JUDGMENT : Patherya, J. 1. This appeal is filed from the order dated 27th June, 2012 passed in W.P. 21643 (W) of 2008 for the reliefs set-out therein supported by grounds therein. 2. Counsel for the appellant submits that the Court below has erred in passing the order dated 27th June, 2012 as the issue of delay was not addressed by the Court below which finds mention in the order dated 5th July, 2008. W.P. 3335(W) of 2008, W.P. 3340(W) of 2008 and W.P. 3338(W) of 2008 were filed wherein an order was passed on 26th March, 2008. 3. While considering the said writ petitions filed in 2008 counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners namely Tarani Kanta Das, Sankar Kumar Deb and Brajeswar Mallick stood on identical footing and ventilated similar grievance as Jayanta Chowdhury, the writ petitioner of W.P. 1151 (W) of 1999 and therefore being on similar footing and similarly situate the same order that was passed in W.P. 1151(W) of 1999 the said reliefs be granted to Brajeswar Mallick, Tarani Kanta Das and Sankar Kumar Deb. 4. W.P. 1151(W) of 1991 was disposed of in July 2002 and an appeal was filed by the Bank and the appeal was disposed of in 2007. The S.L.P. filed was also disposed of in 2007 and it is only thereafter a representation was made by Sankar Kumar Deb, Tarani Kanta Das and Brajeswar Mallick in December 2007. The said representation was not disposed of. Therefore the writ petitions had to be filed by Sankar Kumar Deb, Tarani Kanta Das and Brajeswar Mallick and was disposed of by order dated 26th March, 2008. It was on the prayer of counsel of Sankar Kumar Deb, Tarani Kanta Das and Brajeswar Mallick that the representation was directed to be disposed of as proposed by the learned senior counsel. This representation which had been filed was disposed of as per the direction contained in the order dated 26th March, 2008. There is no dispute that there has been utmost compliance with the principles of natural justice. There is also no allegation in respect thereof. The writ petition was considered. The documents annexed thereto also was considered, so also the representation of December 2007 and it is only after hearing the parties that the order dated 5th July, 2008 on the ground of delay was dismissed. 5. There is also no allegation in respect thereof. The writ petition was considered. The documents annexed thereto also was considered, so also the representation of December 2007 and it is only after hearing the parties that the order dated 5th July, 2008 on the ground of delay was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 5th July, 2008 W.P. 21643(W) of 2008 was filed. Pleadings were filed, considered and thereafter the order dated 27th June, 2012 was passed. But in doing so the Court below erred and made a mistake by setting aside the order dated 5th July, 2008 and directing the Chairman to release all service benefits in favour of the writ petitioner after giving him permission in terms of the rules applicable. The said exercise was to be completed within a period of four weeks and being aggrieved by this order this appeal was filed. 6. The selection process in respect of Jayanta Chaudhury was initiated in 1999 while that of Sankar Kumar Deb was initiated in 2000. Jayanta Chaudhury immediately challenged the circular dated 4th October, 1997. In fact the writ petitioner for the first time filed a representation in December 2007. He took no step to file any representation or writ petition as he did in 2008, either in 2002 or even in 2007, when the appeal court as also the Supreme Court of India passed orders, affirming the order of July 2002. The writ petitioner waited to see the outcome of the 1999 writ petition and he waited on the fence. While doing so he allowed third party rights to intervene and therefore he trampled over the rights of such third parties. The writ petitioner, waited till the outcome of the 1999 writ petition, filed the representation only after disposal of the 1999 proceeding in 2007 before the Supreme Court of India and this representation made by him is in December 2007 and not prior thereto. This representation was not considered, therefore W.P. 3335(W) of 2008, W.P.3338 (W) of 2008 and W.P. 3340 (W) of 2008 were filed and an order was passed. All that the writ petitioner wanted was to dispose of his representation and this order was passed on 26th March, 2008. The said order was accepted both by the writ petitioner and the Bank and there is no dispute in respect thereof. All that the writ petitioner wanted was to dispose of his representation and this order was passed on 26th March, 2008. The said order was accepted both by the writ petitioner and the Bank and there is no dispute in respect thereof. The representation of the writ petitioner was disposed of by the order dated 5th July, 2008 by the appropriate authority, being the Chairman of the Appellant Gramin Bank, the respondent no. 3. The appropriate authority heard both the parties and thereafter rejected the representation of the writ petitioner/respondent. This was challenged in W.P. 21643(W) of 2008 and on consideration of the pleadings of the parties the impugned order dated 27th June, 2012 was passed. The order dated 26th March, 2008 did not bar the appropriate authority from considering the issue of delay. Instead the appropriate authority was entitled to consider all issues which were raised before him and he did so before passing the order dated 5th July, 2008. The Court below instead rejected the plea of