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2018 DIGILAW 745 (GAU)

MUSTT RUPJAN BEGUM v. MD. AZIZUR RAHMAN SAIKIA

2018-05-07

MIR ALFAZ ALI

body2018
JUDGMENT/ORDER : 1. This second appeal is directed against the order dated 27.3.2017, whereby the learned Civil Judge, Guwahati rejected the petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the T.A. No. 115/2014 against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2013 passed in T.S. No.281/07 and consequent dismissal of the first appeal. 2. The brief facts leading to the present second appeal are that the appellant herein as plaintiff filed T.S. No. 281/07 for declaration of right, title and interest and confirmation of possession. In the suit the defendant raised a counter claim for declaration of his right of pre-emption and right to purchase the suit land and also for declaration that the sale deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff were illegal, void and not binding upon the defendant/respondent No. 1. The suit filed by the plaintiff was withdrawn. However, the court proceeded with the counter claim. 3. The learned trial court decreed the counter claim of the plaintiff by judgment and decree dated 31.8.13. Later on, the decree was amended without giving notice to the plaintiff/appellant. After receiving notice of the execution proceeding, the plaintiff/appellant came to know about the amendment made in the decree. Because of lack of communication between the lawyer and parties and the illness of the appellant as well as the engaged counsel, there was delay of 281 days in preferring the appeal against the judgment and decree, which was subsequently amended. Therefore, a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act was filed for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. Learned first appellate court rejected the prayer for condonation of delay and consequently, the appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant stood dismissed. Against the said order rejecting the petition for condonation of delay and consequent dismissal of the first appeal, the plaintiff/appellant preferred the instant second appeal. The second appeal was admitted to be heard on the following substantial question of law :- 1. In view of the order dated 17/1/2014 passed by the trial court modifying the decree whether the period of limitation in the instant case would run from the date of modification of the decree ? 2. Whether the court below committed illegality in construing sufficient cause by failing to take note of the order dated 17.1.14 ? 4. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. P. Kalita and learned counsel Mr. 2. Whether the court below committed illegality in construing sufficient cause by failing to take note of the order dated 17.1.14 ? 4. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. P. Kalita and learned counsel Mr. S. Ali for the respondent were heard at length. 5. Learned counsel, Mr. S. Ali placing reliance on a decision of the Kerala High Court in Thanuvan Appukuttan vs. P.N. Gopala Piliai and Anr. reported in AIR 1969 Kerala 183, contended that as the decree was amended u/s 151/152 CPC, the limitation shall run from the date of original decree and not from the date of amendment. Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that --- "Amendment of a decree u/s 151 or section 152 of the CPC does not alter its date and if so, under relevant Article time runs from the date of decree, even if the appeal is against the portion of the decree, that amended, if there is no alteration in the date of decree, it will be a fit case condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. I am therefore, of the view that when a decree is amended under section 151 or section 152 CPC, time does not run from the date of amendment for filing the appeal." 6. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in Gopi Bibi -VS- Chanu Prasad and Ors. AIR 1930 Patna 42 held that where decree is amended in material particular, which particular is also the subject matter of appeal, the period of limitation ought to be calculated from the date of the amendment of the decree. 7. In Janikamma vs. Raja Gopala reported in AIR 1945 (Mad) 62 (V-32) where decree was amended u/s 19 of the Madras Act of 1938 and not u/s 151 or 152 CPC, the Madras High Court observed that when the amendment u/s 151 CPC is only to clarify the real intention of the original decree, the starting point for limitation shall be the date of original decree, but when the amendment brings a substantial change, the date of amendment shall be relevant. Hon’ble Madras High Court held as under :- "The question is which is the correct terminus a quo in the circumstances of the case, the date of the original decree or the date of the amendment ? Hon’ble Madras High Court held as under :- "The question is which is the correct terminus a quo in the circumstances of the case, the date of the original decree or the date of the amendment ? It has to be borne in mind in this connection that the amendment herein question was not one made in order to express the real intention which the original decree was meant to express but did not, such an amendment under section 152 CPC, in which case it may be that the amendment does not give rise to fresh starting point though, it may be a proper ground for extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The amendment under section 19 of the Act, (i.e. Madras Act IV of 1938), however, brought about a vital alteration, as we have explained above, by substantially reducing the relief originally granted to her, and this alteration was based on the adverse finding which previously was not prejudicial to her. It would be startling if, in such circumstances, the appeal were to be held barred by limitation long before the appellants right of appeal came into being. Such a construction of the phrase the date of the decree in Article 156 cannot be accepted. The article clearly presupposes that the remedy by way of appeal has become available to the appellant and the date of the decree can only mean that the date when the decree became appealable for the party concerned." 