Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 775 (JK)

Baldev Raj v. State of J&K

2018-10-03

SANJEEV KUMAR

body2018
JUDGMENT : The Charge Sheet served upon the petitioner by the respondent No.4 dated 21.05.2014, inquiry proceedings initiated thereupon and Order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the respondent No.4 as also Order dated 01.06.2017 passed by the respondent No.3 as an appellate authority are subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 2. The factual matrix, as gatherable from the pleadings of the parties, is that the petitioner was enrolled as Constable and subsequently promoted as Head Constable in the Police Department. On 23.04.2012, the petitioner was attached as CHM of J-Company, IRP 18th Bn at Zewan. He remained there for some time and thereafter was detached. He joined his parent Battalion where he had been performing his duties regularly. It is stated that on 20.05.2013, one Constable, namely, Hilal Gull of 18th Bn. was arrested by the Sopore Police for his involvement in anti-national activities. An FIR, i.e., FIR No.99/2013 under Section 07/25 Arms Act came to be registered against the aforesaid Constable. During investigation, his cell phone was also seized. On the basis of call details of his cell phone, it was found that the said Constable was active in Sopore and its adjacent areas had remained present there w.e.f. 07.03.2012 to 24.12.2013 and was thus for majority of time absent from his duties in the 18th Bn. The matter was placed before the Armed Police Headquarter and vide Order dated 29.01.2014, respondent No.5 was directed to hold an inquiry against the petitioner and nine others officials of 18th Bn for having committed mis-conduct by wilfully facilitating absence of Constable Hilal Gull, who had remained absent for 386 out of the 408 days and operated in the Sopore and its adjoining area. The allegation against the petitioner was that being CHM, he was supposed to take all warranted actions against the aforesaid Constable in the form of reporting and taking necessary action as per Service Rules but he had failed to do so. The formal charge sheet was served upon the petitioner, which was replied by him. It is the case set up by the petitioner that after receiving reply to the charge sheet, the respondent No.4 straightway issued a Show Cause Notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why his annual increment be not forfeited for five years. It is the case set up by the petitioner that after receiving reply to the charge sheet, the respondent No.4 straightway issued a Show Cause Notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why his annual increment be not forfeited for five years. The petitioner submitted reply to the aforesaid Show Cause Notice also, but the same failed to impress the respondent No.4, who vide his Order No.87 of 2017 dated 31.03.2017 directed the forfeiture of five annual increments of the petitioner for having facilitated the Constable Hilal Gull to remain absent from duties, thus, facilitating his terrorism related activities. This order was appealed against by the petitioner before respondent No.3, who vide Order No. 126 of 2017 dated 01.06.2017 rejected the appeal of the petitioner and upheld the order of respondent No.4. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the instant petition. 3. The respondents have filed their objections in which, the plea taken is that the petitioner having participated in the inquiry without raising any protest or grievance cannot be allowed to turn around and challenge the proceedings only after he has been handed down the penalty of forfeiture of five annual increments. It is stated that the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the appellate authority on 01.06.2017 and, therefore, the challenge thrown to the impugned orders is belated and ill-founded. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, I am of the view that the petitioner must succeed in his petition. Indubitably, the allegations against the petitioner are very serious and cannot be brushed aside. A Constable, namely, Hillal Gull of 18th Bn was found involved in anti-national activities and despite being a permanent employee of the Police Department, he was roaming in Sopore and adjoining area away from his duties. This absence from the duties could not have been possible without the consent of the Supervisory Officer. The allegations against the petitioner that he being CHM of the Company was supposed to take all warranted actions against Constable Hilal Gull in the form of reporting and taking necessary action, cannot be said to be trivial in nature. Nonetheless, the petitioner being a member of police service is also entitled to certain protections guaranteed to him not only by the Constitution of India but also by the Police Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Nonetheless, the petitioner being a member of police service is also entitled to certain protections guaranteed to him not only by the Constitution of India but also by the Police Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It may be noted that the penalty of forfeiture of five annual increments is not amongst the major penalties referred to in Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which would require a slightly different and more stringent procedure in consonance with principles of natural justice to be followed. 