JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant, one of the victims, calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 14th March 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad below Exhibit-11 in Criminal Case No.1849 of 2011, by which the Metropolitan Magistrate ordered release of the respondent No.2 - original accused on bail on the accused being produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate on bring arrested pursuant to a non-bailable warrant issued in connection with the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarised as under: 2.1 On 8th September, 2011, one First Information Report being I-C.R. No.256 of 2011 came to be registered against the respondent No.1 herein with the Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent No.2 herein. 2.2 The respondent No.2 - original accused came to be arrested in connection with the above referred F.I.R. 2.3 On completion of the investigation, the Investigating Agency filed chargesheet dated 24th November 2011 against the respondent No.2 herein for the offences enumerated above. 2.4 The respondent No.2 preferred an application for bail in the City Sessions Court at Ahmedabad being the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4841 of 2011. The said bail application came to be allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.14, Ahmedabad vide order dated 28th December 2011 subject to certain terms and conditions. 2.5 The operative part of the order passed by the Court below releasing the respondent No.2 on bail is extracted hereunder: "The bail application of the applicant in respect of the offence registered vide Navrangpura Police Station First C.R.No.256/2011 under section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 34, 120-B, 506(2), is hereby granted. The applicant of this case is ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing solvent surety of Rs.20,000/- and bail bond of the like amount, subject to the following conditions. CONDITIONS :- (1) The applicant shall produce the certified copy of the sale deed executed in favour of the complainant within 15 days after his release on bail or after the end of the strike of the employees of E-dhara. CONDITIONS :- (1) The applicant shall produce the certified copy of the sale deed executed in favour of the complainant within 15 days after his release on bail or after the end of the strike of the employees of E-dhara. He shall settle the account with the remaining witnesses within four months and make the payment in that regard and submit the pursis thereof before the court. Failure to comply with this condition shall render the bail automatically cancelled. (2) The applicant shall not tamper with the evidence of prosecution or the witnesses and shall never attempt to induce the witnesses. (3) The applicant shall furnish his residential address and shall not change it without permission of the court. (4) The applicant shall not leave the limits of Gujarat State without permission of the court. (5) The applicant shall surrender the passport, if any. (6) The applicant shall not engage in such type of offence or shall not commit any type of act breaching public tranquility until final disposal of this case. (7) The applicant shall produce the surety before the subordinate court." 2.6 Thus, a condition was imposed that the respondent No.2 shall settle the accounts with the victims within a period of four months and make the necessary payment. The learned Sessions Judge clarified that if the conditions were not complied with, then the bail would stand automatically cancelled. 2.7 It appears that the respondent No.2 was unable to comply with the terms and conditions of grant of bail. In such circumstances, he preferred an application being the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1533 of 2012 in the City Sessions Court seeking necessary modification in the conditions. 2.8 The modification application came to be disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.19, Ahmedabad (city) in the following terms: "(2) By way of this application, the applicant has prayed for extension of further 6 months for compliance of condition No.1 which was imposed in the order dtd. 28.12.2011 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.4841 of 2011. (3) The learned advocate for the applicant has submitted that due to weak economic condition of the applicant, he is unable to comply with condition No.1 and four months time is required for the compliance. (4) The learned APP has not taken objection against this application. 28.12.2011 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.4841 of 2011. (3) The learned advocate for the applicant has submitted that due to weak economic condition of the applicant, he is unable to comply with condition No.1 and four months time is required for the compliance. (4) The learned APP has not taken objection against this application. Considering the facts and circumstances of the applicant and bona fides (honest intention) of the applicant, the State has no objection, if time as prayed for is granted. (5) Having heard the respective parties and having considered the material on record, it appears that while passing the order in Criminal Misc. Application No.4841 of 2011, appropriate time was given to the applicant to comply with condition No.1. Even after expiry of this period, the applicant has not complied with the said condition. The reason shown for non compliance is not absolutely satisfactory. The applicant has not placed material on record to show change in circumstances after passing of the said order. Further, instead of cancelling the bail, this court is inclined to give one more last opportunity to comply with the said condition by granting further time upto 15th May 2012. Hence, the following order:- ORDER The application is partly allowed. It is ordered that the applicant shall comply with the condition No.1 of the order dated 28.12.2011 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.4841 of 2011 latest by 15th May 2012. The applicant shall produce a purshish of compliance on 16th May 2012, otherwise his bail stand automatically cancelled and the applicant shall surrender himself before the trial Court. The rest of the conditions of the order dated 28.12.2011 shall remain in force." 2.9 Thus, the respondent No.2 was directed to comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order on or before by 15th May 2012. 2.10 The order passed by the Sessions Judge dated 4th May 2012 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1533 of 2012 extending the time period to comply with the conditions upto 15th May 2012 was noted by the Metropolitan Magistrate i.e. the Trial Court was taken on record. The respondent No.2 failed to comply with the terms and conditions by 15th May 2012. He failed to place on record the compliance report, as directed by the Sessions Court. 3. The respondent No.2 failed to comply with the terms and conditions by 15th May 2012. He failed to place on record the compliance report, as directed by the Sessions Court. 3. In such circumstances referred to above, the Metropolitan Magistrate thought fit to issue a non-bailable warrant vide order dated 17th May 2012 against the respondent No.2 and also issued notice to the surety of the respondent No.2. 4. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, by his order dated 26th July 2012, cancelled the bail of the respondent No.2 and forfeited the amount of surety. 5. It appears that thereafter respondent No.2 herein remained absconding for a period of six years. On 6th March 2018, the respondent No.2 came to be arrested by the police and was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad. On the respondent No.2 being produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, he filed a bail application and the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad allowed the same and ordered the release of the respondent No.2 on bail. The impugned order is extracted hereunder:- "(1) The present application has been filed on 06/03/18 after issuance of arrest warrant against the applicant/accused and after he was arrested, which is pending for hearing. The written objections raised against the application and documentary evidences have been produced vide exhibit no. 13 and exhibit no. 16 respectively for victim witnesses. At the time of hearing of this application, as learned advocate for witness and learned advocate for the accused demanded adjournment, the same was granted. The learned advocates for the parties were heard today in connection with application. The In-charge learned A.P.P. Mr. Vyas was heard. It is pertinent to note that present applicant/accused has been arrested with arrest warrant and has been produced in this court. As per the provision of Cr.P.C. for appearance of the accused during the trial, present accused has been arrested with arrest warrant and brought in this court. The accused was released on bail by the order of Sessions Court. It is mainly submitted by witnesses/victim that as he has not complied with order of the Sessions Court, it is requested not to release the applicant/accused on bail. Further, he states that as applicant/accused has breached conditions imposed by the Sessions Court, it is requested to reject bail application. It is mainly submitted by witnesses/victim that as he has not complied with order of the Sessions Court, it is requested not to release the applicant/accused on bail. Further, he states that as applicant/accused has breached conditions imposed by the Sessions Court, it is requested to reject bail application. He has further submitted that as per the order of Sessions Court, applicant/accused had to pay money to the witnesses within four months, and the said condition has been breached by him. Thereafter, applicant/accused made application to the Sessions Court to extend time and the same was granted by the Sessions Court and time for 4 months more was granted, which has also been violated. Thereafter, witnesses submitted application to reject bail application of the applicant/accused. (2) The learned advocate for the accused has mainly submitted that he executed M.O.U. with the complainant and paid total two crores ninety seven lakh for witnesses/victim mentioned in the complaint. The learned advocate Mr. M.R. Vaidh for the accused has brought to the notice of this court the fact of having paid money by the accused to the complainant and victim. Therefore, this court has to see in the present application as to whether accused arrested with arrest warrant should be kept in judicial custody during the trial or can he appear during the trial if he is released on bail/kept out of judicial custody? (3) The present applicant/accused is a resident of Ahmedabad and he has been arrested with arrest warrant from the new address submitted by the victim. Looking to all these circumstances, it is reasonable and just if conditions are imposed on the applicant/accused so that his presence can be secured during the trial and he may not cause delay in the trial. The present case pertains to 2011 and charge has not been framed till date. Therefore, his presence is required to frame charge against him. The accused no. 2 regularly appears in the court on each date of the case. Thus, it is reasonable and just if applicant/accused is released on bail subject to conditions. Therefore, the following order is passed. ORDER :- The order is passed to release the applicant/accused on bail with local surety of Ahmedabad for Rs. 5,00,000/- (Five Lakh rupees) subject to following conditions. 2 regularly appears in the court on each date of the case. Thus, it is reasonable and just if applicant/accused is released on bail subject to conditions. Therefore, the following order is passed. ORDER :- The order is passed to release the applicant/accused on bail with local surety of Ahmedabad for Rs. 5,00,000/- (Five Lakh rupees) subject to following conditions. Conditions:- (1) The applicant/accused shall have to appear in this court on 04/05/18 without fail to frame charge, failing to which, his present bail shall automatically stand cancelled. The arrest warrant shall be issued against him and it will be ordered to conduct trial against him as under trial prisoner. (2) If applicant/accused is holding passport, passport be deposited in this court within 3 days without fail. If he is not holding the passport, affidavit in that regard be submitted in this court. (3) If applicant/accused does not appear after charge is framed, the learned advocate for the accused shall have to cross examine witnesses by submitting his exemption application, failing to which, order will be passed to cancel bail of present applicant/accused." 6. Being dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, the applicant, one of the victims, is here before this Court questioning the legality and validity of the same. 7. Mr. Rahul Dholakia, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate could be termed as without jurisdiction. Mr. Dholakia submitted that the accused was ordered to be released on bail by the Sessions Court subject to certain terms and conditions. Those terms and conditions were not complied with by the accused and in such circumstances, the bail stood cancelled. If the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court, while releasing the accused, are not complied with and if the bail is cancelled and the accused thereafter is arrested pursuant to the non-bailable warrant issued by the Court, then, in no circumstances, the Magistrate could have released the accused on bail on his production by the police. 8. Mr. Dholakia submitted that even otherwise, the Magistrate could not have exercised discretion in favour of the accused under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. because the accused has been charged with the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C., which is punishable with life imprisonment. 