JUDGMENT This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Procedure (for short herein after called ‘the Code’) has been filed in assailing the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Khurda in R.F.A. No.50 of 2017 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S. No.648 of 1999.The appellant (plaintiff) having been unsuccessful all throughout in getting a decree in his suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, correction of the record of right in respect of the suit and for permanent injunction is now in appeal before this Court against these judgments and decrees dismissing his suit. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to, as they have been arraigned in the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff’s case is that the suit land originally belonged to the ex-intermediary Kanika Raja who had acquired the same being a purchaser in an auction. It is stated that he had settled the same in favour of the father of the plaintiff by fixing salami and rent. The plaintiff’s father having paid the salami got the suit land settled in his favour on permanent basis. It is the further case of the plaintiff that Raja of Kanika had executed an unregistered lease deed on 03.08.1944 and had delivered the possession of the land in suit to him. It is further stated that after the lease, the father of the plaintiff has been in cultivating possession of the suit land. When such state of affairs was continuing by virtue of coming into force of Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (for short, hereinafter called ‘the Act’), the intermediary interest of Kanika Raja vested with the State free from all encumbrances in the year, 1953. The plaintiff since was the permanent tenant in respect of the suit land, his right was however did not get affected thereby and on the basis of ekpadia and other information submitted by Kanika Raja to the Anchal Adhikary, Cuttack, tenancy ledger was opened in the name of the father of the plaintiff, i.e. Nilamani Pani. It is stated that rent upto the year 1973-74 was realised from the father of the plaintiff. It is stated that rent upto the year 1973-74 was realised from the father of the plaintiff. When the settlement operation in the area was going on, since the father of the plaintiff was ill and could not attend the camps, in asserting his right over the property, no raiyati patta was made in his favour as a tenant and the suit land was recorded in the name of State, ignoring the tenancy ledger, the factum of collection of rent as also overlooking the factum of possession of the plaintiff’s father in so far as the suit land is concerned. It is further stated that despite such recording of the land in the name of the State, the plaintiff’s father and after him the plaintiff however continued to possess the suit land without any obstruction and by virtue of said open, peaceful and continuous possession, the right, title and interest over the suit land is also claimed to have been acquired by adverse possession. On coming to know that an encroachment proceeding is going to be initiated against the plaintiff and thereafter when it came to the knowledge of the plaintiff that defendant No.4 has been granted lease in respect of the suit land by the State, apprehending attempt of dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit land, the present suit has been filed. 4. The defendant-State has denied the fact that the suit land originally belonged to Raja of Kanika having been acquired by purchase in an auction. It is stated that the plaintiff having not specified the suit land against which he became the settled raiyat, his case on that score is not acceptable. The unregistered lease deed annexed with the sketch map purported to have been executed by the Raja of Kanika in favour of the father of the plaintiff on 03.08.1946 are attacked as forged and manufactured document, created in order to grab the suit land. The tenancy ledger as presently relied upon is also said to be aforged document. The State has denied the factum of possession of the suit land either by the father of the plaintiff or this plaintiff after the death of his father at any point of time. The recording of the suit land in the name of the State is asserted to be just, proper and valid. The State has denied the factum of possession of the suit land either by the father of the plaintiff or this plaintiff after the death of his father at any point of time. The recording of the suit land in the name of the State is asserted to be just, proper and valid. It has been averred that even accepting the fact of the grant of lease, for a term exceeding one year, the same being compulsorily the registrable under Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Registration Act the unregistered as is said, is inadmissible in evidence and as such cannot also be pressed into service even for co-lateral purpose in showing the possession of the plaintiff’s father as well as the plaintiff. It is denied that the father of the plaintiff had ever cultivated the suit land and was the tiller of the same. The specific case of the State is that the protection under Section 8 (1) of the OEA Act was not extendable in the case of the father of the plaintiff in so far as the suit land is concerned. The defendant No.4 has asserted their right over the property by virtue of lease deed executed by the State in their favour. It is stated that after taking the land on lease as the lessee, construction of the boundary wall around the same has been undertaken through the contractor and when that was on the verge of completion, the suit has been filed. 