JUDGMENT : Shri A. S. Tomar, Counsel for the applicant. Shri R. K. Awasthy, Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1/State. 2. This Criminal Revision under sections 397, 401 of Criminal Procedure Code has been registered by the orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on a paper petition sent by the applicant Smt. Ayasha Rathore. 3. A paper petition dated 21-11-2017 was sent by the applicant, seeking the following reliefs : “A. Applicant/complainant only 38 years of age lady having child of 12 years of age and old mother-in-law in house and due to the murder of the husband, the applicant has changed three houses because of the threatening of the accuses and their sources and she is living in very apprehensive and deadly circumstances. Applicant herself is a teacher in a famous school of Gwalior in such a tough circumstances her work and family life is totally suffered. B. The applicant’s husband has been killed by the accused for which an investigation has been made by the police and preferred a chargesheet for offence under section 302, 201, 120B of Indian Penal Code wherein the specific involvement of the accused Mahesh Gupta that he has given direction and on his contract other accuses committed offence and killed the husband of the complainant. On the other hand the accused Mahesh Gupta himself having criminal history in many police stations of the District Gwalior and against him trials are pending in other Courts also. In spite of that the learned Sessions Judge has granted the permission to the accused without considering the objections preferred before them even without considering the fact that the cancellation of the bail of said accused is still pending before them for consideration by which it seems that the cancellation of bail is pending but otherwise, it has already been rejected without any order and consideration by the learned Session Judge. I have to humbly say that from the act of the learned Session Judge District Gwalior, justice is not seen but smells otherwise. Out of the Court, may thoughts and hummers are in air but I just request to your Lordship kindly go through the all and do justice with my case and take suitable action against the persons who has participated in this process. Out of the Court, may thoughts and hummers are in air but I just request to your Lordship kindly go through the all and do justice with my case and take suitable action against the persons who has participated in this process. C. That, it is true that the Court having their discretionary powers to consider the application but in such fact and circumstances of the said case such a relief granted to the accused was not at all expected by the order and act of the learned Session Judge Gwalior, the hope of justice in the matter is also suffers. Therefore, it is also requested to give a direction to the appropriate authority to see the case of the applicant and shift/transfer the trial for appropriate order dated 6-11-2017 also may kindly directed to be made. It is, therefore, requested to consider all above circumstances fact and material and passed suitable direction accordance with law doing justice with the applicant and murder case of her husband as mentioned above.” 4. By the order dated 14-12-2017 passed by Hon’ble the Chief Justice, the said paper petition was treated as a revision and accordingly, the same has been placed before the Court. 5. On 20-4-2018, the applicant-Smt. Ayasha Rathore appeared in person and made a grievance that the trial Court had not only granted bail to one Mahesh Gupta, but also permitted him to leave the country, therefore, she has an apprehension that she may not get justice from the Court of Sessions Judge, Gawalior, therefore, the case may be transferred to any other Court. Therefore, the following question was formulated by this Court by order dated 20-4-2018 : “The question for consideration which arises in the present case is that if a party to a litigation feels that an incorrect order has been passed by the Presiding Judge, then whether that by itself can be a ground for transfer of the case from his Court or not?” 6. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 27-4-2018, when the Counsel for the applicant prayed for an adjournment on the ground that he has filed the power during the course of the day, therefore, he wanted some time to prepare the case. Thereafter, on 16-7-2018 also, the case was adjourned at the request of the Counsel for the applicant. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 27-4-2018, when the Counsel for the applicant prayed for an adjournment on the ground that he has filed the power during the course of the day, therefore, he wanted some time to prepare the case. Thereafter, on 16-7-2018 also, the case was adjourned at the request of the Counsel for the applicant. Again on 20-8-2018, the matter was adjourned at the request of the Counsel for the applicant. On 29-8-2018, the matter was adjourned to 30-8-2018 at the request of the parties. Accordingly, the matter has been heard on 30-8-2018. 7. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicant that Mania Rathore, the husband of the applicant, was killed on 7-4-2017 and the coaccused Mahesh Gupta is the mastermind of the offence. It is further submitted that during the investigation, Mahesh Gupta was arrested from Mumbai Airport, while he was trying to flee away from the country. After the arrest of Mahesh Gupta, one Roopesh Sharma applied for grant of bail before the High Court, which was registered as M.Cr.C. No. 9530/2017 and considering the allegations made against Roopesh Sharma, he was granted bail by this Court. Thereafter, Mahesh Gupta also filed an application for grant of bail before the trial Court on the ground of parity and although Mahesh Gupta is the mastermind of the case and in fact he had hatched conspiracy, but by wrongly mentioning that the case of Mahesh Gupta is identical to that of Roopesh Sharam, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior also granted bail to the mastermind Mahesh Gupta. It is further submitted that Mahesh Gupta filed applications seeking permission to leave the country and without considering the allegations as well as the seriousness of the allegations, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior by order dated 6-11-2017 granted permission to Mahesh Gupta to leave country on depositing the bank guarantee of Rs.5,00,000/with a further stipulation that he shall come back to India by 25-11-2017. It is submitted that these orders passed by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior has left a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the applicant that she may not get justice in the Court of Sessions Judge, Gwalior, therefore, the Trial may be transferred to some other Court. 