JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of learned Single Judge whereby learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition preferred by the State Government. 2.1 The facts of the case are that the State of Rajasthan filed an application before the Estate Officer, Estate Directorate, Jaipur under section 4 of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1964 for eviction of respondent No.1 from Bunglaw No.15 and 16 situated in Civil Lines Jaipur and requiring him to pay the compensation for the duration of unauthorized occupation of the said Bungalows. 2.2 The respondent instead of filing reply on merits of the aforesaid application, preferred an application before the Estate Officer raising a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the application on the premise that Article 363 of the Constitution of India bars the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to entertain and decide the dispute involved in the present matter. 2.3 The aforesaid application filed by the respondent was opposed by the appellant by filing a written reply and stated that provisions of Article 363 of the Constitution of India are in no way attracted in the facts of the present case. 2.4 The Estate Officer decided the application filed by respondent No.1 upholding the contention of the appellant and holding that with the introduction of Article 363A into the Constitution of India, recognition of the respondent as Ruler of the erstwhile State of Jaipur has now ceased to exist, the properties of Bungalow No.15 and 16 which were entered in the Inventory for use of Households of His Highness were in addition to the personal properties of the Ex-Ruler and were not as such entered as personal properties. It was, therefore, held that Estate Officer could legitimately exercise the jurisdiction over the dispute involved in the instant matter. 2.5 The respondent No.1 feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27.03.2004 preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur which was allowed. 3. It was, therefore, held that Estate Officer could legitimately exercise the jurisdiction over the dispute involved in the instant matter. 2.5 The respondent No.1 feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27.03.2004 preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur which was allowed. 3. The present respondent were the owner of the property which came to be deprived by the State Government pursuant to treaty enter with the inventory of private property of the Ruler Jaipur wherein it was agreed that property more particularly Bungalow No.15 and 16 will be maintained and owned by the Rajasthan Government but His Highness Household Officers will be allowed to use them free of rent. His Highness will return these bungalows when he does not need them. 4. Counsel for the appellant contended that pursuant to this, the proceedings were initiated under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act by the competent authority where the respondents submitted an application which came to be allowed, against which the appeal was preferred whereby the application was allowed and the appeal was dismissed which was confirmed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge while considering the matter has observed as under: "A list of Inventory of the private properties of the Ruler of Jaipur as part of the covenant has been placed on record. As per plan 12 and 13, Bungalow No.15 and Bungalow No.16 were to be maintained and owned by the Rajasthan Government but, it has further been mentioned that his Highness' Household Officers will be allowed to use them free of rent." 5. The appeal preferred by the present respondent came to be allowed by the District and Sessions Judge vide order dated 12.08.2005. Against which, writ petition was preferred and the same was dismissed. Counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon decision of this Court in The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. Sawai Tejsinghji Maharaja of Alwar, AIR 1969 Raj 52 , wherein it has been observed as under: 26. It is not our purpose to review the entire case law on the subject nor is it necessary to do so. Strictly speaking, the principles contained in the cases decided by the highest courts in England are not directly applicable to the cases before us. It is not our purpose to review the entire case law on the subject nor is it necessary to do so. Strictly speaking, the principles contained in the cases decided by the highest courts in England are not directly applicable to the cases before us. But nonetheless, they do show that if the jurisdiction of a municipal court is ousted however flimsy may be the defence raised by the defendants while seeking shelter under Article 363 of the Constitution, cases may occur where injustice may be inflicted on the plaintiff solely for the reason that the defendants have mala fide adopted a defence which in truth has no basis and which the court of law would reject outright. On the other hand, if a preliminary investigation in the nature of the dispute by a court of law is permitted, there is no limit how far the investigation is to go in order to determine whether in truth the defendants had a defence. Placed in this situation, we prefer to adopt the view taken by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the court must be satisfied that conflicting rights have to be decided between the parties and it is only where there is such a case that it must decline to decide the rights and must stay the action, but it ought not to stay the action before that point is reached. 