JUDGMENT : These writ petitions are filed by persons whose land/building were acquired for the purpose of National Highway under the National Highways Act, 1956. The petitioners' case is that they were denied solatium and interest applicable in the case of acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on account of the operation of Sections 3G(5) and 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956. The petitioners have also challenged the vires of Sections 3G(5) and 3J of the National Highways Act. Though several grounds of challenge are raised in these writ petitions, learned counsel for the petitioners confined their claim to solatium and interest based on the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. The brief facts involved in these cases are as follows: The petitioners in all these writ petitions are evictees by virtue of acquisition of land for the purpose of National Highway at various places in Thrissur and Ernakulam Districts. They were given compensation and are not satisfied with the determination of compensation for the reason that solatium and interest were denied to them. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri.K.G. Balasubramanian, placing reliance on a large number of judicial precedents, argued in extenso and submitted that the provision contained in the National Highways Act which makes the Land Acquisition Act not applicable to the acquisition made under the National Highways Act as violative of equal protection guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. The learned Government Pleader, Shri K.R.Vinod submitted that when a special enactment is made exclusively for a purpose, the claim for compensation can be considered only under that one enactment and not under the two Acts. Therefore, it is argued that without challenging the National Highways Act, the petitioners cannot get compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. 5. A brief history on the enactment of the National Highways Act and the Land Acquisition Act seems necessary at this juncture. The Land Acquisition Act was an enactment made in British India for the acquisition of land for public purpose and also for companies. The scheme of the Act, in general, prescribes the procedure for acquisition of land and also for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such an acquisition. Perhaps, it can be called as a general enactment for land acquisition in the country. The scheme of the Act, in general, prescribes the procedure for acquisition of land and also for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such an acquisition. Perhaps, it can be called as a general enactment for land acquisition in the country. Apart from bringing about some amendments to the Land Acquisition Act over the period of time, the States also have made separate Acquisition Act substantially based on the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. The National Highways Act was enacted by the Parliament in the year 1956 to provide for declaration of certain Highways to be National Highways. There was no provision for acquisition when the Act was originally made. Taking note of the importance of National Highway to connect the people in the country and to enable economic development, the Parliament thought it fit to envisage separate procedure for acquisition of land for National Highway and for determining the compensation payable. Therefore, the Parliament made certain amendments to the National Highways Act by incorporating certain provisions for acquisition of land for Highways and also for determining compensation. This was by way of the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (16 of 1997) (w.r.e.f. 24.01.1997). 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the denial of solatium and interest as applicable under the Land Acquisition Act is on account of applying Section 3J of the National Highways Act which states that “nothing in the Land Acquisition Act would apply to acquisition under the National Highways Act”. The petitioners raised a challenge regarding Section 3G of the National Highways Act with regard to the determination of the amount payable as compensation mainly for the reason that the component of compensation does not include solatium and interest. The main plank of argument is that when land is acquired for public purpose, different rates of compensation are paid to persons falling into the same class under two different enactments vis-a-vis Land Acquisition Act and National Highways Act and therefore, it is violative of equal protection before law as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. The main plank of argument is that when land is acquired for public purpose, different rates of compensation are paid to persons falling into the same class under two different enactments vis-a-vis Land Acquisition Act and National Highways Act and therefore, it is violative of equal protection before law as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. Learned Central Government Counsel, Sri.Suvin R Menon, very ably defending the procedure of determination of compensation under the National Highways Act, put forward his submission contending that discrimination in law is not really based on the difference in the procedure under different enactments but it is really a matter of appreciation of relevant factors on which such persons are placed. He propounded his arguments by comparing the different procedures for the determination of compensation under both the enactments. He submitted that compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act is based on a rigid procedure as referable under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. It is submitted that the hands of the Land Acquisition Officer under the Land Acquisition Act are tied by virtue of the operation of the above provisions in determining compensation and therefore, he can grant compensation only with reference to the norms fixed under that Act. According to the learned CGC, the competent authority or the Arbitrator, as the case may be, has no restriction in determining the compensation under Section 3G of the National Highways Act and therefore, in appropriate cases, the competent authority can determine such compensation that would really compensate the land owner. He pointed out to the benefits of formation of a Highway and submitted that such benefits will enure to all concerned, including land owners. According to him, solatium in fact is paid as a money comfort for the loss suffered by the land owner on account of acquisition of land and therefore, when a land owner stands to gain consequent upon formation of a Highway, the balance land in his hand would get higher appreciation and better economic potential for utilisation. It is submitted that solatium, as prescribed under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, was granted for the reason that such land owner need not necessarily be benefited by such acquisition. 