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2018 DIGILAW 754 (KAR)

Chandra S/o Dollegowda v. State of Karnataka

2018-06-29

B.A.PATIL, BUDIHAL R.B.

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. The present appeal has been preferred by accused Nos.1 to 6, being aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 1.10.2015, passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara to sit at Kanakapura in SC.No.95/2008 by which they are convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 506, 302 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case of the prosecution as per the complaint filed by one Nanjunda are that on 15.3.2008 when his cousin (uncle’s son) Shivanna was near the garden land, accused persons Chandra, Padma, wife of Chandra, Bapuji @ Kariya, Aswath, sons of Dollegowda, Srinivasa and Narasimha, sons of Puttaswamygowda assaulted him in connection with digging of borewell. They also assaulted Sanna Marigowda and others. In that light, at about 8.30 p.m. on the very day, the aforesaid accused persons by constituting an unlawful assembly came and picked up a quarrel with Shivanna and accused No.1 assaulted Shivanna with a club on his back and other parts of the body and the other accused persons kicked him and while going, accused No.6Narasimhaiah assaulted him on his stomach with a big stone with an intention to kill him. After seeing the complainant who was near the incident, accused persons threatened him with dire consequences if he tried to rescue and when he made hue and cry Narayana, S/o. Singrigowda, Puttagowda came there and by seeing them accused persons ran away from the place. On the basis of the complaint, a case was registered by Harohalli Circle Police, in Crime No.54/2008 as against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 302, 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. 3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution in all has examined 19 witnesses and got marked 13 Exhibits and also MO.Nos.1 to 4. During the course of cross-examination, the accused got marked Ex.D1 to D4. Thereafter the statement of the accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., accused denied the same. They have not led any evidence. After hearing both the parties, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence came to be passed by the trial Court convicting the accused/appellants herein for the aforesaid offences. 4. Thereafter the statement of the accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., accused denied the same. They have not led any evidence. After hearing both the parties, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence came to be passed by the trial Court convicting the accused/appellants herein for the aforesaid offences. 4. The main grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellants/accused are that though there is no material or overt acts attributed as against accused Nos.2 to 6 to attract the provisions of Section 149 of IPC, the trial Court by taking the assistance of Section 149 of IPC has wrongly convicted accused Nos.2 to 6 for all the offences which is not sustainable in law. Though the prosecution has got examined PWs.1 to 3 as eye witnesses, they are interested and their testimony does not say with regard to the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. He contended that if the evidence of eye witnesses is taken into consideration, it is accused No.1 alone who has assaulted the deceased with the club that too with only one blow and the second blow is on the lower limb, which itself clearly goes to show that accused No.1 has also not used sufficient or much force at the time of assaulting the deceased. Even when he assaulted, no bleeding injuries were found over the body of the deceased, then under such circumstances, the trial Court ought to have held that accused No.1 was also not having any intention to cause the death of the deceased. He further contended that PW.5-Dr. K.V. Sathish has clearly admitted in his cross-examination that if the injured had been treated at the right time, he would have survived. The said fact and the fact that the injured was taken to the hospital and subsequently as the doctors were not available, instead of taking the injured to the hospital at Bangalore, they came back to the village and at that time, the deceased breath his last. Under such circumstances, it clearly goes to show that accused No.1 was also not having any intention to cause the death of the deceased. Hence, the trial Court ought to have considered this aspect and could have punished the accused for lesser offence. Under such circumstances, it clearly goes to show that accused No.1 was also not having any intention to cause the death of the deceased. Hence, the trial Court ought to have considered this aspect and could have punished the accused for lesser offence. He further submitted that when the injured was taken to the hospital at Maralavadi Village and when the Police Station is situated near the Hospital there was no impediment to file the complaint. But the complaint was filed on the next day at 8.00 a.m. There is no explanation for the said delay by the prosecution, which itself clearly goes to show that in order to implicate and to concoct the complaint and to have the deliberation, the said time has been consumed and a false case has been registered against the accused persons. This aspect has not been properly and correctly appreciated by the trial Court. He further submitted that the deceased had consumed alcohol and by falling on the stone he died, under such circumstances, the trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused persons. On these grounds, he prayed for allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment and order passed by the trial Court. 