9. 8. Mr. Dholakia submitted that even otherwise, the Magistrate could not have exercised discretion in favour of the accused under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. because the accused has been charged with the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C., which is punishable with life imprisonment. 9. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed and the bail of the accused be cancelled. 10. The learned A.P.P. appearing for the State also submitted that the impugned order passed by the Magistrate could be termed as a nullity and without jurisdiction. The learned A.P.P. submitted that the Magistrate dealt with the matter in a very casual manner, more particularly, when the accused came to be arrested after a period of six years. The learned A.P.P. submitted that the impugned order releasing the accused on bail is nothing, but a travesty of justice. 11. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned A.P.P. prayed that the impugned order be quashed and the bail be cancelled. 12. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Vishal Anandjiwala, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 - original accused. 13. Mr. Anandjiwala would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Magistrate in releasing the accused on bail. According to Mr. Anandjiwala, it was well within the powers and jurisdiction of the Magistrate to release the accused on bail once he was produced by the police after his arrest. 14. Mr. Anandjiwala submitted that although the accused has been charged with the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C. which is punishable with life imprisonment, yet as the offence is triable by the Magistrate, the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to release the accused on bail in exercise of its powers under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Anandjiwala would submit that the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. Anandjiwala would submit that the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. It is only if the offence is punishable with both i.e. death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life, then the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to release the accused on bail in exercise of his powers under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Anandjiwala submitted that as such so far as the matter on hand is concerned, the issue with regard to the power of the Magistrate to grant bail to an accused charge with the offence of forgery of valuable security punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C. does not arise, because the accused was already released on bail by the Sessions Court. The Magistrate had to consider the bail application filed by the accused as the accused came to be arrested pursuant to a nonbailable warrant issued and was produced in the Court of the Magistrate. Therefore, according to Mr. Anandjiwala, the Magistrate was not called upon to decide the bail application on merits, but thought fit to pass the impugned order as the police arrested the accused and produced him in the Court. 15. Mr. Anandjiwala, in support of his submissions, placed reliance on the following decisions: [1] Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) CrLJ 515 [2] Ishan Vasant Deshmukh @ Pasad Vasant Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 MahLJ 361 [3] Satyan vs. State, (1981) CrLJ 1313 16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel appearing for the accused prayed that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Magistrate committed any error in passing the impugned order. 18. I have no hesitation in accepting the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant as well as the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State that the impugned order is nothing, but a mockery of justice. 18. I have no hesitation in accepting the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant as well as the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State that the impugned order is nothing, but a mockery of justice. I fail to understand how the Magistrate could have released the accused on bail, more particularly, when the bail of the accused granted by the Sessions Court came to be cancelled for noncompliance of the terms and conditions imposed in the order of the bail. The accused was granted time by the Sessions Court to comply with the terms and conditions. The accused, thereafter, prayed for modification of the terms and conditions and the Sessions Judge thought fit to grant some more time to the accused to comply with the terms and conditions making it very explicitly clear that the failure to comply with the terms and conditions shall lead to cancellation of bail automatically. Even after sufficient time was extended by the Sessions Court to comply with the conditions, the accused failed to do so and in such circumstances, the bail came to be cancelled. As soon as the bail came to be cancelled, the accused absconded. A non-bailable warrant had to be issued by the Magistrate. The accused remained absconding for a period of six years. With great difficulty, the police was able to effect arrest of the accused after six years and the day the accused came to be arrested and was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, he came to be released on bail. This ignorance of law on the part of the concerned Presiding Officer is very disturbing. Even while the Magistrate. Vide the impugned order, granted bail to the accused, the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court in the original bail order remained unfulfilled and remains unfulfilled even as on date. The impugned order is nothing, but travesty of justice. The impugned order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate could be termed as without jurisdiction. 19. I could have stopped over here and closed the judgment by quashing the impugned order thereby cancelling the bail of the accused. However, I would like to say something with regard to the powers of the Magistrate under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. to release an accused on bail in connection with an offence, which is punishable for imprisonment of life. However, I would like to say something with regard to the powers of the Magistrate under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. to release an accused on bail in connection with an offence, which is punishable for imprisonment of life. To put it in other words, the power or the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to release an accused on bail in connection with an offence wherein one of the punishments is imprisonment for life. The issue I propose to discuss may not have any direct bearing so far as the matter on hand is concerned because I have thought fit to cancel the bail not on the ground that the Magistrate could not have released the accused on bail because one of the offences he is charged with is Section 467 I.P.C. punishable with imprisonment for life. I am saying so because the accused was already ordered to be released on regular bail by the Sessions Court. It is only after the accused was arrested pursuant to a non-bailable warrant that the Magistrate released the accused on bail. In the course of my previous sitting, I came across few matters, in which I noticed that the Magistrate thought fit to release the accused on bail in cases of offences although triable by a Court of Magistrate, yet one of the punishments prescribed is imprisonment for life. It appears that few judicial officers in the State are labouring under a serious misconception of law that although the offences punishable under Sections 326, 409 and 467 of the I.P.C., as the case may be, are punishable with imprisonment for life, yet as they are magistrate triable offences and there is also a discretion to impose sentence which may extend upto 10 years, it would be within the power and jurisdiction of the Magistrate to release such accused on bail under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. I further noticed that in some of the cases, reliance was placed on the two decisions of the Bombay High Court noted above. 20. I must first set out the provisions of Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. "437. 20. I must first set out the provisions of Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.- (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-incharge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or court of Session, he may be released on bail, but (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence. Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court: (2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, subject to the provisions of section 446A and pending such inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as herein-after provided. Sub-section (3) empowers the Court to impose conditions while releasing the accused on bail. (4) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing. (5) and (6) ... ... ... (7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered." 21. The word 'bail' has not been defined under the Cr. P.C. although under the definition Section 2, an offence is either bailable or nonbailable. Section 436 Cr. P.C. contains the provisions for bail in bailable offences. Sections 437 and 439 Cr. P.C. arc in respect of non-bailable offences, which may be again categorised into three categories: (i) non-bailable offences triable by a Magistrate; (ii) non bailable offences triable by a Sessions Judge; and (iii) non bailable offences triable by a Sessions Court where punishment provided is life imprisonment or death. 22. In the event of arrest of a person accused/suspected to be involved in committing a non-bailable offence, the question whether the person is to be released on bail or not depends upon the gravity of the offence and such gravity is required to be considered on the basis of the punishment provided for the offence. Section 437 Cr. P.C. basically concerns the Magistrate before whom the accused appears or is brought. Under the law, the accused is produced before a Magistrate only and he cannot be produced before the Sessions Court or the High Court. Even in a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, where a Magistrate has absolutely no power to consider or grant bail to an accused, the latter is produced on arrest before the Magistrate only. 23. Even in a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, where a Magistrate has absolutely no power to consider or grant bail to an accused, the latter is produced on arrest before the Magistrate only. 23. In the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another, 2004 7 SCC 539 , the Apex Court held that Article 21 which guarantees personal liberty also contemplates deprivation of personal liberty by procedure established by law and a person accused of commission of a non-bailable offence could be detained in custody during the pendency of trial unless enlarged on bail in accordance with the provisions of law and such detention is not violative of Article 21. The Apex Court further held that even the persons accused of non-bailable offence are entitled to bail if the Court concerned comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against him, and /or if the Court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded that in spite of existence of a prima facie case, there is a need to release such person on bail where fact situations require it to do so. 24. Thus, I find that a Magistrate has the jurisdiction to consider the prayer for bail of a person accused of commission of a non bailable offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. However, in order to release an accused on bail, the Magistrate is required to record a specific finding that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In view of the embargo provided under Sub-clause (i) and Subclause (ii), the Magistrate entertaining a bail application under Section 437 shall have a very limited scope to consider bail. 25. So far the other provisions of the proviso regarding the accused being a woman or sick or infirm, the Apex Court has held time and again that the above proviso does not grant any indefeasible right to a woman accused or sick or infirm accused to obtain bail in a heinous crime. The Apex Court in the case of Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT, Delhi and another, (2001) 4 SCC 280 observed: "...It does not, however, mean that persons specified in the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 437 should necessarily be released on bail. The Apex Court in the case of Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT, Delhi and another, (2001) 4 SCC 280 observed: "...It does not, however, mean that persons specified in the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 437 should necessarily be released on bail. The proviso is an enabling provision which confers jurisdiction upon a Court, other than the High Court and the Court of Session, to release a person on bail despite the fact that there appears reasonable ground for believing that such person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life." 26. The provisions of Section 437 Cr. P.C. are not limited to a case arising out of a police report. They also squarely apply in respect of cases instituted otherwise on police report, generally called 'complaint case'. In the section both the words 'produced' or 'appear' are mentioned and, as such, in a complaint case where process is issued under Section 302 or similarly sections of the Indian Penal Code or other law, where the punishment provided is death or imprisonment for life the rigours of Section 437 shall apply. 