5. The trial Court on the above rival pleadings framed in total 18 issues; all those concern as to the entitlement of the plaintiff to the decree of declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land as also mandatory injunction for recording of the suit land in his favour and the direction for acceptance of rent from him. Those also include the disputed question of fact as to whether the Raja of Kanika was the ex-intermediary in respect of the suit land and as regards the protection claimed under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act. 6. Those also include the disputed question of fact as to whether the Raja of Kanika was the ex-intermediary in respect of the suit land and as regards the protection claimed under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act. 6. Cumulatively taking all those important issues together for decision, the trial Court has found that the father of the plaintiff was never a tiller of the suit land and as such not a raiyat in respect of the same as on the date of vesting of the suit land with the State, free from all encumbrances by virtue of coming into force of the provisions of O.E.A. Act. Consequently, it has been held that he is not to get the protection as provided under Section 8 (1) of the OEA Act. Next coming to the question of unregistered lease deed dated 03.04.1944 which is locally said as ‘Hata Patta’ and as to its validity so as to declare the tenancy right of the father of the plaintiff, the trial Court’s finding has been against the claim of the plaintiff. With these findings, the trial Court has also negated the claim of the plaintiff to have been so acquired right, title and interest over the suit land by adverse possession. The suit has thus been dismissed. 7. The lower appellate Court as is seen from the judgment has gone to judge the sustainability of the finding recorded by the trial Court one by one and has concluded at the end that the father that the plaintiff was not a tenure holder of the land in suit. First of all though it has arrived at a conclusion that Raja of Kanika was the ex-intermediary contrary to the view taken by the trial Court relying upon the case of State of Orissa Vrs. Harapriya Bisoi; 2009 (II) OLR SC 229 decided by the Apex Court, the other crucial issues have been answered in the light of what have been said by the trial Court. It has however refused to accept the case of the plaintiff on the basis of Ext. I, Jamabandi khata of Kanika Raja stated to have been executed by the father of the plaintiff and the Ext. It has however refused to accept the case of the plaintiff on the basis of Ext. I, Jamabandi khata of Kanika Raja stated to have been executed by the father of the plaintiff and the Ext. 3, the certified copy of the tenancy ledger in support of the fact that the appellant’s father was a tenure holder under the ex-intermediary and to have been acknowledged as such at any later point of time. It has given a categorical finding; that no lease was created in favour of the plaintiff’s father. Coming to the alternative case, it has been stated at last that the plaintiff has failed to establish his case of title over the suit land as to have been acquired by the adverse possession. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that on the face of the evidence of P.W. 1 and 2 that the plaintiff’s father was in cultivating possession of the suit land as a tenant under the ex-intermediary, the Courts below ought not to have deprived the plaintiff of the protection under Section 8 (1) of the OEA Act which is supported by the Jamabandi, Ext.1, rent receipt, Ext.2 and tenant ledger, Ext. 3 and as such his right ought to have been declared. It is further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below are not right in applying the ratio decided in case of Hara Priya Bisoi (supra) in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. According to him, these aspects stand as the substantial question of law to be framed for being answered in the case. Therefore, he urges for admission of the appeal. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 to 3 submits all in favour of the findings recorded by the Courts below. According to him, the settled position of law have been duly applied to the fact and circumstances of the case, as shown by the plaintiff leading evidence and there remains absolutely no infirmity in the said findings. He further submits that when said findings which mainly matters with appreciation of evidence, no such perversity surfaces either in the approach and appreciation of evidence by the Courts below in recording the ultimate conclusions on those factual aspects. He further submits that when said findings which mainly matters with appreciation of evidence, no such perversity surfaces either in the approach and appreciation of evidence by the Courts below in recording the ultimate conclusions on those factual aspects. So it is submitted that there remains no scope in this second appeal for re-appreciation of evidence and therefore, no such substantial question of law arises meriting admission of the appeal. 