JUDGMENT : Whether the Kerala State Electricity Board is entitled to continue the exemption granted under S.73A of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (for short “Court Fees Act”), consequent to its being formed as a company during the pendency of the suit, is the question that arises for consideration before this Court. 2. O.S.No.627/2010 was filed before the Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram by the Kerala State Electricity Board (for short 'KSE Board'), which was then a Board under the Government of Kerala, for recovery of Rs.1,13,14,117/-from the defendant, M/s Hindustan Constructions Company. A sum of Rs.8,36,542/- was to be paid by the KSE Board and the Board sought exemption from payment of the Court fees under the provisions of S.73A of the Act and it was granted by the Court. The Court proceeded with trial and no objection was raised by the defendant regarding the deficiency of the Court fees in the written statement. When the suit came up for final hearing before the trial Court, the defendant filed I.A.No.2792/2016 challenging the exemption granted to the plaintiff from payment of Court fees. The plaintiff opposed this application stating that the petition was belated and ought to have been raised at the appropriate stage. It was also contended that the Court fees as on the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiff was entitled to exemption under S.73A of the Court Fees Act, and that it could not have been reviewed by the Court at a later stage. 3. After hearing both sides and considering the scope of S.131 of the Electricity Act, 2003, as well as the Scheme famed by the State of Kerala as Kerala Electricity First Transfer Scheme, 2008 and the Kerala Electricity Second Transfer Scheme (Re-vesting) 2013, the learned Sub Judge held that the property, rights and liabilities of the Board, which had initially vested in the Government of Kerala has been reinvested in the newly constituted company consequent to the forming of the company, and hence, the plaintiff cannot be considered as the State of Kerala in order to claim exemption from payment of Court fees. The Court, therefore, found that there was sufficient reason for reviewing the order of granting exemption to the plaintiff from payment the Court fees. The plaintiff was directed to pay requisite Court fees within 15 days from the date of the impugned order. 4. The Court, therefore, found that there was sufficient reason for reviewing the order of granting exemption to the plaintiff from payment the Court fees. The plaintiff was directed to pay requisite Court fees within 15 days from the date of the impugned order. 4. Aggrieved by this impugned order dated 02-11-2016, the plaintiff has come up on revision. It is pointed out that in accordance with S.131 of the Electricity Act, the Government formulated a Transfer Scheme known as Kerala Electricity First Transfer Scheme vide SRO No.990/2008 dated 25.09.2008 and that by virtue of clause (8) of the Scheme, the Government was entitled to initiate legal proceedings for recovery of any amount due to the erstwhile Electricity Board and the suit was filed by the State Government through a Special Officer for realisation of the amount due from the respondent. The Court below was pleased to grant the exemption sought under the provisions under S.73A of the Court Fees Act. It is consequent to that, that the respondent herein appeared and filed a written statement on 20.06.2011. No objection was raised and the issues were framed regarding the insufficiency or non-payment of Court fees and the trial proceeded. Only when the matter came up for final hearing that the respondent filed I.A.No.2792/2016 questioning the validity of the exemption granted under S.73A of the Court Fees Act. The allegation is that by virtue of the Kerala Electricity Second Transfer Scheme (Re-vesting), 2013 which came into effect on 31.10.2013, the company under the name Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd. was formed and hence the plaintiff lost the status of being the State Government and therefore, the respondent insisted for reviewing the earlier exemption granted. It is alleged that by virtue of the Second Transfer Scheme, the status has changed from State Government to a fully owned Government company, and therefore, the learned Sub Judge was not justified in reviewing the earlier exemption granted. Hence, the revision petitioner seeks interference. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The suit was filed in 2010. The plaintiff was granted exemption under Section 73A, because the KSEB was a Board constituted under the Government and by virtue of the First Transfer Scheme of 2008, the Government was entitled to initiate legal proceedings for and on behalf of the Board. Hence, the revision petitioner seeks interference. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The suit was filed in 2010. The plaintiff was granted exemption under Section 73A, because the KSEB was a Board constituted under the Government and by virtue of the First Transfer Scheme of 2008, the Government was entitled to initiate legal proceedings for and on behalf of the Board. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the exemption granted under S.73A of the Court Fees Act would not cease to continue consequent to the second notification in 2013, whereby the KSEB was reconstituted as a company wholly owned by the Kerala State Government. S.12 of the Court Fees Act states that every suit instituted in any Court shall be registered on payment of appropriate Court fees and the said decision regarding payment of Court fees is only subject to review, further review and correction in the manner specified in the sub-sections of S.12 of the Court Fees Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would argue that vide the provisions under S.12(2) of the Court Fees Act, all questions as to the Court fee shall be heard and decided before the evidence is recorded and if the Court fee paid is not sufficient, the Court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with Court's decision and the deficit fee shall be paid. In S.12(3) also, all the questions arising on such plea shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded and in case the Court finds that the subject matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient, the