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2018 DIGILAW 778 (GUJ)

Naranbhai Shantilal Tadvi v. State of Gujarat

2018-06-23

BELA M.TRIVEDI, SONIA GOKANI

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sonia Gokani, J. This is an appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Code, 1973 against the judgment and order of conviction dated 18.10.2013 passed in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2013 under Section 363, 366, 376, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The appellant is convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad vide the judgment dated 18.10.2013. The facts in capsulized form, as emerging from the prosecution case, leading to the present appeal are as follows :- 2.1 According to the case of the prosecution, there was a wedding in the family of paternal aunt of prosecutrix - original complainant at village Janod of Balasinor Taluka on 10.11.2011. The complainant prosecutrix aged about 12 years 8 months, was sent by her parents on 08.11.2011 with her maternal uncle (Fua) for attending the wedding, since the parents of the prosecutrix were not in a position to attend the same. 2.2 It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant along with victim had gone to Dabhoi in the bus from Kevadiya Colony and after selling scrap, that he brought from the market, both went to watch movie. Therefrom, they went to Dakore in the bus and by the time, they reached Dakore, since it was night already, appellant rented a room in a Guest House namely Sukhadiya Bhawan Dharmshala. 2.3 As per the case of the prosecution, after dinner, the victim complainant and the appellant were sleeping on separate beds. At around 10:30 p.m., the appellant approached the complainant and demanded sexual favours. When she refused for the same, her hands were with tied with the side of bed and she was raped. She was not allowed to move anywhere and was threatened of killing her if she would reveal the incident in the wedding to anyone. 2.4 The prosecution case as unrevealed further is that on 09.11.2011 they went to Banasinor from Dakor in the bus and from there to village Janod in 'Chhackda' rickshaw. 2.5 On 10.11.2011, the wedding was attended by the appellant and victim both and on 11.11.2011, the appellant took her to village Sarsa for borrowing money from the sister of the appellant as they were running short of money for even bus fare. She stayed at Sarsa at the house of the sister of the appellant. 2.5 On 10.11.2011, the wedding was attended by the appellant and victim both and on 11.11.2011, the appellant took her to village Sarsa for borrowing money from the sister of the appellant as they were running short of money for even bus fare. She stayed at Sarsa at the house of the sister of the appellant. On 12.11.2011, they undertook the journey as the appellant intended to go to Ambaji. She was asked to sit in the bus and was not allowed to raise any question. It was only at Himmatnagar when she woke up and the appellant had forced her to join him to go to Idar. 2.6 They stayed at Idar in the agricultural field of one Shri Pankajbhai (Prosecution Witness No. 7). They stayed there for about a week. He practically raped her everyday according to victim. He also threatened the victim that she will be thrown in a well if she discloses the same to anyone. Then he also called up his son Akshay as to whether there was any police case filed or not. In the meantime, victim was desperate to join her parents and from the mobile phone of the owner of the agricultural field Shri Pankajbhai, she spoke to her mother. Mother pleaded Shri Pankajbhai to send her to Kevadiya by helping her and then the appellant joined her. She and the appellant had left for Ahmedabd. From there, they boarded the bus for Vadodara to reach to Kevadiya Colony, where the parents of victim were doing labour work. The appellant got down at Tilakwada and she reached Kevadiya, where her parents were waiting for her. Father of the victim lodged the FIR being the I-C.R. No. 119 of 2011 after the victim narrated entire story to her mother and paternal aunt reaching there. This culminated into filing of the chargesheet after due investigation for the offence punishable under Section 363, 366, 376 and 506(2) of IPC. 3. The case was committed to the Sessions Court under Section 209 of the Code and was numbered as Sessions Case No. 17 of 2013, where the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 5 on 01.05.2013 for the offences punishable under Section 363, 366, 376, 506(2) of the IPC and the prosecution had chosen to examine as many as 16 witnesses when the appellant pleaded not guilty. 5 on 01.05.2013 for the offences punishable under Section 363, 366, 376, 506(2) of the IPC and the prosecution had chosen to examine as many as 16 witnesses when the appellant pleaded not guilty. The documentary evidence also are 18 in number, which can be tabularised as under :- PROSECUTION WITNESS NUMBER NAME OF THE WITNESS EXHIBIT NUMBER 1 Dr. Mrityunjayakumar Ramsharan Sharma 9 2 Artiben Rameshbhai Kalyanbhai Vaghri 17 3 Kanaklataben Arvindbhai Shah 19 4 Nareshbhai Kantibhai Vaghri 22 5 Rajendrakumar Nagindas Shah 24 6 Rameshbhai Gagabhai Gohil 26 7 Pankajbhai Bholabhai Goswami 30 8 Madhuben Rameshbhai Vaghri 31 9 Ramilaben Arjunbhai Vaghri 32 10 Sumitraben Kanjibhai Tadvi 33 11 Rameshbhai Kalyanbhai Vaghri 34 12 Sureshbhai Ramanlal Shah 37 13 Deepakbhai Harishbhai Bhatt 40 14 Devsinh Ramji Makwana 42 15 Somabhai Lalubhai Katara 53 16 Rakeshkumar Phuljibhai Chaudhari 55 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NUMBER PARTICULAR EXHIBIT NUMBER 1 Medical Certificate of the Victim 12 2 Medical Certificate of appellant 16 3 Complaint 18 4 Panchnama of body of victim as well sealing of clothes of victim 21 5 Panchnama of one room situated at agricultural farm of Pankajbhai Bholabhai 23 6 Panchnama of Room No. 1 of Sukhadiya Guest House 25 7 Panchnama of body of accused 27 8 Copy of election card of accused 39 9 Forwarding letter to FSL, Ahmedabad 43 10 Receipt of FSL 44 11 FSL letter 45 12 Report of Biology examination FSL 46 13 Report of Serology examination FSL 47 14 