JUDGMENT : RAJENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. The appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment dated 15.11.2010 passed by Sessions Judge, Raisen; whereby, learned Trial Judge has acquitted appellants under Section 307 read with Section 34, 325/34, 506 IPC and convicted them under Section 294 and also under Section 323 read with Section 34 I.P.C and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and six months respectively and fine of Rs.500/- and Rs.1000/- respectively. 2. Prosecution case in nutshell is that on 20.7.2009, the complainant Kesri Singh (PW 2) lodged a report at Police Station Badi, district Raisen that when he was going towards village from his house, on the way in front of house of Vishal Singh Thakur, respondents/accused met him. They abused him and asked why the cow was driven away. Complainant Kesri Singh (PW 2) told them that as the cows were standing on the way, therefore, he was driving them away. On this accused Dinesh Thakur assaulted him with Baka on head and respondent/accused Rukmesh and Vinay gave him Lathi blows on the hands and legs. Complainant Kesri Singh cried then Vishal Singh Thakur and Surendra Singh reached the spot and intervened. Thereafter respondent/accused went away threatening him for life. Complainant Keshri Singh (PW 2) went to the Police Station but respondents/accused obstructed the way. Complainant Keshri Singh (PW 1) lodged report vide Ex. P-2). He was sent for medical examination. Dr. Devendra Singh Thakur (PW 1) examined him. Thereafter he was referred to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal for further treatment. During the course of investigation statement of witnesses were recorded, Lathi was seized and vide Punchnama Ex. P-8 and P-7 respondents/accused were arrested. After investigation charge-sheet was filed under Section 307 read with Section 34 and Sections 325, under Section 323 read with Section 34 and Section 506 I.P.C. 3. Learned Trial Court framed the charge under Section 294, 506, 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C. Respondents/accused abjured their guilt and pleaded innocence. Prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and respondents/accused did not examine any witness. Learned Trial Court found respondents/accused not guilty under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C and Section 506 I.P.C. Hence, acquited the respondent/accused of these charges. Learned Trial Court found that respondents/accused were guilty under Sections 294 and 323 I.P.C and, therefore, sentenced them accordingly. 4. Prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and respondents/accused did not examine any witness. Learned Trial Court found respondents/accused not guilty under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C and Section 506 I.P.C. Hence, acquited the respondent/accused of these charges. Learned Trial Court found that respondents/accused were guilty under Sections 294 and 323 I.P.C and, therefore, sentenced them accordingly. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. There are material contradiction and omissions in F.I.R as well as in the evidence of witnesses. Medical evidence is against the oral evidence so the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be set aside and appellant be acquitted. Apart from that if appellant was found guilty then they are entitled to get benefit under Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act. 5. Learned Govt. Advocate supports the case of the prosecution and contends that the judgment passed by learned Trial Court is just and proper and does not warrant any interference. 6. Now the question which arises for consideration, first, is that whether the appellants/accused caused injury on Keshri Singh (PW 2) and abused him by obscene words. 7. Keshri Singh (PW 2) has stated in his deposition that when he was going towards village from his house, a cow was standing on the way, therefore, he drove the said cow away the road, on account of which appellants/accused reached the spot. Appellants/accused asked him why he was driving away the cow. Then complainant abused him. Appellants/accused Dinesh took a Baka and assaulted him with Baka on the head of appellants/accused. Rukmesh and Vinay took the sticks. They assaulted him with sticks. His ribs were fractured. At that time Surendra Singh (PW 3) and Vishal Singh Thakur (PW 4) came to the spot. They intervened. His brother Navin Singh also reached the spot. Thereafter they had gone to Police Station Bharkutch. Appellants/accused met him on the way then he went to Police Station Badi. He lodged a report vide Ex. P-2. He was sent to Medical Hospital, Badi. Surendra Singh (PW 3) and Vishal Singh Thakur (PW 4) corroborates the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2). But, they reached the spot after incident. Dr. Devendra Thakur (PW 1) is Medical Officer, Primary Health Center, Badi. He lodged a report vide Ex. P-2. He was sent to Medical Hospital, Badi. Surendra Singh (PW 3) and Vishal Singh Thakur (PW 4) corroborates the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2). But, they reached the spot after incident. Dr. Devendra Thakur (PW 1) is Medical Officer, Primary Health Center, Badi. He deposed that he examined Keshri Singh (PW2) on 29.7.2009. He found lacerated wound on the left side of head in the parital area, lacerated wound on the left side of the head in parito occipital. His medical report is Ex. P-1. 8. Keshri Singh (PW 2) was admitted in National Hospital, Bhopal on 4.8.2009. Dr. K.K. Pateria (PW 8) examined Keshri Singh (PW 2) on 4.8.2009 at National Hospital, Bhopal. He found that the 7th and 8th ribs were fractured. The injury on the head was found to be grievous vide Ex. P-11. Dr. Tinu Singh (PW 11) also deposed that 7th and 8th ribs were fractured vide medical report Ex. P- 12 and X-ray Ex. P-13. She deposed there is no fracture on the head of Keshri Singh (PW 2) according to X-ray Ex. P-15 and P-16. It is proved from the aforesaid evidence that appellant accused inflicted the injury on Keshri Singh (PW 2) and abused using obscene words. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants argued before this Court that the testimony of Keshri Singh (PW 2), Surendra Singh (PW 3) and Vishal Singh (PW 4) is not reliable because they are interested witnesses. The solitary evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2) is not reliable. In the cross-examination of Keshri Singh (PW 2) there are material contradiction and omissions. 10. It is revealed from the evidence of Keshri Singh PW 2 that there is no previous enmity before the incident between Keshri Singh (PW 2) and appellant accused. The incident occurred due to a cow which was standing on the way. So there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2). It is open to the Court to convict the appellant on the basis of a single witness. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deny Bora v. State of Assam reported in [ (2014) 14 SCC 42 ) with regard to conviction on the basis of testimony of sole witness has held as under: "14. As we find, the conviction wholly rests on the sole testimony of PW-14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deny Bora v. State of Assam reported in [ (2014) 14 SCC 42 ) with regard to conviction on the basis of testimony of sole witness has held as under: "14. As we find, the conviction wholly rests on the sole testimony of PW-14. It is well settled in law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a singular witness. It has been held in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) that: "9...... as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. The same principle has been reiterated in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra[6] by stating that it is open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction, if the quality of the witness makes the testimony acceptable.” 11. Thus, the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2) is sufficient to hold that appellant accused caused injury on Keshri Singh. Medical evidence corroborates the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2) Surendra Singh (PW 3) and Vishal Singh Thakur (PW 4) are related to Keshri Singh (PW 2). They admit in their cross-examination that they reached the spot after incident. But the evidence of Keshri Singh (PW 2) is corroborated from the medical evidence of Dr. Defendra Singh Thakur (PW 1). Dr. K.K. Pateria (PW 8) and Dr. Tinu Singh (PW 11). 12. Minor contradictions and omissions on trivial matter without affecting the case of the prosecution does not require the Court to reject the evidence in its entirety. 13. In Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another, [(2010) 10 SCC 158] it is held by their the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “It is settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/ omissions/improvements/embellishments etc. had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. 13. In Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another, [(2010) 10 SCC 158] it is held by their the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “It is settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/ omissions/improvements/embellishments etc. had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, omissions or improvements on trivial matters without affecting the case of the prosecution should not be made the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Court after going through the entire evidence mush form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellant court in natural course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide : Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 ).” 14. So the findings of the learned Trial Court that the appellants inflicted injury on Keshri Singh (PW 2) and abused him by obscene words is based on proper and legal evidence. So in this view of the matter, in our opinion the learned Trial Court has rightly held the appellants of the aforesaid charges. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants argued on the point of sentence that the appellants/accused Rukmesh @ Yogiraj has been selected as Assistant Professor. He was 20 years old at the time of incident. He is not previously convicted. He is permanent resident of village Palkashri, Police Station Bharkutch. Appellant/accused Dinesh and Vinay are villagers. They are also not previously convicted. They are also permanent residents of village Palkashri. So they are entitled to get the benefit under Section 3 and 4 of Probation of Offenders Act. 16. Learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer and argued that there is no necessity to show any leniency. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1981 SC 643 ), Om Prakash and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1982 SC 783 ), Commandant 20 Bn. ITB Police v. Sanjay Binjoa (AIR 2001) SC 2058) and Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas and others [(1974) 4 SCC 22]. 18. In Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held: “1. ITB Police v. Sanjay Binjoa (AIR 2001) SC 2058) and Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas and others [(1974) 4 SCC 22]. 18. In Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held: “1. In this case, the question of dealing with the appellant under S. 360 Cr.P.C. remains to be considered. For this purpose we had directed that a report be called for from the Probation officer having jurisdiction. That report has been put in. His age, according to the Jail Doctor, was 24 years on 23-4-1973 which means that on the date of the offence, he was less than 21 years old. The offence, for which conviction has been rendered, is one which will be attracted by S. 360 or at any rate the Probation of offenders Act, 1958. The materials before us are imperfect because the Trial Court has been perfunctory in discharging its sentencing functions. We must emphasise that sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. The Trial Court should have collected materials necessary to help award a just punishment in the circumstances. The social background and the personal factors of the crime-doer are very relevant although in practice Criminal Courts have hardly paid attention to the social milieu or the personal circumstances of the offender. Even if S. 360 Cr.P.C. is not attracted, it is the duty of the sentencing Court to be activist enough to collect such facts as have a bearing on punishment with a rehabilitating slant. The absence of suck materials in the present case has left us with little assistance even from the counsel. Indeed members of the bar also do not pay sufficient attention to these legislative provisions which relate to dealing with an offender in such manner that he becomes a non-offender. We emphasis this because the legislations which relate to amelioration in punishment have been regarded as 'Minor Acts' and, therefore, of little consequence. This is a totally wrong approach and even if the Bar does not help, the Bench must fulfil the humanising mission of sentencing implicit in such enactments as the Probation of offenders Act. In the present case, the offender is a young person and his antecedents have no blemish. This is a totally wrong approach and even if the Bar does not help, the Bench must fulfil the humanising mission of sentencing implicit in such enactments as the Probation of offenders Act. In the present case, the offender is a young person and his antecedents have no