. The peculiar facts of the present case, if examined in light of the pronouncement of law in respect of the provisions of Customs Tariff Act and Anti Dumping Rules, one would clearly come to the conclusion that the process till issuance of final finding could be classified to be quasi judicial and on that basis the Delhi High Court in various petitions appears to have taken a view that section 9C appeal would be available to the aggrieved party to challenge the same before the CESTAT but if one peruses the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Saurashtra Chemical which has been time and again referred to by this Court and other courts, the final finding is only a recommendatory and aggrieved party can file appeal only after the Government of India issues notification under Rule 18 of the Rules. The counsel for respondent no.1 and 2 based upon the Supreme Court observation in case of Saurashtra Chemical has pleaded that as the government of India is yet to take a call on final finding dated 22.7.2017, these petitions may be disposed of as premature as no cause of action has arisen in favour of the petitioners. 41. The counsel for the respondent no. 7 and other respondents have rather contended that as held by the Delhi High Court in number of decisions, the final findings could be assailed before the CESTAT under the provisions of Rule 9C and therefore, as there is alternative remedy available, the court may relegate the parties the alternative remedy as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the high Court would not entertain the petition when statutory alternative remedy is available. The counsel for respondent no 7 in support its contention relief upon the judgment cited hereinabove. 42. The counsel for respondent no 7 in support its contention relief upon the judgment cited hereinabove. 42. We are of the considered view that there cannot be any dispute qua proposition of law that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would ordinarily entertain the petition when there is a statutory alternative remedy provided, however, one needs to bear in mind that the proposition of law for not entertaining the petition when alternative remedy is available cannot be said to be an absolute proposition and the exception have been carved out by the Supreme Court time and again and as could be seen from the judgment of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , the proposition is said to be having exceptions. The Supreme Court in para 14 and 15 held as under: "para-14: The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". Para-15: Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." therefore, now let us examine the peculiar facts of the present case in light of the propositions of law. First of all one needs to be mindful of the fact that the petitioners have canvassed the submission qua lack of jurisdiction and authority in respondent no.2 in rendering the final finding after the lapse of statutory period. The petitioners have also canvassed the submission qua respondent no.2's lack of jurisdiction and authority in rendering the final finding in MTR when the entire period of 5 years was over and the petitioners have also at least in two petitions assailed the lack of jurisdiction and authority in respect of the order passed by the respondent no. 2 dated 22.7.2017 annulling the rescinding the Sunset Review. We are therefore, of the view that the petitioners have canvassed this submission and when the court have found substance in it, it would not be in the interest of justice to relegate the parties on account of alternative remedy and so far as the challenge to the order dated 22.7.2017 in respect of annulment of Sunset Review is concerned, there exists no other remedy but to file petition. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the respondents plea of alternative remedy does not deserve any acceptance. 43. This brings the Court to consider the challenge to the annulment of Sunset Review dated 22.7.2017. The provisions of Section 9A read with provisions of Rule 23 would clearly indicate that the respondent no. 2 did not have any authority to annul the same without there being any cogent reasons. This is all the more so when the respondent no. 2 had initiated the Sunset Review after recording satisfaction on the strength of the substantive application that was filed by the petitioners concerned. The relevant observation of the respondent no.2 while ordering the Sunset Review deserves to be noted and set out hereinbelow. Page-320 : D. Intimation of Sunset Review 16. 2 had initiated the Sunset Review after recording satisfaction on the strength of the substantive application that was filed by the petitioners concerned. The relevant observation of the respondent no.2 while ordering the Sunset Review deserves to be noted and set out hereinbelow. Page-320 : D. Intimation of Sunset Review 16. Having satisfied, on the basis of the positive evidence submitted by the domestic industry, substantiating the likelihood of continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, the Authority hereby initiates an investigation in accordance with Section 9A(5) of the Act read with Rule 23 of Antidumping Rules, to review whether cessation of the duty on imports of the subject goods originating in or exported from the subject countries, shall lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping of the subject goods from the subject countries and continuation or recurrence of injury to the domestic industry, and need for continued imposition of the definitive duty in force against the subject goods originating in or exported from the subject countries. 