Court shall follow the procedure laid down in sub-section (2). According to the learned Counsel that stage in this particular suit is already over. The defendant did not raise any objection regarding the Court fees and the issues were framed and evidences were taken. Only when the case was posted for final hearing, did the defendant come up with an application regarding insufficiency of Court fees. It is pointed that in S.12(4)(a) the Court of appeal may either on its own motion or on the application of any of the parties to consider the correctness of any order passed by the lower Court affecting the fee payable on the plaint. It is pointed that in S.12(4)(a) the Court of appeal may either on its own motion or on the application of any of the parties to consider the correctness of any order passed by the lower Court affecting the fee payable on the plaint. Hence, the only opportunity now left out to the defendant to challenge insufficiency of Court fees is filing appeal before the Appellate Court and there is no provision by which the exemption granted under Section 73A could be reviewed by the trial Court, subsequent to the completion of evidence. 8. There is no dispute at the time of filing of the suit that the KSEB being a Board under the Government and by virtue of S.131 of the Electricity Act, the Government had the authority to file suit for amounts to be claimed by the Board. Necessarily, S.73A apply and the exemption was properly granted. The question that now arises for consideration is whether the subsequent change of status of the plaintiff would be sufficient for the Court to review its order to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of exemption granted. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent argues that the Court can direct the plaintiff to pay the Court fees, where the status of the party is changed during the pendency of the suit. The learned Counsel attempts to draw an analogy inviting this Court's attention to the provisions of Order XXXIII, C.P.C. wherein the suits may be allowed to be instituted by indigent persons without payment of Court fees. But once it is established that the plaintiff is no longer a pauper and has sufficient means to pay the Court fee, he can be directed to pay the Court fees even at a later stage. The learned Counsel relies on the decision of this Court in Jayaraja Menon v. Rajakrishnan, ( 1997 (1) KLT 813 ) in support of this proposition. 10. The situation under which exemption from payment of Court fee in Order XXXIII is granted is different from the situation under which exemption is granted under S.73A of the Court Fees Act. Order XXXIII of the C.P.C. does not actually exempt the plaintiff, even if be an indigent, from paying the Court fees. It only postpones the collection of the Court fees. Order XXXIII of the C.P.C. does not actually exempt the plaintiff, even if be an indigent, from paying the Court fees. It only postpones the collection of the Court fees. It is, therefore, clear that a plaintiff can resort to Order XXXIII of the C.P.C. only if he is an indigent person. Otherwise, he has an obligation to pay Court fee even at the inception and before his case is tried and decided by the Court. Order XXXIII, Rule 9 provides for a contingency where the plaintiff though originally permitted to sue as an indigent person, ceases to be an indigent person subsequent to the institution of the suit. The rule clearly provides that on the plaintiff ceasing to be an indigent person, the Court shall order him to pay the Court fee, which would have been paid by him if he had not been permitted to sue as an indigent person. It is therefore, clearly a part of an order under Order XXXIII, Rule 9 of C.P.C. dispaupering a plaintiff, to direct the plaintiff to pay the Court fee that he would have paid, if he had not been originally permitted to sue as an indigent person. Once such an order is made, obviously, the Court cannot proceed with the suit unless the Court fee payable on the plaint, is paid by the plaintiff. In the present case, the provisions that applies is S.73A, which does not contemplate a stage where subsequently the plaintiff could be called upon to pay the Court fees. Hence, no analogy can be drawn between a plaintiff being deprived of the status as a State Government and the status of the plaintiff who was subsequently dispaupered. Hence, the decision relied on by the respondent has no application to the case in hand. In G. Joseph v. Sara Thomas, ( 1996 (2) KLT 851 ) this Court held as thus; “From a reading of S.12 as a whole, it is clear that court can consider the correctness of the valuation of the suit at three stages. (1) Before the registration of the plaint or appeal. In such cases, it will be open to the Court to review, correct and further review, its decision in the matter specified in sub-s.(1). (1) Before the registration of the plaint or appeal. In such cases, it will be open to the Court to review, correct and further review, its decision in the matter specified in sub-s.(1). (2) After the suit or appeal has been registered an issue on the question of Court fee can be raised by the defendant or respondent and the court should decide the matter. In such cases, the decision will be binding on the Court that rendered it unless a fresh decision is asked for by the Court fee Examiner and (3) On the objection of Court fee Examiners under S.18 of the Act Even though decision taken under S.12(1) can be reviewed, decision taken under S.12(2) and 12(3) cannot be reviewed by that court. It can be reconsidered only by the Appellate Court under S.12(4) of the Act.” 11. The Court below once allowed the plaintiff to sue as the Government granted exemption under S.73A of the Court Fees Act, cannot review its order at a later point in time. In State of Kerala v. Joy ( 2003 (3) KLT 786 ), it is held that the relevant date for payment of Court fee is at the stage of admission. The only option now left is to challenge the status of the party in the appeal stage under S.12(4)(a) of the Court Fees Act, and the defendant has no liberty to file an application asking the Court to reconsider the status of the plaintiff under S.73A, once it has been allowed. The Court below was not, therefore, justified in allowing the application and hence the impugned order is only to be set aside. The C.R.P. is allowed.