27. As I am dealing with a matter in which the accused has been charged with the offence punishable under Section 467 of the I.P.C., I must look into Section 467 of the I.P.C. Section 467 of the I.P.C. is extracted hereunder: "467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with a [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 28. Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in Gurcharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) AIR SC 179 as under: "19. Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in Gurcharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) AIR SC 179 as under: "19. Section 437, Cr.P.C. deals, inter alia, with two stages during the initial period of the investigation of a non-bailable offence. Even the officer in charge of the police station may, by recording his reasons in writing, release a person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence provided there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence. Quick arrests by the police may be necessary when there are sufficient materials for the accusation or even for suspicion. When such an accused is produced before the court, the court has a discretion to grant bail in all non-bailable cases except those punishable with death or imprisonment for life if there appear to be reasons to believe that he has been guilty of such offences. The Courts oversee the action of the police and exercise judicial discretion in granting bail always bearing in mind that the liberty of an individual is not unnecessarily and unduly abridged and at the same time the cause of justice does not suffer. After the court releases a person on bail under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) of S. 437, Cr.P.C. it may direct him to be arrested again when it considers necessary so to do. This will be also in exercise of its judicial discretion on valid grounds. 21. Section 437, Cr.P.C. is concerned only with the court of Magistrate. It expressly excludes the High Court and the Court of Session. The language of S. 437 (1) may be contrasted with S. 437 (7) to which we have already made a reference. While under subsec (1) of S. 437, Cr.P.C. the words are: "If there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty". Sub-sec. (7) says: "that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence". This difference in language occurs on account of the stage at which the two subsections operate. Sub-sec. (7) says: "that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence". This difference in language occurs on account of the stage at which the two subsections operate. During the initial investigation of a case in order to confine a person in detention, there should only appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, whereas after submission of charge-sheet or during trial for such an offence the court has an opportunity to form somewhat clear opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence. At that stage the degree of certainty of opinion in that behalf is more after the trial is over and judgment is deferred then at a pre-trial stage even after the charge-sheet. There is a noticeable trend in the above provisions of law that even in case of such non-bailable offences a person need not be detained in custody for any period more than it is absolutely necessary, if there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of such an offence. There will be, however, certain overriding considerations to which we shall refer hereafter. Whenever a person is arrested by the police for such an offence, there should be materials produced before the courts to come to a conclusion as to the nature of the case he is involved in or he is suspected of. If at that stage from the materials available there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the court has no other option than to commit him to custody. At that stage, the court is concerned with the existence of the materials against the accused and not as to whether those materials are credible or not on the merits. 22. In other non-bailable cases the court will exercise its judicial discretion in favour of granting bail subject to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 437, Cr.P.C. if it deems necessary to act under it. 22. In other non-bailable cases the court will exercise its judicial discretion in favour of granting bail subject to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 437, Cr.P.C. if it deems necessary to act under it. Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the court which may defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the court will not decline to grant bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also clear that when an accused is brought before the court of a Magistrate with the allegation against him of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he has ordinarily no option in the matter but to refuse bail subject, however, to the first proviso to S. 437(1), Cr.P.C. and in a case where the Magistrate entertains a reasonable belief on the materials that the accused has not been guilty of such an offence. This will, however, be an extraordinary occasion since there will be some materials at the stage of initial arrest, for the accusation or for strong suspicion of commission by the person of such an offence." 29. Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. also came to be interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court and the two learned Single Judges of this Court. 30. In Prakash Kaur Vs. Sohansingh Khadaksing, (1984) 1 GLR 345 , a learned Single Judge of this Court held as under : "Sec. 437 of the Code provides as to when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offences. There is a dichotomy dealing with non-bailable offences. There are two types of non-bailable offences-offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the rest of the non-bailable offences. As far as the first category of non-bailable offences is concerned, provisions of sec. 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code impose a bar to grant of bail by the court or the officer in charge of a police station to an accused person if there appear reasonable grounds, for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. At this stage the court or an officer in charge of a police station has only to see as to whether there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has been guilty of such an offence or not. At this stage the court or an officer in charge of a police station has only to see as to whether there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has been guilty of such an offence or not. It is to be noted that what is required to be seen is the reasonable grounds and not the evidence. In this connection the Supreme Court in the case of Gurcharan Singh and Others Vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) AIR SC 179 has stated to the effect that the words “or suspected of the commission of” were introduced in the provisions of sec. 497 of Old Criminal Procedure Code by an amendment in 1955. These words have been retained in the new Criminal Procedure Code in sec. 437. In this background, the Supreme Court has observed: "..... It is difficult to conceive how if a police officer arrests a person on a reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life (S. 41, Cr.P.C. of the new Code) and forwards him to a Magistrate (S. 167(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code) the Magistrate at that stage will have reasons to hold that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he has not been guilty of such an offence. At that stage unless the Magistrate is able to act under the proviso to sec. 437(1), Cr.P.C. Bail appears to be out of question. The only limited inquiry may then relate to the materials for the suspicion......"" 31. Again in Thakor Kanjibhai Shakarabhai Vs. Thakor Ambaram Kanjibhai, 1985 GLH(UJ) 23, (Misc. Criminal Application No. 2015 of 1984), another learned Single Judge of this Court held as under: "Section 437 provides that the Court may release the accused on bail if there appears no reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If the circumstances of the case are such the Court trying the accused can impose imprisonment for life for an offence punishable under Section 326. If the circumstances of the case are such the Court trying the accused can impose imprisonment for life for an offence punishable under Section 326. Section 437(1)(i) in terms provides that when any person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested and is brought before the Court other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, such person shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It cannot be said that this bar would not operate in respect of offences punishable with imprisonment for life or in the alternative imprisonment for ten years because the Court trying the case is empowered to impose a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. In this set of circumstances, the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced would not have jurisdiction to release him on bail except in cases which fall in the excepted categories of proviso to section 437(1). Therefore, at the initial stage when the accused are produced before the Magistrate and it is alleged that the accused have committed an offence punishable under Section 326, then the Magistrate would not have jurisdiction to release the accused on bail. Further, under sub-section (4) of Section 437 if the Court releases the accused on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) he is required to record in writing his reasons for doing so. The order passed by the learned Magistrate on the face of it shows that he has not given any reasons why he is releasing the accused on bail." 32. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh and the two decisions of this Court referred to above were considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yogesh M. Vyas vs. Registrar and another, (2009) 1 GLH 150 . I may quote the relevant observations of the Division Bench: "11. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh and the two decisions of this Court referred to above were considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yogesh M. Vyas vs. Registrar and another, (2009) 1 GLH 150 . I may quote the relevant observations of the Division Bench: "11. Looking to the contents of the bail applications and the orders passed by the petitioner, it thus appears that while the seven cases under consideration did not fall in the excepted categories mentioned in the first proviso to Section 437(1), with the consent of the learned APP, the petitioner granted bail in five matters, where there were disputes between the complainant and injured witnesses who were agriculturists and the accused were also agriculturists. It is true that as per the decisions of the Apex Court and of the learned Single Judges of this Court, in such cases, the Magistrate should not have treated them as extraordinary or exceptional cases, but we do note the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner that at the relevant time, i.e. in 1993-94, the Magistrates were passing such orders when, prima facie, they were satisfied that the offence did not amount to offence under Section 307 of IPC. It was on account of such approach on the part of the Magistrates that this Court on the administrative side had to establish a State Judicial Academy for imparting proper in-service training to the Magistrates to impress upon them that the Magistrate is not to grant bail for offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the accused belongs to any of the excepted categories indicated in the first proviso to Section 437(1), or on an extraordinary occasion as observed in Gurucharan Singh's case." 33. Thus, in view of the above noted decisions, it is clear that when the Magistrate considers the application for bail for the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, ordinarily, the Magistrate is to refuse the bail unless the case falls in any of the excepted categories (accused being below 16 years of age, woman, sick or infirm person). Thus, in view of the above noted decisions, it is clear that when the Magistrate considers the application for bail for the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, ordinarily, the Magistrate is to refuse the bail unless the case falls in any of the excepted categories (accused being below 16 years of age, woman, sick or infirm person). If the case does not fall in any such excepted categories, the Magistrate may grant bail only in an exceptional or extraordinary case where the Magistrate entertains the reasonable belief on the material that the accused has not been guilty of any offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. 