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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 774 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Suresh Kumar

2018-09-06

PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA

body2018
JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal under section 100 of the C.P.C. is at the instance of the defendant/State challenging the judgments of the two Courts below. Trial Court by the judgment dated 22.10.1991 had decreed the CS No. 110- A/1982 filed by the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) and the first appellate Court by the judgment dated 31.1.2001 had dismissed the appeal as barred by time. 2. The respondent No.1 had filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction with the plea that the respondent No.1 and the respondents No. 3 to 5 are the family members and on 20.3.1932 the then ruler had granted lease of the suit land to the appellant's ancestors Ramchand and Gordhan on 20.3.1932 and the family members and Ramchand and Gordhan had continued in possession thereof and presently respondent No.1 is in possession of the suit land. It was further pleaded that Gordhan had died during the lifetime of Ramchand and therefore, Ramchand had become the owner of the suit land and on the death of Ramchand in 1952, the name of Govind and Satyanarayan was recorded in the revenue record and in the family partition, the suit land was received by Satyanarayan and in the further family partition of Satyanarayan, the suit land was received by respondent No. 1 and since 1972, the respondent No. 1 is in possession and cultivating the suit land as owner. It was further pleaded that the suit land was not given to the ancestors of the appellant in lieu of performing any Pooja in the temple nor they were the Pujari of Ram Mandir, but without any notice to the respondent No. 1 or his family members, the land was recorded as land of Shri Ram Temple and the respondent No. 1 came to know about it on 9.6.1981, when the notice was received and its reply was.given by the respondent No. 1 but the official respondents without considering it had directed for auctioning the suit land. Hence, the present suit was filed. The plea of respondent No.1 was supported by the respondents No. 3 to 5 (defendants No. 3 to 7). 3. Hence, the present suit was filed. The plea of respondent No.1 was supported by the respondents No. 3 to 5 (defendants No. 3 to 7). 3. The suit was opposed by the appellant by filing the written statement and taking the plea that the suit land was given to Ram Mandir for its maintenance and its Pujari has no right of Pakka Krishak and the suit was filed by the respondent No. 1 in collusion with the other private respondents and that by the order of the Commissioner, the Collector has been appointed as Manager of the temple and leaving the land for maintenance of the temple, other lands are sought to be auctioned. 4. The trial Court while decreeing the suit of the respondent No. 1 had found that the lease of the suit land was given to Ramchand and Gordhan jointly by the then ruler of the State of Gwalior vide lease deed dated 22.8.1932 and the respondent No. 1 and his ancestors are since then in possession of the suit land and in the partition, the suit land was received by the respondent No.1. It was further found that without knowledge of the respondent No. 1, the suit land was illegally mutated in the name of Shri Ram Mandir and an attempt was made by the officials/respondents to auction it. The appellant could not prove the plea that the suit land was given to the respondent No. 1 or his family members in lieu of performing the Pooja in the temple or the suit was filed by the respondent No. 1 in collusion with the respondents No. 3 to 5. 5. The trial Court had passed the judgment on 22.10.1991 whereas the first appeal was filed by the appellant on 10.3.2000 along with the application for condonation of delay. The first appellate Court has found that there was no sufficient explanation for the delay, hence, the appeal has been dismissed on the ground of delay. While dismissing the appeal, certain observations have been made by the first appellate Court on merits of the matter also. 6. This Court vide order dated 20.1.2003 had admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law : “1- Whether lower appellate Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant as barred by limitation thereby refusing to condone the delay under section 5 of Limitation Act? 6. This Court vide order dated 20.1.2003 had admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law : “1- Whether lower appellate Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant as barred by limitation thereby refusing to condone the delay under section 5 of Limitation Act? 2- Whether lower appellate Court was justified in proceeding ahead and in confirming the decree passed by the trial Court which had decreed the suit? 3- Whether lower appellate Court was justified in holding that plaintiff is the owner and Bhumi swami of the land in question on the strength of Ex.P-1?” 7. It is undisputed between the parties that the questions No. 2 and 3 as framed above do not arise in the facts of the present case, hence, they need not be answered, therefore by this order only question No. 1 is being answered. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the first appellate Court has committed an error in dismissing the appeal as barred by time whereas, delay ought to have been condoned by the first appellate Court because sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal was disclosed by the appellant. 9. As against this learned counsel for respondents No. 6 to 8 submits that there was an inordinate delay in filing the appeal and no proper explanation for the delay was furnished, therefore, the appeal has rightly been dismissed as barred by time. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on the perusal of the record, it is noticed that undisputedly there was a delay of about 10 years in filing the first appeal. In the application for condontion of delay, the appellant had not furnished any explanation for the delay for the period from 20.10.1991 to 30.10.1999. Not a single word has been mentioned explaining this delay of more than 8 years. In the application for condontion of delay, the appellant had not furnished any explanation for the delay for the period from 20.10.1991 to 30.10.1999. Not a single word has been mentioned explaining this delay of more than 8 years. The appellant had filed the application for condonation of delay with the following plea : **vkosnu i= varxZr /kkjk 5 vof/k fo/kku ds rgr ekU;oj egksn;] lnj vihy esa vihykaV fuEukuqlkj fuosnu djrk gS % 1- ;g fd] fjLikaMsUV lqjs'k dqekj }kjk rglhy dk;kZy; esa ukekarj.k vkosnu ÁLrqr fd;k rc rglhy dk;kZy; }kjk Jheku ftyk/kh'k egksn; eanlkSj dks ,d Kkiu fnukad 30-10-1999 dks ,d i= nsdj mDr lacU/k esa vko';d tk¡p i'pkr~ tkudkjh fHktokus ckcn funsZ'k fn;kA 2- ;g fd] Jheku ftyk/kh'k egksn; ds i= funsZ'kkuqlkj vihykaV }kjk rglhy dk;kZy; Hkkuiqjk dks vko';d funsZ'k nsdj Ádj.k ds fu.kZ; t;i= dh Áfr;ka ÁkIr djuk pkghA 3- ;g fd] rglhy dk;kZy; }kjk fnukad 20-12-1999 dks nh-eq-ua- 110@,@82 ds fu.kZ; t;i= dh udys gsrq vkosnu is'k fd;k ftl ij ls fnukad 5-2-2000 dks udys ÁkIr gks ikbZA 4- ;g fd] fnukad 5-2-2000 dks udys ÁkIr gksus ij voyksdu gsrq Jheku ftyk/kh'k egksn; eanlkSj dks fHktok;h xbZ tgk¡ ofj"B vfHkHkk'kdks ,oa fof/k foHkkx ls ijke'kZ i'pkr~ vihy ÁLrqrh gsrq fu.kZ; fy;k x;kA 5- ;g fd] fnukad 14-2-2000 ls yxkdj fnukad 28-2-2000 rd d`f"k mit e.Mh ds pquko Á'kklfud dk;Z esa O;Lr jgus ls vihy ÁLrqr ugha dh tk ldhA 6- ;g fd] fnukad 29-2-2000 ls ysdj fnukad 9-3-2000 rd tuin iapk;r fuokZpu ds dk;Z esa O;Lr gksus ls ;g vihy le;kof/k esa ÁLrqr ugha dh tk ldh tks ln~HkkoukiwoZd gksdj ekQh Ánku dh tkus ;ksX; gSA vr% ,o vknj.kh; U;k;ky; ls fuosnu gS fd mDr vkosnu i= dks Lohdkj dj mDr vof/k dkWuMu dh tkus dh —ik dj vihykaV dh vihy vof/k esa ekU; dh tk,A fnukad gLrk{kj vihykaV vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh flfoy xjksBA** 11. The order-sheet of the trial Court dated 22.10.1991 reflects that the judgment was pronounced by the trial Court in presence of the counsel for the appellant. Hence, the judgment of the trial Court was known since the very day of its pronouncement. There was no plea in the application for condonation of delay that the counsel had not informed about the judgment. Hence, it is clear that the judgment was within the knowledge of the appellant since beginning. Hence, the judgment of the trial Court was known since the very day of its pronouncement. There was no plea in the application for condonation of delay that the counsel had not informed about the judgment. Hence, it is clear that the judgment was within the knowledge of the appellant since beginning. A minute perusal of the application for condonation of delay reveals that the explanation has been furnished for the period from 30.10.1999 but there is no explanation for the period prior to 30.10.1999. The first appellate Court has, therefore, after examining the application has rightly found that the appellant had failed to give any explanation for the delay from 22.10.1991 to 30.10.1999. Such an inordinate delay has remained unexplained, therefore, the first appellate Court has rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay. 12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project and anr., reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 in a case where the delay was of 1724 days and it was condoned has held that the High Court was not justified in condoning the delay and while taking the said view, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “The applicant having set the machinery in motion cannot abandon it to resume it after number of years because the authority with whom it had entered into correspondence did not heed to its request to file appeals. The question is : Can the respondent/applicant in this case take advantage of its negligence, after lapse of number of years, of the decision of Government? It knew the exact grounds on which appeals could have been preferred. The law will presume that it knew of its right to file appeal against the award. Everybody is presumed to know law. It was its duty to prefer appeals before the Court for consideration which it did not. There is no explanation forthcoming in this regard. The evidence on record suggest neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.' The question for consideration is whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days in filing the appeals. 15. The Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.' The question for consideration is whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days in filing the appeals. 15. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and anr. v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0109/1981 : 1981 CriLJ293 this Court observed : "It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause." (Emphasis supplied) This judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand. 16. The respondent beneficiary of the acquisition did not initiate any steps whatsoever before expiry of limitation and no circumstances are placed before the Court that steps were taken to file appeals but it was not possible to file the appeals within time. 17. Shri Mohta, learned senior counsel relying on the decision of this Court in N.Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy MANU/SC/0573/1998 : 2008(228) ELT 162 (SC) submitted that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of dilatory tactics the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said decision upon which reliance has been placed holds that the law of limitation fixes a life span for every legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The Law of Limitation is thus founded on public policy. The decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or application as the case may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is said that Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. The Law of Limitation is thus founded on public policy. The decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or application as the case may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is said that Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It is observed : "It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium ( it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." 18. In Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. MANU/SC/0042/1961: [1962] 2SCR762, this Court held that: "in construing section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. `It is further necessary to emphasis that even if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party of its bona fides may fall for consideration." On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise Courts' discretion in its favour. 19. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise Courts' discretion in its favour. 19. Learned senior counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Sube Ram and others MANU/SC/1433/1997 : (1997) 9 SCC69. This Court condoned delay of 3379 days in preferring the appeals by Special Leave. The said decision is mostly confined to the facts of that case and does not lay down any law as such requiring us to make any further analysis of the judgment. 