JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. The petitioner is the mother of Sri.Amal, S/o.Ramachandran. The petitioner alleges that her son (who will hereinafter be referred to as 'detenu' for convenience) was taken into preventive detention, under the provisions of the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (for short, 'the Act') on 27.07.2017 and she alleges that such action is illegal and in demonstrable violation of the constitutional protection available to her son. This writ petition has, therefore, been filed praying that a writ in the nature of habeas corpus be issued by this Court to produce her son before this Court and to set him at liberty finding that the proceedings, which led to his detention, are illegal and unlawful. 2. We have heard Sri.Hanis.M.H., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 3. The basal facts, cardinal for issues raised are that the detenu is alleged to have been involved in eight criminal cases during the period from April, 2014 till February, 2017. The cases in which the detenu stands implicated involve offences which attract rigorous punishment and accuses him of committing heinous crimes like causing grievous hurt, attempt to murder and murder. It appears that earlier a rowdy history-sheet was opened against the detenu, on 11.08.2015 and that action was also initiated under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on 18.09.2015, which proceeding was numbered as M.C.No.21 of 2015 by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Muvattupuzha. The records reveal that the detenu was enlarged on a bond to secure peace in such proceedings, but that he was still involved in commission of crimes after the said date. The last offence alleged against the detenu is stated to have happened on 22.02.2017, which led to Crime No.416 of 2017 being registered before the Kuruppampady Police Station. The allegations contained in the said crime is that the detenu, along with his gang, killed one Sunil of Kombanad Village by inflicting fatal injuries. The case records show that the said crime is under investigation and that the detenu was arrested on 02.03.2017 and detained under judicial custody until 07.06.2017, when he was enlarged on bail. 4. The allegations contained in the said crime is that the detenu, along with his gang, killed one Sunil of Kombanad Village by inflicting fatal injuries. The case records show that the said crime is under investigation and that the detenu was arrested on 02.03.2017 and detained under judicial custody until 07.06.2017, when he was enlarged on bail. 4. Since the detenu was seen to be a person involving himself in repeated offences and crimes and since he was exhibiting recidivistic tendencies, thus found to be a threat to social order and peace, a report under Section 3(1) of the Act was initiated by the District Magistrate, which was forwarded to the District Police Chief, Ernakulam (Rural). A copy of the said proceeding is available on record as Ext.P1. On the basis of this report, made under Section 3(1), the District Magistrate issued an order dated 23.07.2017 under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act ordering detention of the detenu. It is stated that the detenu was detained, by execution of the said order, on 27.07.2017 and that, as is required under the Statute, the proposal to continue his detention was made before the Government by the said authority on 03.08.2017. The Government is seen to have granted approval, under the provisions of Section 3(3) of the Act, to continue the detenu under detention, by its order dated 08.08.2017 and the statutorily mandated reference was made by the Government to the Advisory Board, constituted under the Act, on 14.08.2017. The Advisory Board, as we can see from the various proceedings before us, heard the detenu in person and finally gave their opinion, dated 31.08.2017, approving the order of detention, to the Government, which is stated to have been received by it on 13.09.2017. The Government, thereafter, in terms of the powers vested with it under Section 10(4) of the Act, issued a final order confirming the detention for a period of six months on 25.09.2017. This is the factual scenario in which this case has been filed by the petitioner alleging that the proceedings initiated against her son is illegal and unlawful. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the orders passed against the detenu primarily on six grounds. This is the factual scenario in which this case has been filed by the petitioner alleging that the proceedings initiated against her son is illegal and unlawful. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the orders passed against the detenu primarily on six grounds. For the first, he says that the legible copies of all the documents were not made available to the detenu; secondly, according to him, even though there were certain counter cases registered on information and complaints made by the detenu against the persons who claim to be the victims of the crimes in which he is the accused, the copies of such counter cases were not made available to the detenu at the time when he was detained; thirdly, the learned counsel submits that the last of the two crimes alleged against the detenu are still in the process of investigation and that nothing has been concluded against him to show that he was involved in the said crime; fourthly, the learned counsel submits that admittedly since the detenu was enlarged on bail on 07.06.2017 by the Court of the Principal Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, before which the crime which is alleged to be the last proximate incident against him is pending, there was no requirement to initiate proceedings under the Act to detain him within 15 days thereafter and that the conditions in the order granting bail would have been sufficient to ensure that the detenu did not have the opportunity to commit any further crime; fifthly, the learned counsel submits that there was an inordinate delay in disposing of Exts.P2 and P3 representations by the Government and he relies on certain precedents to assert that such delay is fatal and that the detenu will consequentially have to be enlarged on liberty; and the final contention is that Ext.P4, which is the order, confirming the initial order of detention under Section 3(3), of the Government is not issued by an authorised and competent officer and that it does not reveal any cogent reason or need for keeping the detenu under detention and therefore, that it is illegal and unlawful. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 opens his submissions in tune with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the said respondents. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 opens his submissions in tune with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the said respondents. According to him, the allegation that legible copies of the documents were not given to the detenu is completely untenable and without basis because according to him, the proceedings would show that he had received all such documents without any complaint. The learned Public Prosecutor adds that even assuming that one or two pages of the said documents were not legible, without admitting the same in any manner, the detenu would not automatically obtain a legally sustainable cause to claim that his detention is illegal and that he will have to establish through credible evidence that he was incapacitated in making his representation properly before the Advisory Committee or before the Government. The learned Public Prosecutor asserts that in this case, the petitioner or the detenu does not even plead that there was any such prejudice caused to them. 7. We have examined the documents produced on record by the petitioner, as Ext.P1 which is concededly the copies given to the detenu while he was taking into custody. The copies before this Court itself would show us that the contentions of the petitioner does not appear to be on firm ground. This is because the said documents are not illegible, except that some of the pages may be slightly faded, which could also be on account of the copying of the documents produced by the petitioner. Apart from the unsubstantiated allegation made by the petitioner, we are afraid that there is nothing on record to show that the papers were illegible or that the detenu had been prejudiced in any manner on account of some pages thereof being allegedly illegible. In any event, even going by the pleadings on record and the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, all the papers served on the detenu along with Ext.P1 were not illegible but only a few pages were allegedly so, but we do not see any specific assertion, being made by the petitioner or by the detenu, that they had stated this in their representation before the Government or the Advisory Board. In such circumstances, since this is essentially a question of fact, which is not within the domain of this Court to conclusively affirm on, we deem it appropriate not to consider the same any further. 8. As regards the second contention of the petitioner, that the detenu was not given the papers relating to the counter cases, that were allegedly filed at his instance against the persons shown as victims in the crimes in which he is the accused, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues that under the mandate of Section 7(1) of the Act, it is obligatory on the part of the authorities to give the detenu copies of all relevant documents on the basis of which he was declared as a known rowdy on the basis of which his detention was found necessary. 9. We have read the provisions of Section 7 of the Act and we notice that it mandates that the grounds of detention and copies of the materials relied on for such purpose shall be made available to the detenu as far as practicable. In other words, every practicable effort is to be taken to give the materials and the grounds on which the detenu is found to be a “known goonda” or a “known rowdy”, so as to enable him to make an effective representation or defence against such allegations. In the case at hand, what the detenu wants are copies of the counter cases filed at his instance, but not any materials or documents with respect to the crimes in which he has been found to be involved in. He does not have a case that the materials with respect to the crimes alleged against him were not given to him, but his allegation is that the materials with respect to the counter cases were not offered to him. We cannot find favour with this submission at all because the requirement to provide copies of counter cases filed by the detenu are not founded on the mandate of Section 7. No where in the said Section does it say that even such copies of documents will have to be given or that it will have to be furnished to the detenu and we do not see any particular or intelligible reason why such copies should be made available. No where in the said Section does it say that even such copies of documents will have to be given or that it will have to be furnished to the detenu and we do not see any particular or intelligible reason why such copies should be made available. This is because all that the Section provides is that the foundational basis of a person, for being declared as a “known rowdy” or “known goonda” and for ordering his detention be made available to him so as to give him an opportunity of drafting a proper representation and for formulating his defence and nothing more. This does not mean that every document including counter cases and such other initiated by the detenu will also have to be mandatorily made available and we cannot agree with the proposition that if such documents are not made available, the foundation of detention itself will fail. We, therefore, repel such contentions as being completely untenable. 