8. It is submitted that these orders passed by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior has left a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the applicant that she may not get justice in the Court of Sessions Judge, Gwalior, therefore, the Trial may be transferred to some other Court. 8. Although it is a well established principle of law that merely because a party to the litigant is of the view that an incorrect order has been passed by itself would not be a good ground to transfer the case, but before considering the submissions made by the Counsel for the applicant, it would be necessary to consider the correctness of the orders passed by the trial Court, which have been questioned by the applicant. 1. Grant of bail to Mahesh Gupta It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicant that Mahesh Gupta is the mastermind of the case and in fact, he had hatched the conspiracy and his case is not identical to that of coaccused Roopesh Sharma, therefore, by wrongly mentioning that the case of Mahesh Gupta is identical to that of Roopesh Sharma, the Sessions Judge has shown undue favour to Mahesh Gupta. 9. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicant that the evidence which has been collected by the investigating agency against Mahesh Gupta is : “(i) the confessional statement of Mahesh Gupta himself as well as the confessional statements of the coaccused persons, from which it is clear that Mahesh Gupta is the mastermind of the case; and (ii) the call details showing that Mahesh Gupta had talks with shooter Banti Kamaria.” 10. So far as the confessional statement of Mahesh Gupta is concerned, it is fairly conceded by the Counsel for the applicant that in the light of sections 25, 26 and 27 of Evidence Act, the part of the statement, which does not lead to discovery of fact, is not admissible. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhu vs. State of Kerala reported in (2012) 2 SCC 399 has held as under : “48. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is being extracted hereunder : “27. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhu vs. State of Kerala reported in (2012) 2 SCC 399 has held as under : “48. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is being extracted hereunder : “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 49. As an exception, section 27 of the Evidence Act provides that a confessional statement made to a police officer or while an accused is in police custody, can be proved against him, if the same leads to the discovery of an unknown fact. The rationale of sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is, that police may procure a confession by coercion or threat. The exception postulated under section 27 of the Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement leads to the discovery of some new fact. The relevance under the exception postulated by section 27 aforesaid, is limited “… as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered….”. The rationale behind section 27 of the Evidence Act is, that the facts in question would have remained unknown but for the disclosure of the same by the accused. The discovery of facts itself, therefore, substantiates the truth of the confessional statement. And since it is truth that a Court must endeavour to search, section 27 aforesaid has been incorporated as an exception to the mandate contained in sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.” 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Indra Dalal vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 256 has held as under : “6. The philosophy behind the aforesaid provision is acceptance of a harsh reality that confessions are extorted by the police officers by practising oppression and torture or even inducement and, therefore, they are unworthy of any credence. The provision absolutely excludes from evidence against the accused a confession made by him to a police officer. This provision applies even to those confessions which are made to a police officer who may not otherwise be acting as such. The provision absolutely excludes from evidence against the accused a confession made by him to a police officer. This provision applies even to those confessions which are made to a police officer who may not otherwise be acting as such. If he is a police officer and confession was made in his presence, in whatever capacity, the same becomes inadmissible in evidence. This is the substantive rule of law enshrined under this provision and this strict rule has been reiterated countlessly by this Court as well as the High Courts. 17. The word “confession” has nowhere been defined. However, the Courts have resorted to the dictionary meaning and explained that incriminating statements by the accused to the police suggesting the inference of the commission of the crime would amount to confession and, therefore, inadmissible under this provision. It is also defined to mean a direct acknowledgment of guilt and not the admission of any incriminating fact, however grave or conclusive. Section 26 of the Evidence Act makes all those confessions inadmissible when they are made by any person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless such a confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Therefore, when a person is in police custody, the confession made by him even to a third person, that is, other than a police officer, shall also become inadmissible. 