8. In Tincowri Halder -VS- Nani Gopal Mandal reported in AIR 1960 Cal 258 (1959 (63) Cal WN 711), a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed that if the decree is amended on an application u/s 151 or Section 152 CPC, the starting point of limitation would be the date of amended decree, where the appeal is confined to the amended part of the decree, but if the appeal is directed against the decree as it stood prior to the amendment, the starting point would be the date of the original decree. In case of a re-hearing on a successful application for review, the starting point would always be the date of the new decree drawn up and signed after the review, whether the original decree is modified or reaffirmed. 9. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ram Singh Minor Through Kashi Ram And Anr.-Vs. In case of a re-hearing on a successful application for review, the starting point would always be the date of the new decree drawn up and signed after the review, whether the original decree is modified or reaffirmed. 9. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ram Singh Minor Through Kashi Ram And Anr.-Vs. Smt. Ramo Bai Minor Through Ram Baboo and Anr. AIR 1968 MP 220 after having considered several authorities held as under :- "Having in view the several decisions it may be justifiable to propound that although the date of the decree under Order XX, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, would be the date of the judgment, yet where a decree is substantially amended either by way of review or by way of the powers of corrections conferred on the Court under Sections 151,152 or 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party against whom such amendment or correction had been made ought not to be made to suffer merely on the basis of the wording of Order XX Rule, Civil Procedure Code. If I may say so, the ratio decidendi of the above cases would be that if the decree is amended or corrected in respect of unsubstantial matters, a party may not get a right of appeal against such unsubstantial amendments or corrections. But, if it is substantially amended, the right of appeal would be from the date of such substantial amendment. Or, at any rate, if a party filed an appeal against the amended decree, he can invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and if his attack is against the amendment itself, there is no reason why the Court should be reluctant to extend time in his favour. At the most, the Court might not allow him to raise those questions which could have been raised if he had filed an appeal against the unamended decree. But different considerations ought to prevail where the amendment is substantial 10. What therefore, deducible from the views expressed by various High Courts is that the most pertinent and crucial question in case of amendment of a decree, vis-à-vis the starting point of limitation for appeal is, which decree or order is carried to appeal. But different considerations ought to prevail where the amendment is substantial 10. What therefore, deducible from the views expressed by various High Courts is that the most pertinent and crucial question in case of amendment of a decree, vis-à-vis the starting point of limitation for appeal is, which decree or order is carried to appeal. As per Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for filing an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure either to the High Court or to any other court commences from the date of decree or order. As per order XX Rule 7 CPC, the date of decree means the date when the judgment is pronounced and therefore, for purpose of Article 116 of the Limitation Act, crucial date from when the period of limitation starts is the date of judgment. Article 12 of the Limitation Act also gives the indication that in case of filing appeal, review or revision limitation runs from the date on which the judgment appealed against was pronounced. When the amendment of the decree u/s 151 or 152 CPC is only to rectify some clerical or arithmetical error or to remove any ambiguity and in order to express the real intention of the decree, it is not difficult to understand that in such case limitation for filing appeal invariably starts from the date of original decree. Problem arises when substantial change is made in the decree by amendment. Whether substantial change in the decree by way of amendment under the power of correction emanating from section 151 or 152 CPC is permissible or not is altogether a different question, which is not an issue in the present case. Be that as it may, it may so happen, that a party may not be affected or aggrieved by a decree as it originally stood, but may be affected and aggrieved by the modified or amended decree. It is in this context only, the question arises as to from which date the limitation is to start for filing appeal, whether from the date of original decree or the amended decree. 11. It is in this context only, the question arises as to from which date the limitation is to start for filing appeal, whether from the date of original decree or the amended decree. 