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2018 DIGILAW 770 (RAJ)

Iktisar Ali v. Union of India

2018-03-14

ASHOK KUMAR GAUR

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner in the instant petition has challenged the order dt. 17th April, 2017 passed by respondent-Commandant-63, BN, C.R.P.F., rejecting representation of the petitioner filed by him in pursuance of order dt. 24th January, 2017, passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6116/1999. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner came to be appointed as Constable (GD) in CRPF on 4th September, 1995, with-his enlistment No. 951360653. 3. The petitioner while in service was served with a charge-sheet on 17th January, 1998 with the allegation of committing misconduct under Section 11 (a) of the CRPF Act, 1949. 4. The allegation leveled against the petitioner was with respect to suppression and concealment of act of his involvement in a criminal case registered under Sections 323, 341 & 147 I.P.C. in the year 1995 before his appointment in CRPF. 5. The Disciplinary Authority conducted the enquiry and found the charge proved against the petitioner and order of dismissal from service was passed on 18th May, 1998. 6. The petitioner had preferred a Departmental Appeal against the order dt. 18th May, 1998 to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (IGP) and the same was also rejected vide order dt. 19th August, 1998, by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Chennai. The revision petition preferred by the petitioner against orders of Disciplinary and Appellate Authority also came to be dismissed by I.G.P., CRPF, Hyderabad by order : dt. 11th May, 1999. 7. The petitioner had filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6116/1999 before this Court against the impugned orders dt. 18th May, 1998, 19th August, 1998 and 11th May, 1999. This Court vide its order dt. 24th January, 2017, allowed the writ petition of the petitioner and set aside the impugned orders challenged by the petitioner and further directed to file CJ. representation before the respondents for reconsideration of his case in the context of judgment of the Apex Court In the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. 2016(8) SCC 471 . 8. The petitioner after decision of this Court, flied a detailed representation before the authorities. The petitioner stated in his representation that he was falsely Involved In a criminal case, which was registered against him and four other persons for the offences under Sections 323, 341 & 147 IPC. Union of India and Ors. 2016(8) SCC 471 . 8. The petitioner after decision of this Court, flied a detailed representation before the authorities. The petitioner stated in his representation that he was falsely Involved In a criminal case, which was registered against him and four other persons for the offences under Sections 323, 341 & 147 IPC. The petitioner submitted that on 1st May, 1995, he was acquitted of offences under Sections 323 & 341 IPC on account of a compromise arrived at between the complainant and accused. The offence under Section 147 IPC was not compoundable and as such petitioner and other persons, voluntarily admitted their guilt in the Lok Adalat and as such he was convicted for offence under Section 147 IPC and was granted benefit of probation under the Provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 9. The authority has now rejected the representation of the petitioner by order dt. 17th April, 2017 and the reason assigned by the authority is that in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) "It is clearly enumerated that the standard expected of a person intended to serve in a uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and, therefore any deliberate statement of omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the Appointing Authority cannot be faulted." It would be relevant to quote paras 8 & 9 of the order passed by the Authority & same is reproduced as hereunder: "8. Hon'ble Court has set aside the dismissal order No. P VII-3/98-EC-2 dated 18/05/1998 issued by this office and on the other hand the court has directed to dispose of the representation of the petitioner with reference to judgment of the apex court In the case of Avtar Singh. On study of aforesaid judgment order with reference to the judgment of court case related to Avtar Singh Vs. UOI & Ors., SLP (C) No. 20525/2011 it is clearly enumerated that the standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and therefore any deliberate statement on omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted. UOI & Ors., SLP (C) No. 20525/2011 it is clearly enumerated that the standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and therefore any deliberate statement on omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted. No. 951360653 Ex-Constable (GO) Iktisar Ali of A/63 BN CRP, during his initial appointment in CRPF has clearly admitted in the verification roll that he was never arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a court of law for any offence or debarred/disqualified by any Public Service Commission from appearing at its examination/selections, or j debarred from taking any examination/rusticated by any University or any other education authority/Institution. In light of position explained above retention of Ex-CT/GO Iktisar Ali in CRPF is not at all tenable, where the act of appellant Le. suppression & concealment of fact is highly objectionable and liable to be severely punished as per existing rules of the department. 9. I therefore in the capacity of disciplinary authority fully agreed with the orders issued on 18/05/1998 against Ex-Ct/Gd Iktisar Ali imposing the penalty of 'Dismissal' from service and could not be withdrawn in pursuance to the level of integrity required as per service conditions of the department." The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order, has approached this Court. 10. The petitioner has alleged in his writ petition that the Competent Authority has not considered his representation in correct prospective as per directions given by this Court in its judgment dt. 24th January, 2017. 