9. It is submitted that solatium, as prescribed under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, was granted for the reason that such land owner need not necessarily be benefited by such acquisition. 9. It is appropriate to refer to the statutory provisions for determination of compensation under both the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act, which are as follows: National Highways Act, 1956 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Section 3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.- …. (7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section Section 23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.-(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration- (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration- (a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section 3A; first, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1); (b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land; secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof; (c) the damage, if any sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings; thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; (d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change. fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land. (1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector of the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in this subsection, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. (2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Section 24. (2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Section 24. Matters to be neglected in determining compensation- But the Court shall not take into consideration- the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition; secondly, any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired; thirdly, any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a private person, would not render such person liable to a suit; fourthly, any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired, after the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6, by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put; fifthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired; sixthly, any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put; seventhly, any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of, the land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1) or eighthly, any increase to the value of the land on account of its being part to any use which is forbidden by land or opposed to public policy. 10. Is it really the difference in procedure for determining compensation that is needed to be held as discriminatory? Is Section 3J of the National Highways Act stating that the Land Acquisition Act would not apply to acquisition under the National Highways Act ultra vires or violative of the fundamental right? The judicial precedents cited at Bar need to be referred before answering the above questions. 11. In Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vithal Rao and others ( (1973) 1 SCC 500 ), a question arose before the Supreme Court in regard to acquisition under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 enacted by the Maharashtra State. The Improvement Trust Act empowered the Land Acquisition Authority to acquire land for prices lower than those which would have been payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Improvement Trust Act empowered the Land Acquisition Authority to acquire land for prices lower than those which would have been payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Answering the question, the Supreme Court held that as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him for what purpose the acquisition is made and there cannot be a different treatment to individuals. However, it is to be noted that this judgment was rendered on a premise that compensation paid under the Improvement Trust Act was admittedly much lower than those would have been payable under the Land Acquisition Act. 12. In Om Prakash and another vs. State of U.P and others ( (1974) 1 SCC 628 ), the Supreme Court considered modification of the statutory provisions under the Land Acquisition Act. Therein, the land was acquired for a housing scheme in the State of U.P. An addition to Land Acquisition Act was made by the State by adding a proviso to Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The effect of the proviso was that certain provisions under the Act would not apply to acquisition for the purpose of housing scheme formulated by the Government. Holding that such legislation enables the Government to discriminate similarly situated land owners, the provision was struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Chajju Ram (dead) [ (2003) 5 SCC 568 ] considered the question relating to the constitutional validity of the Defence of India Act, 1971. This was in relation to acquisition under the above Act. The above Act does not provide for the payment of solatium and interest for the acquisition of land. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that Section 31 of the Act is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in as much as that the provision denied solatium and interest to the land owner. Reversing the High Court judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: “It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which a willing and informed buyer would offer would be different in the cases where the owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where he is not. Reversing the High Court judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: “It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which a willing and informed buyer would offer would be different in the cases where the owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where he is not. The formulation of the criteria for payment of compensation in terms of Section 31 of the Act was clearly made having regard to the said factor, which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The Parliament while making the provisions for payment of compensation must have also taken into consideration the fact that the owner of the property would have received compensation for remaining out of possession during the period when the property was under acquisition. The learned Attorney General appears to be correct in his submission that the provision for grant of solatium was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by the Parliament having regard to the fact that the amount of compensation awarded to the owner of the land is to be determined on the basis of the value thereof as on the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. It has been noticed that the process takes a long time. Taking into consideration the deficiencies in the Act, the Land Acquisition Act was further amended in the year 1984. