JUDGMENT/ORDER : Ujjal Bhuyan, J. This case was heard on 20.04.2018 and today is fixed for delivery of order(s). 2. Heard Dr J L Sarkar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr S Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr A Kalita, learned Special Counsel, Foreigners' Tribunal (FT). 3. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 24.08.2016, passed by the Foreigners' Tribunal, Nagaon Court No. 7 at Lanka in FT/L/Case No. 116 of 2015 (State v. Smt Bela Rani Debnath), declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner, who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from Bangladesh after 25.03.1971. 4. This Court by order dated 05.10.2016, had issued notice while requisitioning the case record and passed an interim order to the effect that petitioner should be allowed to remain on bail, subject to her appearance before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon and furnishing of adequate surety. 5. Sri D Mukherjee, Superintendent of Police (Border), Hojai, has filed affidavit on 19.01.2017, supporting the order passed by the Tribunal and seeking dismissal of the writ petition. However, in paragraph-5 of the said affidavit, which was in response to the statements made in paragraph - 7 of the writ petition, it was stated that mother's name of the petitioner appeared in the voters' list of 1971 in respect of Lumding constituency as Binoda Devi, wife of Dhirendra. Thereafter, petitioner has filed affidavit on 31.03.2018. 6. Dr Sarkar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no grounds were mentioned in the notice. Notice was the foundation of the reference. In the absence of grounds, the proceeding registered against the petitioner cannot be justified. His second submission is that mother of the petitioner Binoda Devi was registered as a refugee on 11.12.1964. Therefore, petitioner cannot be treated to be a foreigner. Third submission is that since the Superintendent of Police (Border), Hojai has himself stated in his affidavit that mother's name, i.e. Binoda Devi had appeared in the voters' list of 1971 in respect of Lumding constituency, this would go to show that even the authority did not dispute or did not have doubts about the nationality of the petitioner. 7. Third submission is that since the Superintendent of Police (Border), Hojai has himself stated in his affidavit that mother's name, i.e. Binoda Devi had appeared in the voters' list of 1971 in respect of Lumding constituency, this would go to show that even the authority did not dispute or did not have doubts about the nationality of the petitioner. 7. On the other hand, Mr A Kalita, learned Special Counsel submits that petitioner had miserably failed to prove her citizenship of India relatable to a period prior to 25.03.1971, which is the cut-off date for identification of foreigners in the State of Assam as per Section-6 A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, as amended. Petitioner has to prove her nationality through her father and not through her mother or husband, which she failed to do. 8. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have been considered. Also perused the materials on record, including the record requisitioned from Tribunal. 9. Record discloses that an enquiry was conducted by the police administration of the then Nagaon district after suspecting the petitioner to be a foreign national. As per report of the Enquiry Officer, during enquiry petitioner could not produce any valid document to prove her Indian nationality. Therefore, a prima facie view was taken that the petitioner was a foreigner of post-25.03.1971 stream, who had unauthorizedly entered into India (Assam) from Bangladesh. Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon, accepted the enquiry report and, thereafter, made the reference suspecting the petitioner to be a foreigner, who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from Bangladesh on or after 25.03.1971 without valid documents. 10. So this was the basic allegation against the petitioner. 11. It is true that in the notice issued by the Tribunal to the petitioner on 28.09.2015, the stream of foreigners to which petitioner was suspected to belong was not mentioned. It was stated that Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon, had made a reference to the effect that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, petitioner was called upon to submit her written statement. At this stage, we may mention that Section 6 A was inserted in the Citizenship Act, 1955, following signing of the Assam Accord in 1985. It was stated that Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon, had made a reference to the effect that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, petitioner was called upon to submit her written statement. At this stage, we may mention that Section 6 A was inserted in the Citizenship Act, 1955, following signing of the Assam Accord in 1985. As per Section 6 A (2), these persons