5. Rule 359 of the Police Rules lays down elaborate procedure to be followed in the departmental enquiries. The first step for conducting the inquiry would be to summon the accused/police officer before the Inquiry Officer. He shall record and read out to him the statement summarizing the alleged misconduct in such a way as to provide sufficient notice of the circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be recorded. If the accused- Police Officer at this stage admits the misconduct alleged against him, the Inquiry Officer may record the final order if it is within its power to do so or refer the matter to the Officer competent to decide the case. The accused Police Officer, if does not admit his misconduct, the Inquiry Officer would proceed to record such evidence oral or documentary in proof of the accusation as is available and is necessary to support the charge. The witnesses, whenever possible are to be examined in the presence of the accused, who shall also be provided an opportunity to cross-examine them. Even the delinquent Police Officer can be asked to answer the questions with a view to elucidating the facts which have come to light in the statements of the witnesses and the documents brought on record. 6. The second step is that when evidence in support of the allegation has been recorded, the Inquiry Officer shall either discharge the accused or proceed to frame a formal charge depending upon whether or not the allegations against the delinquent are substantiated or not. If the allegations are not substantiated, the Inquiry Officer if he is empowered to do so shall discharge the delinquent and if it is not within its power shall recommend his discharge to the competent authority. If the allegations are not substantiated, the Inquiry Officer if he is empowered to do so shall discharge the delinquent and if it is not within its power shall recommend his discharge to the competent authority. But, if the allegations are substantiated, formal charge or charges in writing shall be framed and the delinquent officer would be called upon to answer them. He would also be required to state his defence and indicate the defence witnesses to whom he wishes to call in support of his defence. 7. The third and final step in the inquiry is that after the conclusion of the defence evidence and hearing the accused in response to the charge, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed to pass order of acquittal or punishment as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances if he is so empowered or make recommendation to the officer competent to do so. It is only in the case of the dismissal, removal or reduction in the rank, the delinquent officer would be provided a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. This, in nutshell, is the procedure laid down in the Section 359 of the Police Rules. 8. I have gone through the record of inquiry to find out as to whether the procedural requirements laid down in the Rule 359 of the Police Rules as discussed hereinabove, have been observed and followed in letter and spirit or not and if not what is its effect on the inquiry proceedings and the consequential orders passed by the disciplinary authority. 9. From the perusal of the record, it reveals that the respondent No.2 vide his Order No.106 of 2014 dated 29.01.2014 directed the respondent No.5 to hold an appropriate departmental inquiry against the petitioner and eight others. It is found that the Inquiry Officer after summoning the accused recorded and read out the summary of allegations to the petitioner, who pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of two officials, namely, Ghulam Hussain, Sub Inspector and Head Constable Ghulam Mohi Din, but it is not discernable from the record as to whether the statements were recorded by the Inquiry Officer in presence of the petitioner nor it is coming fore that the petitioner was afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the aforesaid witnesses. That apart, the Inquiry Officer claims to have examined all the relevant records of 18-J-Company of IRP 18th Bn, what was examined by the Inquiry Officer and relied upon by him has apparently not been served upon the petitioner. He straightway appears to have proceeded to frame the charges against the petitioner. The charge sheet was served on the petitioner on 21.05.2014 and as is apparent from its bare perusal, the petitioner was straightway called upon to submit his reply to the charge sheet along with documentary evidence, but was not afforded any opportunity to produce the defence witnesses. Even, the petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity to file the written statement of his defence upon conclusion of the defence evidence. As a matter of fact, no evidence has been permitted to be led in the case. The inquiry conducted is, thus, not found to be in consonance with Rule 359 of the Police Rules. On the basis of report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, the respondent No.4 straightway decided to forfeit the increments of the petitioner for five years without even sharing the findings of inquiry with the petitioner. The petitioner replied to the Show Cause Notice issued by respondent No.4 and clearly indicated that in absence of copy of report of Inquiry Officer provided to him, he would not be in a position to submit his counter in legal and effective manner. The respondent No.3, however, did not provide him copy of the inquiry report and even the extract of recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer and proceeded to impose the penalty vide his order dated 31.03.2017 impugned in this writ petition. The petitioner availed of the remedy of statutory appeal, which too has been dismissed by the respondent No.3 in a cursory and mechanical manner. No reasons have been indicated by respondent No.3 for dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. The appeal has been dismissed on the ground that the charges against the petitioner and few others are so grave that they could not plead innocence, in any manner, whatsoever, during the course of inquiry, and therefore, there was no ground t entertain the appeal. Such dismissal of the appeal without indicating any reasons has apparently prejudiced the petitioner. Needless to say that sine quo non for holding a fair inquiry is providing adequate opportunity to the delinquent employee to explain his position. Such dismissal of the appeal without indicating any reasons has apparently prejudiced the petitioner. Needless to say that