34. There are two types of non-bailable offences. First, offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the rest of the nonbailable offences. As far as the first category of the non-bailable offences are concerned, the provisions of Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C. imposes a bar to grant of bail by the Court or the officer in-charge of a police station to an accused person if there appears to be reasonable ground, for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. At this stage, the Court or an officer in-charge of a police station has only to see as to whether there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has been guilty of such an offence or not. It is to be noted that what is required to be seen is a reasonable ground and not the evidence. At that stage, unless the Magistrate is able to act under the proviso to Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., the grant of bail appears to be out of question. If bail is granted by a Magistrate in connection with an offence punishable with imprisonment for life and even if such an offence is magistrate triable, such order would be without jurisdiction and liable to be cancelled. The legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "evidence". The two expressions are not interchangeable. Therefore, where the application is moved at the initial stage under Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can only call upon the prosecution to satisfy himself that there is a genuine case against the accused and that it will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. The two expressions are not interchangeable. Therefore, where the application is moved at the initial stage under Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can only call upon the prosecution to satisfy himself that there is a genuine case against the accused and that it will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt at that stage. Therefore, if there are sufficient grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death imprisonment for life, the Magistrate is not to go at a tangent in order to find out possible execute for granting bail. The Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh has held that if a police officer arrests a person on a reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and forwards him to a Magistrate, the Magistrate will have at that stage no reason to hold that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he has not been guilty of such offence and that at that stage unless the Magistrate is able to act under the proviso to Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., the bail appears to be out of the question. Therefore, to be on a safer side while considering bail applications under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C., the correct approach for the Magistrate should be to first look into the First Schedule appended to the Cr.P.C., which clarifies the offences. The column - 3 of the Schedule provides the punishment. No sooner the Magistrate finds that the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life or one of the punishments prescribed is imprisonment for life although there may be a discretion with the Magistrate to impose a sentence which may extend upto 10 years, he should refrain from granting bail, except in cases which fall within the ambit of the proviso added to Sub-section (1) of Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. 35. Let me now straightway proceed to the three decisions on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. 36. Let me now straightway proceed to the three decisions on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. 36. In Ambarish Rangashahi, a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court took the view that Section 409 of the I.P.C. as well as Section 467 of the I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years and even though the maximum sentence which may be awarded is life imprisonment, as per Part I of Schedule annexed to the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is empowered to pass an order of bail under Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C. The observations read thus: "17. It may be noted here that the learned Counsel for intervener contended that the Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to grant bail because the offences under Sections 467 and 409 IPC, carry punishment which may be life imprisonment. According to the learned Counsel, if the offence is punishable with sentence of death or life imprisonment, the Magistrate cannot grant bail under Section 437(1) Cr. P.C. unless there are special grounds mentioned therein. He relied upon certain authorities in this respect including Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT, Delhi & Anr., (2001) 4 JT 116 . In that case, offence was under Section 302 which is punishable with death sentence or life imprisonment and is exclusively triable by Court of Sessions. The offence under Section 409 is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. Similarly, the office under Section 467 is also punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. Even though the maximum sentence which may be awarded is life imprisonment, as per Part I of Schedule annexed to Cr.P.C., both these offences are triable by a Magistrate of First Class. It appears that there are several offences including under sec.326 in the Indian Penal Code wherein sentence, which may be awarded, is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for lesser terms and such offences are triable by Magistrate of the First Class. If the Magistrate is empowered to try the case and pass judgment and order of conviction or acquittal, it is difficult to understand why he cannot pass order granting bail, which is interlocutory in nature, in such cases. If the Magistrate is empowered to try the case and pass judgment and order of conviction or acquittal, it is difficult to understand why he cannot pass order granting bail, which is interlocutory in nature, in such cases. In fact, the restriction under Sec. 437(1) Cr.P.C. is in respect of those offences which are punishable with alternative sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the offence is punishable with life imprisonment or any other lesser sentence and is triable by Magistrate, it cannot be said that Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to consider the bail application. In taking this view, I am supported by the old Judgment of Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in Tularam & Ors. vs. Emperor, 1926 27 CrLJ 1063 and also by the Judgment of the Kerala High Court in Satyan Vs. State, (1981) CrLJ 1313. In Satyan, the Kerala High Court considered several earlier Judgments and observed thus in paras 7 and 8 : "7. According to the learned Magistrate Section 437(1) does not empower him to release a person on bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed an offence punishable with death or an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. In other words the learned Magistrate has interpreted the expression "offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life" in Section 437(1) to include all offences where the punishment extends to imprisonment for life. This reasoning, no doubt, is seen adopted in an old Rangoon Case H.M. Boudville v. Emperor, 1925 AIR(Rang) 129 while interpreting the phrase "an offence punishable with death or transportation for life" in Section 497 Cr.P.C. 1898. But that case was dissented from in Mahammed Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51. The Rangoon High Court held that the prohibition against granting bail is confined to cases where the sentence is either death or alternative transportation for life. But that case was dissented from in Mahammed Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51. The Rangoon High Court held that the prohibition against granting bail is confined to cases where the sentence is either death or alternative transportation for life. In other words, what the Court held was that the phrase "death or transportation for life" in Section 497 of the old Code did not extend to offences punishable with transportation for life only, it will be interesting to note the following passage from the above judgment : "It is difficult to see what principle, other than pure empiricism should distinguish offences punishable with transportation for life from offences punishable with long terms of imprisonment; why, for instance, the detenu accused of lurking house trespass with a view to commit theft, for which the punishment is fourteen years imprisonment, should be specially favoured as against the individual who has dishonestly received stolen property, knowing that it was obtained by dacoity, for which the punishment happens to be transportation for life? It cannot seriously be argued that the comparatively slight difference in decree of possible punishment will render it morally less likely that the person arrested will put in an appearance in the one case rather than the other. On the other hand the degree of difference is so great as between transportation for life and death as to be immeasurable. A prudent Legislature will, therefore, withdraw from the discretion of the Magistracy cases in which, if guilt is probable, even a man of the greatest fortitude may be wiling to pay a material price, however, exorbitant, for life." The above decision has been followed by the Nagpur High Court in the case Tularam v. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53. "8. A prudent Legislature will, therefore, withdraw from the discretion of the Magistracy cases in which, if guilt is probable, even a man of the greatest fortitude may be wiling to pay a material price, however, exorbitant, for life." The above decision has been followed by the Nagpur High Court in the case Tularam v. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53. "8. The reasoning applies with equal force in interpreting the phrase "offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life" So long as an offence under Section 326 is triable by a Magistrate of the First Class there is no reason why it should be viewed differently in the matter of granting bail from an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. for which the punishment extends imprisonment for 7 years or any other non-bailable offence for which the punishment is a term of imprisonment." It would be illogical and incomprehensible to say that the magistrate who can hold the trial and pass judgment of acquittal or conviction for the offences punishable with sentence of life imprisonment or lesser term of imprisonment, for example in offences under Sections 326, 409, 467 etc., cannot consider the application for bail in such offences. In fact, it appears that the restriction under Sec. 437(1)(a) is applicable only to those cases which are punishable with death sentence or life imprisonment as alternative sentence. It may be noted that in Prahlad Sigh Bhati, in para 6, the Supreme Court held that even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence exclusively triable by a Court of session, yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purposes of getting the relief of bail. This may be applicable to many cases, wherein the sentence, which may be awarded, is not even life imprisonment, but the offence is exclusively triable by court of Sessions for example offences punishable under Sections 306, 308, 314, 315, 316, 400 and 450. Taking into consideration the legal position, I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the intervener that merely because the offence is under Sec. 409 and 467 IPC, Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear and grant the bail." 37. Taking into consideration the legal position, I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the intervener that merely because the offence is under Sec. 409 and 467 IPC, Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear and grant the bail." 37. In Ishan Vasant Deshmukh, the Bombay High Court held as under: ""The observations of the Supreme Court that generally speaking if the punishment prescribed is that of imprisonment for life or death penalty, and the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail, unless the matter is covered by the provisos attached to Section 437 of the Code. Thus, merely because an offence is punishable when imprisonment for life, it does not follow a Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to grant bail, unless offence is also exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. This, implies that the Magistrate would be entitled to grant bail in cases triable by him even though punishment prescribed may extend to imprisonment for life. This Judgment in Prahlad Singh Bhati's case had not been cited before Judge, who decided State of Maharashtra Versus Rajkumar Kunda Swami. Had this Judgment been noticed by the Hon'ble Judge deciding that case, the observation that the Magistrate may not decide an application for bail if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life would possibly would not have been made. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati's case, it is clear that the view taken by J.H. Bhatia, J. in Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) AllMR(Cri) 2775 is in tune with the Judgment of the Supreme Court and therefore, the Magistrate would have jurisdiction to grant bail." 38. Thus, in both the aforenoted decisions, the view taken is that although the punishment prescribed may be imprisonment for life, yet if the offence is otherwise triable by a Magistrate and not by the Court of Sessions, then the Magistrate has the power and jurisdiction to entertain the bail application. 39. In Satyan, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, while interpreting Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., held as under: "4. A scrutiny of the several Sections of the Indian penal Code will reveal at there is only an offence viz.; the one under Section 303 for which death alone is the punishment. 