of Indian origin, who had entered into Assam from the specified territory, i.e., present day Bangladesh before 01.01.1966 and after such entry had ordinarily resided in Assam, would be deemed to be citizens of India. Section 6 A (3) provides for a category of foreigners belonging to the stream of 01.01.1966 to 25.03.1971, who are regulated by Sections 6 A (3), (4) and (5). Basically, they are disenfranchised for 10 years, while enjoying all other rights and privileges of a citizen of India; after 10 years they would even regain their voting rights. Thus, only those persons who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory after 25.03.1971 would be considered as a foreigner in the true sense and liable to be deported. Therefore, when we talk of foreigners as defined under Section 2 (a) of the Foreigners' Act, 1946, in the context of section 6 A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 it would mean a foreigner from the specified territory of post- 25.03.1971 stream. 12. This Court has held in Ananda Ghosh v. Union of India; reported in 2017 (3) GLR 815 that wrong mentioning of the stream of foreigners in the notice contrary to the reference made by the State would not vitiate the ultimate opinion rendered by a Foreigners' Tribunal that the proceedee is a foreigner of post-25.03.1971 stream. In this case, there was no wrong mentioning as such. It was specifically mentioned in the notice that reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon that petitioner was a foreigner. As discussed above, foreigner in the context of section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, would mean a foreigner who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory after 25.05.1971, unless it is specifically alleged that he had entered into India (Assam) during the period 01.01.1966 to 25.03.1971. As discussed above, foreigner in the context of section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, would mean a foreigner who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory after 25.05.1971, unless it is specifically alleged that he had entered into India (Assam) during the period 01.01.1966 to 25.03.1971. Therefore, in the context of the reference made and the ultimate conclusion reached by the Foreigners' Tribunal, non-mentioning of the stream of foreigners in the notice in our opinion would not vitiate the final conclusion reached by the Foreigners' Tribunal. This is more so because, as we examine the written statement we will notice that no objection was raised by the petitioner in her written statement that non-mentioning of the stream of foreigners in the notice had caused prejudice to her. Similar would be the position regarding the submission relating to non-mentioning of grounds in the notice. Though paragraph-3 (1) of the Foreigners' (Tribunals) Order, 1964 requires mentioning of the grounds, this Court has held that grounds need not be mentioned separately and elaborately. It would suffice if the grounds are mentioned in the notice itself, which need not be detailed or elaborate. Here also, we find that in the notice it was mentioned that as per reference of the Superintendent of Police (Border), Nagaon, petitioner was suspected to be a foreigner. In her written statement, petitioner did not raise any objection regarding non-mentioning of detailed grounds in the notice. This is because petitioner was fully aware of what was the basic allegation against her as she was confronted and asked during the course of the enquiry preceding the reference to produce relevant documents relating to her citizenship. Since petitioner did not raise any objection on this point and contested the reference without demur, we feel that non-mentioning of detailed grounds in the notice would not vitiate the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. In the context of the case, mentioning in the notice that petitioner was suspected to be a foreigner by the Superintendent of Police (Border) in the reference, coupled with the report of the Enquiry Officer would be substantial compliance to the requirement of furnishing grounds. 13. Besides, it is a settled proposition that a mistake in the notice which is not jurisdictional, does not invalidate a proceeding, if it is otherwise valid. 14. 13. Besides, it is a settled proposition that a mistake in the notice which is not jurisdictional, does not invalidate a proceeding, if it is otherwise valid. 14. Having said that, we may now proceed to the written statement filed by the petitioner. 15. As noticed above, no objection was raised in the written statement by the petitioner regarding non-mentioning of the stream of foreigners as well as non-furnishing of grounds in detail. Petitioner stated that she was born and brought up at Shyambari under Lanka Police Station in the district of Nagaon. Her mother was granted an identity card by the Sub-Deputy Collector in the relief camp at Karimganj on 11.12.1969. Mother became a voter in 1971 in respect of Lumding constituency. Petitioner married Chandan Debnath of Village Panchbhandar under Lanka Police Station in the district of Nagaon and her name appeared in the voters' list of 1997 in respect of Hojai constituency and thereafter in 2005, 2011 and 2014. 