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, solatium is paid in addition to the amount of market value of the land. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the classification sought to be made for determination of the amount of compensation for acquisition of the land under the said Act vis-vis the Land Acquisition Act is a reasonable and valid one. The said classification is founded on intelligible differentia and has a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question”. 14. In Mir Fazeelath Hussain and others vs. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Hyderabad ( (1992) 3 SCC 239 ), the Supreme Court referred the scope of payment of solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act and opined that award of solatium is on account of compulsory acquisition and interest is awarded to compensate the delayed payment. 15. 14. In Mir Fazeelath Hussain and others vs. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Hyderabad ( (1992) 3 SCC 239 ), the Supreme Court referred the scope of payment of solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act and opined that award of solatium is on account of compulsory acquisition and interest is awarded to compensate the delayed payment. 15. In Union of India vs. Hari Krishan Khosla (dead) by Lrs (1993 Supp (2) SCC 149), the Supreme Court, repelling the challenge of constitutional validity of the provisions of Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 enacted by the State of Punjab, held that absence of provisions for solatium on compensation and interest for delayed payment does not render the provisions of the aforesaid Act violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This was pointing out to the nature of the distinction between acquisition under the Act 30 of 1952 and the Land Acquisition Act. 16. In Union of India and others vs. Dhanwanti Devi and others [ (1996) 6 SCC 44 ], the Supreme Court considered the claim for solatium and interest in respect of the property acquired under the Jammu and Kashmir Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968. Following the decision in Hari Krishan Khosla's case (supra), it was held that the Jammu and Kashmir Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968 is not violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. 17. Essentially, the discrimination will have to be considered on the principle of reasonable classification of procedure under two different enactments for determining the compensation. If the classification is reasonable and is founded on an intelligible differentia which is having a rationale relation with the object sought to be achieved, the procedure could not be said to be invalid or void. In this case, there is no challenge in regard to the validity of the enactment of the National Highways Act. The challenge is made to Section 3J of the National Highways Act on the premise that on account of the operation of this provision, the petitioners were denied solatium and interest. Therefore, in the light of the discussions as above, I shall first examine the vires of Section 3J of the National Highways Act. 18. The challenge is made to Section 3J of the National Highways Act on the premise that on account of the operation of this provision, the petitioners were denied solatium and interest. Therefore, in the light of the discussions as above, I shall first examine the vires of Section 3J of the National Highways Act. 18. A statutory provision can be challenged on the grounds of competency of Parliament or State Legislature to make law, so also on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. With regard to the competency of the Parliament, undoubtedly, there is no dispute. Assuming that Section 3J is not thereon in the National Highways Act, what would have been the legal consequences? According to me, nothing would happen. It is not because of Section 3J the petitioners were denied solatium. When the special enactment is made in derogation with the general enactment in relation to the acquisition, the vires of the Act can be examined with reference to the discriminatory nature of it saying that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As already adverted, it was not because of Section 3J, the petitioners were not given solatium or interest. The determination of compensation is referred under Section 3G of the Act. Therefore, the question that has to be considered is whether Section 3G is discriminatory or not. Thus, I am of the view that challenge to Section 3J is redundant in exercising the context of the dispute. 19. The Madras High Court in T.Chakrapani vs. Union of India [(2010) 7 MLJ 858] considered a similar issue in hand and held that Section 3J of the National Highways Act does not satisfy the test of reasonable classification and declared Section 3J as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. I have to disagree with the judgment of the Madras High Court. Even in the absence of Section 3J, provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would not apply to land acquisition under the National Highways Act. The question can be considered as discriminatory only in the perspective of procedure of determining compensation as laid in Section 3G. Therefore, the challenge is repelled. 21. Now, the question is whether Section 3G of the National Highways Act is discriminatory or not. The question can be considered as discriminatory only in the perspective of procedure of determining compensation as laid in Section 3G. Therefore, the challenge is repelled. 21. Now, the question is whether Section 3G of the National Highways Act is discriminatory or not. In M/s.Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs. Union of India and others [2011 (4) R.C.R (Civil) 375], a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that provisions of Sections 3J and 3G of the National Highways Act are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is appropriate to refer the relevant paragraphs of the judgment. “85. SOLATIUM is not a largesse or a mere subsidy that the State doles out to a hapless landowner in discharge of some benevolent exercise of governmental power. Solatium is an amount, paid by the State to an unwilling land owner, for compulsory appropriation of his property. The word solatium draws its meaning from the word “solace” that is comfort money given as a statutorily recognized gesture of conciliation for compulsorily depriving a land owner of his property. The importance of “solatium” cannot be over emphasized and any departure therefrom would, in our considered opinion, be justified only where the enactment discloses a reasonable classification for treating land owners differently. Solatium forms an integral component of compensation and, therefore, can only be denied where the statute satisfies the tests of valid classification. 