JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner, who is presently working as Confidential Assistant in Additional District and Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha, who availed a housing loan for Rs.11,00,000/- from the 1st respondent District Co-operative Bank, in the year 2011, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent to consider the direction given by the 2nd respondent Joint Registrar, which was intimated to the petitioner by Ext.P2 communication dated 02.03.2018 and allow him to clear the defaulted instalments in lump sum and also permit him to repay the regular monthly instalments from September, 2018 onwards. 2. On 28.03.2018, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent Bank was directed to get instructions. 3. On 17.07.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, this Court noticed from the Judges papers in W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018 that the petitioner had earlier approached this Court in that writ petition showing the subject “SARFAESI Act” (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002) on the docket, which ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 23.03.2018, on a finding that he had parted with the possession of the security after receipt of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, violating the provision contained in subsection (13) of Section 13. After the dismissal of that writ petition, the petitioner filed this writ petition on 27.03.2018 through the very same lawyer, showing the subject “Co-operative Societies Act” on the docket, seeking virtually the very same relief. This Court passed an order dated 17.07.2018, whereby the petitioner was directed to file an affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances in filing this writ petition, after the dismissal of W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018, suppressing material facts and showing a different 'subject' on the docket. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner has filed an affidavit dated 26.07.2018. 4. Going by the affidavit dated 26.07.2018 sworn to by the petitioner, he has filed W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018 challenging the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, when he was issued with a notice under the said Act by the Advocate Commissioner. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner has filed an affidavit dated 26.07.2018. 4. Going by the affidavit dated 26.07.2018 sworn to by the petitioner, he has filed W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018 challenging the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, when he was issued with a notice under the said Act by the Advocate Commissioner. It was, in that context that, the subject was shown as “SARFAESI Act” on the docket, whereas in the present writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.10921 of 2018, his grievance is that the Secretary of the 1st respondent Bank was not complying with the direction of the 2nd respondent Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Alappuzha. It was in that context, the subject matter was shown as “Co-operative Societies Act”. In the said affidavit, the petitioner has also stated that mentioning of two subject matters on the docket was under a bonafide belief that the relief sought for falls under those subject matters. Since the filing of the earlier writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018 and the dismissal of that writ petition were mentioned in paragraph 5 of the present writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.10921 of 2018, it cannot be said that he has approached this Court with malafide motives. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent District Co-operative Bank and also the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent Joint Registrar. 6. Going by the averments in this writ petition, in view of the recovery proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, the petitioner approached the Minister for Co-operation for waiver of interest and penal interest and also seeking six months time for repayment, by submitting a representation dated 14.02.2018. The said representation was forwarded to the 2nd respondent Joint Registrar for necessary action, with an endorsement made by the Minister for Co-operation. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued Ext.P2 communication dated 02.03.2018 to the General Manager of the 1st respondent Bank, with a direction to take an appropriate decision on the request made by the petitioner, taking note of the endorsement made by the Minister for Co-operation on his representation dated 14.02.2018. 7. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued Ext.P2 communication dated 02.03.2018 to the General Manager of the 1st respondent Bank, with a direction to take an appropriate decision on the request made by the petitioner, taking note of the endorsement made by the Minister for Co-operation on his representation dated 14.02.2018. 7. In paragraph 5 of this writ petition filed on 27.03.2018, it is averred that, though the petitioner had approached this Court in W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018, when he was served with a notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Alappuzha in M.C.No.23 of 2018, demanding vacant possession of his dwelling house, where he is residing at present with his family, this Court dismissed that writ petition on 23.03.2018 and the petitioner is yet to receive a copy of that judgment. 8. On 17.07.2018, when this writ petition was taken up for consideration, the Judges Papers in W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018 were called for. From the Judges' Papers, this Court noticed that the petitioner had filed that writ petition on 09.03.2018 seeking the following reliefs; “(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent not to proceed with under SARFAESI Act against the petitioner for a period of 1 year and allow him to clear off the defaulted installment arrears in lump-sum by the time and also permit the petitioner to repay the regular EMIs from September, 2018 onwards.” (Underline supplied) 9. The subject of the writ petition shown on the docket of W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018 reads thus; “Sub: SARFAESI Act - Seeking direction to grant six months time for repayment to the petitioner.” (underline supplied) 10. By the judgment dated 23.03.2018, this Court dismissed W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018, on a finding that the petitioner had parted with the possession of the security after receipt of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of SARFAESI Act, violating the provision contained in sub-section (13) of Section 13 of that Act. The said judgment reads thus; “Petitioner availed a housing loan from the respondent bank. It is stated that the instalments of the loan have not been paid by the petitioner as agreed. Consequently, proceedings have been initiated by the bank under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the Act) against the security. The said judgment reads thus; “Petitioner availed a housing loan from the respondent bank. It is stated that the instalments of the loan have not been paid by the petitioner as agreed. Consequently, proceedings have been initiated by the bank under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the Act) against the security. The said proceedings is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. When the matter was taken up, the learned counsel for the petitioner only sought indulgence of this Court to permit the petitioner to liquidate the overdue in the loan account in instalments. 3. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent bank, however, pointed out on instructions that it is a case where the petitioner has parted with the possession of the security after receipt of notice under subsection (2) of Section 13 of the Act, violating the provision contained in sub-section (13) of Section 13 of the Act. The said fact is not disputed by the petitioner. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition, in exercise of my discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” (underline supplied) 11. After the dismissal of W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018, the petitioner filed the present writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C) No.10921 of 2018 before this Court on 27.03.2018, through the very same lawyer, seeking the following relief; (i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 1st respondent to consider the direction given by the 2nd respondent which was intimated to the petitioner by Exhibit P2 and allow the petitioner to clear off the defaulted installment arrears in lump-sum by the time and also permit the petitioner to repay the regular EMIs from September, 2018 onwards. (Underline supplied) 12. The subject of the writ petition shown on the docket of W.P.(C)No.10921 of 2018 reads thus; “Sub: Co-operative Societies Act-Non consideration of direction of the 2nd respondent to the first respondent, which was intimated by Exhibit P2 notice to the petitioner.” (underline supplied) 13. (Underline supplied) 12. The subject of the writ petition shown on the docket of W.P.(C)No.10921 of 2018 reads thus; “Sub: Co-operative Societies Act-Non consideration of direction of the 2nd respondent to the first respondent, which was intimated by Exhibit P2 notice to the petitioner.” (underline supplied) 13. As already noticed, the dismissal of W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018 filed by the petitioner, by the judgment of a learned Judge of this Court dated 23.03.2018, was after recording the submission made by the learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent Bank that the petitioner has parted with the possession of the security after the receipt of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, violating the provision contained in sub-section (13) of Section 13 of the said Act. A reading of the said judgment would also show that the said fact was not disputed by the petitioner. In such circumstances, this Court found in the judgment dated 23.03.2018 that the writ petition cannot be entertained in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, that writ petition was dismissed. 14. Immediately after the dismissal of W.P.(C) No.8147 of 2018, the petitioner filed this writ petition through the very same lawyer on 27.03.2018. From the judges papers of W.P.(C) No.8147 of 2018, it can be seen that the statement of facts and grounds of both writ petitions are one and the same, except the addition of certain paragraphs. The relief sought for in both the writ petitions is one and the same, i.e., an order allowing him to clear off the defaulted instalments in lump-sum and to repay regular instalments from September, 2018 onwards. Therefore, it can be seen that, immediately after the dismissal of W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018, with almost the very same pleadings, the petitioner moved another writ petition suppressing the fact that in W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018, this Court declined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on a finding that he has parted with possession of the security after receipt of notice under subsection (2) of Section 13 of SARFAESI Act. When, admittedly, the recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner is one under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, after the dismissal of W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018, the petitioner cannot file another writ petition in relation to the very same recovery proceedings showing the subject “Cooperative Societies Act” on the docket. The filing of this writ petition showing another subject as per roster, on the docket is nothing but a calculated attempt made by the petitioner to secure an interim order by suppressing material facts from the notice of this Court. 15. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lays down that, no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. 16. In Saroja v. Chinnusamy (Dead) by L.Rs [ (2007) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, after examining the provisions under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has enumerated the essential conditions to be satisfied in order to constitute res judicata. Paragraph 4 of that judgment reads thus; "4. . ..... After a careful reading of the provisions under Section 11 of the CPC, it is discernible that in order to constitute res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) There must be two suits - one former suit and the other subsequent suit; (ii) The Court which decided the former suit must be competent to try the subsequent suit; (iii) The matter directly and substantially in issue must be the same either actually or constructively in both the suits. (iv) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the former suit; (v) The parties to the suits or the parties under whom they or any of them claim must be the same in both the suits; (vi) The parties in both the suits must have litigated under the same title." 17. As per Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. But, going by the 'Explanation' to Section 141 of the Code, inserted by Section 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the expression 'proceedings' in Section 141 includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. However, a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in G. K. Dudani v. S. D. Sharma [(1986) Supp SCC 239] held that, although by reason of the 'Explanation' which was inserted in Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 11 of the Code does not in terms apply to any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the principle of res judicata does apply to all writ petitions under Article 226. 19. In Daryao v. State of U. P. [ AIR 1961 SC 1457 ] a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, if the rule of res judicata itself embodies a principle of public policy which in turn is an essential part of the rule of law then the objection that the rule cannot be invoked where fundamental rights are in question may lose much of its validity. The rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32. 20. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32. 20. In Daryao's case (supra), the Apex Court held further that, if a judgment has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction it is binding between the parties unless it is reversed or modified by appeal, revision or other procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, if a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court in a writ petition filed by a party rejecting his prayer for the issue of an appropriate writ on the ground either that he had no fundamental right as pleaded by him or there has been no contravention of the right proved or that the contravention is justified by the Constitution itself, it must remain binding between the parties unless it is attacked by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. The Apex Court held further that, if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. 21. Therefore, the principle that can be gathered from the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra is that, the principle of res judicata does apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. Therefore, the principle that can be gathered from the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra is that, the principle of res judicata does apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Before a plea of res judicata can be sustained, either in a proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure or writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the following conditions must be satisfied, i.e., (i) the parties to the suits/writ petitions (i.e., the former suit/writ petition and the subsequent suit/writ petition) or the parties under whom they or any of them claim must be the same in both the suits/writ petitions; (ii) the matter directly and substantially in issue must be the same either actually or constructively in both the suits/writ petitions; (iii) and the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit/writ petition must have been heard and finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the former suit/writ petition. 