16. This was all that the petitioner stated in her written statement, which by any account was wholly inadequate to establish her identity as a citizen of India having regard to the mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners' Act, 1946 as explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph-26 of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 , which is extracted hereunder:- "26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." 17. There was no disclosure about the year or date of birth of the petitioner, but most crucially, petitioner did not mention the name of her father not to speak of her paternal grandparents, brothers and sisters, if any. It is trite that in India particularly in matters relating to citizenship, lineage is drawn through the father. 18. Be that as it may, from whatever was disclosed in the written statement, what is discernible is that according to the petitioner her mother Binoda Devi was granted an identity card by the Sub-Deputy Collector at a relief camp at Karimganj on 11.12.1964, whereafter, she became a voter of Lumding constituency in 1971. Though not specifically mentioned, we find that Binoda Devi was referred to as wife of Dhirendra, which may mean that Dhirendra was the father of the petitioner, but there is no pleading to that effect. Moreover, though not specifically mentioned, it can be presumed that petitioner had entered into India and she was granted identity card on 11.12.1964 in the relief camp at Karimganj, which in the course of argument, Dr Sarkar tried to highlight that petitioner was granted an identity card as a refugee from East Pakistan. 19. Even if this statement is accepted at its face value it is only the identity card of the mother and not of the father. It may be mentioned that under section 5 (1) (a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, Central Government may on an application register as a citizen of India any person not being an illegal migrant, if he is a person of Indian origin, who is ordinarily resident in India for seven years before making an application for registration. This would mean that even if Binoda Devi had entered into India on 11.12.1964, to be eligible to apply for Indian citizenship minimum stay of 7 (seven) years would be required. This would mean that even if Binoda Devi had entered into India on 11.12.1964, to be eligible to apply for Indian citizenship minimum stay of 7 (seven) years would be required. Therefore, prior to 11.12.1971, Binoda Devi could not have applied for and could not have become an Indian citizen. If that be so, her name would not have figured in the voters' list of 1971, which was prepared by taking 01.01.1971 as the qualifying date. That apart, as already noticed, this identity card was in respect of Binoda Devi and not in respect of Dhirendra, who was the husband of Binoda Devi and by implication father of the petitioner. But most importantly, this identity card was not exhibited. 20. Petitioner narrated the same thing in her evidence-in-chief, which was filed by way of affidavit on 10.12.2015. However, this time, she disclosed her age as 40 years, which would mean that she was born sometime in the year 1975. She also identified herself as the daughter of Late Dhirendra Debnath. 21. From the above, petitioner was required to prove that Dhirendra Debnath was a citizen of India or had entered into India from East Pakistan prior to 01.01.1966 to enable him to be a deemed citizen in terms of section 6 A (2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, as amended, and thereafter to establish or prove that she was the daughter of Dhirendra Debnath. 22. Proceeding to the exhibits, we find that Exhibit-1 is a certified copy extract of the voters' list of 1970 in respect of Binoda Devi, wife of Dhirendra, resident of village Chamboria under Lanka Police Station. Even if we overlook the discrepancies relating to the name of the village etc., we find that this is a document relating to Binoda Devi and not Dhirendra Debnath. 23. Exhibit-2 is a certified copy extract of the voters' list of 1997, where the sole voter was Bela Rani, wife of Chandan. Likewise, exhibits-3 and 4 were voters' lists of 2005 and 2011 in respect of Hojai constituency, where the voters were Chandan Debnath and Bela Rani Devi, wife of Chandan Debnath. These exhibits are of no assistance to the petitioner, inasmuch as, on the basis of these exhibits no linkage is established between petitioner and Dhirendra Debnath or for that matter even with Binoda Devi, whom the petitioner claims to be her mother. 24. These exhibits are of no assistance to the petitioner, inasmuch as, on the basis of these exhibits no linkage is established between petitioner and Dhirendra Debnath or for that matter even with Binoda Devi, whom the petitioner claims to be her mother. 