86. DIFFERENCE in procedure would not govern rights of parties to compensation. The difference, as repeatedly emphasized herein before, must be such as would disclose a valid classification based upon an intelligible differentia and not mere differences of procedure. The public purpose must be such as cannot be achieved by resort to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and disclose such a distinct or peculiar object as could not be achieved under the Land Acquisition Act. The public purpose must be such as cannot be achieved by resort to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and disclose such a distinct or peculiar object as could not be achieved under the Land Acquisition Act. We have carefully perused the Act, in our endeavour to understand the so called differentia sought to be pressed into service by counsel for the respondents and have made a concerted effort to understand their submissions but express our inability to determine any justification whether legal, factual or theoretical that would have us hold that the public purpose, underlying the amending Act constitutes a separate class and is so different from the public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act that denial of solatium and interest could be held to be based upon a valid classification and consequently a valid exercise of legislative power. We find no basis whether in the objects and reasons, in the written reply, the written submissions, as also from the assistance rendered to hold anything other than that as the provisions of the Act do not provide for grant of solatium and interest, they suffer from the vice of discrimination and violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and would, therefore, be held to be ultra vires”. I am not able to follow the judgment of the Division Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana for the reasons stated hereafter. 22. As rightly argued by Sri.Suvin R. Menon, learned Central Government Counsel, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, do not leave any room for discretion to be exercised by the Land Acquisition Officer to award compensation according to the exigencies and nature and type of acquisition. The main feature of the Land Acquisition Act is uniformity in the procedure of determining compensation. While Sections 11 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act direct the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the matters in determining compensation, provisions of Section 24 place restrictions on the scope of enquiry under Section 23 by directing the Land Acquisition Officer to neglect such matters referred to therein. Though reference in Sections 23 and 24 are made for determination of compensation by the court, nevertheless this would equally bind the Land Acquisition Officer as well while determining the compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer will have to consider such parameters as referred in Sections 23 and 24 for determination of compensation. Though reference in Sections 23 and 24 are made for determination of compensation by the court, nevertheless this would equally bind the Land Acquisition Officer as well while determining the compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer will have to consider such parameters as referred in Sections 23 and 24 for determination of compensation. It is to be noted that under Section 23(2), the power to grant solatium is vested on the Court. It is on account of the very restrictive nature of the power conferred on the Land Acquisition Officer, the Statute specifically provides a provision for payment of solatium. On the other hand, the competent authority or the Arbitrator has no restriction in determining the compensation. Section 3G(7) of the National Highways Act only says that the competent authority or the Arbitrator shall take into account the factors referred therein as (a) to (d). It is not an exhaustive list compared to Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the competent authority can consider all such aspects that are relevant for determining a just compensation due to the land owner. The difference of these powers had not been adverted to in the judgment of the Madras High Court as well as the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Supreme Court in Hari Krishan Khosla's case, Dhanwanti Devi's case and in Chajju Ram's case (supra) having held that the classification founded on intelligible differentia cannot be said to be ultra vires, it is the nature and procedure for determination that is actually required to be considered for the basis of discovering the discrimination and not the difference in the statutory provisions. If the nature of the procedure of determination of compensation denies an owner the compensation actually due, it would fall foul of the equality and not otherwise. 23. No authority can award compensation under any head if statutory provisions place restrictions on such authority to award compensation on such head. When statutory provisions provide leeways to an authority to determine the compensation on any justifiable grounds, that authority is not bound by any restrictions and can be legitimately persuaded to award compensation on any legally recognised grounds. 24. 'Equality' does not mean unanimity or uniformity. The demand of unanimity may lead to inconceivable conflict in achieving objects on the purport of different enactments. 24. 'Equality' does not mean unanimity or uniformity. The demand of unanimity may lead to inconceivable conflict in achieving objects on the purport of different enactments. Unanimity or uniformity is not the principle on which egalitarian values is found, it is rational choice on which action is corelated and falls for consideration to determine the legitimacy of an action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If two different procedures under a different enactment for compensation on acquisition of land regulate provisions to fulfil the conditions to restore loss on a credential perspective, the court shall not frown on such statutory provisions for being distinct with each other. Two different procedures if produce the desired outcome and guarantee compensation due, the difference in provision will not make the provisions as discriminatory. The constitutional courts in such situation need to examine only the perfectness of such procedure to produce desired outcome while deciding the validity of such statutory provision. When a challenge is made to statutory provision on the ground of discriminatory procedure, the focus of the constitutional court is on the outcome of procedures and not on the differences in such procedure. The element of justice would embrace equality as well. Therefore, the process of enquiry is to determine whether the procedure adopted would yield just result or not. If the procedure for awarding compensation for land acquisition under the special enactment is fair and the outcome would protect the interest of the land owner, merely because it is different from general enactment, it will not make special enactment as void or discriminatory. 