blemish. His life is not unsettled or restless and the report indicates that he is an agriculturist, pursuing a peaceful vocation. His parents are alive and he has a wife and children to maintain. These are stabilizing factors in life. A long period of litigation and the little period of imprisonment suffered? will surely serve as a deterrent. We are mindful of the fact that a fire-arm has been used by the appellant and we cannot sleep over the gravity of the offence. Nevertheless, the report of the Probation officer states that the appellant is not given to any bad habits or stresses of poverty. A land dispute led to the crime and that does not survive any longer. The Probation officer recommends that an opportunity be given to the appellant to improve himself and bring up his family by honest labour as an agriculturist so that the interests of social defence may be secured. We are inclined to agree that in this case the appellant may be given the benefit of the Probation of offenders Act. We are satisfied that the offender has a fixed place of abode and regular occupation. We are inclined also to rely on the Probation officer's report which supports the direction for release on probation. We, therefore, direct that the appellant be released under S. 4 (1) of the Probation of offenders Act, 1958, and instead of sentencing him direct that he be released on his entering into a bond before the trial Court with two sureties, one of whom shall be his father, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of. three years from the date of release and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In addition, we pass an order that the Probation officer shall have supervision A over the offender for a period of one year and shall make reports once every three months to the Sessions Court about the conduct of the offender. In addition, we pass an order that the Probation officer shall have supervision A over the offender for a period of one year and shall make reports once every three months to the Sessions Court about the conduct of the offender. We direct further, that the appellant shall be specially supervised from the point of consumption of intoxicants and the matter brought to the notice of the Court in case the appellant violates. The undertaking to be incorporated in his bond shall contain a term that he shall not consume alcohol during the period covered by the bond. We allow the appeals in the manner above indicated.” 19. In Commandant 20 Bn. ITB Police v. Sanjay Binjoa (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “9. While allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order we direct that despite confirmation of conviction by the learned Sessions Judge, the respondent be given the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. Instead of sentencing him to any punishment, we direct the respondent to be released on his entering into a bond with two sureties, to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during the period of two years and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour The respondent shall furnish the bond and the sureties before the Trial Magistrate within a period of two months from today. We further hold respondent entitled to the benefit of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act.” 20. In Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas and others (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held: “11. The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jail term should normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the sentence which the society passes on convicts is relentless. The ignominy commonly associated with a jail term and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the. disease and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of being frustrated. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. disease and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of being frustrated. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in the interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social defiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail term, is apt to think that he has no more to lose or fear may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip that attitude in the bud. Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home. Edwin E. Sutherland raises it to a status of a convicted offender. 21. The appellants/accused are found to be guilty of committing an offence under Sections 294 and 323 read with Section 34 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and six months respectively with fine of Rs.500/- and Rs.1000/- respectively. Appellants/accused are not previously convicted. They are first offenders and permanent residents of village Palkashri. Dispute occurred due to trivial matter. Appellants/accused inflicted injury only once. Apart from that appellants/accused Yogiraj has passed the examination of Assistant Professor, at the time he was 20 years of age. Other appellants are agriculturists. They should not be punished with the sentence of imprisonment and they be benefited of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act. So the sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is hereby set aside. They are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged. It is ordered that appellants/accused be released on entering into a bond of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousands only) with one surety that they will not consume alcohol for a year, they will not get themselves involved in any other criminal activities and will spare the life in peaceful manner. They are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged. It is ordered that appellants/accused be released on entering into a bond of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousands only) with one surety that they will not consume alcohol for a year, they will not get themselves involved in any other criminal activities and will spare the life in peaceful manner. If they breach any condition then they will appear before the learned Trial Court and they will be reheard on the question of sentence. Apart from that it is considered that the complainant should be compensated. Therefore, each of the appellants/accused shall pay to the complainant an amount of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousands only) within a period of two months from this order. The amount of fine paid by them would be treated as cost of proceedings. The appellants/accused shall furnish the bond and surety before the learned Trial Court within a period of two months from today. We further hold that appellants/accused are entitled to the benefit of Section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act.