18. In the present case, as pointed out above, not only the confessions were made to a police officer, such confessional statements were made by the appellants after their arrest while they were in police custody. In Bullu Das vs. State of Bihar, while dealing with the confessional statements made by the accused before a police officer, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 132, para 7) “7. The confessional statement, Ext. 5, stated to have been made by the appellant was before the police officer in charge of the Godda Town Police Station where the offence was registered in respect of the murder of Kusum Devi. FIR was registered at the police station on 8-8-1995 at about 12.30 p.m. On 9-8-1995, it was after the appellant was arrested and brought before Rakesh Kumar that he recorded the confessional statement of the appellant. Surprisingly, no objection was taken by the defence for admitting it in evidence. FIR was registered at the police station on 8-8-1995 at about 12.30 p.m. On 9-8-1995, it was after the appellant was arrested and brought before Rakesh Kumar that he recorded the confessional statement of the appellant. Surprisingly, no objection was taken by the defence for admitting it in evidence. The trial Court also did not consider whether such a confessional statement is admissible in evidence or not. The High Court has also not considered this aspect. The confessional statement was clearly inadmissible as it was made by an accused before a police officer after the investigation had started.” ***** 23. It is clear that section 27 is in the form of proviso to sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes it clear that so much of such information which is received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, which has led to discovery of any fact, may be used against the accused. Such information as given must relate distinctly to the fact discovered. In the present case, the information provided by all the appellant-accused in the form of confessional statements, has not led to any discovery...” 13. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya reported in (1961) 1 SCR 14 has held as under : “9. On an analysis of sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following material propositions emerge : (a) Whether a person is in custody or outside, a confession made by him to a police officer or the making of which is procured by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him and proceeding from a person in authority, is not provable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (b) A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. (b) A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. (c) That part of the information given by a person whilst in police custody whether the information is confessional or otherwise, which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered but no more, is provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (d) A statement whether it amounts to a confession or not made by a person when he is not in custody, to another person such latter person not being a police officer may be proved if it is otherwise relevant. (e) A statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation of an offence under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot except to the extent permitted by section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, be used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when the statement was made in which he is concerned as a person accused of an offence.” 14. Thus, it is clear that any confessional statement, which has not led to discovery of fact, would not be admissible in law, in the light of sections 25 and 26 of Evidence Act. Thus, any confessional statement made by Mahesh Gupta, with regard to his involvement in the crime, would not be admissible and cannot be read to find out that whether he is the mastermind of the case or not. The Counsel for the applicant could not point out any admissible and substantive evidence against Mahesh Gupta, so as to consider him to be a mastermind behind the offence in question. An inadmissible evidence cannot be read against Mahesh Gupta, in order to term him as a mastermind. 15. The second submission made by the Counsel for the applicant is that there are call details to show that Mahesh Gupta had talked to Banti Kamaria, the assailant, which prima facie establishes involvement of Mahesh Gupta in the crime. An inadmissible evidence cannot be read against Mahesh Gupta, in order to term him as a mastermind. 15. The second submission made by the Counsel for the applicant is that there are call details to show that Mahesh Gupta had talked to Banti Kamaria, the assailant, which prima facie establishes involvement of Mahesh Gupta in the crime. The applicant has annexed a handwritten list of call details, which, according to the applicant, has been prepared from the call details filed by the prosecution. According to this call details, Mahesh Gupta had talks on certain occasions with assailant Banti Kamaria and coaccused Roopesh Sharma on 6-4-2017 and on one occasion with coaccused Roopesh Sharma on 7-4-2017. 16. The next question for determination is that : “Whether the telephonic conversation of Mahesh Gupta, makes his case distinguishable from the coaccused Roopesh Sharma, who has been granted bail by this Court, or not?” 17. If the call details are considered, then it would be clear that Roopesh Sharma and Mahesh Gupta had talks with Banti Kamaria for limited period. Thus, the allegations of having telephonic conversation with Banti Kamaria are against Roopesh Sharma also. Thus, it is clear that the call details of Mahesh Gupta, showing conversation with Banti Kamaria, would not make his case distinguishable from Roopesh Sharma, who was granted bail by this Court. 