24. Similar is the position in respect of exhibit-5, which is an elector photo identity card, where the name of the elector was Bela Rani Devi and relation's name was Chandan Debnath. 25. This brings us to exhibits-6 and 7. Exhibit-6 is a certificate dated 22.06.2015, issued by the Sarkari Gaonburah of Panch Bhandar village, certifying that Bela Rani Devi was the daughter of Late Dhirendra Debnath. This certificate cannot be accepted as a valid piece of evidence for more than one reason. Firstly, the Gaonburah has used the State Emblem of India in his certificate though he is not authorized under the State Emblem of India (Regulation of Use) Rules, 2007 to use the State Emblem. Such unauthorized use of the State Emblem of India has rendered the said exhibit inadmissible in evidence. Besides, printing of serial number and the heading "Sarkari Gaonburah Certificate" above the State Emblem without mentioning Government of Assam or Government of India is a clear take away that exhibit-6 may not be genuine. That apart, the Gaonburah did not depose before the Tribunal on the basis of contemporaneous record to prove the said certificate as well as the contents thereof. Therefore, this certificate was not proved. Notwithstanding that the certificate was not proved and that it was inadmissible in evidence, even if we accept the contents of the certificate at face value, Dhirendra Debnath's presence in India is not traceable to any document before 25.03.1971 or prior to 01.01.1966. If Dhirendra Debnath's presence is not traceable to such period, question of linkage of the petitioner with Dhirendra Debnath would not arise. In fact, there is no presence of Dhirendra Debnath in India at all at any point of time. 26. Similar would be the position in respect of exhibit-7, which is a certificate issued by the Secretary of Lanka Vata Gaon Panchayat dated 06.07.2015, certifying Bela Rani Debnath to be the daughter of Dhirendra Debnath. In addition to the above reasons, Supreme Court has clarified in Rupajan Begum v. Union of India; (2018) 1 SCC 579 that such a certificate by itself is no proof of citizenship. In addition to the above reasons, Supreme Court has clarified in Rupajan Begum v. Union of India; (2018) 1 SCC 579 that such a certificate by itself is no proof of citizenship. It is at best a linkage document between a married woman and her parents. But such a document would have to be verified at two stages; at the first stage authenticity of the document has to be verified and, thereafter, at the second stage, the contents of the document would have to be verified. There is nothing on record to show that exhibit-7 was verified in such a manner. Therefore, it has no probative value. 27. For the reasons mentioned above, this certificate is also of no assistance to the petitioner. 28. Pausing for a moment, we find that in Exhibit-6 Bela Rani Devi was shown as the daughter of Late Dhirendra Debnath. Question is when did Dhirendra Debnath expire. As discussed above, his presence in India is not traceable to any document. But from the deposition of the petitioner, we find that she was born in 1975. If Dhirendra Debnath was indeed her father, then he ought to have been around till 1974 for the petitioner to be born in 1975, but not to speak of any document there is no averment either in the written statement or in the evidence-in-chief about the petitioner's father. Even in the writ petition, there is no averment in respect of the father, i.e., Dhirendra Debnath. There is not a single statement that he had entered into India from East Pakistan prior to 01.01.1966 or even thereafter or that he was a citizen of India by birth. In fact, there is no presence of the father either in pleadings or in documents. 29. Therefore, it is evident that petitioner had failed to prove that she was the daughter of an Indian father relatable to a period prior to 25.03.1971. Thus, petitioner had failed to discharge her burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners' Act, 1946 to prove that she was not a foreigner but a citizen of India. Consequently, we find no merit in the writ petition. In such circumstances, we have no other option but to dismiss the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. 30. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 31. Consequently, we find no merit in the writ petition. In such circumstances, we have no other option but to dismiss the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. 30. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 31. Registry to send down the LCR forthwith and inform the concerned Foreigners' Tribunal, Superintendent of Police (Border) and Deputy Commissioner for taking necessary follow-up steps. 32. A copy of this order may also be furnished to learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and State Coordinator, National Register of Citizens (NRC), for doing the needful.