5. Per contra, the learned Additional SPP Sri Vijaya kumar Majage, appearing for the respondent-State vehemently argued by contending that PWs.1, 2, 3 and 8 are the eye witnesses who have categorically stated the overt acts of each of the accused and assault committed by them and nothing is brought on record to discard their evidence. Keeping in view the said facts, the trial Court by rightly appreciating the evidence, has convicted the accused-appellants herein. He further submitted that though some discrepancies are found in the evidence of the eye witnesses, it does not take away the entire case of the prosecution. He further submitted that motive for the incident in question is not disputed by the accused. The first incident took place when the accused persons dug the borewell at a distance of 50 feet from the borewell of the deceased Shivanna. As the borewell of Shivanna was affected and as such there was a quarrel between the accused persons and the deceased. Subsequently in the evening, the accused persons by constituting an unlawful assembly, carried the deadly weapons and assaulted the deceased. As the borewell of Shivanna was affected and as such there was a quarrel between the accused persons and the deceased. Subsequently in the evening, the accused persons by constituting an unlawful assembly, carried the deadly weapons and assaulted the deceased. Only because of the assault committed by accused No.1 on the head of the deceased, he died. The said evidence is also corroborated with the evidence of PW.5 and postmortem report at Ex.P3. In that light, the trial Court has come to a right conclusion and has convicted the accused. He further submitted that when the injured was taken to the Government Hospital at Maralavadi and as there were no doctors available in the hospital and the persons who took the injured were informed that they should take the injured to Bangalore and as there were no facilities during night hours, as such they brought back the injured to the village and subsequently, the injured who was in coma succumbed to the injuries. Thereafter, on 16.3.2008 complaint came to be filed. In that light, there is no delay in lodging the complaint by the complainant. Even the cross-examination of the complainant does not throw any light on these aspects. He further submitted that the entire evidence produced by the prosecution clearly goes to show that the accused persons have committed the alleged offence by constituting an unlawful assembly and as such the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants and they have not made out any good grounds so as to reverse the findings and acquit the accused. On these grounds, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal by confirming the impugned judgment and order. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Additional SPP, we have carefully and cautiously gone through the submissions made by them and we have also perused the evidence of the witnesses and the documents on record. The main case of the prosecution is that the accused persons being the members of an unlawful assembly with regard to quarrel held near borewell, assaulted Shivanna and caused criminal intimidation and accused No.1 assaulted with club on the head of the deceased Shivanna and thereby committed his murder. The main case of the prosecution is that the accused persons being the members of an unlawful assembly with regard to quarrel held near borewell, assaulted Shivanna and caused criminal intimidation and accused No.1 assaulted with club on the head of the deceased Shivanna and thereby committed his murder. In so far as motive for the incident is concerned, the accused persons dug a borewell and the said borewell was at a distance of 50 feet from the borewell of Shivanna and because of digging the borewell as deceased found dirty water, gas, silt and dust in his borewell, the deceased and others assaulted the accused persons earlier to the incident and at about 8.30 p.m. the accused persons came and assaulted the deceased due to which he died. In this behalf, the complainantPW.1 and PWs.4 and 9 have categorically deposed that earlier, the deceased Shivanna dug the borewell and was providing water to his mulberry plantation and he also used to provide water to others. As accused No.1 dug another borewell and due to which there was formation of gas in the borewell of the deceased, Shivanna being enraged told the accused persons that by availing loan he dug the borewell and they are doing injustice to him. The said incident took place about two years 10 months’ back of the incident in question and the said galata was pacified. Though it was pacified, their evidence led by the prosecution proves the motive. The said fact has not been destroyed by the learned counsel for the accused in other evidence. Hence, the motive has been proved by the prosecution with cogent and corroborative evidence. 7. The next contention taken up by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the provisions of Section 149 of IPC are not going to attract so as to bring home the guilt of accused Nos.2 to 6 in order to punish them for the offence punishable under Section 149 of IPC. Before going to discuss the evidence, we feel it just and proper to put the principles lying under Sections 143 and 149 of IPC. Mere presence in assembly does not make a person a member of an unlawful assembly and no such person could be convicted of any offence with the aid and assistance of Section 149 of IPC. Before going to discuss the evidence, we feel it just and proper to put the principles lying under Sections 143 and 149 of IPC. Mere presence in assembly does not make a person a member of an unlawful assembly and no such person could be convicted of any offence with the aid and assistance of Section 149 of IPC. So also, when the accused persons have been involved in heinous crimes, no doubt under Section 149 of IPC, it is like a vicarious liability principle, but the essence of the offence is the common object of the persons forming the assembly. Whether the object is in their minds when they come together or whether it occurs to them afterwards is not material, but it is necessary that the object should be common to the persons who compose the assembly. Further, what is to be proved in a case registered for the offence in Section 149 of IPC is to be looked into. In such cases, what is important in such case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed, there must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb and others Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2006)2 SCC 450 . For the purpose of brevity we extract, paragraphs21 and 22 of the said decision: “21. The question arises whether the conviction of the remaining accused under Section 302 read with section 149 IPC is legally sustainable. The scope of Section 149 IPC was explained in Mizaji v. State of U.P. which decision has been followed in many later cases, in the following manner (SCR p.949) The first part of Section 149 IPC means that the offence committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary that there should be a pre-concert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly as to the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall under the first part, the offence committed must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were members. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. The expression “know” does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. Though it can be said that when an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object that does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part, but not within the first. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149, Indian Penal Code cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined whether the offence committed falls within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part. (AIR p.572) 22.In Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar the import of Section 149 IPC was explained as under: (SCC pp.1618, para 8) “This section creates a specific offence and makes every member of the unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences committed in the course of the occurrence provided the same was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be safely construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be safely construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of any one or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will render his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC…. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of an unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to invoke Section 149 it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly. Even if an act incidental to the common object is committed to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object they would be liable for the same under Section 149 IPC.” 8. By keeping in view the aforesaid proposition of law let us consider the evidence which has been produced by the prosecution to prove its case. As could be seen from the evidence of the prosecution, the alleged incident has taken place at 8.30 p.m. and accused No.6 caught hold of the collar of the shirt of the deceased Shivanna and assaulted him with hand and at that time the other accused persons were also present. As could be seen from the evidence of the prosecution, the alleged incident has taken place at 8.30 p.m. and accused No.6 caught hold of the collar of the shirt of the deceased Shivanna and assaulted him with hand and at that time the other accused persons were also present. Accused No.1 assaulted on the head of the deceased Shivanna, Shivanna fell down by making hue and cry and again accused No.1 assaulted on the right elbow and the other accused persons surrounded and were kicking the deceased. PW.1 has specifically deposed that accused No.5Srinivasa has not assaulted and when PW.1 tried to resolve, accused Nos.2 and 3 along with accused No.6 threatened him with dire consequences. 9. PW.2 has also deposed that accused No.6 caught hold of the collar of the shirt of the deceased and slapped. Accused No.2Padma also slapped and at that time accused No.1 assaulted on the head of the deceased with club and accused Nos.4 and 5 assaulted with hand and kicked the deceased. Even as could be seen from the evidence of PWs.3 and 8, they have only deposed against accused Nos.1 and 6. Keeping in view the said evidence, in so far as accused No.5 is concerned, PW.1 himself who is the complainant has specifically deposed that accused No.5 has not assaulted the deceased and even there is no specific overt act stated as against him. In so far as accused Nos.2 and 4 are concerned, though each of the witnesses have deposed against them, there is no consistency or corroboration with regard to assault with hand or kicking the deceased. Even the prosecution has not established the fact that the accused persons committed the aforesaid offence to accomplish the common object of the said group and they knew that their act is likely to cause such act. 10. We have carefully scrutinized the evidence of PWs.1, 2, 3 and 8 who are said to be the eye witnesses to the alleged incident. Though they have stated against accused Nos.2 to 5, the said statements are not consistent and some of the witnesses have given omnibus evidence in general terms that all the persons were present and were kicking. We have carefully scrutinized the evidence of PWs.1, 2, 3 and 8 who are said to be the eye witnesses to the alleged incident. Though they have stated against accused Nos.2 to 5, the said statements are not consistent and some of the witnesses have given omnibus evidence in general terms that all the persons were present and were kicking. When that is the evidence produced by the prosecution, a duty is cast upon the Court to closely scrutinize the evidence of the witnesses in order to eliminate all chances of false or mistaken implication of the miscreants. Generally in villages, the villagers and other persons would gather whenever a galata takes place between the two groups and some times it is possible to include the persons though they have not actually participated in such an incident. In that light, the scrutiny of the evidence is very much essential. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baladin & others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1956 SC 181 , wherein at paragraph19, it has been observed as under: “(19). It is manifest that the first three grounds do not make out a case for special leave but we think that the fourth ground does. It is well settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make such a person a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case falls under section 142, IPC. In this case there is no doubt that the original inhabitants of the village were all inimically disposed towards the newcomers. From the site plan (Ex.P18) of the houses of the refugees, it is clear that the houses of the accused persons and of the refugees are situate close to one another. The house of Mangal Singh which was the scene of the occurrence was surrounded by the houses of the original inhabitants of the village including some of the accused persons. According to the prosecution case, one party of the members of the unlawful assembly entered the first floor of the house of Mangal Singh through the roof of the house of Parichhat Lodhi adjacent to the southeast and attacked the three persons who were there. According to the prosecution case, one party of the members of the unlawful assembly entered the first floor of the house of Mangal Singh through the roof of the house of Parichhat Lodhi adjacent to the southeast and attacked the three persons who were there. The other party of the miscreants collected at the front door of Mangal Singh’s house facing west. In front of Mangal Singh’s house is the house of Mahabir, appellant, and on the other three sides of that house are the houses of Baladin Lodhi, Parichat Lodhi and Ajodhia Lodhi, appellants. It would thus appear that the place of occurrence is surrounded on all sides by the houses of the appellants. If members of the family of the appellants and other residents of the village assembled, all such persons could not be condemned ‘ipso facto’ as being members of that unlawful assembly. It was necessary, therefore, for the prosecution to lead evidence pointing to the conclusion that all the appellants before us had done or been committing some overt act in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly. The evidence as recorded is in general terms to the effect that all these persons and many more were the miscreants and were armed with deadly weapons, like guns, spears, pharsas, axes, lathis, etc. This kind of omnibus evidence naturally has to be very closely scrutinized in order to eliminate all chances of false or mistaken implication. That feelings were running high on both sides is beyond question. That the six male members who were done to death that morning found themselves trapped in the house of Mangal Singh has been found by the courts below on good evidence. We have, therefore, to examine the case of each individual accused to satisfy ourselves that mere spectators who had not joined the assembly and who were unaware of its motive had not been branded as members of the unlawful assembly which committed the dastardly crimes that morning. It has been found that the common object of the unlawful assembly was not only to kill the male members of the refugee families but also to destroy all evidence of those crimes. Thus even those who did something in connection with the carrying of the dead bodies or disposal of them by burning them as aforesaid must be taken to have been actuated by the common objective.” 11. Thus even those who did something in connection with the carrying of the dead bodies or disposal of them by burning them as aforesaid must be taken to have been actuated by the common objective.” 11. In that light, in so far as accused Nos.2 to 5 are concerned, there is no material so as to bring home the guilt of the accused under Sections 141, 143 and 149 of IPC. In so far as accused No.6 is concerned, there is consistency in the evidence of all the witnesses and throughout the incident he was also present. In that light, he is liable to be punished for the offences punishable under Sections 141, 143, 302 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. When accused Nos.2 to 5 were not the members of unlawful assembly to accomplish the common object, though they were present at the place of incident, the conviction made by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 302, 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC is not maintainable in law. 12. Keeping in view the above said proposition of law and the facts and circumstances of the case, on close scrutiny of the evidence, we are of the opinion that there is no material as against accused Nos.2 to 5. But in so far as accused Nos.1 and 6 are concerned, there is material evidence against them. 13. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused/appellants that accused No.1 was not having any intention to cause the death and even the injured has not sustained any bleeding injuries and if really accused No.1 was having an intention to cause the death of the deceased, definitely he could have used force at the time of assault. In that light, the learned counsel submitted that the offence does not fall within the provisions of Section 302 of IPC and it comes under the provisions of Section 304 Part-I or II of IPC. 14. As could be seen from the evidence of PW.5 and the postmortem report at Ex.P3, the deceased sustained the following injuries: 1. Contusion over inner aspect of right upper arm; 2. Contusion seen over inner aspect of left upper arm and after dissection he found scalp on reflection of scalp there was an extravasation prevent over the left temporal region and in the brain there was subdoual haematoma. Contusion over inner aspect of right upper arm; 2. Contusion seen over inner aspect of left upper arm and after dissection he found scalp on reflection of scalp there was an extravasation prevent over the left temporal region and in the brain there was subdoual haematoma. The doctorPW.5 he has also opined that the possibility of death is due to the assault with weapon like MO.1 and the injuries sustained by the injured. 15. Even as could be seen from the evidence which has been produced by the prosecution, all the witnesses who took the injured to the hospital, have categorically deposed that when they were taking the injured Shivanna, he was not having any bleeding injuries, but he was in coma. They took the injured to the Government Hospital at Maralavadi Village and as the doctors were not available there they insisted him to take to a bigger hospital at Bangalore. Thereafter they brought back the injured to their place and by that time, the injured Shivanna succumbed to the injuries. Even as could be seen from the evidence of the DoctorPW5 he has deposed in the cross-examination that if the injured is hit with great force with weapon like MO.No.1, it is likely to cause bleeding injuries. He did not find any bleeding injuries on the body of the deceased. He has further admitted that there were no blood stains on the clothes of the deceased. When the said evidence is available