9. Learned Assistant Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents reiterating the submission of the learned counsel for the State, submits that the defendant No.4 has been duly leased with the land by the State, the owner-lessor and since then the property in question has been under the possession of the respondent No.4 as the lessee. He further submits that as against the record of right which is challenged being published in the year 1973, the present suit has been instituted in the year 1999 and this shows that the plaintiff has woken up from deep slumber after more than two decades and half having maintained sphinx like silence which is wholly barred by limitation. So at this point of time, the defendant No.4 having been clothed with the rights as a valid and bonafide lessee, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the reliefs as prayed for. 10. The land in the suit stood described under the pre sabik records to be under Khata No.918, Plot No.1725 admeasuring an area of Ac.0.50 dec., plot No.1726, Ac.2.00 dec. corresponding to 1973 settlement Khata No.1074, Plot No.4704 and 4706 admeasuring Ac.0.50 dec. and Ac.2.00 respectively further corresponding to Khata No.4689, plot No.7401 measuring Ac.0.64 dec. and plot No.7634 measuring Ac.1.600 dec. under Khata No.4689 as per the records of 2014 settlement. It is said that the same was the erstwhile Kanika estate with the Raja of Kanika remaining as the ex-intermediary and had purchased the estate that is the entire suit village Gadkana in an auction. 11. The specific case of the plaintiff is that said Raja had settled the land in favour of Nilamani Pani, the father of the plaintiff by executing an unregistered lease deed on 03.04.1944 and since then Nilamani possessed the suit land paying salami to the intermediary by doing cultivation over there. 11. The specific case of the plaintiff is that said Raja had settled the land in favour of Nilamani Pani, the father of the plaintiff by executing an unregistered lease deed on 03.04.1944 and since then Nilamani possessed the suit land paying salami to the intermediary by doing cultivation over there. The said intermediary interest having vested with the State free from all encumbrances in the year 1953 after coming into force of the O.E.A. Act, the plaintiff’s case is that Nilamani is to be deemed to be a tenant in view of Section 8 (1) of the said Act and has accordingly received the protection, notwithstanding the recording of the land in the name of the State in the subsequent records of right. During the suit, it is seen that the plaintiff has further improved his case by giving explanation that initially the property had been taken by the Kanika Raja from Chaudhury Chakradhar Mohapaetra land others on mortgage that is prior to the year 1940. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the relevant portion of the D register marked as Ext. 16. It reveals from the record of right of pre sabik khata No.918 of the said mouza-Gadakana marked as Ext. B that Choudhury Chakradhar Mohapatra and others under Ekamabhag Khewat No.1 were the intermediaries in respect of the suit khata. But then Ext.6, the D register finds mention; the name of Raja and below the same, there again appears the name of Chaudhury Chakradhar, Chintamani and Ramakrushna. 12. The trial Court as it appears has considered the rival claim by carefully examining the certified copy of the pre sabik settlement of record of right in respect of the suit land marked as Ext. B along with the certified copy of Register-D, Part-1 combined with the Register-A marked as Ext.6. The conclusion appears to be very right that the land in question was acquired through mortgage and in the possession of the mortgagee having the interest as such. If we now give a careful reading to the decision of the Apex Court in the case Harapriya Bisoi (supra) and proceed further for examination, it is found that said case relates to the land in village – Gadakana, where the suit land situates. If we now give a careful reading to the decision of the Apex Court in the case Harapriya Bisoi (supra) and proceed further for examination, it is found that said case relates to the land in village – Gadakana, where the suit land situates. It has been held by the Apex Court in that case that Chaudhury Chakradhara Mohapatra, Ramakrushna Mohapaetra were the erstwhile intermediaries of the suit Mouza-Gadakana and that the estate of the intermediaries Chaudhury Chakradhar and Ramakrushna Mohapatra vested with the State by virtuie of a notification dated 01.05.1964 issued under Section 3 of the O.E.A. Act. In that case the land was under Khatian No.1076 and here in the case in hand also some lands are described to be under that Khata No.1076 which remain the subject matter. Thus, the same position/conclusion is bound to be maintained in respect of the part of the suit land which falls under Khata No.1076 and there cannot be a conclusion to the contrary. The decision of the Apex Court although may not stand to operate as resjudicata but is certainly to be given due regard to as precendent. The Apex Court’s finding is that the intermediaries were Chakradhar and Ramakrushna Mohapatra and that their interest as intermediaries vested with the State by virtue of notification dated 19.05.1954 under the O.E.A. Act. Such being the clear conclusion in respect of some land under khata No.1076 of mouza – Gadakana, the same has to be respected not only in respect of rest land under that khata but also the rest land involved in the suit and conclusion has to be given effect to, it cannot be held that the Raja of Kanika was the ex-intermediary. This now wholly cuts the case of the plaintiff through and through at its very root. The lower appellate Court has not gone to view this aspect and thus has fallen in error in rendering a finding that Raja of Kanika was the ex-intermediary. 