18. At this stage, it is submitted by the Counsel for the applicant that the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, while granting bail to Mahesh Gupta, did not consider the call details, therefore, the order granting bail to Mahesh Gupta is bad, however, the Counsel for the applicant could not explain as to how the call details, showing conversation between Banti Kamaria and Mahesh Gupta, can be treated as strong circumstance against Mahesh Gupta and how this allegation would prima facie show that Mahesh Gupta was the mastermind. Thus, when the Counsel for the applicant could not submit as to how the order granting bail to Mahesh Gupta is bad in absence of non-mentioning of circumstance of call details, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of the Sessions Judge, cannot be said to be bad in law and vitiated only because of the fact that the allegation of call details were not mentioned/considered by the Sessions Judge, while granting bail to Mahesh Gupta. 2. 2. Grant of permission to Mahesh Gupta to leave Country from 8-11-2017 to 25-11-2017 It is next contended by the Counsel for the applicant that the Sessions Judge granted various opportunities to Mahesh Gupta to file various applications seeking permission to leave the country and in all 4 applications were filed and ultimately by order dated 6-11-2017, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior granted permission to Mahesh Gupta to leave the country and to go to Dubai in connection with his business from 8-11-2017 to 25-11-2017 on furnishing the bank guarantee of Rs.5,00,000/. 19. So far as filing of multiple applications for grant of permission to leave the country are concerned, the Counsel for the applicant fairly conceded that not a single application was rejected and all the applications were filed during the pendency of the previous applications. However, the Counsel for the applicant could not point out any provision in law, which empowers the Court to restrain a person from filing an application. Merely because Mahesh Gupta had filed multiple applications seeking permission to go to Dubai in connection with his professional engagements, it cannot be said that the Sessions Judge, Gwalior had shown any undue favour to Mahesh Gupta. Furthermore, the applicant has not disputed the claim of Mahesh Gupta with regard to his professional engagements and requirement to go to Dubai. The applications filed by Mahesh Gupta have been placed on record as Annexure P/12. The first application was filed on 13-10-2017 seeking permission to go to Dubai from 20-10-2017 to 5-11-2017. Second Application was filed in the month of October 2017 in which it is mentioned that Mahesh Gupta is the partner of A to Z International General Trading Limited having its Head Office at Dubai and accordingly, Mahesh Gupta is required to attend the quarterly meetings and, therefore, sought permission to go to Dubai from 8-11-2017 to 25-11-2017. This application was allowed by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior by order dated 6-11-2017. However, third application was filed on 29-11-2017, in which it was mentioned that when Mahesh Gupta reached Mumbai Airport for leaving to Dubai, his passport was seized and accordingly, he could not go to Dubai in the light of the permission granted by the Sessions Judge. The fourth application is dated 15-1-2018. However, third application was filed on 29-11-2017, in which it was mentioned that when Mahesh Gupta reached Mumbai Airport for leaving to Dubai, his passport was seized and accordingly, he could not go to Dubai in the light of the permission granted by the Sessions Judge. The fourth application is dated 15-1-2018. Thus, it is clear that it is not a case where Mahesh Gupta was given any liberty by the Sessions Judge to file multiple applications and every application was filed on the basis of new cause of action. Even otherwise, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, could not have restrained Mahesh Gupta from filing applications because there is no provision in law, which empowers the Court to restrain an accused from filing the applications. Furthermore, the claim made by Mahesh Gupta that he is the partner of A to Z International General Trading Limited has not been disputed by the applicant. Although the fundamental right as enshrined under Article 19 of the Constitution of India may not be an absolute right, but the same cannot be curtailed without any reasonable reason. Even otherwise, in application dated 15-1-2018, Mahesh Gupta has specifically mentioned that since his passport is seized, therefore, he could not go to abroad so far. 20. It is further submitted by the Counsel for the applicant that since Mahesh Gupta has a criminal antecedent, therefore, he should not have been permitted to go to Dubai. 21. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the applicant. 22. In the light of the Fundamental Right as enshrined/guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, it is discretionary on the part of the trial Court to grant or not to grant permission to go abroad. Further, the trial Court was expected to consider the allegations made against the accused in the case in hand. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that in absence of any challenge to the claim of Mahesh Gupta that he is the partner of A to Z International General Trading Limited, having its Head Office at Dubai, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, did not commit any illegality in exercising his discretion in favour of Mahesh Gupta. 23. No other point was urged by the Counsel for the applicant. 24. In order to transfer a case from the trial Court, the applicant must show reasonable apprehension of not getting justice from the said Court. 