25. In view of the discussions as above, merely because the provisions itself are different for determination of the compensation, it will not lead to a conclusion that the provisions are discriminatory. 26. What does 'compensation' mean in the context of Section 3G of the National Highways Act? The compensation as referred under Section 3G has to be understood in general term in the absence of any restrictive meaning given in the Statute. On an analysis of Section 3G, I am of the view that the competent authority and the Arbitrator are given wide and broad power to determine compensation. This power of determination of compensation, therefore, will have to be understood with reference to the general meaning of compensation. On an analysis of Section 3G, I am of the view that the competent authority and the Arbitrator are given wide and broad power to determine compensation. This power of determination of compensation, therefore, will have to be understood with reference to the general meaning of compensation. In a perspective of land acquisition, “is compensation to be understood as a just and equal of the value of the property?” or “it means to be understood only as market value of the property?”. I must answer this issue in negative. It is not a mere money equivalent of the property acquired, it would also include such damages as a component of compensation. Compulsory nature of acquisition demands additions to the value of the land. This is how the concept of payment of compensation on the ground of solatium was developed. The compensation paid under the Land Acquisition Act statutorily recognise the 'solatium' as a component of compensation. 'Solatium' is defined in Collins Concise English Dictionary as compensation awarded for injury to the feelings as distinct from physical suffering and pecuniary loss. The payment of solatium, therefore, is based on emotional factors and not based on the physical deprivation or pecuniary loss. The word 'solatium' is derived from the concept of 'solace'. It means to say 'comfort' or 'console' a deprived. It has nothing to do with the physical loss one would suffer consequent upon the compulsory acquisition. In common law, compensation is synonymous with 'damages'. Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries on the Laws of England (Vol.I Book the First, of the Rights of Persons at Page 109 and 110), refers to the fundamental principles of compensation. It is referred therein, the “Legislation alone has the power to strip the subject of one's property by giving him a full indemnification and an equivalent for an injury thereby sustained. In Halsbury Laws of England (Vol 8(I) Edn.4 Reissue) refers to the right of compensation as follows: “233. The right to compensation. The owner whose land is compulsorily acquired is entitled to compensation no less than the loss imposed on him but on the other hand no greater, since the purpose of compensation is to provide fair compensation for a claimant whose land has been compulsorily taken from him. This is sometimes described as the principle of equivalence. The right to compensation. The owner whose land is compulsorily acquired is entitled to compensation no less than the loss imposed on him but on the other hand no greater, since the purpose of compensation is to provide fair compensation for a claimant whose land has been compulsorily taken from him. This is sometimes described as the principle of equivalence. Compensation or purchase money is assessed upon the basis of the value of the land to the owner and in addition the owner is entitled to compensation for disturbance, for severance of his retained land or for other injurious affection.” 27. In CRIPPS on Compulsory Acquisition of Land by Harold Parrish (Eleventh Edn. page 695), the author refers to the allowance for compulsory nature of purchase as follows: 4-046. Allowance for compulsory nature of purchase. There is no express authority in the Lands Clauses Acts for an addition of a percentage to the value of the lands because of the compulsory nature of the purchase but it was customary to make an addition of 10 per cent. of the value. The fact that lands have been taken under compulsory powers does not alter the principle of valuation and the customary addition of 10 per cent. can only be justified as a part of the valuation and not as an addition thereto. In practice the 10 per cent. is applied to the value of the lands only and not to incidental damage; this per-centage may be taken to cover various incidental costs and charges to which an owner whose land has been taken is subject, and if no percentage were added such incidental costs and charges would have to be considered in assessing the amount of compensation. In Re Athlone Rifte Range [(1902) 1 Ir.R.433] an addition of 20 per cent. was disapproved. In Jervis v. Newcastle Waterworks Co. [(1897) 13 T.L.R 14, 312] an amount added for compulsory purchase was disallowed on the ground that the purchase was not compulsory.” 