JUDGMENT : Dixit Krishna Shripad, J. 1. Since these two appeals involve substantially common questions of law and facts, they are taken together for hearing and for disposal by a common judgment, with the consent of the Counsel appearing for both the sides. Appeal in MFA No. 5230 of 2010 is directed against the judgment and order dated 17-3-2010 made by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (hereafter 'Commissioner'), Davanagere, whereby, respondents claim petition bearing WCA No. 313 of 2007 came to be allowed by awarding a compensation of Rs. 35,892/- with a condition as to payment of statutory interest. 2. Appeal in MFA No. 2512 of 2010 is directed against the judgment and order dated 15-12-2009, whereby the same Commissioner allowed the claim petition bearing WCA No. 307 of 2007 awarding a compensation of Rs. 93,591/- with a condition as to payment of statutory interest. 3. The brief facts of the cases are: (a) In a vehicular accident that happened on 2-5-2007 due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry in question, the claimants suffered grievous injuries. In connection with the said incident, the Bilalchuda Police have registered Crime No. 52 of 2007, which after being investigated into, resulted in the filing of charge-sheet. (b) The injured coolies (loaders-cum-unloaders) presented the claim petitions seeking compensation under the provisions of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereafter 'Act') stating that the injuries sustained by them were out of and in the course of their employment. The claim was resisted by the Insurance Company by filing a reply statement in each of the claim petitions. (c) There was no much dispute as to the occurrence of the accident in question and the injuries consequently suffered by the claimants. To prove the claims, both the claimants independently got examined as A.W. 1 in their respective cases and got marked Exhibits A.1 to A.9 in the first case and Exhibits A.1 to A.12 in the second case. The Commissioner made the impugned judgment and order awarding a compensation of Rs. 35,892/- and Rs. 93,591/- with interest to the respective claimants. The same are in challenge in these two appeals. 4. The Commissioner made the impugned judgment and order awarding a compensation of Rs. 35,892/- and Rs. 93,591/- with interest to the respective claimants. The same are in challenge in these two appeals. 4. Sri E.S. Indiresh, the learned Panel Counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company in both the appeals, vehemently contends that although, when no specific contention is taken up in the Objection Statement as to the identity of the lorry involved in the incident, still it is open to the appellants to show that the lorry involved in the accident was different from the one for which the Insurance Policy was bought; this fact can be established by preponderance of probability looking to the pleadings of the parties and the evidentiary material placed on record; the Commissioner ought to have framed a question and adjudicated the same. 5. Sri Indiresh, further submits that the Commissioner having not undertaken this exercise, there is a material irregularity apparent on the face of the record and consequently a substantial question of law as under arises: "Whether on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidentiary material available on record, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is justified in not properly adjudging the issue as to the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident, when the said issue could have been otherwise arose notwithstanding the absence of plea by the Insurance Company in its reply statement?" 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the issue having not been framed and duly adverted to, by the Commissioner, the above substantial question of law arises in the matter. Therefore, he submits, this itself satisfies the requirements of Section 30 of the Act, as a substantial question of law warranting indulgence of this Court. 7. Smt. Sowmya R, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimants in the connected appeal (MFA No. 2512 of 2010) per contra contends that the provisions of Section 30 of the Act, almost approximate to the provisions of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, therefore, an appeal before this Court will lie only if a substantial question of law much different from a just mixed question of law arises in the case, and not otherwise. Relevant part of Section 30 of the Act read as under: "30. Relevant part of Section 30 of the Act read as under: "30. Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely.-- (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [Clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) are omitted from our consideration as being not relevant] Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees: [Other provisos are omitted from our consideration as being not relevant]." 8. Elaborating her arguments, learned Counsel submits that whether the lorry in question was involved in the accident are not, or that some other lorry was involved are the pure questions of facts inasmuch as, to answer these questions, what we open is only the record of evidence and not the Statute book. Rightly or wrongly, if the Competent Authority which is having the accumulated wisdom in such matters, decided this question of fact one way or the other, the same being a question of fact even if it is assumed to be wrong, an appeal in the scheme of Section 30 of the Act does not lie. Shortly, what she submits is that in the present matter, no question of law, much less a substantial one is involved in this case, warranting indulgence of this Court. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel on both the sides and also having gone through the Lower Court Records, I do not find any reason to interfere in these appeals. 10. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company that from the pleadings of the parties and the material borne out by record, if a question of fact can be decided fairly and unmistakably in variance with what is decided by the Commissioner, such question should ordinarily be treated as the substantial questions of law. 11. This argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant at the first blush appears to be attractive but a deeper consideration shows that it is bereft of legal substance. 11. This argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant at the first blush appears to be attractive but a deeper consideration shows that it is bereft of legal substance. Learned Author, Salmond on 'Jurisprudence' (12th Edition, 1996 at page 65) states: "It is commonly said that all questions which arise for consideration and determination in a Court of justice are of two kinds, being either questions of law or questions of fact... The term question of law is used in three distinct though related senses. It means, in the first place a question which the Court is bound to answer in accordance with a rule of law-a question which the law itself has authoritatively answered, to the exclusion of the right of the Court to answer the question as it thinks fit in accordance with what is considered to be the truth or justice of the matter. All other questions are questions of fact - using the term fact in its widest possible sense to include everything that is not law. In this sense, every question which has not been predetermined and authoritatively answered by the law is a question of fact......" 12. Ordinarily, in order to answer the question as framed above, one has to open the record of the evidence as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant; no answer can be found out by opening the Statute book since the said question has not been predetermined or authoritatively answered by the law. Merely because the answer to this question will have bearing on the operative portion of the award, does not make it a substantial question of law as distinguished from a substantial question of fact. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the question framed above does not fall within the realm of law at all and there is nothing substantial, either. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant Sri Indiresh may be right in submitting that several questions, answers to which, do not fit into the above view of Salmond in deciding whether a question is a substantial question of law or of fact, has force. It is true that certain questions even when apparently appear to be touching the realm of facts, still are treated as the substantial questions of law. It is true that certain questions even when apparently appear to be touching the realm of facts, still are treated as the substantial questions of law. This becomes apparent by the cursory survey of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and also Section 30 of the Act. But, even that does not advance his case inasmuch as there is no substratum to invoke those principles, which in fact do not fit into "Salmond's simplicity view" of bifurcation of all questions of law and facts, is not brought out from either the pleadings or the evidentiary material. 14. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that no reasonable person in the armchair of the Commissioner would have arrived at the impugned finding as to the identity of the vehicle in question, is not supported by the pleadings of the parties or the evidence on record. That apart, stretching the said submission virtually touches the question of sufficiency of evidence to sustain the finding of fact. This necessarily lies within the realm of the Statutory Authority. That apart, the argument that a different view is also possible looking to the records is no ground for an appeal that lies only on the substantial question of law. 15. Except the aforesaid, no other ground is urged in these appeals. 16. In the above circumstances, both appeals being unworthy of merits, stand dismissed. The amount in deposit in the Registry of this Court be transmitted to the jurisdictional Court of Commissioner forthwith for disbursal to the claimants/awardees at the earliest, in accordance with law.