10A. The petitioner has alleged in his petition that since this Court has categorically opined that conviction of the petitioner under Section 147 IPC giving him the benefit of Probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 would not itself dis-entitle him for the appointment, which was given to him on 4th August, 1995 and as such the representation filed by the petitioner, was not considered in correct & legal perspective, in the light of the order passed by the High Court and also as per directions given by the Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Supra). 11. Union of India and Ors. (Supra). 11. The reply has been filed by the respondents and it has been specifically averred that the representation of the petitioner has been decided as per law and petitioner being a member of Disciplined Force, is not entitled for reinstatement in service. 12. The respondents have submitted in the reply that standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service, is quite distinct from other services and therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the Appointing Authority cannot be faulted. 13. The respondents have submitted that the Apex Court In the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) considered the Judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2012(8) SCC 748 and as such the standard in a uniformed service is quite distinct. 14. The respondents have pleaded in their reply that the petitioner was specifically asked about fact of his conviction by the Court in a criminal case and he has simply mentioned the word "No", and when the specific question was asked in the verification roll was - "Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by the Court of law for any offence or debarred/disqualified by any public service commission from appearing at its examination/selection or debarred from taking any examination/rusticated by any university or any other education authority/institution?", the petitioner did not give correct information and as such not entitled for any relief. 15. The respondents have submitted that facts of the case reveal that there was intentional concealment on the part of the petitioner and the false statement would itself would be serious misconduct and such person cannot be kept in security service. The respondents have also made a reference of case decided by the Apex Court in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India, 2010(14) SCC 103 . 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R.P. Vijay, has submitted that respondents while deciding the representation of the petitioner has picked up few lines from the judgment of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra) and in particular para 29.7 has been taken note of, for denying the appointment to the petitioner. 17. Counsel submitted that the case of Avtar Singh Vs. R.P. Vijay, has submitted that respondents while deciding the representation of the petitioner has picked up few lines from the judgment of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra) and in particular para 29.7 has been taken note of, for denying the appointment to the petitioner. 17. Counsel submitted that the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) was decided by Larger Bench of three Hon'bla Judges of the Apex Court, where reference was made for resolving the conflict of opinion in the various decisions of the Division Benches of the Apex Court as was noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (Supra). 18. Counsel submits that the principle which was laid down in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra) was itself a subject matter of reference and in particular para 29.7 could not have been resorted to defeat the claim of the petitioner by the respondents. 19. Para 29.7 of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra) is reproduced as hereunder : "29.7 The standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and, therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted." 20. Counsel submitted that the Authority while deciding the representation has been swayed by the fact that petitioner is working in CRPF and he being a member of Disciplined Force cannot be considered for appointment as per law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (Supra). 21. Learned counsel has submitted that the final direction which has been given by the Apex Court, is required to be followed by all the authorities including the Disciplined Force, and same parameters are required to be kept in mind while deciding the cases of the candidates who at one point of time, were not able to disclose the fact of a criminal case, while filling the application form/verification form. The counsel submitted that judgment of Avtar Singh (supra) applies to all authorities. 22. The counsel submitted that judgment of Avtar Singh (supra) applies to all authorities. 22. Counsel submitted that looking to the nature of the case in which petitioner was involved and where conviction is said to be recorded under Section 147 IPC and petitioner being granted benefit of probation, for such petty offence, even petitioner would have disclosed the same, it would not have rendered him unfit for the post in question. 23. Counsel has further submitted that once the High Court in its judgment dt. 24th January, 2017 has given finding with respect to the nature of criminal case against the petitioner, the respondents could not have applied the different logic/reasoning for defeating the claim of the petitioner only on account of the fact that employer happens to be Central Police Reserve Force (CRPF). 24. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Ravi Chirania, has submitted that it is the right of the employer to consider the antecedents of a person and employer cannot be compelled to employ the petitioner/candidate. 25. Mr. Ravi Chirania Adv. has submitted that direction given by this Court has been complied with and the employer cannot be forced to appoint a person whose antecedents are not upto the mark particularly when such person are found to be Involved in criminal cases. Counsel has further submitted that in a disciplined force like CRPF, the employer does not want to keep such persons who have antecedents of committing criminal offence and such proper discretion exercised by the authority, cannot be challenged in Court. 26. Counsel has further submitted that In the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (Supra) the Apex Court Itself has made a distinction In respect of persons who are holding the civil posts and persons who are working in Disciplined Forces. 