11. The answer to the above question, as would appear from the views taken by the various High Courts, perhaps, needs to be traced in the third column of the Article 116 of the Limitation Act, i.e., the date of the decree appealed against or in other words, the question should be looked from the angle—as to which decree is carried to appeal. Having taken note of the views expressed by various High Courts, the legal proposition can be summarised as follows :- (a) In view of order XX Rule 7 CPC date of judgment is date of decree. (b) When the decree is varied or reaffirmed in review, limitation shall run from the date when the new decree is drawn after the review. (c) When a decree is amended in exercise of power u/s 151, or 152 CPC, usually date of decree does not change or in other words, it remains the date of judgment i.e., the original date of judgment and decree. (d) So far the question of limitation in filing appeal against the decree which is amended u/s 151 or 152 CPC is concerned, limitation would run normally from the date of original decree if the amendment is unsubstantial or in order to rectify any clerical or arithmetical error or in order to express the real intention of the original decree. (e) In exceptional cases when the decree is substantially amended by incorporating or adding any new relief or increasing or decreasing the original relief and the decree carried to appeal is only the amended part and not the original decree, starting part of limitation shall be the date of amendment of the decree and not the original decree. (e) If the appeal is against both the original as well as the amended portion of the decree, limitation would run from the date of the original decree. However, in any case amendment of the decree shall be a good ground for condoning the delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Applying the above principles, let me now proceed to answer the first substantial question of law raised in this appeal. In the case in hand, the decree was for right of pre-emption. However, in any case amendment of the decree shall be a good ground for condoning the delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Applying the above principles, let me now proceed to answer the first substantial question of law raised in this appeal. In the case in hand, the decree was for right of pre-emption. Order XX Rule 14 provides that when court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and purchase money has not been paid, the court shall give necessary direction in the decree in terms of order XX Rule 14 CPC. While passing the original judgment and decree, the necessary direction in terms of order XX Rule 14 CPC was not incorporated in the judgment in this particular case. Subsequently, the defendant /decree holder filed an application u/s 151/152 CPC for amendment of the judgment and decree. Learned trial court allowing the petition amended the original judgment and decree by incorporating the necessary directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC. It is no doubt true, that in absence of such direction in terms of Order XX Rule 14 of the CPC, the decree in its original form would have remained a paper decree. Therefore, though literally the amendment of decree in the present case appears to be of substantial in nature, bringing change in the texture of the decree, in view of the relief sought for in the suit (counter claim in the present case) and the nature of the original decree, the amendment by incorporating the necessary directions in terms of the Order XX Rule 14, has in fact, expressed the real intention of the decree, which was missing in the original judgment and decree, may be, due to accidental or inadvertent omission. The amendment made in the decree appealed against in the present case was apparently intended to rectify the defect or deficiency in the original decree or to express the real intention of the decree, and as such, the limitation for filing appeal in the present case would run from the date of original decree and not from the date of amendment. However, I must say that amendment in the instant case would be a good ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal at least for two reasons, firstly the amendment was allegedly made without notice to the party affected by the amendment and secondly though, the amendment was explanatory in nature, it changed the texture of the decree by turning an inexecutable decree to executable decree. The substantial question no. 1 is answered accordingly. 13. Learned counsel Mr. Kalita submitted that the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2013 was substantially amended without notice to the plaintiff/appellant and the appellant came to know about the amendment of the decree only from the execution case. Learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff/appellant was not aggrieved by the unamended judgment and decree dated 31.08.2013, and as such, did not feel the necessity to file appeal, inasmuch as, the original decree passed in the counter claim on 31.08.2013 was not executable one. In the above backdrop of the matter, while considering the petition for condonation of delay, learned appellate court ought to have taken note of the fact that the decree was substantially amended without notice, submits Mr. Kalita. In support of his submission, Mr. Kalita placed reliance on the following authorities :- (i) Ram Singh Minor Through Kashi Ram And Anr. -Vs. Smt. Ramo Bai Minor Through Ram Baboo and Anr. AIR 1968 MP 220 (ii) Polavarapu Ankinnedu -VS- Bavaji Mutt, Singarayapalam reported in AIR 1962 AP 134. 