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2018 DIGILAW 742 (KAR)

Leo D’souza S/o Paul D’souza v. State of Karnataka Represented By Its Secretary

2018-06-26

DINESH MAHESHWARI, KRISHNA S.DIXIT

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. In this Writ Appeal, challenge is to the judgment and order dated 06.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing appellant’s W.P.No.8277 of 2017 (KLR-RES) and thereby, affirming the 2nd respondent Tahsildar’s order rejecting his application for grant of land. Though this case is listed in the Preliminary Hearing, with consent and at the request of learned counsel for the parties, it is taken up for final disposal at this stage itself. Brief facts of the case are:- (a) The appellant claims to be in unauthorized occupation and cultivation of Government land admeasuring 1 acre in Sy.No.220/1B of Bantwal-Mooda village, Bantwal Taluk, D.K. District, ‘from the time of his ancestors’. It is asserted that the appellant’s father has put up a residential building, a cow shed and a dung well in a portion of the land and the other portion is being used for agriculture. (b) Way back in the year 1976, the 2nd respondent Tahasildar had issued a notice in Form No.1 dated 13.04.1976 under the provisions of Section 94 (1) & (3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, asking the appellant’s mother to show cause why she should not be evicted from the petition land, and the structures standing thereon should not be forfeited, along with the standing crop. (c) The appellant’s mother, a landless lady, went to the office of the 2nd respondent Tahasildar and offered explanation. Accordingly, an encroachment case bearing No.LND/R/337/82/75-76 was registered and a report in terms of the statement of the occupant was prepared on 18.01.1976 specifically stating that the occupant was a poor person whose annual income did not exceed Rs.2,000/-and that the land has been in the unauthorized occupation since long. The Tahasildar instructed the Deputies to look into the matter, since a claim was made for grant of lease or regularization of unauthorized occupation. (d) The Municipality of Bantwal had issued a notice dated 01.12.1978 asking the appellant’s mother to pay within 30 days the tax on the building and structures in a sum of Rs.9/-per year taking the annual rental value at Rs.60/-. Similarly, the Revenue Inspector attached to the office of the Spl. (d) The Municipality of Bantwal had issued a notice dated 01.12.1978 asking the appellant’s mother to pay within 30 days the tax on the building and structures in a sum of Rs.9/-per year taking the annual rental value at Rs.60/-. Similarly, the Revenue Inspector attached to the office of the Spl. Assistant Commissioner (Land Grant) S.K. Mangalore, issued a notice in Form II proposing to grant the petition land on payment of a price of Rs.1,000/-and other dues (Date of this notice is not forthcoming from Annexure-G) (e) The appellant by his letter dated 11.03.2011 stated that the earlier proposal for grant on payment of Rs.1,000/-could not be complied with, because of financial difficulty and therefore, the appellant was now paying the same and that the land be granted to him. However, the Tahasildar, by his endorsement No. NCR CR/5/2011-12 dated 07.03.2014 rejected appellant’s request on the sole ground that there is a statutory bar under Sections 94A and 94B of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. (f) The appellant challenged the above order of the Tahasildar in W.P.No.8277 of 2017 (KLR-RES) which came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated 06.12.2017 on the ground that the petition land is a ‘Punja land’ and, therefore, it cannot be granted. Having heard Sri.Ravishankar Shastry, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Venkatesh Dodderi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents, we are of the opinion that the matter merits remand for reconsideration. The learned counsel for the appellant firstly submits that though the records show that the petition land is a Punja land, still it has been brought under cultivation since decades, as is evident by the Demand Notice sent by the office of the Tahsildar himself. He further submits that, although Punja land in Dakshina Kannada, ordinarily, is not an agricultural land, still it can be brought under cultivation and that whether it is accordingly brought under cultivation or not, is a question of fact to be ascertained by the official respondents in the course of enquiry. It is noticed that the question whether the Punja land in Dakshina Kannada District is an agricultural land or not, was considered by this Court in more or less similar facts. This Court in the case of SUBHAKAR AND OTHERS v. LAND TRIBUNAL, KARKALA & OTHERS: [1999(4) KLJ 524] in paragraphs 6 and 8 has observed as under: “6. It is noticed that the question whether the Punja land in Dakshina Kannada District is an agricultural land or not, was considered by this Court in more or less similar facts. This Court in the case of SUBHAKAR AND OTHERS v. LAND TRIBUNAL, KARKALA & OTHERS: [1999(4) KLJ 524] in paragraphs 6 and 8 has observed as under: “6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a book written by Sunder Raj Iyengar ‘Land Tenure in Madras Presidency’ published in the year 1921. It has to be mentioned that Dakshina Kannada District was originally a part of the Madras State before the States Reorganisation. In the said book, the Division of Tamil villages is