10. As to the third contention impelled on behalf of the petitioner that the last two crimes shown in the detention order are still under investigation and that it has not ended in a final report is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner says that as long as the last two crimes have not been found proved by the Police in the final report, it ought not to have been included in the list of crimes, by the sponsoring authority while initiating proceedings under Section 3(1). We do not find favour with this submission because the Full Bench of this Court has already considered these issues in the judgment in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala [ 2017 (3) KHC 517 ] and has answered against this contention of the petitioner. One among us (P.R.Ramachandra Menon, J), who authored the judgment has concluded in the said judgment affirmatively as under: “10. KAAPA is an enactment providing for detention as several other preventive detention Statutes like Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act [COFEPOSA], National Security Act [NSA], Maintenance of Internal Security Act [MISA] etc. The detention in all preventive detention matters is not based on guilt of the detenue, but on the basis of strong suspicion to have indulged in objectionable activities which affect the society/nation at large. The detention in all preventive detention matters is not based on guilt of the detenue, but on the basis of strong suspicion to have indulged in objectionable activities which affect the society/nation at large. In other words, there is black and white difference between 'punitive detention' and 'preventive detention'; the former being a proceeding by way of imposition of punishment for the offence already committed by the accused; whereas in the case of the latter, it is only to prevent occurrence of any such act which is recorded as possible by virtue of the past conduct of the detenue. In the case of preventive detention, the mischief is more against the society at large, adversely affecting the 'public order', which is at a much higher pedestal than the pedestal occupied by the 'law and order' situation. By way of 'punitive detention', the undesirable consequences which have already been resulted [by virtue of commission of offence] cannot be ruled out and the sentence is only to punish the guilty and to send a message as to consequences to the public at large. But in the case of 'preventive detention', the probable damage to be caused is of much more magnitude, as it is likely to affect the 'public order' and hence the law makers have consciously decided to take preventive measures rather than cure, thus giving rise to such Statute to abate the possible repetition/recurrence of adverse act/offence and the consequence. At the same time, the basic liberty granted to the citizen in terms of Art.21 of the Constitution of India will have to be safeguarded. This was well in the minds of the framers of the constitution as well, who hence provided sufficient requirements by way of Art.22(5) and such other provisions as to the various procedures to be complied with in the matters of 'preventive detention' as it was an exception carved out to the personal liberty by way of Art.22(3)(b) of the Constitution. As made clear, by the Supreme Court, there is no charge sheet in a matter of preventive detention, unlike the matters of punitive detention. Reasonable chance for repetition of the acts/offence, based on the past conduct of the detenue, if discernible from the materials produced, is sufficient for the detaining authority to record his satisfaction and to pass an order of detention. Reasonable chance for repetition of the acts/offence, based on the past conduct of the detenue, if discernible from the materials produced, is sufficient for the detaining authority to record his satisfaction and to pass an order of detention. Such reasons/grounds need not conclusively prove the guilt of the accused as in the case of punitive detention - wherein the degree of proof required to find a person guilty and to impose punishment is beyond all reasonable doubts. As it stands so, the expression used "found in any investigation" by the police/investigating officer, as used in S.2(o)(ii) or S.2(p)(iii) of the KAAPA, cannot be misunderstood or misconstrued as analogous to the level for arriving at the guilt of the accused for imposing any punishment on proving the guilt.” 11. In such view of the matter, we do not require to consider these contentions any further since the view of the Full Bench is binding on us and we find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom. 12. The further contention raised before us is that there is inordinate delay in the disposal of the representations of the petitioner by the Government. We notice that the petitioner had made Ext.P2 representation before the Government and Ext.P3 representation before the Board, both of which are dated 04.08.2017. The underpinning of the petitioner's allegation of delay is that Ext.P4 reply was issued only on 19.08.2017. The petitioner says that there is thus a delay of 15 days and that this would render the entire proceedings illegal. These allegations have been answered by the respondents in their respective counter affidavits. The first respondent - State of Kerala has explained in its counter affidavit, dated 08.11.2017, that there was no delay at all in disposing of the representation made before it because the said representation was received by the Government only on 09.08.2017 and it was disposed of on 19.08.2017. The deponent of the said affidavit, who is the Deputy Secretary to the Home Department, Government of Kerala, has averred that the Government of Kerala had to consider the representation “properly, impartially, carefully and expeditiously and, therefore, that a few days was taken to put their minds to the representation and take a final decision thereon”. The deponent of the said affidavit, who is the Deputy Secretary to the Home Department, Government of Kerala, has averred that the Government of Kerala had to consider the representation “properly, impartially, carefully and expeditiously and, therefore, that a few days was taken to put their minds to the representation and take a final decision thereon”. We do not think that the time taken by the Government to dispose of Ext.P2, namely about 9 or 10 days, would in any manner be unconscionably long or that it would be a reason why the proceedings itself would stand vitiated. These issues are concluded against the petitioner by the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in K.M.Abdulla Kunhi and B.L.Abdul Khader