39. In Satyan, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, while interpreting Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., held as under: "4. A scrutiny of the several Sections of the Indian penal Code will reveal at there is only an offence viz.; the one under Section 303 for which death alone is the punishment. There are three offences for which the sentence is death or imprisonment for life and fine (See Sections 121 and 302). The offences mentioned in Sections 132, 305, 307 and 396 are punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. All these offences are to be tried only by the Court of Session. There are other offences wherein the punishment is either imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term and fine. Incidentally it is noted that under Section 363-A, for the offence of maiming a minor for being employed or used for purposes of begging the punishment is imprisonment for life with liability to fine also. Section 389 provides for imprisonment for life where the offence punishable is under Section 377 Indian Penal Code. It is significant to note that while most of the offences for which imprisonment for life is provided as a punishment are triable by the Court of Session, there are some where the trial is to be by a Magistrate of the First Class (See Sections 326, 389, 394, 409, 467, 472, 474 and 477, I.P.C.). A Magistrate of the First Class is not competent to pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding three years. In case the Magistrate feels that an accused ought to receive a more severe punishment he may submit the proceedings to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as provided in Section 325 Cr. P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate is not competent to sentence an accused for imprisonment exceeding seven years. (See Section 29, Cr. P.C.). It follows that in cases where the offences are to be tried by the Magistrate of the First Class or the Chief Judicial Magistrate, even if the maximum punishment is imprisonment for life the legislature does not ordinarily except the imposition of that sentence. 5. The policy of the law is that a person should not be detained in custody unless authorised by law. 5. The policy of the law is that a person should not be detained in custody unless authorised by law. Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Under Section 57, Cr. P.C. a person arrested by the police is not to be detained for more than 24 hours in police custody. Under Section 167 in a case where investigation cannot be completed within a period of 24 hours and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded the police officer is to produce the person concerned before the Magistrate. The Magistrate after satisfying that there are proper reasons for extending the period of detention may authorise detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. The proviso to the Section which has been newly added in 1978 directs that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody for a total period exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and sixty days where the investigation relates to any other offence and the person concerned is to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. 6. Reference may also be made to Section 389 Cr. P.C., which mentions that if a person, who was on bail is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and if he intends to present an appeal the Court shall order that he be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing bail for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court. It is thus clear that the legislature has made a liberal approach in the matter of granting bail and has shown its disapproval in the matter of keeping an accused person in custody in cases where he is ordinarily entitled to bail. It is now wellsettled that the purpose of keeping a person in custody is to ensure his appearance in Court at the time of trial and that he is also made available for the purpose of execution of the sentence. It is now wellsettled that the purpose of keeping a person in custody is to ensure his appearance in Court at the time of trial and that he is also made available for the purpose of execution of the sentence. The purpose is not penal in character. If the Court has no reason to believe that the accused would abscond or that he would tamper with the evidence or try to intimidate or win over witnesses or that his being at large would be hazardous to the interests of the community it is only proper that he is granted hail in the absence of any prohibition by a statute. 7. According to the learned Magistrate Section 437(1) does not empower him to release a person on bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed an offence punishable with death or an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. In other words the learned Magistrate has interpreted the expression "offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life" in Section 437(1) to include all offences where the punishment extends to imprisonment for life. This reasoning, no doubt, is seen adopted in an old Rangoon Case H.M. Boudville v. Emperor, 1925 AIR(Rang) 129 while interpreting the phrase "an offence punishable with death or transportation for life" in Section 497 Cr.P.C. 1898. But that case was dissented from in Mahammed Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51. The Rangoon High Court held that the prohibition against granting bail is confined to cases where the sentence is either death or alternatively transportation for life. In other words, what the Court held was that the phrase "death or transportation for life" in Section 497 of the old Code did not extend to offences punishable with transportation for life only. It will be interesting to note the following passage from the above judgment : "It is difficult to see what principle, other than pure empiricism should distinguish offences punishable with transportation for life from offences punishable with long terms of imprisonment; why, for instance, the detenu accused of lurking house trespass with a view to commit theft, for which the punishment is fourteen years imprisonment, should be specially favoured as against the individual who has dishonestly received stolen property, knowing that it was obtained by dacoity, for which the punishment happens to be transportation for life ? It cannot seriously be argued that the comparatively slight difference in decree of possible punishment will render it morally less likely that the person arrested will put in an appearance in the one case rather than the other. On the other hand the degree of difference is so great as between transportation for life and death as to be immeasurable. A prudent Legislature will, therefore, withdraw from the discretion of the Magistracy cases in which, if guilt is probable, even a man of the greatest fortitude may be willing to pay a material price, however, exorbitant, for life." The above decision has been followed by the Nagpur High Court in the case Tularam v. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53 8. The reasoning applies with equal force in interpreting the phrase "offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life". So long as an offence under Section 326 is triable by a Magistrate of the First Class there is no reason why it should be viewed differently in the matter of granting bail from an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. for which the punishment extends to imprisonment for 7 years or any other non-bailable offence for which the punishment is a term of imprisonment. 9. It follows that the learned Magistrate is not justified in holding that he had no power to grant bail to a person accused on the sole around that the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life. 40. The first and the most important thing which I would like to clarify is that the powers of Magistrate while dealing with a bail application are not governed by the Court competent to try the case, but are regulated by the punishment prescribed for an offence. 41. In Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT, Delhi and another, (2001) 4 SCC 280 , the Supreme Court observed: "6. Even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purposes of getting the relief of bail. Even in a case where any Magistrate opts to make an adventure of exercising the powers under Section 437 of the Code in respect of a person who is, suspected of the commission of such an offence, arrested and detained in that connection, such Magistrate has to specifically negativate the existence of reasonable ground for believing that such accused is guilty of an offence punishable with the sentence of death or imprisonment for life. In a case, where the Magistrate has no occasion and in fact does not find, that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had not committed the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he shall be deemed to be having no jurisdiction to enlarge the accused on bail." 42. Thus, the Supreme Court made itself very clear that in a sessions triable case, a Magistrate should direct the accused to approach the Sessions Court, yet it has clarified that as such there is no legal bar. What is discernible from the observations of the Supreme Court is that the power of bail is not dependent upon the forum which would be capable of trying the offence. 43. However, the confusion in this regard is on account of the following observations of the Supreme Court in the very same case of Prahlad Singh Bhati : "7. Powers of the Magistrate, while dealing with the applications for grant of bail, are regulated by the punishment prescribed for the offence in which the bail is sought. Generally speaking if punishment prescribed is for imprisonment for life and death penalty and the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail unless the matter is covered by the provisos attached to S. 437 of the Code. The limitations circumscribing the jurisdiction of the Magistrate are evident and apparent. Assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the application is distinguishable from the exercise of the jurisdiction. 8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. The limitations circumscribing the jurisdiction of the Magistrate are evident and apparent. Assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the application is distinguishable from the exercise of the jurisdiction. 8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the Court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the Court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." 44. The aforenoted observations of the Supreme generally are taken as a support for a proposition that if the offence is not exclusively triable by a Sessions Court meaning that the offence is triable by a Court of Magistrate, the satisfaction will not fall within the ambit of Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate will be empowered to grant bail even if cases where sentence could be of life imprisonment if the same is triable by a Magistrate. It will be erroneous to interpret the judgment of the Supreme Court in such a manner. 45. In terms of the provisions under Section 26 of the Cr.P.C., all offences under the I.P.C. are triable by a Sessions Court irrespective of the Schedule showing it to be triable by a Magistrate. Therefore, it is not as if the offence cannot be tried by a Sessions Court if it is triable by a Magistrate. 46. Let me give one simple illustration. Therefore, it is not as if the offence cannot be tried by a Sessions Court if it is triable by a Magistrate. 46. Let me give one simple illustration. Section 323 of the Cr.P.C. empowers a Magistrate to forward the case to the sessions for triable even if the offence is not exclusively triable by a Sessions Court. Section 323 of the Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: "323. Procedure when, after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed If, in any inquiry into an offence or a trial before a Magistrate, it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings before signing judgment that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session, he shall commit it to that Court under the provisions hereinbefore contained and thereupon the provisions of Chapter XVIII shall apply to the commitment so made." 47. Thus, the jurisdiction so far as grant of bail under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, is dependent upon the punishment provided and not on the forum for trial. * THE EXPRESSION "DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE": 48. What is important is to ascertain the meaning of the expression "death or imprisonment for life" in Section 437(1)(i) of the Cr.P.C. Whether the aforesaid expression indicates only such offences in which death and life imprisonment are alternatively provided such as Section 302 of the I.P.C. or any offence with either of the punishment will fall within the ambit? 49. Now, in ordinary usage, 'and' is conjunctive and 'or' disjunctive. But to carry out the intention of the legislature, it may sometimes be necessary to read 'and' in place of the disjunctive 'or' and vice versa. 50. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, it is stated at page 135 that the word 'and' has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of the word 'or'. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection it is, by force of a context, read as 'or'. When two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the legislative intent that all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive 'and' is used. On the other hand, where a failure to comply with any requirement imposes liability the disjunctive 'or' is used. When two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the legislative intent that all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive 'and' is used. On the other hand, where a failure to comply with any requirement imposes liability the disjunctive 'or' is used. What is, thus, plain is that ordinarily the word 'and' would be used in the cumulative sense and would require the fulfilment of all the conditions unless the context shows otherwise. In other words when the term 'and' is used, it is presumed to be used in the conjunctive sense, unless the legislative intent is clearly contrary. 51. It is true that there has been some laxity in the use of these terms that the Courts have generally said that the words are interchangeable and that one may be substituted for the other, if to do so is consistent with the legislative intent. 