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2018 DIGILAW 735 (HP)

Hari Ram v. Dropti Devi

2018-04-25

SANJAY KAROL

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In the present petition, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners, who are the Judgment Debtors, lay challenge to the order dated 20.5.2016, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.6, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Case No.6-10 of 2011, titled as Dropti Devi v. Hari Ram & others, rejecting the objections filed in the Execution Petition. 2. On 1.4.2008, suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.3, Shimla. It is a decree for prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Undisputedly, the said judgment has attained finality. 3. The Decree Holder filed a petition, seeking execution of the said decree, way back in the year 2011, in which the Judgment Debtors filed an application, under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, resisting execution of the decree. 4. Noticeably, execution of the decree is resisted on six grounds, which the Court below has referred to and dealt with in the impugned order. 5. Before this Court, Judgment Debtors argue that the decree cannot be executed, for being barred by limitation. In support, learned counsel for the Judgment Debtors seeks reliance on M.J. Simon v. Special Grade Panchayat, Athirampuzha, AIR 2001 Kerala 132 (Para-5); and Sargunam v. Duraisamy, 2007 (2) MadLJ 746 (Para-9). 6. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act) mandates that every application, which, in the instant case, is the one for execution, made after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed, despite the fact that limitation is not set up as a defence. 7. The periods of limitation are prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. We are concerned with Clause-136, dealing with the execution of decree, which reads as under: 136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years [When] the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 8. 8. This Court is of the considered view that in the given facts and circumstances, the question of limitation does not apply at all. Trial Court passed the judgment and decree on 1.4.2008. Appeal thereof was preferred on 25.5.2008, which was decided by the District Judge only on 5.8.2013. Much prior thereto, the Decree Holder had filed the Execution Petition on 11.5.2011, objections thereto were filed only in the year 2014, which stand partly allowed by the Executing Court, in terms of the impugned order. 9. The Judgment Debtors have been directed to demolish the construction, overhanging over the plaintiff’s (Decree Holder’s) land, comprising in Khasra Nos.262/1 and 263/1, situate at Mauza Chalonthi, Tehsil and District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. 10. Decisions in M.J. Simon (supra) and Sargunam (supra) are thus not applicable to the given facts. 11. The starting point of limitation would be the date on which the appeal stands decided. (Bhawanipur Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankar, AIR 1950 SC 6 ; Sardarsing Amarsing Gaherwal v. Ramkaran Ramnath Upadhaya & others, AIR 1960 Bom 154 ; and Pasani Ramachandraiah v. Daggupati Seshamma, AIR 1978 AP 342 ). 12. It is a settled principle of law that with the passing of appellate order, decree of the lower Court merges into decree of the Appellate Court. (Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1124 ; and Civil Revision No.68 of 1990, titled as Hari Krishan and others v. Bachittar Singh, decided by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh on 18.12.1992). 13. Hence, the impugned order cannot be said to be unreasonable, illegal or perverse, warranting interference by this Court. 14. For all the aforesaid reasons, present petition, devoid of merit, is dismissed. 15. Any observation made hereinabove shall have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the main case. Parties, through their learned counsel, are directed to appear before the Court below on 14.5.2018. Petition stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.