delay on the ground that the said issue was waived by the respondent before S.P.Talukdar, J., and was estopped from taking the said plea. In fact delay was condoned by the order dated 26th March, 2008 but no such waiver or estoppel can be seen from the order dated 26th March, 2008. The conduct of the Chairman being the appropriate authority cannot be construed to be unfair or unjustifiable as has been mentioned in the impugned order. The Court below in fact did not consider the order dated 26th March, 2008 in its proper perspective nor the contention made by the appellant bank while contesting W.P. 3335(W) of 2008. The Court below proceeded on the basis that the writ petitioner Deb was similarly situate as Jayanta Chaudhury but he did not consider that the selection process governed by Jayanta in 1999 and Deb in 2000 were different. In fact the claims/averments in paragraphs 9 and 11 were pleaded by the writ petitioner himself and having said so could not have retracted or could not have got support from the Judgment of Jayanta Chaudhury. As third party rights had intervened and delay of about 8 years had arisen, in filing W. P. 21643(W) of 2008, therefore, the order dated 27th June, 2012 cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 7. As third party rights had intervened and delay of about 8 years had arisen, in filing W. P. 21643(W) of 2008, therefore, the order dated 27th June, 2012 cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 7. Counsel for the writ petitioner submits that there is no delay in proceedings initiated by the writ petitioner/respondent. The circular dated 4.10.1997 dealt with the issue with regard to seniority cum merit and Jayanta Chaudhury the writ petitioner of W. P. No. 1151 (W) of 1999 was aggrieved. Therefore, W. P. 1151 (W) of 1999 was challenged by him. His writ petition of 1999 was allowed in July 2002, but the appellant/Bank’s appeal and the special leave petition were dismissed. This was in 2007. A representation was filed by the writ petitioner and in December, 2007 at the earliest his representation was filed with the authorities. As his representation was not considered he filed W. P. No. 3335 (W) of 2008. By order dated 26th March, 2008 his writ petition was allowed. This writ petition/representation filed by him was disposed of and point of delay was not urged by the respondent authorities at the time of hearing. In the first writ petition he had urged that he was similarly situate with Jayanta Chaudhury and therefore being similarly situate as Jayanta Chaudhury would be entitled to the claim of Jayanta Chaudhury too. There is no dispute that no appeal had been filed from the order dated 26th March, 2008 but while considering the representation as directed by order dated 26th March, 2008 was not considered by the appropriate authority while passing the order dated 5th July, 2008. This resulted in filing of the second writ petition being W. P. No. 21643 (W) of 2008. The issue of similarly situate was to be addressed by the appropriate authority and nothing else and in doing so the appropriate authority erred in passing the order dated 5th July, 2008 which was set aside by order dated 27th June, 2012. The appellant Bank is an instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore the writ petitioner must be treated as an ideal employee by not pursuing the point of delay. This issue was waived and implicitly condoned. Therefore this issue of delay was a dead issue when the parties came before the appropriate authority, at the hearing, pursuant to the order dated 26th March, 2008. Therefore the writ petitioner must be treated as an ideal employee by not pursuing the point of delay. This issue was waived and implicitly condoned. Therefore this issue of delay was a dead issue when the parties came before the appropriate authority, at the hearing, pursuant to the order dated 26th March, 2008. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that delay could have been addressed by the appropriate authority. Reliance is placed on (2006) 2 SCC 747 , (2011)(1) CLJ Cal 495 and (2008) 9 SCC 24 . 8. Having considered the submissions of the parties, it appears that the court below erred in passing the order dated 27th June, 2012 and the reason for making such mistake is set out hereinbelow: (1) There is no dispute that a circular for seniority cum merit was issued on 4th October, 1997. This circular was challenged by one Jayanta Chaudhury in W. P. 1151 (W) of 1999. His writ petition was allowed in July, 2002, and although an appeal was filed from the said order by the bank the bank’s appeal so also the special leave petition before the Supreme Court of India were dismissed in 2007. (2) The selection process of Jayanta Chaudhury was initiated in 1999 and that of Deb, the writ petitioner was in 2000. The writ petitioner for the first time in December, 2007 filed a representation and for non-consideration of such representation filed W.P. 3335(W) of 2008. 9. It is important for us to set out the reliefs of W.P. 3335(W) of 2008 and for ready reference is set out herein below. The writ petitioner for the first time in December, 2007 filed a representation and for non-consideration of such representation filed W.P. 3335(W) of 2008. 