22. In the instant case, in both the writ petitions the petitioner is challenging the recovery steps taken by the 1st respondent Bank against his property offered as security. Admittedly, the recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner's property is one under the provisions of SARFAESI Act. The relief sought for in both writ petitions is an order allowing him to clear the defaulted instalments in lump-sum within a time and to repay the regular instalments from September, 2018 onwards. Therefore, once W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018 filed by the petitioner stands dismissed on the ground that he has parted with possession of the security in violation of the provisions under sub-section (13) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, thereby declining exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner cannot file another writ petition seeking relief in relation to the very same recovery proceedings, invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner cannot be entertained. 23. As stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486], an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the Court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. 23. As stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486], an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the Court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. 24. In Prestige Lights Limited v. State Bank of India [ (2007) 8 SCC 449 ], the Apex Court reiterated that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. Therefore, in exercising extraordinary power, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible. 25. In Prestige Lights' case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. Paragraphs 33 and 34 of the said judgment read thus: “33. It is thus clear that though the appellant-Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is thus clear that though the appellant-Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. 34. The object underlying the above principle has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)], in the following words: "It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts - facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it - the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside, any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement." (Emphasis supplied) 26. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481], the Apex Court held that the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Apex Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the court knows law but not facts". In the said decision, the Apex Court held further that, if the primary object as highlighted in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for Contempt of Court for abusing the process of the court. 27. In Usha Nanthini v. Regional Transport Authority, Palakkad and another [ 2018 (2) KHC 89 ] this Court held that, once it is found that the petitioner has approached this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by suppressing material facts and making false statements, such an attempt made by the petitioner to abuse the process of this Court has to be dealt with appropriately. In such cases this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of the writ petition. In such cases this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of the writ petition. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary cost is inevitable, in order to prevent abuse of process of this Court and to preserve purity of judicial proceedings. Paragraphs 26 to 28 of the said judgment read thus: “26. In Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar [ (2017) 5 SCC 496 ] : [2017 SCC Online SC 211] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 27. A litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands and clean objects. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements should be curbed with an iron hand. A litigant has every right to withdraw the writ petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution. However, once it is found that he has approached this Court suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of that writ petition. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, in order to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. 28. In the instant case, a reading of the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 09/01/2018 would show that the said affidavit has been drafted in a casual manner harbouring the notion that this Court is required to grant permission for withdrawal of the writ petition as a matter of course. 28. In the instant case, a reading of the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 09/01/2018 would show that the said affidavit has been drafted in a casual manner harbouring the notion that this Court is required to grant permission for withdrawal of the writ petition as a matter of course. Once it is found that the petitioner has approached this Court suppressing materials facts and making false statements, such an attempt made by the petitioner to abuse the process of this Court has to be dealt with appropriately. In such circumstances, the dismissal of this writ petition imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, declining the permission sought for withdrawal of the same.” 28. Therefore, it is well settled that, a litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands and clean objects. The judicial proceedings are sacrosanct, and no person would be allowed to abuse the judicial process, particularly, in public law remedy. In writ proceedings, the Court places implicit faith on the parties and their pleadings, as it does not indulge in any fact finding or roving enquiry of what has been asserted. Since Article 226 of the Constitution of India espouses equity jurisprudence, a litigant who has approached the Court with unclean hands, without disclosing full facts, is not entitled for any reliefs. 29. As held by the Apex Court in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik's case (supra) a litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner requires only a breathing time to repay the entire overdues and that, he may be granted 6 months' time to pay off the said liability due towards the 2nd respondent. A person who has approached this Court suppressing material facts cannot seek any equitable relief, in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A person who has approached this Court suppressing material facts cannot seek any equitable relief, in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The conduct of the petitioner disentitles him from seeking any such relief in this writ petition. Moreover, the dismissal of W.P. (C)No.8147 of 2018 disentitles the petitioner from seeking any relief in respect of the recovery proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, by filing another writ petition. 31. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed imposing a cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) payable by the petitioner to the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund, to provide relief to flood victims in Kerala. The petitioner shall remit the said amount in the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund, within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Failing which, the State Government shall recover the said amount from the petitioner by initiating revenue recovery proceedings. 32. The remittance/recovery of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) as cost by/from the petitioner shall be brought to the notice of this Court by way of a memo filed by the learned Senior Government Pleader. The Registry shall place a copy of this Judgment in the Judge's papers of W.P.(C)No.8147 of 2018.