52. The cardinal principle of interpretation is that the words being used in a statute if they are free from ambiguity should be given their plain meaning. I see no reason to read the words "death or imprisonment for life" occurring in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. as "death and imprisonment for life". The disjunctive "or" word used between the words "death or imprisonment for life" in Section 437 Cr.P.C. is significant and that the same indicates that it is not necessary that the offence should be punishable with both i.e. death and imprisonment for life so far as Section 437 Cr.P.C. is concerned. 53. The Supreme Court in Som Nath Puri vs. State of Rajasthan, (1972) AIR SC 1490 has held as under:- "On behalf of the appellant it was urged before the High Court that as the appellant had to face a trial extending over more than 3 years incurring enormous expenses for coming to and fro from Chandigarh where he was practising law and was also in Jail for some time, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should be given to him. This contention was rejected because the provisions of that Act were inapplicable in view of his conviction under section 409, I.P.C. As the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 409, I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life, the High Court, in our view, was right because the provisions of section 4 are only applicable to a case of a person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life." 54. Section 409 of the I.P.C. provides for life imprisonment. It does not provide for a death penalty. However, from the aforenoted decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Som Nath Puri, it can be said that a person convicted for the offence punishable under Section 409 of the I.P.C. would not be entitled for the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 55. Section 4(1) of the Probation of Officers Act reads as under:- "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life......." 56. I must refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chand vs. State of Haryana, (1988) 1 SCC 717 . In the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as under: "One of the punishments for the offence of murder is death and, therefore, the offence of murder would be covered within Section 2(4)(i)(a) of the Punjab Act and to such a conviction the Punjab Borstal Act would have no application." 57. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court clearly goes to show that the expression "death or imprisonment for life" should be construed disjunctively and not conjunctively. 58. I may reproduce the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chand : "Support for such a view is available from 561 several decisions of different High Courts. Section 562(1) of the Code A of Criminal Procedure of 1898 as amended in 1923 brought in the phrase: "Punishable with death or transportation for life". "In Emperor v. Mt. Janki & Anr., (1932) AIR Nagpur 130 that phrase was interpreted disjunctively and women convicted of an offence for which transportation for life was one of the punishments provided were held ineligible for release on probation under Section 562. "In Emperor v. Mt. Janki & Anr., (1932) AIR Nagpur 130 that phrase was interpreted disjunctively and women convicted of an offence for which transportation for life was one of the punishments provided were held ineligible for release on probation under Section 562. It was pointed out that the words 'death or transportation for life' must be read as referring to offences the penalty for which provided by the Penal Code contains either death or transportation for life as one of the punishments awarded and not necessarily both. Reliance was placed on a full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in King Emperor v. Nga San Htwa & Ors., (1927) AIR(Rang) 205 which was dealing with a similar phrase occurring in Section 497 of the old Code. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chetti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1959) AIR M.P. 291 also took the same view. In Emperor v. Bahawati, (1928) AIR Lahore 920 it was held that as one of the alternative punishments for that offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code, is transportation for life, it is obvious that Section 562 is not applicable and the accused must be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine. The Allahabad High Court in the case of State vs. Sheo Shanker, (1956) AIR All. 326, the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor of Madras v. Paneswar Rao, (1946) AIR Madras 173, the Rajasthan High Court in Sarkar v. Jalam Singh, (1950) AIR Raj. 28 and the Bombay High Court in Naranji Premji v. Emperor, (1928) AIR Bom. 244 have taken the same view."" 59. I take notice of the fact that the Supreme Court in Subhash Chand referred to and relied upon a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court. This Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court deals specifically with the powers of the Magistrate to grant bail in a life imprisonment case. The Rangoon High Court read the relevant provisions of the old Cr.P.C. in disjunctive a manner accepting that even if death is not provided, the life imprisonment cases are beyond the powers of the Magistrate in normal circumstances. 60. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Chetti vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1959) CrLJ 989. 60. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Chetti vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1959) CrLJ 989. The relevant observations are as under: "Relying on the cases, Emperor v. Nga San Htwa, (1927) AIR(Rang) 205 (FB), In Re Ezhuvan Vellappan, (1943) AIR Mad. 681, and Public Prosecutor Madras v. Paneswara Rao, (1946) AIR Mad. 173, the learned Judge held that the phrase, 'punishable with death or imprisonment for life, occurring in S. 4(b)(ii) of the Act has to be interpreted disjunctively and, therefore, the section could not be availed of by a person, who was convicted of an offence, which is punishable either with death or with imprisonment for life. Therefore, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the applicant, who had been convicted of an offence under S. 376, Indian Penal Code could not avail of the benefit of probation. 3. It is true that S. 562 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is analogous to S. 4(b) of the C. P. and Berar Probation of Offenders Act 1 of 1936 had been interpreted conjunctively as suggested by the learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Mohammad Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51 by Doyle, J., which was followed by Kinkhedo A. J. C. in the case of Tularam v. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53. But later on, a Full Bench of the Rangoon. High Court in the case of 5 ILR(Rang) 276 : (1927 AIR(Rang) 205) rejected this earlier view, Doyle, J., who was also a member of the Full Bench, remarked that his earlier view in the case of 3 ILR(Rang) 538 : (1926 AIR(Rang) 51) was wrong. As the earlier Rangoon case was dissented from by the Full Bench, the same could not be an authority for the proposition laid down therein. Kinkhede, A. J. C. in the case of 1927 AIR Nagpur 53, relied on the earlier Rangoon Case. Besides this, he referred to another case namely Nagendranath v. Emperor, (1924) AIR Cal. 476. In the said Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court, the point was not specifically decided. Moreover, it concerned grant of bail under S. 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that by implication, the Calcutta High Court took the same view as the earlier Rangoon case. 476. In the said Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court, the point was not specifically decided. Moreover, it concerned grant of bail under S. 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that by implication, the Calcutta High Court took the same view as the earlier Rangoon case. But as the point was not specifically decided, the case could not be an authority for the proposition enunciated by Kinkhede, A. J. C. Moreover, Grille, A. J. C. (as he then was) in a later case Emperor v. Mst. Janki, (1932) AIR Nagpur 130, followed the Rangoon Full Bench and rejected the view of Kinkhede A. J. C., which was based on the overruled case of 3 ILR(Rang) 538 : (1926 AIR(Rang) 51). We feel that the view enunciated by Grille, A. J. C. (as he then was), which is based on the Full Bench case of Rangoon High Court is the correct view. Therefore, we affirm the same. 4. It is significant to note that the other High Courts later on took the same view, as Grille, A. J. C. in the case of 28 Nag LR 260 : (1932 AIR Nagpur 130) . To mention some of those cases, we may state that the Lahore High Court in the cases of Emperor v. Bahawali, (1928) AIR Lahore 920 and Emperor v. Bakhsha, (1934) AIR Lahore 131 and the Rangoon High Court in the case of A. H. Gandhi v. The King, 1941 AIR(Rang) 324, as also the Madras High Court in the cases of 1943 AIR Madras 681 and 1946 AIR Madras 173, took the same view. Recently Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sarkar v. Jalamsingh, (1950) AIR Raj. 28, adopted the same view. 5. Section 562 of the Criminal Procedure Code and S. 4(b) of the C.P. and Berar Probation of Offenders Act 1 of 1936 are an exception to the general scheme of punishments awardable under the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. The phrase "not punishable with death or imprisonment for life" ought to be interpreted in its ordinary disjunctive sense. Its scope cannot be permitted to be expanded by giving a strained meaning, by reading it conjunctively. If that were permitted, the only offences to be excluded from the benefit of the provision of probation would be Ss. The phrase "not punishable with death or imprisonment for life" ought to be interpreted in its ordinary disjunctive sense. Its scope cannot be permitted to be expanded by giving a strained meaning, by reading it conjunctively. If that were permitted, the only offences to be excluded from the benefit of the provision of probation would be Ss. 121, 302, 305, 307 (Part II) and 396, while in all grave and heinous offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the section could be availed of by an accused. The intention of the legislature in enacting the provisions of probation was to deal with the first offenders guilty of not serious offences leniently. The benefit of the provision of probation cannot, in our opinion, be extended under the guise of interpretation. In fact there is no scope for interpretation, as the wording is quite clear. There is no ambiguity. We see no reason to depart from the well-established view, propounded by Grille, A. J. C. based on the Rangoon Full Bench case." 61. I may also refer to and rely upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Sririyappa alias Sree Ram, (1995) CrLJ 2304. The relevant observations are as under: "4. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, reads as under : "4. I may also refer to and rely upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Sririyappa alias Sree Ram, (1995) CrLJ 2304. The relevant observations are as under: "4. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, reads as under : "4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct: (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour : Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under Sub-Section (1), the Court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under Sub-Section (1) is made, the Court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender. (4) The Court making a supervision order under Sub-Section (3), shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the Court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to imose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The Court making a supervision order under Sub-Section (3), shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned." 5. The plain reading of Section 4, shows that a person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life is not eligible for the benefit tinder Section 4 of the Act for release under a bond with or without sureties for good behaviour for a period not exceeding three years. The learned Sessions Judge in upholding the benefit of Section 4, of the Act to the respondent found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 326, I.P.C. has opined that since. Section 326, I.P.C. is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life he is entitled to be released under bond for good behaviour under Section 4, of the Act. In so extending the benefit, the learned Sessions Judge had read the two punishments conjunctively i.e., an offence punishable with death and life imprisonment. The word 'or' appearing between death or life imprisonment has been read as practically 'and'. That is not the correct interpretation placed by the learned Sessions Judge. The purport of Section 4, of the Act is to extend the benefit of release on bond for goad conduct in cases where the person found guilty is not in respect of serious offences punishable with grave punishment such as the penalty of death or life imprisonment. 6. If the interpretation of the learned Sessions Judge is accepted then the offence punishable with death under Section 303, of I.P.C. would also entitle a person found guilty thereunder to be released under Section 4 of the Act under bond because the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 6. If the interpretation of the learned Sessions Judge is accepted then the offence punishable with death under Section 303, of I.P.C. would also entitle a person found guilty thereunder to be released under Section 4 of the Act under bond because the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. That cannot be the intention of the legislature. The view of majority of the High Courts is in favour of reading this clause offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life disjunctively and not conjunctively. This view is taken by Rajasthan High Court in Shivcharan Lal v. State, (1973) AIR Raj. 167, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Smt. Sheelan Devi, (1986) CriLJ 245, Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chetti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1959) AIR M.P. 291, and the said decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court refers to various decisions of other High Courts including the High Courts of Madras, Rangoon and Lahore. In view of the legal position state above, it is found that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that a person found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 326, I.P.C. which is punishable with life imprisonment is entitled to benefit of Section 4, of the Act is incorrect and unsustainable." 62. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Emperor vs. Naranji Premji, (1928) 30 BomLR 622 has held as under:- "The first point taken by Mr. Jinnah in this application for bail is that in Sub-section (1) of Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the words "if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with, death or transportation for life" only cover offences punishable with death or in the alternative with transportation for life, such as cases of murder and of waging war under Sections 302 an 121 of the Indian Penal Code, and that they do net include offences merely punishable with transportation for life. Although no authority has been referred to in the argument before us, there is, in fact, a ruling that does support Mr. Jinnah's contention, viz Mohammad Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51 . But that has been overruled by a Full Bench of the same Court in Emperor v. Nga San Htwa, (1927) AIR(Rang) 205 . In my opinion this is a construction which cannot be adopted. Jinnah's contention, viz Mohammad Eusoof v. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51 . But that has been overruled by a Full Bench of the same Court in Emperor v. Nga San Htwa, (1927) AIR(Rang) 205 . In my opinion this is a construction which cannot be adopted. If one refers to the definition of "warrant case" in Section 4(1)(w) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it will be seen that it is defined as a case relating to an offence punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months. The Legislature obviously does not there mean an offence which is punishable with those kinds of different punishments in the alternative, and they do not put the word "with" before "transportation" or before "imprisonment". Therefore, I do not attach any importance to the argument that, in Sub-section (1) of Section 497 the word "with" does not appear before "transportation for life", and, therefore, the reference is merely to an offence which is punishable with death or in the alternative with transportation for life." 63. From the meaning ascribed to the word "punishable" in various English Dictionaries, it can be said that it is ordinarily defined as deserving of or capable or liable to punishment, capable of being punished by law or right, may be punished, or liable to be punished, and not must be punished. The phrase "not punishable with death or imprisonment for life" should be interpreted in its ordinary disjunctive sense. Its scope cannot be permitted to be expanded by giving a strained meaning, by reading it conjunctively. If it is read conjunctively, then the only offences to be excluded from the benefit of the provisions of Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. would be Sections 121, 302, 305, 307 (Part II) and 396 of the I.P.C. while in all other grave and heinous offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the section could be availed of by an accused. This does not appear to be the intention of the legislature. 64. The words used in Section 437(1)(i) are "the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life". The word used between "death" and "imprisonment for life" is 'or' and not 'and'. This does not appear to be the intention of the legislature. 64. The words used in Section 437(1)(i) are "the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life". The word used between "death" and "imprisonment for life" is 'or' and not 'and'. So it cannot be said that this bar to power of the Magistrate to grant bail, shall be applicable in those cases only where the offence is punishable with death as well as life imprisonment and that it shall not be applicable if the offence is punishable with life imprisonment only. 65. Giving an interpretation to the aforesaid clause to this effect that the above bar on power of the Magistrate is applicable to those cases only where the offence is punishable with death as well as with life imprisonment and not to those cases which are punishable with life imprisonment only would make the words 'punishable with life imprisonment redundant, because if the intention of the legislature was to impose the above bar in those cases only where the offence is punishable with death as well as with life imprisonment, the above object could have been achieved by using the words "offences punishable with death sentence" and then all the offences punishable with death sentence as well as the life sentence would have been excluded from the Magisterial jurisdiction to grant bail, and as such the use of the words "punishable with life imprisonment" would become redundant because in India every offence punishable with death sentence is punishable with life imprisonment also in the alternative. There were apparently two exceptions only. Section 303 I.P.C. and Section 27(3) Arms Act but those sections have been declared to be unconstitutional by the Apex Court. As such the bar to grant of bail in offences punishable with death sentence as well as with life imprisonment could be achieved by using the words "death sentence only in Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. and there could have been no requirement to use the words "punishable with life imprisonment". 66. With profound respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the two decisions referred to above. In fact, the ratio, as laid down in the case of Ambarish Rangashahi and Ishan Vasant did not favour with a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. 66. With profound respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the two decisions referred to above. In fact, the ratio, as laid down in the case of Ambarish Rangashahi and Ishan Vasant did not favour with a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Later in point of time, in the case of Jyoti Kaur Kohli vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 BCR(Cri) 116. Let me quote the relevant observations as under: "10. Justice Vishnu Sahai in the case of Kaushar Yasin Qureshi has held that the jurisdiction to grant bail should be exercised by the Magistrate after the greatest circumspection. In arriving at a conclusion whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life the Magistrate should examine the question whether a prima facie case is made out or not. He should not enter into a thread-bare analysis of the prosecution case. It is only in those cases where no prima facie case is made out would it be open to the Magistrate to grant bail on the ground that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a person is guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. This Court has further held that "at the stage of bail, it was not open for him (Magistrate) to have entered into a meticulous analysis as to what offence would be made out because that question can only be charged upon after the evidence had been adduced in the trial Court. What the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had to do is only examine as to whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent No.1 was guilty of murder or offence which is punishable with death or life imprisonment he erred in granting bail on the ground that the offence ultimately would not be murder." Hence, this Court had held that the order passed by the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in favour of the accused was without jurisdiction, untenable in law and hence ought to be set aside. The Hon'ble Judge had cancelled the bail of Kaushar Qureshi on the ground that the said order was without jurisdiction. 11. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in favour of the accused was without jurisdiction, untenable in law and hence ought to be set aside. The Hon'ble Judge had cancelled the bail of Kaushar Qureshi on the ground that the said order was without jurisdiction. 11. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) AllMR(Cri) 2775. This Court (Coram: J. H. Bhatia, J.) has held that "even though the maximum sentence which may be awarded is life imprisonment as per Part I of Schedule annexed to Cr.P.C. both these offences are triable by a Magistrate of First Class. It appears that there are several offences , including the one under Section 326 of IPC wherein sentence which may be awarded is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for lesser terms and such offences are triable by Magistrate of First Class. If the Magistrate is empowered to try the case and pass judgment and order of conviction or acquittal, it is difficult to understand why he cannot pass order granting bail which is interlocutory in nature in such cases. In fact, the restriction under Section 437(1) of Cr.P.C. is in respect of those offences which are punishable with alternative sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the offence is punishable with life imprisonment or any other lesser sentence and is triable by Magistrate, it cannot be said that the Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to consider the application for bail. 12. The Counsel appearing for the respondent relies upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Ishan Vasant Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 BCR(Cri) 243 (Coram: R. C. Chavan, J.) . This Court has considered several judgments passed by this Court including the judgment passed by the Nagpur Bench in the case of Tularam Vs. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53. This Court has agreed with the judgment passed by Justice Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere and has held that "it would be illogical and incomprehensible to say that the magistrate who can hold the trial and pass judgment of acquittal or conviction for the offences punishable with sentence of life imprisonment or lesser term of imprisonment, for example in offences under Sections 326, 409, 467, etc. cannot consider the application for bail in such offences. cannot consider the application for bail in such offences. In fact, it appears that the restriction under Section 437(1)(a) is applicable only to those cases which are punishable with death sentence or life imprisonment as alternative sentence. It may be noted that in Prahlad Singh Bhati, in para 6, the Supreme Court held that even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence exclusively triable by a Court of session, yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purposes of getting the relief of bail." It is ultimately held by Justice R.C. Chavan that the Metropolitan Magistrate had jurisdiction to consider the bail application. 13. Clause (I) of Sub-section (1) of the Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 takes away the power of Magistrate to grant bail if there appears to be a reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 14. The question is whether notwithstanding the bar created by Clause (I) of Sub-section (1) of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A Magistrate can consider application for bail on merits merely because he has jurisdiction to try the offence. This question arises only in a case where the offence alleged is punishable with imprisonment for life which is triable by the Court of Magistrate. A bail application in case of an offence which is not triable by Magistrate and which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, will be governed by the law laid down by Paragraph 6 of the case of Pralhad Singh. 15. A bail application in case of an offence which is not triable by Magistrate and which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, will be governed by the law laid down by Paragraph 6 of the case of Pralhad Singh. 15. Paragraph 6 of the Judgment in the case of Prahlad Singh Bhan is as under :- "It may be noted that in Prahlad Singh Bhati , in para 6, the Supreme Court held that even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence exclusively triable by a Court of session, yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purposes for getting the relief of bail." 16. In the case of Virendra Singh, A. Chandok vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) AllMR(Cri) 296, this Court (Coram: A. M. Khanwilkar, J.) has held that "I have no hesitation in accepting the submission canvassed on behalf of the applicant that the Magistrate could not have granted bail to the Respondents 2 and 3, on the reasoning stated in the impugned order. The applicant has rightly relied on the decision of our High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Kaushar Yasin Qureshi and anr." The Court has further relied upon para 7 of the decision in Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. N.C.T., Delhi, (2001) AllMR(Cri) 739 which has held : ""generally speaking, if punishment prescribed is for imprisonment for life, and death penalty and the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail, unless the matter is covered by the provisos attached to Section 437 of the Code. The said view is also followed by Justice V.K. Tahilramanai in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Rajkumar Kunda Swami, 2002 3 BomLR 567. Justice V.K. Tahilramani has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Akil Anand Arya v. K.V. Satya Murthi and another, wherein this Court had held that the Magistrate has no power to release the person accused of offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. Justice V.K. Tahilramani has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Akil Anand Arya v. K.V. Satya Murthi and another, wherein this Court had held that the Magistrate has no power to release the person accused of offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. The Court has concluded that the Magistrate did not have the jurisdiction to grant bail in a case where the accused was arrested in an offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC." 17. The Counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 2 SCC(Cri) 508, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even though re-appreciation of the evidence as done by the court granting bail is to be avoided, the court dealing with an application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC can consider whether irrelevant materials were taken into consideration. The irrelevant materials should be of a substantial nature and not of a trivial nature." It is submitted that the Magistrate ought not to have considered the delay in filing FIR or that the offences were not committed in India. 18. The Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Tularam & Ors. vs. King Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53 wherein the Court has held as follows :- "I accordingly hold that the phrase "death or transportation for life" in S.497 does not extend to offences punishable with transportation for life only and means only those offences for which death and transportation for life are alternative sentences; and that the Magistrate improperly refused to exercise the discretion vested in him by law of granting bail in the present case." It was further held that "Section 497 of Cr.P.C. (Section 437 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) leaves ample room for exercise of discretion in the matter of granting bail and the intention of the amendment made by Section 136 of the Act of 1823 in that section was to vest thenceforth in the Courts a discretion less fettered then before. The intention of the Legislature is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try him with as little delay as possible, and that occasions for remand to jail custody of under-trial prisoners should be as few as possible as Section 344, Criminal P.C. Clearly shows." 19. The Counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon the Judgment delivered by the Full Bench Rangoon in the case of King Emperor vs. Nya San Htwa and others, (1927) AIR(Rang) 205, wherein the Court has held that the amended Section 497 does not limit the powers of Magistrates in granting bail in case of non-bailable offences except in cases punishable with transportation for life or with death. It is further held that the amendment as a matter of fact enlarge the powers of Magistrates in granting bail in non-bailable cases except death or imprisonment for life. 20. The Counsel for the respondent has placed further reliance on the Judgment of this Court in the case of Santosh Bhaurao Raut vs. State of Maharashtra, (1989) CrLJ 205, wherein this Court (Coram: S. M. Daud, J.) has held that "for the purposes of entitlement to bail it is not the maximum punishment that is relevant. The offender who is accused of a non-bailable offence is not deprived of the entitlement to bail merely because the offence is punishable with life imprisonment. Such a disability is occasioned where the offence allegedly committed by the offender is punishable only with death or imprisonment for life. To put it differently, Section 437(1)(I) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be applied to the case of a person who can be punished with a sentence of imprisonment less than imprisonment for life." 21. The view taken by the learned Single Judges in the cases of Ambarish Rangshahi and Ishan Vasant Deshmukh needs reconsideration to the extent it is held that a Magistrate gets power to grant bail in case of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life when the offence is triable by him. 22. The view taken by the learned Single Judges in the cases of Ambarish Rangshahi and Ishan Vasant Deshmukh needs reconsideration to the extent it is held that a Magistrate gets power to grant bail in case of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life when the offence is triable by him. 22. Hence, the following questions need to be considered by a Larger Bench : (i) Whether the powers to grant bail in non-bailable offences, where the punishment is life imprisonment or offences for which the punishment extends upto imprisonment for life can be exercised only within the limited purview of Section 437(1)(I) of Cr.P.C. and the proviso to Section 437 of Cr.P.C. ? (ii) Whether a Magistrate is empowered to grant bail in an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or the punishment prescribed may extend to imprisonment for life, only on the ground, that he has jurisdiction to try the offence ?" 67. Thus, the issue has now been referred to the Larger Bench. Even otherwise, in my view, the decisions in the case of Ambarish Rangashahi and Ishan Vasant are in direct conflict with a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Naranji Premji referred to above. I take notice of the fact that in Ambarish Rangashahi and Ishan Vasant, reliance has been placed upon Mohammad Eusoof vs. Emperor, 1926 AIR(Rang) 51 and Tula Ram vs. Emperor, (1927) AIR Nagpur 53. Mohammad Eusoof has been overruled. So far as Tula Ram is concerned, the very same High Court in Emperor vs. Janki, 1928 AIR(NagLR) 260 dissented with the view taken therein in view the fact that Mohammad Eusoof vs. Emperor came to be overruled. The decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Satyan also cannot be said to be laying down a correct proposition of law, because in Satyan also, Tula Ram and Mohammad Eusoof were relied upon. 68. Let me refer to few decisions on the subject. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Ramdoss vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1993) CrLJ 2147 in context with the offence under Section 124A I.P.C. and power of the Magistrate to release an accused on bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. observed as under: "21. 68. Let me refer to few decisions on the subject. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Ramdoss vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1993) CrLJ 2147 in context with the offence under Section 124A I.P.C. and power of the Magistrate to release an accused on bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. observed as under: "21. The learned Magistrate had already noticed in his order of remand that the offence under S. 124-A was made out on the allegations in the first information report. He would have still exercised the jurisdiction to grant bail to the petitioners only if they fell under any one of the categories of persons mentioned in the aforementioned proviso, if any one of them was under the age of sixteen years or was a woman or sick or infirm. We have no information whatsoever that any of the petitioners satisfied the requirements of the exceptions. There could thus be a legitimate grievance that the Magistrate Mr. T. V. Subramaniyan failed to exercise his judicial discretion in accordance with law. He failed to exercise the restraint that the law clearly imposed upon his jurisdiction, viz., "such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life" and has, it appears, granted bail without there being any material for invoking the exceptions to the said rule." 69. A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Santosh Bhaurao Raut vs. State of Maharashtra, (1989) CrLJ 205 has explained the position of law in a very simple and lucid manner. I may reproduce the relevant observations as under: "3. Counsel for the Applicant submits that the Sessions Court was in error in holding that the Applicant was disentitled to bail merely because one of the punishments prescribed for the offence of rape, is life imprisonment. It is argued that though the Applicant is accused of gang rape, the punishment prescribed is 10 years R.I. though it is possible that in a given case the offender may be sentenced to life imprisonment. However, for the purposes of entitlement to bail it is not the maximum punishment that is relevant. The offender who is accused of a non-bailable offence is not deprived of the entitlement to bail merely because the offence is punishable with life imprisonment. However, for the purposes of entitlement to bail it is not the maximum punishment that is relevant. The offender who is accused of a non-bailable offence is not deprived of the entitlement to bail merely because the offence is punishable with life imprisonment. Such a disability is occasioned where the offence allegedly committed by the offender is punishable only with death or imprisonment for life. To put it differently, S.437(1)(i) of the Cr. P.C. cannot be applied to the case of a person who can be punished with a sentence of imprisonment less than imprisonment for life. The Indian Penal Code prescribed a minimum sentence of 10 years R.I. for one accused of the offence of gang rape. This is the punishment to be taken into consideration for the purposes of deciding on the applicability or otherwise of S.437(1)(i) of the Cr. P.C. In other words it is not the maximum sentence imposable for gang rape which determines the applicability or otherwise of S.437(1)(i). It is not possible to agree with this submission. Section 437(1)(i) says that a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, shall not be released on bail if there appears reasonable ground for believing that he has committed such an offence. Therefore, even if the law prescribes death or imprisonment for life as the maximum imposable sentence. S.437(1)(i) is attracted and the offender deprived of the right to get bail. This of course is on it being made to appear that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed an offence for which the prescribed punishment is, death or imprisonment for life." 70. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the final conclusion drawn is as under: [1] When an accused is brought before the Court of a Magistrate with the allegations against him of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Magistrate has ordinarily to refuse bail subject, however, to the first proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. and in a case where the Magistrate entertains a reasonable belief on the materials that the accused has not been guilty of such an offence. At that stage, the Court is concerned with the existence of the materials against the accused and not as to whether those materials are credible or not on the merits. At that stage, the Court is concerned with the existence of the materials against the accused and not as to whether those materials are credible or not on the merits. To put it in other words, what is required to be seen is a reasonable ground and not the evidence. [2] The bar, as imposed in section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. as regards the power of the Magistrate to release an accused on bail in connection with an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, would also operate in respect of those offences punishable with imprisonment for life or in the alternative imprisonment upto ten years. A Judicial Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate trying an accused for an offence punishable under Sections 326, 409 or 467 I.P.C., as the case may be, may not be empowered to impose punishment for life, but, in a given case, by virtue of Section 323 Cr.P.C., the case can be committed to the Court of Sessions. What is important to be seen is the punishment prescribed by law for a particular offence and not whether the said offence is sessions triable or magistrate triable. [3] If the offence is otherwise triable by a Court of Magistrate, but such offence provides for punishment of imprisonment for life, then the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to entertain a bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the offence is magistrate triable and there is an alternative punishment prescribed by the statute. This of course is subject to the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 437 Cr.P.C. [4] The expression "death or imprisonment for life" should be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. 71. In view of the aforesaid, this application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad, below Exhibit: 11 in Criminal Case No.1849 of 2011 is hereby quashed. The bail granted by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad to the respondent No.2 - original accused stands cancelled. It is brought to my notice that even as on date, the respondent No.2 - original accused is in judicial custody in connection with two other offences registered against him. As the accused is already in judicial custody as on date, no further direction asking him to surrender before the Trial Court is passed. 72. It is brought to my notice that even as on date, the respondent No.2 - original accused is in judicial custody in connection with two other offences registered against him. As the accused is already in judicial custody as on date, no further direction asking him to surrender before the Trial Court is passed. 72. The Registry shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Gujarat State Judicial Academy at the earliest.