JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —The petitioner is the complainant, whose complaint, under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code came to be dismissed by the learned Trial Magistrate and the said judgment was affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II) , Mandi and aggrieved thereby, has filed the instant revision petition. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the complainant filed a criminal complaint before the trial court on 27.2.2012 wherein it was alleged that her house had earlier burnt down and now she was residing in a rented accommodation. It was alleged that whenever the complainant used to go to reside in her old house, the respondents and their family members under a state of intoxication during night hours would throw stones on her house and use filthy language. She was also threatened that she should leave the house or else they would burn her in the house. 3. After the complainant had adduced preliminary evidence, trial court took cognizance and summoned the accused. Notices of accusation were put to them, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The complainant in support of her case examined herself as CW-1 and closed her evidence. Statements of the accused persons under section 313 were recorded wherein they denied all the said incriminating evidence that had been led and further stated that they do not want to lead any evidence in defence. 5. On the basis of evidence led by the complainant, learned trial Magistrate dismissed the complaint and appeal filed against the same was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge constraining the petitioner to file the instant revision petition. 6. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgments passed by the learned courts below are not sustainable as the same are against the facts and law. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 8. 6. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgments passed by the learned courts below are not sustainable as the same are against the facts and law. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 8. At the outset, it may be observed that this Court has very limited revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as held by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 50 of 2011, titled as Rajinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 13.9.2017, wherein the scope of criminal revision has been delineated in the following manner:- "In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another , (1973) AIR(Supreme Court) 799, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu , (1979) AIR(Supreme Court) 663, the Hon''ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram , (1973) AIR(Supreme Court) 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that "judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system". In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad , (1986) AIR(Supreme Court) 1436, the Hon''ble Apex Court observed that High Court "committed an error in making a reassessment of the evidence" as in its revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact". In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh , (1986) AIR(Supreme Court) 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following terms: "It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR(Supreme Court) 26, Hon''ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu , (1993) AIR(Supreme Court) 1126 (SC) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR(Supreme Court) 26, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint." In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another , (1997) AIR(Supreme Court) 2485 (SC) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1962) AIR(Supreme Court) 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh , (1968) AIR(Supreme Court) 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu , (1975) AIR(Supreme Court) 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh , (1981) AIR(Supreme Court) 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when "there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice". 9. In order to adjudicate this petition, it would be necessary to refer to the statement of the complainant as admittedly it is only the sole statement of the petitioner around which the entire case hinges. 10. The complainant appeared as CW-1 and stated all the facts that had been mentioned in the complaint. 9. In order to adjudicate this petition, it would be necessary to refer to the statement of the complainant as admittedly it is only the sole statement of the petitioner around which the entire case hinges. 10. The complainant appeared as CW-1 and stated all the facts that had been mentioned in the complaint. According to her, her house at Harabag had been burnt down by the respondents and only two rooms were left. She was residing in these two rooms being an old widow, but the respondents would throw stones on her and used filthy language and had been extending threats to kill her on the pretext that the land belongs to them. The matter was reported to the police but nothing was done. They even laid claim to the burnt house. When it was burnt the other villagers had come to put off the fire but the respondents did not come there, but were laughing. 11. In cross-examination, the petitioner stated that she was not aware about the Khasra number on which her house was situated and further admitted that there were 8-10 houses adjoining to her house. She further stated that she made a complaint to the police but the police did not do anything. She also claimed to have made the noise but the people did not react as they were sleeping. She further stated that she had brought all these facts to the notice of the Pradhan but he did not react as he had consumed alcohol. She admitted that she had strained relations with the respondents and further stated that this was on account of the fact that they wanted her to vacate the house. She denied that she has filed the complaint due to animosity and enmity. 12. Noticeably, this is the entire evidence available on record, which obviously is not sufficient to prove the case of the petitioner so as to convict the respondents. 13. That apart, it is not safe to rely upon the testimony of the petitioner in view of her admission that she has strained relations with the respondents. In her written complaint, the petitioner had alleged that she was living in Jogindernagar but while deposing in the Court she would maintain that she is still residing in two rooms that remained unburnt in the burnt house. In her written complaint, the petitioner had alleged that she was living in Jogindernagar but while deposing in the Court she would maintain that she is still residing in two rooms that remained unburnt in the burnt house. The petitioner has admitted that there are number of houses near her house, but strangely she has not examined any person from the neighbourhood in support of her allegations, which undeniably are fairly serious. 14. Moreover, the evidence led by her is not in tune with the complaint because in a complaint she has not alleged that the stones were pelted on the festival of Sair. However, in her evidence, she claimed that the stones were pelted on the day of said festival. 15. That apart, there are as many as five respondents, who were made accused before the trial court and are now respondents before this Court, but strangely there are no separate allegations against each one of such accused and the allegations otherwise are far too general. No official from the police Department has been examined by the complainant even though her specific case is that she had approached the police authority but they have done nothing. Not only this, even the Pradhan, to whom complainant states to have approached, was not examined. 16. This being the position, I find no difficulty in concluding that the petitioner has miserably failed to prove the allegations of the complaint by leading cogent and convincing evidence and, therefore, the judgment of acquittal as passed by the trial court and affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge calls for no interference. 17. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed accordingly.