14. Mr. Ali submitted that by amendment of the decree u/s 151 or 152 CPC in the instant case, no substantial change was made, rather, the court corrected the inadvertent error in the original judgment and decree, inasmuch as, the original judgment and decree did not contain the necessary directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 of the CPC, which is essential component of a decree in a pre-emption suit. Learned counsel further contended that notice was given to learned counsel, who represented the plaintiff in the suit. 15. The order dated 17.01.14, by which the judgment and decree was amended does not reflect that any notice of amendment was given to the appellant/plaintiff. Learned counsel further contended that notice was given to learned counsel, who represented the plaintiff in the suit. 15. The order dated 17.01.14, by which the judgment and decree was amended does not reflect that any notice of amendment was given to the appellant/plaintiff. The order dated 17.01.14 transpires that on the basis of the application filed by the respondent under section 151/152 CPC for amendment of the judgment and decree, the record was put up on 17.01.14 and on the same day, the order was passed by the learned trial court amending the operative part of the judgment. Let me quote the relevant paragraph of the order dated 17.01.14 passed in T.S. 281/07 by which the decree was amended. "However, inadvertently no such specification under Order XX Rule 14 of the CPC, 1908 has been made in the judgment dated 31/08/2013 passed in the main suit. Hence, I am of the opinion that in the absence of such a direction the decree of pre-emption becomes in-executable. Accordingly, u/s 152 of the CPC such accidental omission in the judgment is corrected today by complying with the provision of Order XX Rule 14 of the CPC, 1908. The paragraph of the judgment dated 31/08/13 is accordingly amended with the following words :- ORDER In the conclusion the counter-claim is decreed on contest with cost. The counter claimant/defendant No. 1 has the right of pre-emption over the Schedule A and Schedule-B land as mentioned in the counter-claim. The counter claimant has accordingly the right to purchase the said Schedule-A and Schedule B land of the counter-claim. The sale deeds No. 1656/2001, 1660/2001, 1662/2001, 1715/2001, 1719/2001 and 1720/2001 are accordingly not binding upon the counter claimant. The pre-emptor is directed to deposit the purchase money in the court within a period of 30 days from the date of this order. Moreover, on payment of the purchase money the vendee/plaintiff shall execute sale-deeds in favour of the counter-claimant in respect of the aforesaid schedule lands failing which the same will be executed by the court as per the provisions of law." 16. The above observation of the learned trial court makes it clear, that the operative part of the judgment was amended by incorporating a new clause in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC. The above observation of the learned trial court makes it clear, that the operative part of the judgment was amended by incorporating a new clause in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC. It is undeniable, that dehors the amended clause incorporated in the judgment and decree, the decree for pre-emption, indeed would have become sterile. Even without entering into the question whether such amendment was permissible u/s 152 CPC or not, I must say, that at least such amendment could not have been made without giving notice to the party to be affected by such order of amendment of the judgment and decree, bringing in a substantial change in the texture of the decree. It is needless to say, that in absence of such amendment, the decree originally passed in the present case would have remained a paper decree. Therefore, in my considered view, even if the date of the amended decree relates back to the original decree (by operation of doctrine of relation back), amendment of the decree bringing in a substantial change was certainly a significant circumstance, which, the learned first appellate court ought to have taken note of, while considering the petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, reason being that, a party might not be aggrieved by a decree though, passed against him, if such decree is in-executable and teethless one. 17. It is pertinent to mention that the appellant plaintiff sought for condonation of delay on varied grounds, such as, lack of communication between the advocates and the parties, illness of the parties and also the illness of the engaged counsel. Evidently, in the instant case endeavour to file appeal was made only after institution of the execution proceeding. 17. It is pertinent to mention that the appellant plaintiff sought for condonation of delay on varied grounds, such as, lack of communication between the advocates and the parties, illness of the parties and also the illness of the engaged counsel. Evidently, in the instant case endeavour to file appeal was made only after institution of the execution proceeding. The learned appellate court, while considering the reason for delay observed that : "Even if we accept that a little delay occurred due to illness of the learned Advocate but the appellant could not show sufficient ground as to why they remained silent after passing of the judgment from 31.08.2013 till March 2014." Again at the concluding para of the impugned order learned first appellate court further observed that "Hence considering all aspects, I find that the appellant/petitioner could not show sufficient and satisfactory ground as to why delay was occasioned by the petitioner in filing the appeal after passing of the judgment from 31.08.2013 till March 2014 and therefore, I hold that the prayer of the petitioner to condone the delay cannot be considered." 18. The above observation of the learned first appellate court, while rejecting the petition for condonation of delay, goes to show that learned first appellate court was satisfied with the cause shown for the period, after March 2014, till filing of the appeal. However, learned first appellate court was not convinced with the cause shown for the delay till March, 2014 from the date of original decree dated 31.08.2013. 