17. The Authority is at present conducting a midterm review, initiated vide notification File No.15/28/2014-DGAD dated 21st July, 2015 where the Authority has not made final determination so far. The present sunset review is subject to the outcome of this midterm review investigations would indicate that the Sunset Review was issued after recoding the satisfaction. The impugned annulment order unfortunately proceeds on the aspect of the same being expressly made subject to outcome of MTR the authority annul the same, in our view there exists no power in the authority to annul the same. It has to be brought to its logical conclusion once it is initiated as there exists power to suspend but there is no power to annul and the circumstances under which the dropping is provided are also spell out under Rule 14 and 15 only. Apart therefrom there exists no other provision which would permit annulling of the Sunset Review or terminating the Sunset Review and same would be in our view without authority of law and same is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule 14 and 15 of the Rules are reproduced herebelow for ready reference : "14. Termination of investigation. Apart therefrom there exists no other provision which would permit annulling of the Sunset Review or terminating the Sunset Review and same would be in our view without authority of law and same is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule 14 and 15 of the Rules are reproduced herebelow for ready reference : "14. Termination of investigation. - The designated authority shall, by issue of a public notice, terminate an investigation immediately if – (a) it receives a request in writing for doing so from or on behalf of the domestic industry affected, at whose instance the investigation was initiated; (b) it is satisfied in the course of an investigation, that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping or, where applicable, injury to justify the continuation of the investigation; (c) it determines that the margin of dumping is less than two per cent of the export price; (d) it determines that the volume of the dumped imports, actual or potential, from a particular country accounts for less than three per cent of the imports of the like product, unless, the countries which individually account for less than three per cent of the imports of the like product, collectively account for more than seven per cent of the import of the like product; or (e) it determines that the injury where applicable, is negligible. Rule : 15. Suspension or termination of investigation on price undertaking – (1) The designated authority may suspend or terminate an investigation if the exporter of the article in question,- (i) furnishes an undertaking in writing to the designated authority to revise the prices so that no exports of the said article are made to India at dumped prices, or (ii) in the case of imports from specified countries undertake to revise the prices so that injurious effect of dumping is eliminated and the designated authority is satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated: Provided further that the designated authority shall complete the investigation and record its finding, if the exporter so desires, or it so decides. (2) No undertaking as regards price increase under clause (ii) of the sub-rule (1) shall be accepted from any exporter unless the designated authority had made preliminary determination of dumping and the injury. (2) No undertaking as regards price increase under clause (ii) of the sub-rule (1) shall be accepted from any exporter unless the designated authority had made preliminary determination of dumping and the injury. (3) The designated authority may, also not accept undertakings offered by any exporter, if it considers that acceptance of such undertaking is impractical or is unacceptable for any other reason. (4) The designated authority shall intimate the acceptance of an undertaking and suspension or termination of investigation to the Central Government and also issue a public notice in this regard. The public notice shall, contain inter alia, the non-confidential part of the undertaking. (5) In cases where an undertaking has been accepted by the designated authority the Central Government may not impose a duty under subsection (2) of section 9A of the Act for such period the undertaking acceptable to the designated authority remains valid. (6) Where the designated authority has accepted any undertaking under sub-rule (1), it may require the exporter from whom such undertaking has been accepted to provide from time to time information relevant to the fulfillment of the undertaking and to permit verification of relevant data: Provided that in case of any violation of an undertaking, the designated authority shall, as soon as may be possible, inform the Central Government of the violation of the undertaking and recommend imposition of provisional duty from the date of such violation in accordance with the provisions of these rules. (7) The designated authority shall, suo moto or on the basis of any request received from exporters or importers of the article in question or any other interested party, review from time to time the need for the continuance of any undertaking given earlier." 44. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the final findings dated 22.7.2017 cannot be sustained as they have been vitiated and hence they are required to be quashed and set aside. Petitions are allowed. Rule is made absolute in all the petition. 45. This Court has also considered that the respondent no. 2 could not have annulled the Sunset Review and the annulment of Sunset Review is only in the eventuality mentioned in the rules and same being absent in the present case, the respondent no.2 was require to bring the Sunset Review in its logical conclusion. 45. This Court has also considered that the respondent no. 2 could not have annulled the Sunset Review and the annulment of Sunset Review is only in the eventuality mentioned in the rules and same being absent in the present case, the respondent no.2 was require to bring the Sunset Review in its logical conclusion. Hence we quash and set aside the annulment and direct the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to do the needful for bringing the Sunset Review to its logical end strictly in accordance with law. Registry is directed to keep copy of this CAV judgment in each matter. Order in IA No.1 of 2018 in SCA No.14202 of 2017: In view of order passed in Special Civil Application No. 14202 of 2017, no order in I.A and I.A is disposed of.