ORDER 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of Criminal Revision No. 14/2017 as both these revisions have been filed against a common judgment dated 21.12.2016 passed by the III ASJ, Sagar whereby Criminal Appeal No. 23/2016 and Criminal Appeal No. 565/2015 filed by the applicants respectively, whereby the order dated 23.11.2015 passed in Criminal Case No. 4606/ 2007 by JMFC, Sagar has been partly allowed wherein the petitioners have been convicted under section 6/ 9 the Govansh Pratishedh Adhiniyam and sentenced to 6 months R.I. instead of 1 year and a fine of Rs. 5000 each was kept as it is; with default stipulations. They have been further convicted under section 11(Gha) Da of the Pashu Krurta Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1960 and a fine of Rs. 50/- each has been imposed on them with default stipulations. 2. In brief the facts of the case are that on 2.9.2007 a pick up vehicle was apprehended by the Sub Inspector of Sehora Chowki at around 12:30 in the noon in which two cows were standing while three cows were lying on the floor. It is alleged that the aforesaid cows were being transported for slaughtering, hence a case under section 6/ 9 the Govansh Pratishedh Adhiniyam, 2004 was registered and after trial, the learned Judge of the trial Court has convicted the applicants as aforesaid and in two separate appeals, which were preferred by the applicants the order of the JMFC has been confirmed vide impugned judgments dated 21.12.2016. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants have submitted that the impugned order is perverse in nature in as much as the cows were weak and had minor injuries, but it was opined by the treating veterinary doctor that they can be productive after proper feeding, which has also been proved vide Ex.P-7. This aspect has also been considered by the appellate Court in para 15 of the judgment but no importance has been attached to it. Thus, counsel has submitted that merely if the cows were weak in their constitution, it cannot be a reason to hold that they were being transported for slaughtering purpose and as such the impugned orders being erroneous are liable to be set aside. 4. Thus, counsel has submitted that merely if the cows were weak in their constitution, it cannot be a reason to hold that they were being transported for slaughtering purpose and as such the impugned orders being erroneous are liable to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the manner in which the cows were being transported in itself is more than sufficient to draw the conclusion that they were being transported for slaughter only. 5. Learned counsel has further submitted that the accused persons have also not come out with any case as to for which purpose the cows were being transported. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. From the record this Court finds that the accused persons have not come out with any defence under section 313 of the CrPC and they have simply stated that they have been falsely implicated whereas PW5 Dr. S.K. Agrawal, who is a veterinary doctor, has clearly stated that all the five cows were weak in constitution but they were not so weak or old so as to treat them useless. 8. In their defence accused persons have also exhibited the photographs of the vehicle at the time when the vehicle was apprehended by the police. These photographs are filed as EX.D-2 to Ex.D-5 in which the cows were also seen lying on the floor of the vehicle which in fact portrays a dismal condition of cows. So far as the seÁure witnesses are concerned, they have been declared hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution but under the facts and circumstances of the case it is not material. 9. In view of the aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court, so far as the conviction of the applicants is concerned, there appears to be no illegality or irregularity committed by both the Courts below in coming to a conclusion regarding guilt of the applicants hence the same is hereby confirmed. However, so far as the sentence part is concerned which is three months, the question is, whether the same requires reconsideration or it is just and proper under the circumstances. However, so far as the sentence part is concerned which is three months, the question is, whether the same requires reconsideration or it is just and proper under the circumstances. In this regard it would be apt to refer to an enlightening decision rendered by the apex Court in the case of Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa, (2012) 3 SCC 221 wherein the apex Court has emphasised sagaciously on the importance of compensation and applicability of S. 357 of CrPC in criminal jurisprudence in a manner. The relevant para of the same read as under : “38. Even in Hari Singh case, the Court granted a similar benefit to a convict under section 325 who had been sentenced to undergo two years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Court in addition invoked its power under section 357 CrPC to award compensation to the victim, and determined the amount payable having regard to the nature of the injury inflicted and the paying capacity of the appellant. This Court said: (Hari Singh case, SCC pp. 557-58, paras 10-11) “10. Sub-section (1) of section 357 provides power to award compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused. In this case, we are not concerned with sub-section (1). We are concerned only with subsection (3). It is an important provision but Courts have seldom invoked it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it. It empowers the Court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the Court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of Courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to all Courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. 11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to all Courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. 11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. What is reasonable, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending upon the acts of each accused. Reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary by instalments, may also be given. The Court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default.” 39. Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure embodies the concept of compensating the victim of a crime and empowers the Courts to award a suitable amount. This power, it goes without saying, shall be exercised by the Courts having regard to the nature of the injury or loss suffered by the victim as also the paying capacity of the accused. That the provision is wide enough to cover a case like the present one where the appellant has been found guilty of offences punishable under sections 323 and 325 IPC has not been disputed before us. Indeed Mr Luthra relied upon the provision and beseeched this Court to invoke the power to do complete justice short of sending the appellant back to the prison. Ms Subhashini also in principle did not have any quarrel with the proposition that the power was available and can be exercised, though according to her, the present being a gross case of unprovoked violence against law abiding citÁens the exercise of the power to compensate the victims ought not to save the accused from suffering a deterrent punishment warranted under law. 40. Prof. Andrew Ashworth of Oxford University Centre for Criminological Research has in the handbook of Criminology authored by him referred to what are called “Restorative and Reparative Theories” of punishment. 40. Prof. Andrew Ashworth of Oxford University Centre for Criminological Research has in the handbook of Criminology authored by him referred to what are called “Restorative and Reparative Theories” of punishment. The following passage from the book is, in this regard, apposite : “Restorative and Reparative Theories These are not theories of punishment, rather, their argument is that sentences should move away from punishment of the offender towards restitution and reparation, aimed at restoring the harm done and calculated accordingly. Restorative theories are therefore victim-centred, although in some versions they encompass the notion of reparation to the community for the effective crime. They envisage less resort to custody, with onerous community-based sanctions requiring offenders to work in order to compensate victims and also contemplating support and counselling for offenders to regenerate them into the community. Such theories therefore tend to act on a behavioural premises similar to rehabilitation, but their political premises is that compensation for victims should be recognised as more important than notions of just punishment on behalf of the State.” 41. The provision for payment of compensation has been in existence for a considerable period of time on the statute book in this country. Even so, the criminal Courts have not, it appears, taken significant note of the said provision or exercised the power vested in them thereunder. The Law Commission in its 42nd Report at Para 3.17 refers to this regrettable omission in the following words: “3.17.Payments of compensation out of fine.—We have a fairly comprehensive provision for payment of compensation to the injured party under section 545 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is regrettable that our Courts do not exercise their statutory powers under this section as freely and liberally as could be desired. The section has, no doubt, its limitations. Its application depends, in the first instance, on whether the Court considers a substantial fine proper punishment for the offence. In the most serious cases, the Court may think that a heavy fine in addition to imprisonment for long terms is not justifiable, especially when the Public Prosecutor ignores the plight of the victim of the offence and does not press for compensation on his behalf.” 42. In the most serious cases, the Court may think that a heavy fine in addition to imprisonment for long terms is not justifiable, especially when the Public Prosecutor ignores the plight of the victim of the offence and does not press for compensation on his behalf.” 42. In Manish Jalan v. State of Karnataka, even this Court felt that the provision regarding award of compensation to the victims of crimes had not been made use of by the Courts as often as it ought to be. This Court observed: (SCC p.230, para 12) “12. Though a comprehensive provision enabling the Court to direct payment of compensation has been in existence all through but the experience has shown that the provision has rarely attracted the attention of the Courts. Time and again the Courts have been reminded that the provision is aimed at serving the social purpose and should be exercised liberally yet the results are not very heartening.” 43. In the above case the appellant had been convicted under sections 279 and 304A IPC. The substantive sentence of imprisonment was in that case reduced by this Court to the period already undergone with payment of fine and a compensation of an amount of rupees one lac to the mother of the victim. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Rachhpal Singh v. State of Punjab where this Court emphasised the need to assess and award compensation by the accused to the gravity of the offence, needs of the victim’s family as also the paying capacity of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. Thus, on the touchstone of the aforesaid dictum, the sentence part of the judgment can be reconsidered, by imposing adequate fine. Admittedly, the incident took place on 2.9.2007 and as such more than 10 years have already passed since the date of incident in which the allegation is of transportation of cows, in such circumstances this Court is of the considered opinion that no purpose would be served to send the applicants back to jail after a period of 10 years and since they have already undergone 22 days in incarceration out of six months R.I., ends of justice would be met if the applicants are sentenced under section 6/9 of Govansh Pratishedh Adhiniyam to the period already undergone by them which is 22 days and the fine amount is hereby increased from Rs. 5000/- each to additional Rs. 10,000/- each before the trial Court within two months time from today. It is made clear that in case of any default on the part of the applicants to deposit the said amount within the period as aforesaid i.e. within two months from today, the applicants shall be taken into custody and they shall suffer the remaining part of their jail sentence as provided in the impugned orders which shall stand revived On compliance of this order, the applicants’ bail bonds shall stand discharged. 11. Resultantly, these criminal revisions stand disposed of as partly allowed and the impugned orders dated 21.12.2016 is hereby modified to the aforesaid extent.. 12. Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court for its compliance and necessary action.