ORDER : By this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 6th June 2017, whereby petitioner has been declared ineligible for appointment in the police services on account of prosecution in criminal case. 2. The petitioner case is that he had participated in the selection for appointment to the post of Constable and had qualified the written test and the interview call letter was also issued and petitioner had downloaded information showing that his posting unit is SP Narsinghpur but thereafter the impugned communication was received by petitioner holding him ineligible for appointment. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner has already been acquitted on the basis of compromise therefore, the petitioner cannot be denied appointment on the ground of criminal prosecution. 4. As against this learned counsel for State has submitted that acquittal of petitioner is not an honourable acquittal and case has already been examined by the screening committee in terms of the judgment of the Supreme court, hence no ground for interference is made out. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record it is noticed that crime No. 271/12 was registered against petitioner for offence under Sections 323, 504 and 325 of IPC, trial of which had resulted into conviction of petitioner for offence under section 325 of IPC and sentencing him 6 months imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,500/-. Against the order of conviction petitioner had preferred an appeal in which he has been acquitted on the basis of compromise. 6. Supreme court in the matter of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2016)8 SCC 471 has laid down the test and the criteria on the basis of which the cases relating to appointment of candidates who have been prosecuted in the criminal cases or who had suppressed the information of involvement in criminal case is to be considered as follows: 38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2 While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3 The employer shall take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4 In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted : - 38.4.1 In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5 In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6 In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.6 In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7 In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8 If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9 In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10 For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11 Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him. 7. The record reflects that respondents in pursuance to the directions of the Supreme court in the aforesaid judgment and also direction in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another Vs. Mehar Singh in Civil Appeal No. 4842/13 by judgment dated 2nd July 2013 have constituted the screening committee for examining such cases and in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme court in the aforesaid judgment case of petitioner has been examined by screening committee which vide report contained in Annex. R-7 has found that acquittal of petitioner did not fall under clean or Honourable acquittal and petitioner was not fit for appointment in the police services. 8. R-7 has found that acquittal of petitioner did not fall under clean or Honourable acquittal and petitioner was not fit for appointment in the police services. 8. The record further reflects that circular dated 5th June 2003 Annexure R-5 has been issued by Home Department specifying the cases which fall under category of the moral turpitude and the offence under section 325 in terms of said circular is an offence relating to moral turpitude. 9. That apart Supreme court in the matter of State of MP and others Vs. Parvez Khan in civil appeal No. 10613/14 vide judgment dated 1st December 2014 in similar case relating to denial of appointment in a case of acquittal in criminal case while rejecting the claim has held: 13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the Respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational. There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of evidence or discharge based on compounding. 14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the matter was also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was held : “36. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However, certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious offences have been recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However, certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious offences have been recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur ( 2010 (11) SCC 455 ). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people with doubtful background do not enter the police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but we cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents to rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the police force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-depth examination of this allegation at the highest level. Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is strictly implemented.” 15. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent for recruitment to the police service by way of giving him compassionate appointment. 10. The Division Bench of this court in the matter of Roop Narayan Sahu Vs. State of MP and others vide order dated 11/8/2017 passed in WA No. 163/09 while holding a candidate unfit for appointment for the post of constable, though he was acquitted in the criminal case, has held that: 13. In the present case, the employer has examined the case of the appellant in the light of the Circular dated 5-6-2003 issued by the Department. In the present case, the employer has examined the case of the appellant in the light of the Circular dated 5-6-2003 issued by the Department. It was found that the appellant was involved in a case of theft of crown (MUKUT) from a temple, the value of the aforesaid stolen property was more than 40 lacs and the appellant was prosecuted in respect of the offence punishable under sections 452 and 380 of the IPC. The courts found that even though the stolen property was recovered from the possession of the appellant, but there was some discrepancy in the seizure-memo, Ex.P/4; statement of the Investigating Officer (PW-6) and seizure witnesses and, therefore, the appellant was extended the benefit of doubt and he was acquitted. The competent authority evaluated the entire matter in proper perspective after going through the judgments of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and ascribed the finding that the appellant has been granted benefit of doubt to the discrepancies in the statements of witnesses. However, considering the nature of the case and implication of the appellant and taking note of the fact that he is not acquitted on a clear finding of non-existing of guilt but has acquitted him by extending the benefit of doubt and, therefore, he was not found fit to be considered for appointment in the Police Department in accordance to the requirements of the Circular (Annexure-R/1). 14. Thus, the decision taken by the Department was not mechanical, but it was a conscious decision after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in proper perspective. Further, if a candidate is to be recruited to the Police service, he must be worthy confidence of an utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. The persons having criminal antecedents, would not fall within the ambit of the said category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he can be completely exonerated. [See: State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Parvez Khan, (2015) 2 SCC 591 ] 15. The persons having criminal antecedents, would not fall within the ambit of the said category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he can be completely exonerated. [See: State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Parvez Khan, (2015) 2 SCC 591 ] 15. In the conspectus of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion, that there is no illegality or impropriety in the decision taken by the respondents, denying appointment to the appellant-petitioner, the same is in accordance with law expounded in Avtar Singh (supra) and the findings ascribed by the learned Single Judge are impeccable and deserve stamp of approval of this Court. 16. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is devoid of any substance and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, we so direct. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 11 Having regard to the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the opinion that the respondents have not committed any error in passing the impugned order dated 6th June 2017 holding the petitioner ineligible for appointment in the police services. 12. While considering the case of a candidate seeking appointment in police force his criminal antecedents are required to be meticulously examined. If the screening committee constituted for this purpose on the basis of applicable criteria finds him to be unfit for appointment due to prosecution in criminal case, then this court while exercising writ jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate authority and interfere in such a decision unless the same is found to be palpably erroneous or dehorse the rule, regulation or settled law. 13. The impugned order has been passed after due examination of the case by the screening committee and by following the directions issued by Hon’ble Supreme court in cases of Mehar Singh and Avtar Singh (supra) which indicates that a conscious decision by due application of mind has been taken by the respondents which does not require any interference by this court. 14. Hence the writ petition is found to be devoid of any merit which is accordingly dismissed. C.C. As per rules.