13. Be that as it may, even accepting that Kanika Raja to be the intermediary, when the case in hand is examined further the question stands as to whether Nilamani, the father of the plaintiff can be said to have been validly inducted as a tenant in respect of the suit land by the said intermediary. 13. Be that as it may, even accepting that Kanika Raja to be the intermediary, when the case in hand is examined further the question stands as to whether Nilamani, the father of the plaintiff can be said to have been validly inducted as a tenant in respect of the suit land by the said intermediary. The basis is said to be an unregistered lease deed dated 03.04.1944 and delivery of possession of the land thereof followed by payment of salami and its acceptance. Besides oral evidence, these facts are sought to be established through Ext.1- Jamabandi said to have been granted to Nilamani and rent receipt (Ext.2) said to have been issued on behalf of the Raja of Kanika. The provision of Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act is meant to protect the real tiller of the soil, i.e., a person in cultivating possession of the land in question by deeming him to be a tenant and the other precondition is that a person must be in possession as on the date of publication of the vesting notification, so that when the vesting takes placed by the statutory provision pursuant to the notification as required, free from, all encumbrances, in such exceptional cases, it is, however, with the encumbrance in respect of possession of the land in question that said person in possession as a cultivator would continue as such notwithstanding the vesting and that right is not affected. The document relied upon for the purpose is the rent roll (ekpadia) submidtted to the Anchal Officer, Cuttack by the ex-intermediary and lethe Jamabandi (tenant ledger) opened in the name of Nilamani on the basis of the said ekpadia and collection of rent from him by the Anchal Adhikari. In order to get the protection under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act, it is not enough by showing a document even a valid deed of lease and that ipso facto would not clothe the lessee the status as a raiyat in going to say that he was in possession of the said holding as a cultivating tenant under the ex-intermediary. The above view derives further support from the established legal position that by lease, an interest in the immovable property is transferred by the lessor to the lessee and created for the period subject to the terms and conditions of the lease with such other protections as well as restrictions but that possession with interest itself would not go to the rescue of the lessee for receiving the protection under Section 8 (1) of lthe Act. For that, the said person has to be a raiyat cultivating the land himself land having the right of occupancy under the tenancy laws of the State. Thus, always it is not correct to say that a lessee under the ex-intermediary in relation to the agricultural land becomes a raiyat for the purpose of receiving protection under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act. Giving a reading to the definition of intermediary as provided under Section 2 (h) of the O.E.A. Act, the position becomes as clear as noon day; the intermediary covers all owners and holders of interest in the land between the riayat and the State. 14. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have discussed the evidence on record in great detail so as to render a finding about that protection under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act coming to rescue of the plaintiff. Several decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court having been referred to, it has been finally said that the plaintiff has not been able to establish by leading clear, cogent and acceptable evidence that his father Nilamani was in peaceful possession of the suit land as the tiller. In arriving at the said decision, no such perversity either in the approach or in the matter of appreciation of evidence is seen to be surfacing. In view of the failure of the plaintiff as above, the contention raised from the side of the plaintiff as regards the failure of the State to produce the tenant ledger has also been taken care of in rightly saying that the factum of non-production of the same itself would not lead to establish the case of the plaintiff. Lastly, the Courts below have negated the case of the plaintiff as to have acquired title over the suit land by adverse possession. Lastly, the Courts below have negated the case of the plaintiff as to have acquired title over the suit land by adverse possession. In that connection, suffice it to say that in the facts and circumstances of the case, such a plea is not cognizable at all that once a person is claiming protection under the statutory provision by virtue of his possession as a tenant being the tiller of the soil having failed in that would again be in a position to claim title over the very same property by taking the plea of adverse possession, the foundations are just fundamentally opposed to one another especially as to the nature of possession which is most significant. For the aforesaid discussion and reasons, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that there arises substantial questions of law to be formulated for being answered meriting the admission of the appeal fails. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed and in the facts and circumstances without cost. Appeal dismissed.