25. 23. No other point was urged by the Counsel for the applicant. 24. In order to transfer a case from the trial Court, the applicant must show reasonable apprehension of not getting justice from the said Court. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Usmangani Adambhai Vahora vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2016) 3 SCC 370 has held as under : “6. .............. First, we shall refer to the issue of apprehension. The apprehension is based on some kind of conversation between the informant and another that the accused persons shall be convicted. There is also an assertion that the trial Judge is a convicting Judge and that is why, the High Court has observed that he is in dilemma. 7. So far as apprehension is concerned, it has to be one which would establish that justice will not be done. In this context, we may profitably refer to a passage from a three Judge Bench decision in Gurcharan Das Chadha vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 1418 wherein it has been held : (AIR p. 1423, para 13) “13. … The law with regard to transfer of cases is well settled. A case is transferred if there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a case that justice will not be done. A petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. He is entitled to a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. It is one of the principles of the administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to be done. However, a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. The Court has further to see whether the apprehension is reasonable or not. To judge of the reasonableness of the apprehension the state of the mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension.” 8. This Court in Abdul Nazar Madani vs. State of T. N., (2000) 6 SCC 204 has ruled that : (SCC pp. 210-11, para 7) “7. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension.” 8. This Court in Abdul Nazar Madani vs. State of T. N., (2000) 6 SCC 204 has ruled that : (SCC pp. 210-11, para 7) “7. … The apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based upon conjectures and surmises. If it appears that the dispensation of criminal justice is not possible impartially and objectively and without any bias, before any Court or even at any place, the appropriate Court may transfer the case to another Court where it feels that holding of fair and proper trial is conducive. No universal or hard-and-fast rules can be prescribed for deciding a transfer petition which has always to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Convenience of the parties including the witnesses to be produced at the trial is also a relevant consideration for deciding the transfer petition. The convenience of the parties does not necessarily mean the convenience of the petitioners alone who approached the Court on misconceived notions of apprehension. Convenience for the purposes of transfer means the convenience of the prosecution, other accused, the witnesses and the larger interest of the society.” 9. In Amarinder Singh vs. Parkash Singh Badal, (2009) 6 SCC 260 , while dealing with an application for transfer petition preferred under section 406, Criminal Procedure Code, a three Judge Bench has opined that for transfer of a criminal case, there must be a reasonable apprehension on the part of the party to a case that justice will not be done. It has also been observed therein that merely an allegation that there is an apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case alone does not suffice. It is also required on the part of the Court to see whether the apprehension alleged is reasonable or not, for the apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension. In the said context, the Court has held thus : (SCC p. 273, paras 1920) “19. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice. The purpose of the criminal trial is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. In the said context, the Court has held thus : (SCC p. 273, paras 1920) “19. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice. The purpose of the criminal trial is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. When it is shown that the public confidence in the fairness of a trial would be seriously undermined, the aggrieved party can seek the transfer of a case within the State under section 407 and anywhere in the country under section 406, Criminal Procedure Code. 20. However, the apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary. Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. If the criminal trial is not free and fair and if it is biased, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would be at stake, shaking the confidence of the public in the system. The apprehension must appear to the Court to be a reasonable one.” 10. In Lalu Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand [ (2013) 8 SCC 593 ], the Court, repelling the submission that because some of the distantly related members were in the midst of the Chief Minister, opined that from the said fact it cannot be presumed that the Presiding Judge would conclude against the appellant. From the said decision, we think it appropriate to reproduce the following passage : (SCC p. 600, para 20) “20. Independence of judiciary is the basic feature of the Constitution. It demands that a Judge who presides over the trial, the Public Prosecutor who presents the case on behalf of the State and the lawyer vis-à-vis amicus curiae who represents the accused must work together in harmony in the public interest of justice uninfluenced by the personality of the accused or those managing the affairs of the State. They must ensure that their working does not lead to creation of conflict between justice and jurisprudence. A person whether he is a judicial officer or a Public Prosecutor or a lawyer defending the accused should always uphold the dignity of their high office