19. As indicated above, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that when the original decree was not executable one, there was no reason for the appellant to be aggrieved by such decree for preferring an appeal. Allegedly, after receiving the notice of the execution proceeding, the appellant came to know about the amendment of the decree. Admittedly, in the original judgment passed on 31/03/2013 the direction in terms of order XX Rule 14 CPC were not given, though such direction was an integral part of a decree in a pre-emption suit. It is not difficult to comprehend, that in absence of the directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC, a decree in a pre-emption suit would be meaningless. Failure of the learned trial court to incorporate directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC, might be inadvertent or accidental. It is not difficult to comprehend, that in absence of the directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC, a decree in a pre-emption suit would be meaningless. Failure of the learned trial court to incorporate directions in terms of Order XX Rule 14 CPC, might be inadvertent or accidental. But, consequence of such omission in a decree of pre-emption suit, when put a party in an advantageous position, the court was under obligation to give notice to the party/parties to be affected, while amending the decree. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant that the original decree being inexecutable, there was no reason for the plaintiff to file any appeal against a paper decree and the question of filing appeal arose only when the plaintiff came to know that the decree was substantially amended and put to execution, appears to be pre-ponderous, in view of the change made in the judgment and decree by way of amendment. 20. Learned counsel, Mr. S. Ali, placing reliance on the following decisions submits, that delay should not be condoned in a routine manner, unless there is sufficient ground entitling the parties to get the delay condoned :- (1) Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Pawan Kr. Saraf & Anr. (1999) 2 SCC 400 . (2) P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala & Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556 . (3) Union of India and Ors. vs. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. & Anr. 2001 (1) GLT 34. 21. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Pawan Kr. Saraf (supra), Hon’ble Justice D.P. Wadhwa observed that the court should be liberal in condoning the delay in filling the petition, but delay is inexcusable, unless sufficient cause is shown. It is not the law, that when an application seeking condonation of delay is filed, the delay should be condoned irrespective of whether sufficient cause is shown or not. 22. In P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala & Anr. (supra), the Apex Court held as under :- "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper not judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper not judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs." 23. Following the decision in P.K. Ramachandran case, this Court, in Union of India and Ors. vs. Wood Crafts Products Ltd, while refusing to condone the delay for filing the petition in a casual manner without properly explaining the cause of delay, observed that :"The term "sufficient cause" is not defined under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but by the same, it means and so far has been construed as beyond control of the party seeking indulgence for extension of the period of limitation. On the facts of the case, this Court having found the petition for condonation of delay filed in a casual manner, without explaining the delay as required by law of limitation, this court declined to condone the delay on equitable ground." 24. Learned counsel Mr. Kalita placing reliance on the following decisions contended, that keeping in view of the primary function of the court to provide substantial justice to the litigants, the expression "sufficient cause" required to be construed liberally in order to further the cause of justice and not to obstruct the substantial justice on mere technicalities. 1. S. Ganesha Raju (Dead) Through LRS. & Ors. -VS- Narasamma (Dead) Through LRS & Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341 . 2. Land Acquisition -VS- Katiji 1987 2 SCC 107 . 3. N. Bala Krishnamurthy vs. 1998 7 SCC 123 . 25. The Apex Court, in S. Ganesha Raju (supra) reiterating the age old principle of construing the expression "sufficient cause" liberally held as under :- "We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the matter." 26. In Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji (supra), the Apex Court observed, that "legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.389 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 27. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. K.M. Krishnamurthy (supra), the apex court held that : "there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The word "sufficient cause " u/s 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the cause of substantial justice." 