v. Union of India [ 1991 (1) SCC 476 ]. The affirmative declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court resides in paragraph 12 of the said judgment, which is apposite to be read in full and is, therefore, extracted as under: “12. The representation relates to the liberty of the individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in Art.21 of our Constitution. Clause (5) of Art.22 therefore, casts a legal obligation on the Government to consider the representation as early as possible. It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu submits his representation to consider the representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. The words "as soon as may be" occurring in Clause (5) of Art.22 reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement however, is that there should not be supine indifference slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. This has been emphasised and re - emphasised by a series of decisions of this Court.” 13. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. This has been emphasised and re - emphasised by a series of decisions of this Court.” 13. It is, therefore, obvious that going by the declaration of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as afore, the submissions of the learned counsel with respect to the alleged delay, in disposing of Ext.P2 representation by the Government, is completely without substance. 14. In any event of the matter, it is admitted before us that the petitioner had simultaneously made Ext.P3 representation before the Advisory Board and that the said Board had considered the same while making their recommendation before the Government. This is pertinent because as per Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Act, the detenu is given an option of making representation either to the Government or to the Advisory Board and since such option is vested with the detenu, he can invoke it either by making a representation to both the authorities or to one of them and the fact that such a representation was considered by the Advisory Board and the fact that the Government had issued Ext.P4 in disposal of Ext.P2 representation would make it ineluctable that the mandate of the said Section had been complied with by the authorities in its full import. These submissions are therefore without merit and are, therefore, repelled. 15. Calling attention to the next and fourth contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the detenu need not have been detained under the provisions of the Act, since he has been already enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court on certain very strict conditions. According to him, since the detenu has been directed by the said court to appear before the investigating officer on periodic basis, that itself would be sufficient to ensure that he would not engage himself in deleterious activities and that he would be incapacitated from committing any further acts of crime. The learned counsel also refers to various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to drive home his contention that when a detenu is under the rigor of bail conditions, there is no requirement for an order of detention to be issued against him. The learned counsel also refers to various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to drive home his contention that when a detenu is under the rigor of bail conditions, there is no requirement for an order of detention to be issued against him. He refers to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rekha v. State of T.N. Tr. Sec. to Govt. and Another [2011 KHC 4268], T.V.Sravanan Alias S.A.R. Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi v. State through Secretary and another [2006 KHC 133] and Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another [ (1991) 1 SCC 128 ] and contends that when a detenu is on bail in a crime, which led to the initiation of action for preventive detention, it is not necessary for such proceedings of law to be maintained against him. 16. We have considered these precedentially binding judgments quite in detail. It is perspicuous from the facts presented therein, that these cases were ones in which the detenu was still in jail without an application of bail being moved when the orders of detention was issued against him. Their Lordships, therefore, found that when a person is in jail, on account of remand by a competent criminal court, without even an application for bail being presented by him, it would not be necessary to initiate action for preventive detention, since he is already suffering incarceration. In fact, these issues were further spoken to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Champion R. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya and another [2015 KHC 5604] wherein their Lordships, after considering the various judgments in this area, in particular T.V.Sravanan Alias (supra), held as under: “14. In the instant case, though the detention order and even the grounds of detention record the factum of the appellant's being in custody, no satisfaction has been recorded by the detaining authority that there was reliable material before the authority on the basis of which it would have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail. It is not mentioned as to whether any bail application was even moved by the appellant or not, what to take out likely fate of such an application. The order is also conspicuously silent on the aspect as to whether there was any probability of indulging in activity if the appellant would be released on bail. It is not mentioned as to whether any bail application was even moved by the appellant or not, what to take out likely fate of such an application. The order is also conspicuously silent on the aspect as to whether there was any probability of indulging in activity if the appellant would be released on bail. On the contrary, we are amazed that the averments made in the counter - affidavit which are self - defeating and clinching the issue against the respondent at p. 171 Para 3 of the paper book which reads as under: "3. I state that the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the