sine quo non for holding a fair inquiry is providing adequate opportunity to the delinquent employee to explain his position. Admittedly, the petitioner had emphatically denied the allegations and had put-forth his defence. The Inquiry Officer committed the first illegality when he did not provide any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. Even the statements of the witnesses do not appear to have been recorded in the presence of the accused. The Inquiry Officer has also claimed to have relied upon the documentary evidence available with him but it is nowhere discernable from the record that such record was ever shared with the petitioner or that the petitioner was given any opportunity to rebut the same. The petitioner was not even asked to submit the list of defence witnesses. After receiving the reply to the charge sheet from the delinquent officer, the Inquiry Officer proceeded to make the recommendations for forfeiture of five annual increments of the petitioner. The disciplinary authority accepted the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer in toto. It is true that before passing the order impugned imposing the penalty of forfeiture of five annual increments, the petitioner was issued the Show Cause Notice and provided an opportunity to explain his position but, as rightly contended that the petitioner, in absence of the inquiry report and the recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer, he was incapacitated to make an effective representation. Indubitably by denying this right to the petitioner, a serious prejudice has been caused to him. 10. The Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director ESIL Hyderabad etc. etc. Indubitably by denying this right to the petitioner, a serious prejudice has been caused to him. 10. The Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director ESIL Hyderabad etc. etc. V. B. Karunakar reported in 1993 (4) SCC 727 , while hearing reference made by three judge Bench in the case of Managing Director Electronic Corporation v. B. Karunakar reported in 1992 (3) JT (SC) 605, considered an important question of law as to whether the report of Inquiry Officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any, to be awarded to him. Alongside the aforesaid question, some incidental questions too fell for consideration which included a question as to whether the report should be furnished to the employee even when the statutory rules laying down procedure for holding the disciplinary inquiry are silent on the subject or are against it? After elaborate discussion, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court answered all those questions settling the law on the subject. It was held that the reason why the right to receive the report of Inquiry Officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity in the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority, which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It was further held that where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion on the basis of the evidence, Inquiry Officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it; and the second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of inquiry. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. The Constitution Bench went on to hold that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of Inquiry Officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of employee’s right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. The denial of Inquiry Officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges is denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the Constitution Bench also replied the incidental questions raised in the following manners:- (i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. (ii) The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is as follows: "(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." Thus the Article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. (iii) Since it is the right of the employee to, have the report to defend himself effectively, and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the, report or not, the report has to be furnished to him. (iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case ( AIR 1991 SC 471 ) (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non- furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to a "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice. Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court! Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court! Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court. Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should nut mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/ Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Courts/ Tribunals find that the furnishing of the report would have made a: difference to the result in the case that should set aside the order of punishment Where after following the above procedure the Courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority, management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law. In this connection we may refer to a decision of this court in State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 3 SCR 160 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1111 ) where the Court has shown the proper course to be adopted where the termination of service of an employee is faulted on a technical ground. This was a case where an employee was appointed as Cashier off and on by the State Bank of India between July 31, 1973 and August 29. 