28. The common thread passing through all these authorities appears to be that the expression "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally in the manner, so as to advance the cause of substantial justice. However, liberal construction does not necessarily mean that even when a party is guilty of gross negligence or lack of bona fide or lack of diligence and the cause shown are so silly that are far from reasonableness, delay should be condoned on equitable ground. Therefore, when gross negligence or absence of due diligence or lack of bona fide is attributable to a party seeking condonation of delay, such party obviously should not be entitled to the indulgence of condonation of delay under the garb of liberal construction of the term "sufficient cause". What is imperative to note is that the expression "sufficient cause" having no rigid or inflexible definition or criteria, it needs to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The facts which can be considered as sufficient cause in a case, may not be considered as sufficient cause in another case. 29. What is imperative to note is that the expression "sufficient cause" having no rigid or inflexible definition or criteria, it needs to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The facts which can be considered as sufficient cause in a case, may not be considered as sufficient cause in another case. 29. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, apparently, the learned appellate court was convinced with the cause shown for the period after March, 2014 till filing of the appeal. However, learned trial court was reluctant to accept the cause for delay shown for the period, from the date of passing the original decree till March, 2014, i.e. initiation of the execution proceeding. The impugned order manifested that the learned appellate court did not take into consideration at all, the development with regard to the amendment of the decree bringing in a substantial change turning the inexecutable decree to an executable one, and that a party might not be aggrieved by an inexecutable and teethless decree. 30. It is to be borne in mind, as observed by the Apex Court in Land Acquisition -VS-Katiji (supra), that a party does not stand benefited by filing an appeal belatedly for it would always have the risk of being rejected, and as such, there cannot be a presumption of negligence or deliberate delay against a party seeking the indulgence to file appeal beyond the statutory period. When the original decree was such, for which there might not be reason for the appellant to be aggrieved and the question of filing the appeal arose only when decree was amended, the amendment of the decree in the facts and circumstances of the present case was certainly a significant factor, which the learned appellate court ought to have taken note of, while considering the sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 31. Kerala High Court in Thanuvan Appukuttan (supra), while taking the view that amendment of a decree u/s 151/152 CPC does not bring about any change in the date of decree and the time for filing appeal against the decree runs from the date when the decree was passed and not from the date on which it was amended, held, that amendment of the decree will be a fit case for condoning delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act in preferring the appeal. The same view was expressed by the Single Judge of M.P. High Court in Ram Singh Minor Through Kashi Ram (supra). Learned Single Judge having considered several authorities held as under :- "Although the date of decree under Order XX Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure would be the date of judgment, yet where a decree is substantially amended either by way of review or by way of power of correction conferred on the court under section 151, 152, 153 the Code of Civil Procedure, the party against whom such amendment or correction has been made ought not to be made to suffer ......... on the basis of the wording of Order XX Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code. The High Court further observed that " at any rate if a party filed an appeal against the amended decree, he can invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 32. In Polavarapu Ankinnedu -VS- Bavaji Mutt, Singarayapalam reported in AIR 1962 (AP) 134, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while dealing with the amendment of decree without notice to the party to be affected by such amendment, observed that "even assuming without conceding that the decree contemplated in O. XXI, R 22, C.P.C. includes amended decree, such a decree must be one which must have been amended with the knowledge of and notice to the party to be affected when the amendment sought, introduces a radical change in the texture of the decree. If no notice of the proposed amendment is given, he cannot be fixed with the knowledge of the date of the decree which would be the original date, on which it was actually passed." 33. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, learned first appellate court was evidently satisfied with the cause of delay for the period from March, 2014 till filing of the appeal. Manifestly the decree was amended without notice to the appellant, as record does not reflect that notice of the amendment was given to the appellant. The delay for the first part, i.e., from the date of original decree till March, 2014 having been attributed, amongst others, to the amendment of the decree bringing in substantial change in the texture of the decree, learned first appellate court ought to have taken into account the amendment of the decree as indicated above, while considering the prayer for condonation of delay. 34. 34. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the view, that delay in preferring the appeal in the present case ought to have been condoned taking into account the amendment of the decree in order to decide the appeal on merit. Accordingly, the substantial question No. 2 is answered in affirmative and in favour of the appellant. 35. In view of the forgoing discussions, the appeal is allowed and the delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. 36. Let the matter be remitted back to the learned first appellate court to decide the appeal on merit. 37. Send back the LCR.