9. It is important for us to set out the reliefs of W.P. 3335(W) of 2008 and for ready reference is set out herein below. “(a) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents concerned to consider and dispose of the representation dated 10.12.2007 made by the petitioner; (b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents concerned to consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgment and order dated 19.7.2002 passed by the Hon’ble Justice Ashim Kumar Banerjee in W. P. No. 1151 (W) of 1999 which was affirmed by the judgment and order dated 12.3.2007 passed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar and the Hon’ble Pinaki Chandra Ghose which received the final seal of approval by the order dated 12.11.2007 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 20285 of 2007; (c) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents concerned to give all consequential benefits of to the petitioner for promotion from the post of OJM-I to the post of NMG-II with effect from the date 1.1.1998 giving effect to promotion to their juniors who got promotion by superseding the petitioner vide Circular No. C/007/22/163/PRS-I dated 9.1.1998. (d) A declaration be made that when the Special Leave of Appeal (Civil) No. 20285 of 2007 filed by the bank has been dismissed and the judgment and order passed in FMA 1771 of 2003 remains operative and the rights of the petitioner relating to promotion is accordance with service regulations stood finally and completely adjudicated; (e) A further declaration be made that the petitioner’s right to be considered for promotion cannot suffer erazement and imperilment simply because the petitioner has not moved challenging the actions of the respondents concerned earlier and there cannot be any waiver and/or estoppel in regard to the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be considered for promotion. (f) A writ in the nature of Certiorari commanding the respondents concerned to transmit the records of the case to this Hon’ble Court so that conscionable justice may be done after looking to the same;” 10. The order passed in the said writ petition was annexed to W.P. 21643(W) of 2008. (f) A writ in the nature of Certiorari commanding the respondents concerned to transmit the records of the case to this Hon’ble Court so that conscionable justice may be done after looking to the same;” 10. The order passed in the said writ petition was annexed to W.P. 21643(W) of 2008. But the writ petition in itself had not been annexed to the second writ petition but we thought in our wisdom to call for production of W.P. 3335(W) of 2008 and found that in prayer (a) all that the writ petitioner wanted us, was to dispose of his representation dated 10.12.2007 and he wanted to consider his case in the light of the order dated 19th July, 2002 i.e., an order passed in W.P. 1151(W) of 1999. Therefore, he sought for promotion and declaration but these reliefs were abandoned. 11. We are not aware why he did not pursue the said reliefs being prayers (c) (d) (e). But this can be found from the order dated 26th March, 2008 itself. We must set out this order of 26th March, 2008 hereinbelow as it is of great importance. “Liberty is given to correct the annexure P-1 in the manner as proposed. 12. Heard Mr. Moitra, learned counsel, for the writ petitioner. 13. It is submitted that the writ petitioner has been denied his legitimate promotion and the consequential benefits. Before entering into the merit of the application, it is submitted by Mr. Moitra that another person standing on an identical footing approached this Court with a writ application ventilating similar grievances. The said writ application, being W.P. No. 1151(W) of 1999, was disposed of in favour of the petitioner. 14. It was assailed by the concerned authority, being the Uttar Banga Kshetriya Gramin Bank, by preferring an appeal and the learned Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the judgment and order of the learned Single Bench. The authority concerned did not stop there and preferred a Special Leave to Petition before the Apex Court which, however, was dismissed. 15. In such background, Mr. Moitra submits that it will be better if the concerned authority is directed to consider the grievances of the writ petitioner in their proper perspective and take appropriate action in accordance with the rules. 16. 15. In such background, Mr. Moitra submits that it will be better if the concerned authority is directed to consider the grievances of the writ petitioner in their proper perspective and take appropriate action in accordance with the rules. 16. It is not understood as to why should the authority concerned unnecessarily invite litigation and hesitate to extend the benefit which the persons/employees standing on an identical footing are entitled to get in view of the judicial pronouncement which reached its finality. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent authority, however, submits that the present writ petitioner does not stand on the footing identical to that of the petitioner whose case was favourably disposed of by this Court. This is a matter to be ascertained by the appropriate authority. 18. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I think interest of justice would be best served if the matter is considered afresh as rightly proposed by learned senior counsel, Mr. Moitra. 