28. The essence of solatium being 'comfort' to a person who suffered loss, therefore, need to be considered while awarding compensation. In the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in the year 1958, (See Universal's Compendium Reports of the Law Commission of India Vol.1 1st to 13th Report, Page 10.24) after referring to the need for reforms in the land acquisition, it was observed as follows: “53. In the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in the year 1958, (See Universal's Compendium Reports of the Law Commission of India Vol.1 1st to 13th Report, Page 10.24) after referring to the need for reforms in the land acquisition, it was observed as follows: “53. Solatium' We are also not in favour of omitting section 23(2) so as exclude the solatium of 15% for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. It is not enough for a person to get the market value of the land as compensation in order to place himself in a position similar to that which he would have occupied, had there been no acquisition; he may have to spend a considerable further amount for putting himself in the same position as before. If, for example, the only property a person possessed was three acres of arable land and he was deprived of this under the compulsory power of acquisition, he would no doubt get the market value of his property; but he would not be in a position to provide himself with a vocation to which he had been all along accustomed. He must find suitable land in or about the locality where he resides which may not be easily available and he may have to wait and spend more than the amount of compensation he has obtained. As pointed out by Fitzgerald, the community has no right to enrich itself by deliberately taking away the property of any of its members in such circumstances, without providing adequate compensation for it This principle has been in force in India ever since the Act of 1870 (vide section 42), The Select Committee which examined the Bill of 1893 did not think it necessary to omit the provision but on the other hand transferred it to section 23. There is equity behind the rule, as the transfer of the land is not voluntary but compulsory. It may be of interest to notice that in the United States of America the same principles as laid down in the Chemudu case(Sri Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju Bahadur Garu v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam [ILR 1939 Mad 532 PC) are in vogue and we think it more equitable to follow the principles accepted in the United rather than adopt the recent much criticized changes in the law in England.” 29. In Sri Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju Bahadur Garu v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam [ILR 1939 Mad 532 PC], it is observed as follows: “In the case of land, its value in general can also be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for land of similar quality and in similar positions, and this is what must be meant in general by "the marketvalue" in section 23. But sometimes it happens that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features, as regards its position or its potentialities. In such a case the arbitrator in determining its value will have no market-value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain, as best he may from the materials before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser for the land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities. For it has been established by numerous authorities that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined [that time under the Indian Act being the date of the notification under section 4 (1)], but also by reference to the uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future. No authority indeed is required for this proposition.” 30. In the absence of any statutory provision, the award of solatium would depend upon the circumstances in which land owners are placed on an acquisition. As already adverted, solatium is being given as consolation for compulsory acquisition. It is not necessarily in all cases that solatium should be paid for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. Such emotional loss of an owner of the land needs to be the subject matter of enquiry for grant of compensation on the ground of solatium as well. If a person stands to gain on account of acquisition, it cannot be said that he should be 'consoled' by paying solatium. For example, if an owner having only 5 cents of land and no land is left after the acquisition of Highway, makes a claim for solatium, certainly, that claim would be legitimate. If a person stands to gain on account of acquisition, it cannot be said that he should be 'consoled' by paying solatium. For example, if an owner having only 5 cents of land and no land is left after the acquisition of Highway, makes a claim for solatium, certainly, that claim would be legitimate. In contrast, if a person having a large extent of land and is benefited by such acquisition, he cannot put forward such a claim for solatium. All that I would say, the competent authority or the Arbitrator will have to apply their mind judiciously in determining the compensation. They cannot act merely as an administrative authority and treat awarding compensation as a mere calculation of a loss of compensation. The uniform application of rules sometimes generates unforeseen inequalities causing absolute hardships to the person who has been deprived of his valuable land. The discretionary power of the competent authority or the Arbitrator will have to be exercised on sound legal principles. He has to draw a judicious line of permissible deviation of compensation being paid to other owners. In each case, he has to assess the compensation objectively depending upon the nature of the claim. The mere absence of the provisions for payment of solatium itself would not result in denial of a legitimate claim for solatium of a person. 31. Considering the wide discretionary power given to competent authority and the Arbitrator, I would say that they have discretion in considering such a claim. Solatium will have to be considered as a component of compensation and not independent of compensation. However, the claim would depend upon the nature of deprivation one would suffer consequent upon acquisition. It is not necessary that solatium should be at the same rate as applicable under the Land Acquisition Act. It is for the competent authority or the Arbitrator to decide on it depending upon the nature of facts in a particular claim. 32. In regard to interest, I would say, such claim is inadmissible for the reason that deposit under Section 3H of the National Highways Act will have to be made with the authority under Section 3G before taking possession of the land. However, nothing prevents the competent authority or Arbitrator from awarding interest on equitable consideration if such authority is of the view that delay was involved in disbursing the compensation. However, nothing prevents the competent authority or Arbitrator from awarding interest on equitable consideration if such authority is of the view that delay was involved in disbursing the compensation. Upshot of the above discussions, the challenge regarding Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act must fail. The claims of the petitioners for payment of solatium and interest, in the light of the discussions as above, shall be considered by the competent authority within a period of three months. The parties are given an opportunity to place materials before the competent authority to substantiate their claim for payment of solatium and interest. These writ petitions are disposed of as above.