27. Applying this test to suit No. 5 of 1963, we find that the inventory attached to the letter of Mr. Menon dated 14th September, 1949, mentioned that the City Palace including the adjoining building is to be treated as private property of the plaintiff but the extent of adjoining building is not to be found with precision in that inventory and there is really a dispute between the parties in this case whether the suit property was included in the expression 'adjoining building.' 28. This dispute no doubt arises out of the provision contained in the letter dated the 14th September, 1949, but, as we have already pointed out, it embodies the agreement referred to in Article 363 of the Constitution. 29. This being the position, in our opinion, issue No. 1 in suit No. 5 of 1963, should be partly decided in favour of the defendants and it is held that the suit is barred by the provision of Article 363 of the Constitution. 30. 29. This being the position, in our opinion, issue No. 1 in suit No. 5 of 1963, should be partly decided in favour of the defendants and it is held that the suit is barred by the provision of Article 363 of the Constitution. 30. Now we come to suit No. 4 of 1963. The principle which we have adopted with regard to suit No. 5 when applied in this case, leads to the conclusion that the property about which mesne profits are claimed in this suit is part of City Palace itself. It is a part of Mardana Mahal as mentioned in the decision of the State Ministry embodied in the letter of Sri Menon with regard to the private property of the plaintiff. It has been further mentioned that every effort will be made to release the accommodation at present occupied in the Mardana Mahal at the earliest possible date. In the written statement filed by the State of Rajasthan, practically all this is conceded but it is said that the suit property was not the exclusive property of the plaintiff but what is meant by saying it as not exclusive property of the plaintiff is not clarified. An altogether illusory dispute about a matter that it is not the property of the plaintiff is sought to be raised by the State of Rajasthan in this suit. The plaintiff has produced letter dated 6/8th December, 1960, from Ministry of Home Affairs, para No. 3 of which runs as follows: "Regarding the buildings recognised as Your Highness' private property, but maintained and utilised by the Government of Rajasthan, the State Government have informed us that they would be prepared to consider purchasing them if you are agreeable to this course. By parting with the proprietary rights over these buildings, you will be eliminating a cause of potential friction with the State Government and also saving the expenditure on the payment of wealth tax on them. We, therefore, feel that the suggestion is worth consideration. If your Highness agrees you will no doubt inform that State Government." This letter exposes the illusory character of defence adopted by the State Government. 31. Thus, in our view, there is no real dispute between the parties so as to bar the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Alwar under Article 363 of the Constitution. If your Highness agrees you will no doubt inform that State Government." This letter exposes the illusory character of defence adopted by the State Government. 31. Thus, in our view, there is no real dispute between the parties so as to bar the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Alwar under Article 363 of the Constitution. It may also be mentioned that the plaintiff in this case has claimed mesne profits about this property and if there is no genuine dispute about the suit property, no dispute can arise about the mesne profits out of the provisions of any covenant or agreement as contemplated in Article 363. We have already pointed out that there is no question of exercise of an act of State against a subject. Thus, in our opinion, issue No. 1 in this case must be decided in favour of the plaintiff. We do not think that for deciding other issues, arising in this case, this case should be kept in this Court. 32. We, therefore, remit this case back to the trial court for deciding the other issues arising in this case according to law. and which was confirmed in Colonal his Highness Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar v. Union of India and Anr., (1979) 1 SCC 512 . Counsel for respondent strongly objected even the suit is not maintainable. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. While considering the appeal, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned District and Sessions Judge regarding the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act which was confirmed by the learned Single Judge. In our considered opinion, it is correct. However, in view of the observations made by the Divion Bench in the above referred judgment, it will open for State Government to initiate proper proceedings. It is made clear that we are not confirming any finding of the authority in favour of respondent nor in favour of the State Government. As and when the suit is filed the competent court will decide the suit in accordance with law and after giving full opportunity to both the sides who may raise all contentions permissible under the law. 8. The appeal stands disposed of.