detaining authority was satisfied that there was some likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and thereafter the detention order was passed to prevent such contingency is completely unfounded. In fact the detention order was passed on 29-1-2013 and from the detention order it no way reflects that with a view to pre - empt the petitioner from getting the bail in the pending 8 criminal cases that the detention 0.2013 was passed. In fact after noticing the fact that the petitioner was arrested by the police in various unlawful activities and crimes like extortion, dacoity, kidnapping, murder and robbery with deadly weapons for ransom, for disruption of public order, etc. and being satisfied that if the petitioner is allowed to remain at large he would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and shall be a constant threat to peace that the detention order was passed under S.3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995.” 17. Interestingly, though cited by the petitioner to support his contention that when a person is already in jail, there is no requirement of using a detention order against him, in Kamarunnissa (supra) the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were quite to the contrary and we see that the learned Public Prosecutor is also relying on the same judgment to assert the position of law otherwise. In paragraph 13 thereof, which is extracted below, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the particular question of law without any room for doubt that when a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances so demand, resort can be made to the law of preventive detention: “13. In paragraph 13 thereof, which is extracted below, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the particular question of law without any room for doubt that when a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances so demand, resort can be made to the law of preventive detention: “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav, ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This stems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.” 18. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.” 18. The declaratory umbra of the judgments above would thus render the contentions of the petitioner, that no person already under incarceration can be proceeded under the law of preventive detention, untenable and gelded. It can garner no forensic force and hence fails. 19. Coming to the final contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exhibit P4 order has been issued by an officer, who had no legal authority to do so and that since it does not speak in detail of the reasons for ordering detention, it is in conflict with the mandate of the Act, we notice that the said order has been issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Secret Cell) Department, Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram. We are, therefore, unable to understand the basis of the submission that Exhibit P4 has been issued by the incompetent authority. We cannot find any greater authority than the Additional Chief Secretary (Home Department) as per the provisions of the Rules of Business of the Government to pass such order on behalf of the Government. In any event, nothing has been placed on record to substantiate this claim and in the absence of any such effort on the part of the petitioner, we do not deem it necessary to consider the submission at all and we repel it as being without merit. 20. The only surviving limb of the contention, against Exhibit P4 order, is thus as regards the quality of its contents and the petitioner's assertion on this is that it does not record the specific reasons that went through the minds of the authority while issuing the said order under. The learned counsel avouches that it is a non-speaking order and it does not state anything as to why the petitioner should be kept under detention. We are unable to accede to the submission either, because Exhibit P4 is only an order passed under Section 10(4) of the Act. The learned counsel avouches that it is a non-speaking order and it does not state anything as to why the petitioner should be kept under detention. We are unable to accede to the submission either, because Exhibit P4 is only an order passed under Section 10(4) of the Act. It is a continuation of the process that was initiated on the basis of the report of the sponsoring authority, which obtained the confirmation of the Government earlier under Section 3(3) and being thereafter guided by the report of the Advisory Committee under Section 10(1) of the Act. The requisition of the sponsoring authority states the reasons under which it was made before the District Magistrate and the subsequent order of detention issued by the District Magistrate also make it ineluctable that such order was being issued taking into account the various factors and circumstances that were presented against the detenu. The Government, while it initially acted under Section 3(3) of the Act, had obviously considered this also while confirming the period of detention beyond the initial period of twelve days statutorily fixed under Section 3 of the Act and since the recommendation of the Advisory Board was also that the petitioner be kept under further detention, all that the Government required under Section 10(4) is to independently consider whether there is any ground for not continuing his detention and as to whether the period originally fixed by the District Magistrate and confirmed by the Advisory Board should be altered in any manner. In Exhibit P4, the competent authority has found neither and has chosen to confirm the earlier orders of the Government in tune and line with the recommendations made by the Advisory Board under Section 10(1) of the Act. We, therefore, do not see any reason why the authority should have spoken as if it was making a first order relating to the detention of the detenu, other than to conclude cogently on the basis of all the factors and materials that were taken against the detenu while passing the detention order. This having been done in this case, we cannot find sustenance with this submission and we, therefore, do not deem it necessary to answer it any further. 