19. Thus, the present application being W.P. No. 3335(W) of 2008 is disposed of with a liberty to the writ petitioner to submit a fresh representation before the appropriate authority, being the respondent no. 3 herein, within a period of three weeks from this date. 20. While submitting such representation, the writ petitioner may annex a copy of the writ application as well as annexures thereto. The said respondent no. 3 upon receipt of the said representation must consider the entire matter in its proper perspective and of course, in the context of the fact of the earlier application as referred to. 21. While considering the matter, the writ petitioner may also give an opportunity of hearing. The entire process must be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the representation. 22. Action to be so taken or order to be so passed must duly be communicated to the writ petitioner within a further period of two weeks. 23. Affidavit of service filed be kept with the records. 24. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties expeditiously.” 25. On a perusal of the said order it will appear that counsel for the writ petitioner himself submitted that another person had sought for identical reliefs on same footing. Such writ petition was dismissed. 24. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties expeditiously.” 25. On a perusal of the said order it will appear that counsel for the writ petitioner himself submitted that another person had sought for identical reliefs on same footing. Such writ petition was dismissed. The appeal, and the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India were dismissed. It was at the invitation of the writ petitioner Deb’s Counsel that S. P. Talukdar, J. allowed the said application directing that the representation dated December 2007 be considered. Besides the said representation liberty had also been given to the writ petitioner to submit fresh representation. Therefore, besides the representation of 2007 and annexed to the documents therein so also the fresh representation filed was to be considered by the appropriate authority. We cannot make any comment on this aspect of the order as the parties accepted the said order. But the writ petitioner was to be given an opportunity of hearing and he was heard. In fact the observation made by the court below in the said order which we will set out herein below is nothing but an obiter or an observation but is no direction at all and this is because thereafter what follows is that the proposal made by the senior counsel of the writ petitioner/respondent was actually accepted by the court below and the representation was to be disposed of by the appropriate authority. At hearing on 26th March, 2008 the contention of the respondent authority was set-out in the said order which for ready reference is set out hereinbelow : “Learned counsel for the respondent authority, however, submits that the present writ petitioner does not stand on the footing identical to the petitioner whose case was favourably disposed of by this Court. This is a matter to be ascertained by the appropriate authority.” 26. The appropriate authority was entitled to consider all the issues raised before him for consideration and that is exactly what he did and in passing the said order dated 5th July, 2008 on the ground of delay rejected the contention or the representation of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner was aggrieved by the said order and filed W. P. No. 21643 (W) of 2008. The writ petitioner was aggrieved by the said order and filed W. P. No. 21643 (W) of 2008. It will not be correct on our part to say that the court below did not consider the contention of both the appellant bank and the writ petitioner Deb but while considering the contention of the appellant/bank committed a mistake in relying on the order dated 26th March, 2008 as according to him delay was not pursued by the respondent that is at the time of disposal of the first writ petition and therefore the appellant bank was estopped from taking the plea of delay. According to the court below delay had also been condoned by the order dated 26th March, 2008. In the order dated 26th March, 2008 the issue of delay was not addressed by S.P. Talukdar, J. and for this reason we cannot support the finding of the court below on a reading of the said order dated 26th March, 2008. 27. Counsel for the appellant Bank had categorically stated that the matter is to be ascertained by the appropriate authority and this contention was not rejected by S.P. Talukdar, J. Therefore, the findings of the Court below cannot be supported. Unfairness or unjustifiability of the conduct of the Chairman also cannot be found by us as all that the Chairman did was to give a hearing in compliance with the order dated 26th March, 2008. He considered the representation, writ petition and the documents annexed to the writ petition. Therefore, unfairness on his part cannot be found by us as was found by the Court below. In fact, the case of Jayanta Chaudhury the writ petitioner of W.P. 1151(W) of 1999 was different from the case of Deb’s writ petition and although the Court below has found that the appropriate authority namely the Chairman has decided the matter in a bias manner but the issue of bias was not canvassed before the Court below by writ petitioner Deb. 28. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of W.P. 21643(W) of 2008 reads as follows: “8. Your petitioner states that the result of the promotional process was declared on 9.1.1995 by virtue of circular no. c/007/22/158/… It appeared from the said circular that 27 officers from OJM-I were promoted to the post of MG-II. The name of the petitioner did not appear in the said circular. Your petitioner states that the result of the promotional process was declared on 9.1.1995 by virtue of circular no. c/007/22/158/… It appeared from the said circular that 27 officers from OJM-I were promoted to the post of MG-II. The name of the petitioner did not appear in the said circular. But, it appears from the said circular that two officers from OJM-I who were juniors to the petitioner were selected for promotion. In the seniority list as stated above, the name of the said two officers being Sri Brojen Chakraborty (now deceased) and Swapan Kumar Bhattacharjee are appearing in sl. No. 60 and 61. But their name appeared in Sl.No. 26 and 27 of the said circular declaring the promotion of the officers from OJM-I to MNG-II. Xerox copy of the circular dated 9.1.1998 is annexed hereto and marked with Letter “P3”. 9. Your petitioner states that in the year 1998-99 another promotional process was initiated and the said promotional process was also conducted on the basis of the principles of seniority-cum-merit. In the said promotional process 14 officers of OJM-I were selected”. Therefore it is evident that 14 officers were selected in the promotional post/process. Paragraph 11 of the writ petition also reads as follows: “11. Your petitioner states that not only the petitioner but also other officers were superseded by their juniors in different promotional process. The said officers ventilated their grievance. The management tried to avoid the grievances of such officers who were superseded by their juniors only by showing the reason of pendency of the case arose in W.P. No. 1151(W) of 1999 (Jayanta Chowdhury Vs Uttar Banga Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors.) The management further stated that the question of supersession of all the officers will be decided after disposal of the above mentioned case.” And on a reading of the aforesaid paragraphs it is evident that third party rights had intervened and by passing the order dated 27th June, 2012 the said settled claims or rights were in fact unsettled. This is another reason for not supporting the order dated 27th June, 2012. 29. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 27th June, 2012 is set aside. 30. This is another reason for not supporting the order dated 27th June, 2012. 29. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 27th June, 2012 is set aside. 30. I have considered the factual aspect of the appeal before us and have left it to my Brother Mantha, J. to deal with the decisions which were cited before us by the writ petitioner Deb and the case reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 which was though addressed before the Court below was not canvassed before us. 31. Certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. 32. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by my Learned Sister. I, however, wish to deal with the decisions cited before us as also one vital decision relied upon by the bank in Court below. 33. My sister has painstakingly set out the facts and has thereafter dealt with the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and particularly the respondent/writ petitioner before us. therefore shall not reproduce the same here. 34. The entire case before the Court below revolved around the effect of the order of a learned Single Judge dated 26th March, 2008 in W.P.3335(W) of 2008 on the case of the writ petitioner. The order has been set out by my Learned Sister. The respondent would argue, as has been accepted by the Learned Single Judge, that the issue of delay not having been raised by the appellant herein, in W.P.3335(W) of 2008 was conclusively dealt with and rejected by the order dated 26.03.2008. 35. It was also argued that the issue of delay was not specifically urged in the said W.P.3335(W) of 2008 and hence waived by the appellant/Bank. It was further contended that the direction in the said order dated 26.03.2008 on the appellant to consider the writ petitioner’s representation, condoned the delay in making such representation. This contention of the respondent/writ petitioner, according to us is not even remotely sustainable in law or the facts of the case. In this regard we are constrained to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in C.Jacobs Vs. Director of Geology and Mining and Anr., reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 . Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the said Judgment are set out herein below. “9. In this regard we are constrained to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in C.Jacobs Vs. Director of Geology and Mining and Anr., reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 . Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the said Judgment are set out herein below. “9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserve a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any “decision” on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceeding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In the manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale of barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground along, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representation unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merit, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merit, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action.” 36. The facts in the case of C. Jacob (supra) above were inter alia that a delinquent employee against whom departmental proceedings were initiated and punishment awarded, approached the High Court after eighteen years whereupon the High Court directed his writ petition to be considered as a representation by the respondent Employer, therein. 37. The representation was rejected by a detailed order. The said rejection came to be challenged in a second writ petition. The High Court in consideration of the second writ petition allowed the claims of the writ petitioner delinquent employee inter alia holding that the delay of 18 years stood extinguished and/or condoned by the direction of the Single Judge in the earlier writ petition that the delinquent employee’s representation be considered by the respondents therein. 38. Setting aside the views of the High Court the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as set out herein above. The dicta as evident from the above paragraphs is inter alia that mere direction to consider to a representation will not extinguish or condone the delay that occurred in making of such representation before the authorities concerned. The practice of directing the representation to be considered itself has been deprecated. Applying said dicta in the instant case we find in no uncertain terms as follows: 39. The cause of action of the writ petitioner/respondent arose in the year 2000 as admitted in paragraph 10 of the writ petition. Such paragraph was affirmed as true to the knowledge of the writ petitioner. It is averred in the said paragraph that the writ petitioner was allegedly superseded by the respondents mentioned therein. There is, therefore, no reason for the writ petitioner to wait until 2007 for making a representation as regards such alleged superseding. Such paragraph was affirmed as true to the knowledge of the writ petitioner. It is averred in the said paragraph that the writ petitioner was allegedly superseded by the respondents mentioned therein. There is, therefore, no reason for the writ petitioner to wait until 2007 for making a representation as regards such alleged superseding. The writ petitioner/respondent argued that he was awaiting result of the litigation initiated by Jayanta Chaudhury in W.P.1151(W) of 1999 to be decided Hon’ble Supreme Court does not hold water in our view. Delay in making the representation was not addressed in the Order dated 26th March, 2008. The writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage on the prayer of the Writ petitioner’s Counsel. The respondents did not raise the question of delay as the matter was directed to be considered by the Respondent authorities. The delay therefore could not have been condoned by the Learned Single Judge in the order dated 26th March, 2008 in W.P.3335(W) of 2008. 40. There is yet an another reason in this regard that cannot be ignored. The learned Single Judge in the order dated 26th March, 2008 had directed the respondents to consider the writ petition also as per of his representation. The argument of the respondent/writ petitioner that the authorities had sought to decide the writ petition itself, thus acting in excess of jurisdiction, therefore, cannot and does not hold water. We therefore hold that the issue of delay was neither decided nor deemed to have been condoned or stale by reason of the order dated 26.03.2008. The learned Single Judge should have decided the same in the court below. 41. At the bar before us the respondent/writ petitioner relied upon the decision of State of Karnataka &Ors. –Vs- C. Lalitha reported in (2006) SCC 747 particularly paragraph 29 thereof. In the said decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that persons similarly situated must be treated similarly. We cannot have any quarrel of such proposition. However, we must bear in mind that the said decision related to a claim for selection to a post and not to promotion. The question as to whether persons are similarly situated is also a question of fact. Each decision and the ratio thereof must be seen in the facts and circumstances of such case. However, we must bear in mind that the said decision related to a claim for selection to a post and not to promotion. The question as to whether persons are similarly situated is also a question of fact. Each decision and the ratio thereof must be seen in the facts and circumstances of such case. We therefore feel that the Karnataka Vs Lalitha decision (supra) cannot come to the aid of the respondent/writ petitioner. 42. The other decision cited was that of a Single Judge of this High Court reported in (2011) 1 CLJ 495. The facts of that case relate to fixation of pay of similarly situated persons. The said case does not have anything to do with promotion or the right to agitate non-consideration or a faulty promotion process. 43. In the instant case the grievance of the writ petitioner having arisen in the year 2000 and that too in respect of a faulty promotion process, according to him was canvassed as late as 2007. As a consequence whereof third party rights had substantially accrued. The above decision is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. 44. The respondent/writ petitioner also relied on the decision reported in 2008 (9) SCC 24 . We do not see the need to deal with the same, as the same is also equally distinguishable on facts. 45. For the reasons above, I am in complete agreement with my Sister that the appeal should be allowed and the impugned Judgment and order is liable to be set aside. 46. Certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. 47. In view thereof, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.