27. Counsel submitted that the yardstick which is to be applied in the arm force, will be different as compared to other services and as such the directions given by the Apex Court cannot be made applicable to the Disciplined/Uniformed Force and no employee can claim automatic reinstatement only on account of filing the representation, informing involvement in offences of a trivial nature. 28. Counsel for the respondents has submitted that in view of the judgment passed in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. 28. Counsel for the respondents has submitted that in view of the judgment passed in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India (Supra), the antecedents of a candidate are required to be examined/verified and if there are concealment of facts with regard to criminal cases, the candidate does not deserve to be reinstated in service. I have heard the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. It would be relevant to refer and quote paras 32 to 39 of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors., which are reproduced as hereunder : "32. No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information to be furnished, declarant is duty bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or submitting false information, may by Itself lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case. However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. In such a case non-disclosure of submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself may be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services. 33. The fraud and misrepresentation vitiates a transaction and in case employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as observed in M. Bhaskaran's case (supra), it has also been observed in the reference order that if an appointment was procured fraudulently, the incumbent may be terminated without holding any inquiry, however we add a rider that in case employee is confirmed, holding a civil post and has protection of Article 311 (2), due inquiry has to be held before terminating the services. The case of obtaining appointment on the basis of forged documents has the effect on very eligibility of incumbent for the job in question, however, verification of antecedents is different aspect as to his fitness otherwise for the post in question. The fraudulently obtained appointment orders are voidable at the option of employer, however, question has to be determined in the light of the discussion made in this order on impact of suppression or submission of false information. 34. The fraudulently obtained appointment orders are voidable at the option of employer, however, question has to be determined in the light of the discussion made in this order on impact of suppression or submission of false information. 34. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employee to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects. 35. Suppression of 'material' information presupposes that what is suppressed that 'matters' not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due cosideration of rules/instructions if any in exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material 10 information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service but he has a right not to• be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases. 36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by concerned authorities considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects. 37. The 'McCarthyism' is antithesis to constitutional goal, chance of reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitble cases, interplay of reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power for canceling candidature or discharging an employee from service. 38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2 While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3 The employer shall take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4 In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction ('r acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted :- 38.4.1 In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order canceling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing, authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal of dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggerstio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him. 39. We answer the reference accordingly. Let the matters be placed before an appropriate Bench for consideration on merits." 29. This Court finds that the principle which was laid down in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (Supra), para 29.7 was one of the observations made by the Division Bench of the Apex Court, and this case was referred for resolving conflict of opinion by the Larger Bench of the Apex Court in Avtar Singh case (supra). 30. The impugned order in the writ petition makes reference and as in fact quoited para 29.7 of the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. 30. The impugned order in the writ petition makes reference and as in fact quoited para 29.7 of the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and the authority only on account of petitioner being an employee of a Disciplined Force, found that uniformed service is distinct from other service and further recorded that deliberate statement/omission regarding a vital information has to be seriously viewed. 31. This Court finds that the Authority did not keep in mind the conclusions which have been drawn by the Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (supra) and on the contrary the authority has been swayed by para 29.7 and principle as laid down in the case of Jainendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra), and the same judgment was before the larger Bench of Supreme Court. 32. This Court finds that in eawrlier round of litigation, this Court had specifically recorded that the offence which was committed by the petitioner under Section 147 IPC with the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, would not dis-entitle him from appointment as he was already appointed on 4th September, 1995. 