21. This having been done in this case, we cannot find sustenance with this submission and we, therefore, do not deem it necessary to answer it any further. 21. After exhausting all contentions as above, the learned counsel for the petitioner invokes a reference to the judgment of a Bench of this Court in Anitha Bruse v. State of Kerala [2008 (2) KHC 742] and contends that since the final order of the Government under Section 10(4) of the Act was not issued within a period of nine weeks from the date of detention, it fails in law and therefore, that the entire proceedings relating to the detention will have to be set aside. We understand that the submission is based on the fact that in Anitha Bruse (supra), this Court had passingly remarked that the period within which the Government has to pass a final order under Section 10(4) is nine weeks from the date of detention or 63 days. We, however, also notice that in a subsequent judgment, this particular observation was taken note of and it was concluded that it does not confirm to the statutory prescriptions under the Act. In Sarojini v. Union of India [2009 KHC 1134], another Division Bench of this Court specifically looked at this observation made by the Bench in Anitha Bruse (supra) and said as under: “11. The learned counsel contends that a conjoint reading of S. 10(1) and S.10(4) of the KAAPA must lead this Court to the conclusion that the order under S.10(4) must also be passed within nine weeks of the date of detention. From the plain language of S.10(1) and 10(4) or by the scheme of S.10, this contention does appear to us to be acceptable. Time limit is prescribed for submission of the opinion of the Advisory Board. No time limit is prescribed for passing the order confirming detention under S.10(4) of the KAAPA. Of course, it does not say or imply that the Government can pass an order under S.10(4) at such time when it pleases them. The right of a person to make a representation against his detention to the Government and the Advisory Board is well recognised under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and S.7(2) of the KAAPA. Of course, it does not say or imply that the Government can pass an order under S.10(4) at such time when it pleases them. The right of a person to make a representation against his detention to the Government and the Advisory Board is well recognised under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and S.7(2) of the KAAPA. The right to make a representation brings with it the obligation to consider the same as also the obligation to consider the same effectively, efficaciously and expeditiously. Even though no specific period is prescribed for passing an order under S.10(4) confirming the order of detention, when the opinion shows that there is sufficient cause to continue the detention, it will inevitably have to be held that the detenu cannot be kept in suspended animation not knowing what order has been passed under S.10(4) of the KAAPA. If there be unreasonable and unexplained delay between the submission of the report by the Advisory Board and consequent order passed under S.10(4), certainly the detenu will be entitled to take advantage of that unexplained and unjustifiable gap of time. S.10(4) of the KAAPA further shows that when the opinion of the Advisory Board is that there is no sufficient cause for detention, the order must be passed 'forthwith'. Having said so, in respect of that category of cases, it may not be irrelevant to note that such a stipulation has not been made in respect of the order of confirmation of detention to be passed under S.10(4) when the opinion shows that there is sufficient cause for detention. At any rate, we agree that the order has to be passed expeditiously after getting the report of the Advisory Board, though no specific time limit is prescribed for passing such an order.” 22. The position of law is, therefore, clear that the period of nine weeks or 63 days mandated under Section 10(1) of the Act is applicable only to the report to be obtained from the Advisory Board and that the Government may, thereafter, issue an order within a reasonable time. No particular time frame is fixed for the Government to act under Section 10(4) or to issue a final order there under, but the desideratum is that it shall be done at the earliest possible time. No particular time frame is fixed for the Government to act under Section 10(4) or to issue a final order there under, but the desideratum is that it shall be done at the earliest possible time. In the case at hand, we notice that the report of the Advisory Board, containing its opinion, is dated 31.08.2017 and that it is received by the Government on 13.09.2017. The final order under Section 10(4) of the Act was thereafter issued by the Government on 25.09.2017, which is merely 12 days after the date on which the report of the Advisory Board was received by them. This can, by no stretch of imagination, be seen to be delayed in any manner and we cannot find that the submissions of the petitioner in this regard to be justified in any manner whatsoever. 23. At this point of time, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the detenu has got only another five or six days for his release and that since his father is in the Intensive Care Unit on account of some grave indisposition, he should be given an interim respite. We are afraid that this is not something which is within the powers of this Court and if at all the detenu wanted any such indulgence, it should have moved the Government under Section 14 of the Act, which invests the Government with such powers. Such powers are not within the jurisdictional purlieu of this Court and we are incapable of acceding to any such request. In summation, we are presented with no reason or cause to interfere with the order of detention or the orders of its confirmation against the detenu and we, therefore, can do nothing else but to dismiss this writ petition, confirming the orders impugned herein as having been issued legally and in terms of the relevant provisions of the Statute.