before this Court, the said act of accused No.1 appears to be that though he might have assaulted with the clubMO.No.1, he was not having any intention to cause the death. A single lathy blow in a spur of moment resulting in death and the evidence produced by the prosecution establishes that the injury caused by accused No.1 is though fatal and at that time there was no intention or premeditation in the mind of accused No.1 to inflict injuries to the deceased as were likely to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In that light, the offence falls under Section 304 Part-II of IPC instead of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurmukh Singh Vs. In that light, the offence falls under Section 304 Part-II of IPC instead of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurmukh Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2009 (15) SCC 635 , wherein at paragraphs10, 21, 25 and 26, it has been observed as under: “10. We have carefully perused the judgments of the trial court and the High Court as also the evidence of witnesses. It is fully established from the evidence on record that the appellant had caused the injury to the deceased Hazoor Singh which proved fatal. xxx xxx xxx xxx 21. In the instant case, the occurrence had taken place on the spur of the moment. Only the appellant Gurmukh Singh inflicted a single lathi blow. The other accused have not indulged in any overt act. There was no intention or premeditation in the mind of the appellant to inflict such injuries to the deceased as were likely to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. On consideration of the entire evidence including the medical evidence, we are clearly of the view that the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained under Section 302 IPC, but the appropriate section under which the appellant ought to be convicted is Section 304 Part II IPC. xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. When we apply the settled principle of law which has been enumerated in the aforementioned cases, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained. In our considered view, the appellant/accused ought to have been convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC instead of under Section 302 IPC. 26. We accordingly convert the conviction and sentence of the appellant Gurmukh Singh from Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The fine as imposed by the trial court and as upheld by the High Court is maintained. The appellant would be entitled to get benefit of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” The aforesaid factual matrix has not been properly considered and appreciated by the trial Court. 16. The fine as imposed by the trial court and as upheld by the High Court is maintained. The appellant would be entitled to get benefit of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” The aforesaid factual matrix has not been properly considered and appreciated by the trial Court. 16. Be that as it may, even as could be seen from the evidence of PW.5, he has admitted during the course of cross-examination that if the injured had been treated at the right time he would have survived. When admittedly the injured was taken to the Government Hospital at Maralavadi, thereafter to Kanakapura and instead of taking him to Bangalore, they took him back to the village and at about 3.00 p.m. he succumbed to the injuries. This fact also substantiates the evidence of the DoctorPW5. Had he been treated immediately, there could have been every chance of he being survived. In that light, it appears that the death of the deceased was due to lack of treatment immediately after the incident. 17. Keeping in view the above factual situations, the contention taken up by the learned counsel for the accused/appellants appears to be acceptable and having a force of law. 18. In the light of the discussion held above, we are of the considered opinion that the accused Nos.1 and 6appellant Nos.1 and 6 herein are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304II of IPC instead of Section 302 of IPC. In so far as accused Nos.2 to 5 are concerned, there is no ample material to bring them under Sections 143, 302, 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. In that light, they are liable to be acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Accordingly, we pass the following: Appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 1.10.2015 passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara to sit at Kanakapura in SC.No.95/2008 as against accused Nos.2 to 5appellants 2 to 5 herein is set aside. They are acquitted of the offences punishable under Section Sections 143, 302, 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. In so far as the impugned judgment and order as against accused Nos.1 and 6appellants 1 and 6 herein are concerned, the same is modified. They are acquitted of the offences punishable under Section Sections 143, 302, 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. In so far as the impugned judgment and order as against accused Nos.1 and 6appellants 1 and 6 herein are concerned, the same is modified. Accused Nos.1 and 6appellants 1 and 6 are convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304II of the IPC and also under Sections 143, 506 r/w Section 149 of IPC. They are sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.15,000/(Rupees fifteen thousand only) each, in default, they shall undergo R.I. for further period of one year in respect of offence punishable under Section 304II of IPC. Further, they are sentenced to undergo S.I. for a period of two months for the offence punishable under Section 143 of IPC. They are also sentenced to undergo S.I. for a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 506 r/w Section 149 of IPC. All the sentences shall run concurrently. Accused Nos.1 and 6appellant Nos.1 and 6 herein are also entitled for set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. Accused Nos.2 to 5appellant Nos.2 to 5 herein shall be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case. In so far as Accused Nos.1 and 6appellants 1 and 6 herein are concerned, the prison authorities are directed to release them if they have served the sentence and if they are in custody and not required in any other case.