described at page 80 of the book and the classification of lands are also mentioned. Reference to Punja land is mentioned at pages 159, 160,438 and 439 wherein the Punja lands are mentioned as follows:- PUNJA BAGHAYAT, Garden cultivation when made on Punja land. PUNJA MEL NANJA, Cultivation of wet crops on land classified as dry. PUNJA TARAM NANJA, Dry land assessed as wet from having been cultivated with a wet crop. PUNJA TIRWA, Assessment fixed on dry lands. PUNJA VANPAYIR, Special products such as chillies,brinjal, tobacco, saffron, sweet-potato, etc., raised on Punja. PUNJA-VARAVU-NANJA, Punja converted into wet. There cannot be any dispute about the above classification. Wherever Punja lands are converted into wet, baghayat and garden lands, the same was called as Punja baghayat, Punja mel nanja, Punja taram nanja, Punja vanpayir etc. But, the question whether Punja land is cultivable or not is a pure question of fact. Where the finding is there that the Punja land is not cultivable land and only grass is grown naturally on the land, the presumption or inference raised that the said land is only grassland and not an agricultural land cannot be found fault with. 7. ………… 8. In view of the above circumstances, we hold that in this case, the land in question is a Punja land where only thatched grass is grown naturally. There may be some trees on the land. That does not mean that a natural grass growing land is an agricultural land particularly, in the facts and circumstances of this case where a built house is surrounding the land. There may be some trees on the land. That does not mean that a natural grass growing land is an agricultural land particularly, in the facts and circumstances of this case where a built house is surrounding the land. For all the above reasons, in the present case, having regard to the facts of the case, we make it clear that Punja land in Dakshina Kannada is not an agricultural land. We make it clear that where Punja land is brought under cultivation, it is not a bar on the parties to adduce evidence that such land is brought under cultivation for agricultural purpose……”. In view of this legal position, the claim of the appellant for the grant of petition land ought to have been considered. The respondent-Tahsildar could not have rejected the claim merely by saying that petition land being Punja land cannot be granted. The learned counsel for the appellant next submits that, normally the Land Grant Orders stipulate a standard condition that the Grantee should bring the land under cultivation within some specified period and that on cause being shown, even this period is extended. This contention of the appellant, we notice, finds support from the text of clause (ii) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 which reads as under: “9. Conditions of grant – (1) The grant of lands under these rules [for agricultural purposes shall be jointly in the name of husband and wife and] shall be subject to the following conditions namely, - (i) the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of [twenty-five years] from the date of taking possession. Provided that he may, after a period of five years, with the previous permission of, and subject to [the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of certain lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), and] such conditions as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner, alienate the whole or any portion of such land. But however, the Deputy Commissioner shall not grant such permission unless he is satisfied that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and the grantee credits to the Government an amount equal to fifty percent of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation as determined by the Deputy Commissioner. Provided that no person who has obtained permission to alienate land under the Rule shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4 be eligible for grant of any Government land. (ii) The land granted shall be brought under cultivation within three years from the date of taking possession: Provided that the Deputy Commissioner, may, if he is satisfied that the grantee could not do so for bona fide reasons extend the aforesaid period upto five years”. A plain reading of the above provision of the Rules makes it clear that, even a non-agricultural land could also be the subject matter of grant, provided such land is otherwise tillable or can be brought under cultivation within two years; and there is discretion vested to the Deputy Commissioner to extend this period upto 5 years for bona fide reasons. The learned counsel for the appellant argues, and in our considered opinion rightly, that the two aspects of the matter mentioned above appear to have been not duly adverted to, by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel appearing for the official respondents is not in a position to controvert the submissions. In the given circumstances, it appears just and proper that the matter be remanded for reconsideration. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed to the extent and in the manner indicated above; the impugned judgment and order dated 06.12.2017 is set aside; W.P.No.8277 of 2017 (KLR-RES) stands restored for its reconsideration after filing of Reply/Statement by the respondents. The parties, through their counsel, shall stand at notice to appear before the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.8277 of 2017 (KLR-RES) on 31.07.2018. No costs.