1973. Together with the earlier employment, this nine days, employment during the said period had ripen into 240 days of broken bits of service. The employment, however, was terminated without notice or payment of retrenchment compensation. The Court moulded the relief taking into consideration the long period which had passed and directed that the employee would be put back to the same position where he left off, but his new salary will be what he would draw were he to be appointed in the same post "today" de novo. He was further directed to be ranked below all permanent employees in that cadre and to be deemed to be a temporary hand till that time. He was not allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority. As for the emoluments, he was left to pursue other remedies, if any. He was further directed to be ranked below all permanent employees in that cadre and to be deemed to be a temporary hand till that time. He was not allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority. As for the emoluments, he was left to pursue other remedies, if any. Questions (vi) and (vii) may be considered together. As has been discussed earlier, although the furnishing of the Inquiry Officer's report to the delinquent employee is a part of the reasonable opportunity available to him to defend himself against the charges. before 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the stage at which the said opportunity became available to the employee had stood deferred till the second notice requiring him to show cause against the penalty was issued to him. The right to prove his innocence to the disciplinary authority was to be exercised by, the employee along with his right to show cause as to why no penalty or lesser penalty should be awarded. The proposition of law that the two rights were independent of each other and in fact belonged to two different stages in the inquiry came into sharp focus only after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution which abolished the second stage of the inquiry, viz., the inquiry into the nature of punishment. As pointed out earlier, it was mooted but not decided in E. Bashyan's case ( AIR 1988 SC 1000 ) (supra) by the two learned Judges of this Court who referred the question to the larger Bench. lt has also been pointed out that in K. C. Asthana's case ( AIR 1988 SC 1338 ) (supra), no such question was either raised or decided. It was for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case ( AIR 1991 SC 471 ) (supra) that the question squarely fell for decision before this Court. Hence till 20th November, 1990, i.e., the day on which Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) was decided, the position of law, on the subject was not settled by this Court. It is for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) that this court laid down the law. That decision made the law, laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment passed after 20th November, 1990. It is for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) that this court laid down the law. That decision made the law, laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment passed after 20th November, 1990. The law laid down was not applicable to the orders of punishment passed before that date notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings arising out of the same were pending in courts after that date. The said proceedings had to be decided according to the law prevalent prior to the said date which did not require the authority to supply a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report to the employee. The only exception to this was where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings themselves made it obligatory to supply a copy of the report to the employee.” 11. I am not oblivious of the fact that the law laid down in the Managing Director ECIL (supra) was more or less in the context of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which deals with the major penalty of the dismissal, removal or reduction in the rank yet the principles evolved in the aforesaid judgment are equally applicable to all the departmental inquiries, which necessarily envisage a reasonable and fair opportunity to the delinquent to prove his innocence. 12. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the position of law enunciated above, this Court is of the considered opinion that right of the petitioner to defend and prove his innocence in the departmental inquiry has been seriously infringed and a grave prejudice has been caused to him. The grievance of the petitioner could have been well redressed by the appellate authority, had it applied its mind and performed its duties in accordance with law. The appellate authority, as noted above, rejected the appeal of the petitioner in most mechanical and perfunctory manner. The order of rejecting the appeal impugned in this writ petition was nothing short of adding salt to the injuries of the petitioner. 13. Having held thus, the only question which is left to be determined is as to what course should be adopted in the instant case and what relief should be granted to the petitioner. The order of rejecting the appeal impugned in this writ petition was nothing short of adding salt to the injuries of the petitioner. 13. Having held thus, the only question which is left to be determined is as to what course should be adopted in the instant case and what relief should be granted to the petitioner. As noted above, the whole inquiry is vitiated right from the very beginning and as such, this Court is left with no option but to quash the whole proceedings including the orders impugned. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed, the charge sheet, the enquiry proceedings as also the Order dated 31.03.2017 and the Order dated 01.06.017 are quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to all the consequential benefits which would accrue to him upon quashing of the orders impugned. This, however, does not mean that the respondents cannot initiate denovo inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with provisions of the Rule 359 of the Police Rules and in consonance with the principles of natural justice as adumbrated in the case of Managing Director ECIL (supra). 14. Disposed of as above along with connected MP(s).