33. The finding of this Court was infact in consonance with the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India where the Apex Court held in para 38.4.1. that if a case is of trivial in nature in which conviction for petty offence has been recorded and such fact if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for the post in question, the employer may In his discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. This Court finds that only on account of employer being CRPF, the case of the petitioner could not have been rejected by relying on principle in the case of Jainendra Singh (supra) which itself was considered by the Larger Bench in the case of Avtar Singh. 34. The judgment of the Apex Court in Avtar Singh case has clearly recorded in para 37 that chance of re-information has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases, interplay of reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power of canceling the candidature or discharging an employee from service. 35. 35. This Court finds that in view of clear enunciation on principle of law by the Apex Court, the respondents could not have rejected the representation of the petitioner only on account of the fact of his serving under the Disciplined Force-CRPF. 36. The contention made by learned counsel for the respondents that Apex Court has given complete discretion to the employer and as per para 38.5 of the judgment in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (supra), the employer has a right to consider the antecedents of a candidate and employer cannot be compelled to appoint such person, this court finds that the present case is required to be governed by the principles laid down as per para 38.4 in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (supra), as it relates to the suppression of false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form. 37. The bare perusal of para 38.5 makes a distinction between the employees who have suppressed the fact of their involvement in the criminal case and the candidates who makes declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents and it cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38. This Court finds that the Apex Court has also laid down the law by holding that right of the employer to deny appointment to a candidate on the basis of antecedents cannot be taken away. The case in hand is not in respect of declaration made by the petitioner in truthful manner while filing the verification form and as such there is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that case of the petitioner is required to be governed a sper para 38.5 of the Avtar Singh's case. 39. This Court finds that the Apex Court in Avtar Singh case while considering the various decisions reconciled them and finally they summoned up and summarized the conclusions in para 38 of the judgment. The Apex Court has not made a distinction between the employees who are working in uniformed/disciplined force or any other service under the State or Union of India. 40. The Apex Court has not made a distinction between the employees who are working in uniformed/disciplined force or any other service under the State or Union of India. 40. The distinction as sought by counsel for the respondents to deal with the employees who were workinig in disciplined force, no distinction has been drawn and as such this Court is bound by the judgment of the Apex Court. 41. This Court is of the opinion that the respondents have not considered the representation of the petitioner in objective manner and they have only been swayed by the fact that their service is distinction from other services, the Court finds that the distinction is an artificial distinction and the persons who were working in organization like CRPF cannot be deprived to be governed by the law of the land laid down by the Apex Court and as it applies to all the persons in the same manner. This Court also finds that recently the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Amit Singh, 2018(1) SCC 293 ; has reiterated the principles which have been laid down in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra). 42. The Union of India had challenged the orders passed by the Single Judge of the High Court as confirmed by the Division Bench wherein termination of the respondents in that case was found to be illegal and the respondent in that case was terminated on the basis of information gathered on verification of the antecedents. It was found by the employer after three years of service that employee was found involved in a criminal case. 43. The Apex Court while allowing the appeal of the Union of India and setting aside the orders passed by the High Court, directed the employee to file representation before the Appointing Authority and representation was to be decided in the light of the judgment of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (supra) and in particular para 38.4.1 of the judgment read with any other relevant instructions after affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee. The relevant paras 4-7 in the case of Union of India and ers. Vs. Amit Singh (supra) are quoted as hereunder :- "4. Union of India (supra) and in particular para 38.4.1 of the judgment read with any other relevant instructions after affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee. The relevant paras 4-7 in the case of Union of India and ers. Vs. Amit Singh (supra) are quoted as hereunder :- "4. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this is a case where the respondent should be permitted to file an appropriate representation before the appointing authority. Ordered accordingly. In the event if such a representation is filed, in the light of the judgment referred to above and in particular para 38.4.1 of the judgment read with any other relevant instructions, a speaking order on the representation shall be passed after affording an opportunity for hearing to the respondent, within four months. 5. We make it clear that while passing the orders, as above, the appointing authority will also verify whether there was involvement of the respondent in any other criminal case, his age at the time of incident, his conduct during the period of service and also the fact that he was served for around five years under the CRPF. 6. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is accordingly, disposed of. 7. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall be no orders as to costs." 44. This Court finds that the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Amit Singh (supra) also specifically directed that respondents-CRPF of authorities were required to consider para 38.4.1. 