with a full sense of responsibility and see that its value in no circumstance gets devalued. The public interest demands that the trial should be conducted in a fair manner and the administration of justice would be fair and independent. The public interest demands that the trial should be conducted in a fair manner and the administration of justice would be fair and independent. The aforesaid passage, as we perceive, clearly lays emphasis on sustenance of majesty of law by all concerned. Seeking transfer at the drop of a hat is inconceivable. An order of transfer is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because an interested party has expressed some apprehension about proper conduct of the trial. The power has to be exercised cautiously and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so to provide credibility to the trial. There has to be a real apprehension that there would be miscarriage of justice. (See Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India [ (2011) 1 SCC 307 ].) 11. In the instant case, we are disposed to think that apprehension that has been stated is absolutely mercurial and cannot remotely be stated to be reasonable. The learned Single Judge has taken an exception to the remarks given by the learned trial Judge and also opined about nonexamination of any witness by him. As far as the first aspect is concerned, no exception can be taken to it. The learned Sessions Judge, while hearing the application for transfer of the case, called for remarks of the learned trial Judge, and in such a situation, he is required to give a reply and that he has done. He is not expected to accept the allegations made as regards his conduct and more so while nothing has been brought on record to substantiate the same. The High Court could not have deduced that he should have declined to conduct the trial. This kind of observation is absolutely impermissible in law, for there is no acceptable reason on the part of the learned trial Judge to show his disinclination. Solely because an accused has filed an application for transfer, he is not required to express his disinclination. He is required under law to do his duty. He has to perform his duty and not succumb to the pressure put by the accused by making callous allegations. He is not expected to show unnecessary sensitivity to such allegations and recuse himself from the case. If this can be the foundation to transfer a case, it will bring anarchy in the adjudicatory process. He has to perform his duty and not succumb to the pressure put by the accused by making callous allegations. He is not expected to show unnecessary sensitivity to such allegations and recuse himself from the case. If this can be the foundation to transfer a case, it will bring anarchy in the adjudicatory process. The unscrupulous litigants will indulge themselves in Court hunting. If they are allowed such room, they do not have to face the trial before a Court in which they do not feel comfortable. The High Court has gravely erred in this regard.” 26. The Supreme Court in the case of Amarinder Singh vs. Prakash Singh Badal, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 260 has held as under : “16. In Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal (II) vs. State of T.N. this Court has held that: (SCC p. 790, para 22) “22. … If there is reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a case that justice may not be done, he may seek transfer of the case.” It also held that: (SCC p. 790, para 22) “22. … The apprehension entertained by the party must be a reasonable one and the case cannot be transferred on a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done.” 17. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political mandate of the informant or the complainant. However, if justifiable and reasonable apprehension of miscarriage of justice and likelihood of bias is established, undoubtedly, the proceeding has to be transferred elsewhere by exercise of power under section 406, Criminal Procedure Code. 18. For a transfer of a criminal case, there must be a reasonable apprehension on the part of the party to a case that justice will not be done. It is one of the principles of administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to be done. On the other hand, mere allegations that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. In other words, the Court has further to see whether the apprehension alleged is reasonable or not. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension. 19. On the other hand, mere allegations that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. In other words, the Court has further to see whether the apprehension alleged is reasonable or not. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension. 19. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice. The purpose of the criminal trial is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. When it is shown that the public confidence in the fairness of a trial would be seriously undermined, the aggrieved party can seek the transfer of a case within the State under section 407 and anywhere in the country under section 406, Criminal Procedure Code. 20. However, the apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary. Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. If the criminal trial is not free and fair and if it is biased, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would be at stake, shaking the confidence of the public in the system. The apprehension must appear to the Court to be a reasonable one.” 27. Thus, if the grounds raised by the applicant are considered in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be clear that the apprehension expressed by the applicant is nothing, but an imaginary apprehension and, therefore, the trial cannot be transferred on the basis of imaginary apprehension. 28. The revision therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed.