JUDGMENT : 1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record. 2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State. 3. The present revision has been filed against the order dated 11.12.2017 passed by the Judge, Family Court/F.T.C. Court No.1, Meerut in Case No. 857 of 2015 (Smt. Shikha Jain and others Vs. Sidharth Jain), by which the application filed by the opposite party nos. 2 and 3, under Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been allowed. By that order, the monthly maintenance allowance @ of Rs. 8,000/- per month to opposite party no.2 and @ of Rs. 2,000/- per month to opposite party no.3, has been awarded from the date of their application, being 24.12.2015. 4. As on date (up to April, 2018) the maintenance allowance for 29 months has become due being Rs. 2,90,000/- (in all). 5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is a highly educated lady deriving income and that in any case she has received sufficient money from sale of her share in a partnership firm. It has therefore been submitted that the award of monthly maintenance allowance @ of Rs. 8,000/- to the opposite party no.2 is excessive. 6. Second, as to his own earning capacity, it has been submitted that the applicant is currently unemployed and that he does not have income of Rs. 80,000/- as has been assumed by the learned Court below. For this reason also, it has been submitted that the monthly maintenance allowance awarded is wholly excessive and arbitrary. In this regard, it has also been submitted that the applicant does not derive any income from running of any factory/industry and the learned Court below has grossly erred in including the income of his relatives in the income of the present applicant. 7. Third, it has been submitted that in any case, the award of monthly maintenance allowance from the date of the application is wholly unwarranted and the learned Court below should have awarded the maintenance allowance from the date of the order and not from the date of the application. 8. In respect of the first submission advanced by learned counsel for the applicant, reliance has been placed on the cross-examination statement of opposite party no.2 recorded before the learned Court below on 8.5.2017. A copy of such statement has been annexed with the supplementary affidavit. 9. 8. In respect of the first submission advanced by learned counsel for the applicant, reliance has been placed on the cross-examination statement of opposite party no.2 recorded before the learned Court below on 8.5.2017. A copy of such statement has been annexed with the supplementary affidavit. 9. Having considered the first argument advanced by learned counsel for the applicant, it is seen, during her cross-examination, the opposite party no.2 had stated that her father and not she was a partner in a real estate partnership firm by the name 'Pooja Property'. He died before her marriage. She claimed ignorance as to the names and details of the surviving partners of that firm and its business and as to the income derived by her father during his live time. She specifically stated that the said firm was still in business but that she was not a partner of the same. Also, the opposite party no.2 stated that her father had not made any will in her favour and that she did not become his legal representative in any business. 10. On the strength of such admission made by the opposite party no.2, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the opposite party no.2 had admitted that she had a share in the firm 'Pooja Property'. Such submission appears to be based solely on the word 'hamara' used by the opposite party no.2 in the sentence 'Firm aaj bhi chal rahi hai. Usme hamara share hai. Main usme partner nahi hun'. 11. Having considered the argument, no benefit can be drawn by the applicant upon the use of word 'hamara' by the opposite party no.2 because it is equally possible that by using the word 'hamara' the opposite party no.2 was referring to her paternal family as a unit and she used the word 'hamara' in that context. In any case, the said word/sentence cannot be read in isolation, disjointed from her cross-examination statement that is elaborate and straight forward. 12. Reading her entire cross-examination statement, it is clear that the opposite party no.2 had admitted to the fact that her father was a man of means and that he was engaged in a profitable business. However, at the same time, the applicant specifically stated that neither she was a partner in her father's business nor she inherited anything from her father under any will etc. 13. However, at the same time, the applicant specifically stated that neither she was a partner in her father's business nor she inherited anything from her father under any will etc. 13. Further, a question was put to the opposite party no.2 whether her (paternal) family received any money in lieu of share of her father in that firm. To that question, she replied in the affirmative. A question having been asked with respect to the money received by her (paternal) family, the answer given by the applicant in the affirmative cannot ever be read to mean that the applicant therefore admitted to have received money in her individual capacity. 14. Then, it is not disputed that the opposite party no.2 is an educated lady. As to her qualification she admitted to have completed her B.B.A. course from a college at Meerut and to have obtained her M.B.A. degree through correspondence course. However, she denied the fact of having ever been gainfully employed. 15. As to her earlier job engagement, she stated, on the applicant's insistence she had started working in year July, 2011 subsequent to her marriage. However, she left the job for reason of having to commute from & to Meerut in connection with that work and also she did not like the office atmosphere. She thus left that job in the year August, 2011. 16. It thus appears that though the opposite party no.2 had been gainfully employed for a brief period prior to her separation from the applicant, there is no evidence at all to indicate that the opposite party no.2 was at the time of filing of her application or at any time subsequent thereto gainfully employed such that she may be held disentitled to receive maintenance allowance from the applicant. 17. The findings recorded by the learned Court below are based on material and evidence that has been discussed by it while dealing with issue no.1. In absence of any other material being pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant such that one may reach a conclusion that the finding recorded by the learned Court below is either perverse or wholly arbitrary, no interference is warranted in the present revision on the first ground raised by the learned counsel for the applicant. 18. In absence of any other material being pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant such that one may reach a conclusion that the finding recorded by the learned Court below is either perverse or wholly arbitrary, no interference is warranted in the present revision on the first ground raised by the learned counsel for the applicant. 18. Then, coming to the ground of the financial capacity of the applicant, it has been submitted that the learned Court below has completely erred in reaching the conclusion that the applicant has means to provide for monthly maintenance allowance @ of Rs. 10,000/- (in all) to the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. It has been submitted that the applicant is presently unemployed, he having been forced to leave the job because of marital discord with the opposite party no.2. 19. It has then been submitted that the applicant was never earning Rs. 80,000/- per month from software company where he was employed but that he was only earning about Rs. 30,000/- in August, 2016. 20. As to the inference drawn by the learned Court below that the applicant derived income from two factories namely M/s Siddharth Textile Mohkampur and M/s G. Fabrics Udyogpuram, Meerut, it has been submitted that those factories do not belong to the applicant but that they belong to his father and his paternal uncle. It is thus submitted that the applicant does not derive any income from those two factories. 21. Then, it has been submitted that merely because the applicant had admitted to have visited Australia during March and April, 2017 and had stayed in some hotel, it cannot be held that the applicant had means to provide for maintenance allowance @ of Rs. 10,000/- per month (in all), to the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. 22. In this regard, it is first noticed that though the applicant admitted that he was earlier employed in a software company, he did not produce either proof of his actual salary or documentary evidence of severance from such employment or any documentary evidence in the shape of his income tax return or his pay slip or his bank statement or constitutional documents of the businesses in the name of M/s Siddharth Textile, Mohkampur and M/s G. Fabrics, Udyogpuram, Meerut. 23. 23. In view of the fact that the applicant had admitted that he had gone abroad from March, 2017 to April, 2017. it is clear that the applicant is certainly a man of means and would have had the documents in the shape of income tax returns and bank accounts statement etc. 24. Even as to his foreign visit, the applicant did not state that he had gone abroad on the expenses met by someone else. The applicant being a major, it has to be presumed that he had gone abroad on his own and had not been sponsored by anyone else. 25. The fact that the applicant chose not to bring on record any such evidence to establish his real earning though at the same time, he chose to file other documents in the shape of hospital bills etc. including the bills of Apollo Clinic and Apollo Hospital and other private hospital etc., it appears that the relevant evidence that may have been led by the applicant, if at all, in rebuttal to the evidence led by the opposite party no. 2, was deliberately not filed before the learned Court below. 26. Such details as would have revealed his true income/earning in the shape of income tax return, bank details were in the special knowledge of the applicant. After not leading such evidence the applicant exposed himself to an adverse inference of the nature as has been drawn by the learned Court below. 27. Once it was admitted to the applicant that there exist two factories being run (with which he had been associated and from which it was stated by the opposite party no. 2 that the applicant was deriving income), it was incumbent on the applicant to have led evidence in rebuttal to establish that those two factories did not belong to him or that he had no share of income from such factories. 28. On the contrary, during his cross examination statement, the applicant did not make any mention of such facts. In fact, he only stated that his father and uncle had certain factories (without disclosing the names of such factories) but that he had none. 29. Such an evasive and vague denial made by the applicant was rightly not taken note of the learned Court below. Upon the opposite party no. In fact, he only stated that his father and uncle had certain factories (without disclosing the names of such factories) but that he had none. 29. Such an evasive and vague denial made by the applicant was rightly not taken note of the learned Court below. Upon the opposite party no. 2 having specifically mentioned that the applicant was deriving income from M/s Siddharth Textile Mohkampur and M/s G. Fabrics Udyogpuram, Meerut, it was for the applicant to have rebutted the same specifically. He neither led any documentary evidence to rebut the claim made by the opposite party no. 2 nor he made any specific denial even during his cross-examination statement. 30. Even as to his own salary/income, the applicant had not led any documentary or other evidence on the basis of which it may be accepted with any certainty that he is unemployed. 31. Thus, in view of the facts and evidence as discussed above, it does not appear that the learned Court below has erred in estimating the income of the applicant. 32. Merely because while making such estimation, the learned Court below has referred to the claim made by the opposite party no. 2 in her application, it cannot be said that the learned Court below has suddenly reached that conclusion. In fact, in the preceding paragraphs of the impugned order, the learned Court below had made detailed discussion of the facts and evidence relied upon by the parties. 33. Thus, even if the order is held to be not very happily worded, it cannot be said that the estimation made by the learned Court below is either perverse or arbitrary or excessive. 34. In fact, in the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the applicant is a man of means. He appears to be well qualified to be well employed. Besides, he appears to be having his own manufacturing business which, he has chosen to hide. In any case, as noted above, the applicant having not filed copies of income tax returns and applicant not having disclosed his bank details in the facts of this case, he cannot be heard to doubt the estimation made by the learned Court below. 35. In this regard, it cannot be lost sight of the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are a provision to advance social justice. 35. In this regard, it cannot be lost sight of the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are a provision to advance social justice. Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are to provide for means of sustenance to preserve human life and dignity and prevent vagrancy. In view of the facts pleaded and the evidence led by the parties, some of which has been annexed with the revision and supplementary affidavit, it does not appear that the learned Court below has committed any error in providing for maintenance allowance @ of Rs. 8,000/- and Rs. 2000/- to the opposite party no.3. These amounts appear to be minimum that should have been awarded in such a case looking at the financial and social status of the parties. 36. Therefore, the order of the learned Court below in so far as it relates to quantification of the maintenance allowance also does not warrant any interference. 37. Then it has been submitted that the maintenance allowance should have been awarded from the date of order and not the date of the application. 38. Insofar as the order has been made for payment of maintenance amount from the date of application, I do not find any error in the same in view of the fact that the application had been filed by the opposite party on 24.12.2015, which ought to have been decided within a period of 60 days from that date. However, the same has been decided more than 25 months from the date when such application was filed. 39. For a very long time, the opposite party did not receive any amount towards maintenance as had been claimed by her and which under law, she was entitled to. Also, even upon amount as claimed becoming payable she did not become entitled to any interest for the inordinate delay. 40. An application filed under section 125 Cr.P.C., is a loud cry for help for means to sustain life with dignity which, the legislature expects, be answered promptly. The fact that such a cry made by the applicant is often doubted by the person at whose sufferance the order (is eventually made) and therefore the application remains pending for a long period time, cannot itself be a ground to deny the help cried out for, for the period such application remained pending. The fact that such a cry made by the applicant is often doubted by the person at whose sufferance the order (is eventually made) and therefore the application remains pending for a long period time, cannot itself be a ground to deny the help cried out for, for the period such application remained pending. To do that would compromise human dignity that section 125 Cr.P.C. seeks to protect, and to risk vagrancy that it seeks to prevent. 41. To hold otherwise would also be to reach self contradicted conclusions. Once, upon objections being filed, evidence being led and after hearing all parties, it has been found that the claimant did not have the means to sustain herself for any period, it cannot then be said, at the same time, that too without assigning any reason that such means would be provided from the date of the order and not the date from which the claimant has established, she had no means. 42. The cost of such delay, has to be borne by the applicant herein and not the opposite parties/claimant especially, when the law created an expectation in favour of the application to be decided within sixty days of it being filed. 43. Then, there does not appear to exist any material or other mitigating circumstances whereby the delay caused in the proceedings may be attributed to the opposite parties. 44. The claimants, in such cases may have somehow survived the period of pendency of the application. However, their survival cannot be evidence or proof of their not having required the help for the period (often years) gone by. Costs of survival have to be presumed to have been met by the claimant party, from whatever sources. They must be defrayed by the person who is held liable to provide for maintenance unless the contrary is proved. 45. The amount of monthly maintenance allowance being minimal, it is the arrears of that allowance, when paid may be such as may be able to defray the costs of dignified existence, at the sufferance of the applicant. Such expenses may be assumed to be such as would have been necessarily borne by the applicant, had the opposite party resided with him all this while. 46. The applicant cannot deny the care to the opposite parties-his wife and child, for the period they have not resided with him, for reason of marital discord. Such expenses may be assumed to be such as would have been necessarily borne by the applicant, had the opposite party resided with him all this while. 46. The applicant cannot deny the care to the opposite parties-his wife and child, for the period they have not resided with him, for reason of marital discord. Consequentially, though they may have stayed physically apart from the applicant, he has to still bear the expenses that may be assumed to have been met to preserve their dignified human existence, keeping in mind the financial and social status of the parties. 47. Also, the applicant as an able bodied person is responsible to take care of all the financial needs of his wife and child from beginning and not from the date on which the court passes an order in that regard. Only upto the date, an application is made, would a defence be available to the applicant that such needs have been taken care of. Also, the learned court below has not found the mother/opposite party no. 2 to be a person with any earning to provide for the latter's needs. 48. Even otherwise, such a plea is being raised in numerous cases. It is common fact noticed in all such cases that proceedings under section 125 Cr.P.C. are almost never concluded within 60 days in accordance with the legislative spirit. In many cases the applications are decided with a delay ranging between two to five years. 49. To accept the argument advanced by learned counsel for the applicant would be to incentivize delay for the benefit of the person who has to provide for the means of sustenance and to the peril of the hapless victim for whose benefit the provision of section 125 Cr.P.C. exists. 50. In any case, date of the order has no bearing to the date from which the claimant seeks relief. That date is indeterminate and varies from case to case. To accept the date of the order as the date from when maintenance allowance is to be allowed, in absence of any reason given in such order may render the order arbitrary, to that extent. 51. Therefore, in my view the award of the maintenance from the date of application does not suffer from any infirmity. 52. To accept the date of the order as the date from when maintenance allowance is to be allowed, in absence of any reason given in such order may render the order arbitrary, to that extent. 51. Therefore, in my view the award of the maintenance from the date of application does not suffer from any infirmity. 52. Last, it has been submitted in any some time granted to the applicant to pay the opposite party no.2 and 3 the arrears of maintenance allowance. 53. Accordingly, the instant revision is disposed of with the following directions: 1. Subject to the applicant furnishing adequate security for the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the satisfaction of the court below in the shape of other than cash or bank guarantee by 30.04.2018, further coercive measures adopted against the applicant shall remain stayed, subject to other conditions provided herein. 2. The applicant shall pay Rs. 10,000/- towards maintenance allowance for the period April, 2018 on or before 15.04.2018. 3. The applicant shall continue to pay the monthly maintenance allowance from the period May, 2018 onwards as and when it becomes due, in the manner provided by the court below under the impugned award. 4. Subject to the applicant having complied with the above, the amount of Rs. 2,80,000/- (approximately) being arrears of maintenance allowance for the period from the date of application till the date of order shall be deposited in six instalments, such instalments being payable on or before 31.05.2018, 31.08.2018, 30.11.2018, 28.02.2019, 31.05.2019 and 31.08.2019 respectively. The first five instalments would be of Rs. 50,000/- each while the sixth/last instalment would be for the balance amount. 54. Any amount deposited by the applicant may be adjusted towards last payment/s to be made by the applicant. 55. All the amounts if deposited by the applicant in the Court below shall be released to the opposite party no. 2 forthwith. 56. However, it is made clear that in the event of failure on part of the applicant to comply with any part of the order, coercive measures be revived from that stage without any further reference to this Court and recoveries be made from the applicant in compliance of this order.