45. This Court is also dealing with a case of an employee who is working in CRPF and the Apex Court itself has directed the CRPF authorities to keep in mind para 38.4.1 of the Avtar Singh's case and as such it cannot be said that the authorities of CRPF are not bound by the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra). 46. The Apex Courtin the case of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Am., reported in JT 2018(1) SC 148 has recently decided that acquittal in criminal cases does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. The Apex Court held that it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Am., reported in JT 2018(1) SC 148 has recently decided that acquittal in criminal cases does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. The Apex Court held that it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. It was held that a candidate who is to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. 46A. The Apex Court also considered that if the Screening Committee makes a decison about non-suitability of such persons, it has to be given due weightage unless the same decision is to be shown on the basis of mala fide. The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as hereunder : "8. On the basis of the aforesaid rival contentions urged on behalf of both the parties, the following points arise for consideration :(i) Whether the contention of respondents that they were honourably acquitted and that they should not be deprived of being appointed to the post of Constable is acceptable? (ii) Whether the High Court was right in setting aside the decision of the Screening Committee and directing the authorities to consider the respondents to the post of Constable in the disciplined police force? 11. Entering into the police service required a candidate to be of good character, integrity and clean antecedents. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh, 2013(7) SCC 685 , the respondent was acquitted based on the compromise. This Court held that even though acquittal was based on compromise, it is still open to the Screening Committee to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision. Emphasizing upon the importance of character and integrity required for joining police force/discipline force, in Mehar Singh case, this Court held as under :- "23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force. 24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in contention with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787 this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram 2013(1) SCC 598 . In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Courtin RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal 1994(1) SCC 541 , where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an employee In service on the ground that In the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and. therefore, It was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in. setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. 33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain Integrity and high standard of police force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that. 35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee; The decision of the Screening Committeemust be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an hand." 11.1. The same principle was reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Parvez Khan, 2015(2) SCC 591 . 12. While considering the question of suppression of relevant information or false information in regard to criminal prosecution, arrest or pendency of criminal case(s) against the candidate, in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, 2016(8) SCC 471 , three-Judges Bench of this Court summarized the conclusion in para (38). As per the said decision in para (38.5), "In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate." 13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitble for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and parvez Khan cases, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to he importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character. 47. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to he importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character. 47. In the humble opinion of this court, the Apex Court was dealing with the case where person was denied appointment on the ground that employee had been prosecuted in the criminal trial but were acquitted by the trial court giving them benefit of doubt and the case was referred to the Committee headed by Senior Superintendent of Police but the employee was not found suitable for appointment on the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. 48. The Apex Court in the said judgment in para 12 has followed the decision in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and para 38.5 has been also quoted and relied. This Court finds that the case in hand is in respect of non-disclosure of registration of case in the verification form and on the ground of concealment of fact8, services have been terminated. The parameters which are to be kept in mind in respect of non-disclosure of fact of criminal case, are given by para 38.4 of the judgment passed in Avtar Singh's case (supra). The principle laid down in the case of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Am. (supra) will not be applicable in the present case as the Supreme Court itself has clarified that cases where truthful disclosure is made yet employer can deny appointment as per Para 38.5 of Avtar Singh's case. 49. In the instant case, the representation so decided by the repsondents by impugned order dt. 17th April, 2017 is not decided as per requirement of law and the same is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is permitted to file fresh comprehensive representation narrating all the facts. 50. The respondents are directed to decide the representation of the petitioner by keeping the parameters/principles as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in para 38.4.1 of Avtar Singh's case within a period of five weeks. The respondents are further under a legal obligation to keep in mind the relevant consideration for considering the case of the petitioner for his reinstatement. The writ petition stands allowed as indicated above.