20. Submissions based on public interest and involvement of public money : The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Balbir Singh and ors. MANU/SC/2730/2000: (1999) ILLJ735SC in support of his submission that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay particularly whenever public interest and public money is involved. All that the said decision states is that in the circumstances of the case the Court was inclined to condone the delay, particularly, "because it is in the public interest as public money is involved." The facts are not evident from the judgment and as to what were those public interest parameters that were taken into consideration to condone the delay in filing appeals. 21. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows: "The Courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." 22. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as `statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as `statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This Court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others MANU/SC/0342/1973: [1974]1SCR381 has observed : "the object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches". In Motichand v. Munshi MANu/SC/0127/1968, [1969]2SCR 824, this Court observed that this principle is based on the maxim "interest republicae ut sit finis litum, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time Law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 13. This Court also in a case where the second appeal was filed with a delay of about 15 years, vide order dated 17.1.2018 while dismissing the Second Appeal No. 441/2016 on the ground of delay has held as under : “Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the appellants have challenged the judgment of the first appellate Court dated 8.12.2001 in this second appeal which has been filed on 31.8.2016. There is a delay of about 15 years in filing this second appeal. The application for condonation of delay reveals that an attempt has been made to explain the delay after 8.7.2013 but from 8.12.2001 to 8.7.2013 the only explanation which is furnished is that the OIC had not informed about the outcome of the appeal. Undisputedly the judgment of the first appellate Court is a by-parte judgment and even the name of the said OIC has not been disclosed. Undisputedly the judgment of the first appellate Court is a by-parte judgment and even the name of the said OIC has not been disclosed. The application states that the appellants had come to know about the judgment of the first appellate Court on 8.7.2013 but even thereafter the appeal was not filed promptly and it has been filed after more than 3 years on 31.8.2016. The explanation furnished in Para-4 of the application also reveals that at each stage there was an inordinate delay and no prompt steps were taken in filing this appeal. Even otherwise it has been pointed out that the suit property has been declared to be the properties of the public temple. A perusal of the application for condonation of delay reveals that the appellants have failed to explain the inordinate delay of about 15 years in filing the appeal. The Supreme Court in the matter of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (supra), has held that the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretion to condone the delay and such a discretion is to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. In the said judgment it has been held as under : “26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic maner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” The Division Bench of this Court also in the case of Abdul Gani (supra), taking note of the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 2012 SC 1506 [Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd.] has held that : “5. The law with respect to the consideration of sufficient cause is well settled in the latest judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. [ AIR 2012 SC 1506 ] wherein the Hon'ble apex Court has held as under : “11) We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA Nos. 418 and 1006 of 2007 as 11.9.2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8.1.2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11.9.2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 8.1.2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 14) In view of our conclusion on issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of the issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.” 6. The aforesaid view has again been affirmed by the Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Amar Nath Yadav [ (2014) 2 SCC 422 ]. 7. Accordingly, we find no good reason to condone the delay in this case. I.A. No.5 405/2012 is dismissed. Consequently, the first appeal is also dismissed.” Though the counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Executive Officer, Antiyur Town (supra), but in that case the delay was only of 1373 days and it was found that the Executive Officer was responsible for the delay and it has been held that if the Court is convinced that there is an attempt on the part of the Government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, in the larger public interest, the lenient view is to be taken but no such situation exists in the present case. Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that since the appellant has failed to furnish any convincing reason explaining the delay of almost 15 years, therefore, the prayer made in the IA cannot be allowed.” 14. Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that since the appellant has failed to furnish any convincing reason explaining the delay of almost 15 years, therefore, the prayer made in the IA cannot be allowed.” 14. Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 , but in that case also, it has been held that the proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the Court in respect of delay on the part of the State in filing the appeal. It has been held that the expression sufficient cause should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay, but the appellant is not entitled to benefit of the said judgment because in the present case there is absolutely no explanation for the delay from 1991 to 1999. 15. Similarly, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (Dead) By Legal Representatives, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 569 , but in this case nothing has been pointed out to show that there was an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat the justice by causing delay. 16. In the present case also since no proper explanation for such an inordinate delay of 10 years has been furnished, therefore, the first appellate Court has rightly dismissed the appeal as barred by time. Certain observations made on merit by the first appellate Court are of no consequence because without condoning the delay, the appeal could not have been entertained and examined on merit. 17. In view of the aforesaid, the question No.1 is answered in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and against the appellant and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.