Forwarding letter to FSL, Ahmedabad 48 15 Receipt of FSL 49 16 FSL letter FSL letter 17 Report of Biology examination FSL 51 18 Report of Serology examination FSL 52 3.1 On closure of evidence by the prosecution, further statement of appellant - accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., where he denied every incriminating evidence. His stand is that the parents of the prosecutrix when had reached Kevadiya for the labour work, they have had no place to stay. He had given his own house and later on they were asked to vacate the same, they have chosen not to do the same and this bogus complaint was filed against him. His stand is that the parents of the prosecutrix when had reached Kevadiya for the labour work, they have had no place to stay. He had given his own house and later on they were asked to vacate the same, they have chosen not to do the same and this bogus complaint was filed against him. 3.2 The trial Court after having heard detailed submissions of both the sides passed the judgment and order of conviction under Section 363, 366, 376 and 506(2) of IPC and after hearing the appellant, awarded rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years for the offence punishable under Section 366 and 363, and awarded further life imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 of IPC, whereas under Section 506(2) of IPC, one year of rigorous imprisonment has been awarded. The Court has erroneously not awarded any amount of fine with the reason that he is not capable to pay fine. We shall deal with the same at the appropriate stage. Suffice to note here that the appellant since is being aggrieved by this judgment and order of conviction, he has challenged the same by way of the present appeal. 4. The appellant has been provided legal aid by the High Court. Learned advocate Mr. Hardik K. Raval appears in the legal aid for him. He has strenuously argued at length the case of appellant taking us to the entire set of evidence. He has urged that the animosity on account of the appellant asking to vacate his premises, has resulted into the present case. He has also urged that not only there is a complete absence of valid birth proof, it further emerges that Investigating Officer has failed to get ossification test done, and therefore, no valid age proof of the prosecutrix having come on record, the judgment and order of conviction of the trial Court, deserves to be set aside. He has further urged that it is unbelievable that the prosecutrix would not reveal the factum of rape to any person, even when she had met all her relatives in the wedding and thereafter also she travelled far and wide with the appellant, without a murmur. He has further urged that it is unbelievable that the prosecutrix would not reveal the factum of rape to any person, even when she had met all her relatives in the wedding and thereafter also she travelled far and wide with the appellant, without a murmur. It is unthinkable that she would not disclose such unpalatable facts to anyone in the family and therefore, it has to be believed that the incident had not happened and subsequently at the behest of her parents, a false complaint has been lodged only with view to pressurize the appellant so that he may not demand his house back. It is also the say of learned advocate that the offence took place on 08.11.2011 and the FIR was registered on 21.11.2011, which is almost 13 days after the alleged incident. There is no reason much less satisfactory reason for such huge delay in lodgment FIR of rape. It is emphasized that she was neither abducted nor kidnapped but she voluntarily moved with the appellant at Dakor, Balasinor, Sarsa village at her own will and free consent and stayed there at many places, where she chose not to indicate to any single soul about any incident of rape. Further, from the chain of events there is neither any enticement on the part of the appellant nor any inducement to the victim girl, and therefore it must be held that no offence has been committed. 4.1 Learned advocate also urged further that in the evidence of medical expert, he has not spoken of any injury to the private part of the victim. There is no other material to indicate and support her version of rape, the Court must not believe her. The FSL report also no manner supports the case of prosecution. He has urged that the case rests on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and therefore, it is very risky to confirm the conviction on the basis of her version, more so, when the appellant had succeeded in pointing out the motive for filing such a false complaint. 4.2 The learned advocate has urged reiteratively that the single witness has not been examined so far as the school leaving certificate is concerned. Mere production of School Leaving Certificate for a purpose to prove her age, may not suffice. 4.2 The learned advocate has urged reiteratively that the single witness has not been examined so far as the school leaving certificate is concerned. Mere production of School Leaving Certificate for a purpose to prove her age, may not suffice. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat versus Jivanlal Chhotalal Patel, (1985) GLH 388. He has urged that as held by this Court way back in the year 1985, primary duty of the Investigating Agency is given a go-bye, and the investigating agency ought to have understood that every child born in some village or Taluka town or District town or in city where birth and death register is compulsorily required to be maintained, his birth would have been registered. He has urged that this Court in that earlier judgment had lamented the fact as with regard to the age, there had not been any valid proof and that needs to be held true even in the instant case. He has relied upon the deposition of PW-7 Pankajbhai Bholabhai Goswami - owner of the firm, PW-10 Sumitraben Kanjibhai Tadvi - sister of the accused, and PW-12 Sureshbhai Ramanlal Shah - Manager of the Guest House. It is also urged that cumulative reading of evidence of prosecution witnesses would not score to confirm the judgment and order of conviction and therefore, the appeal be allowed. 5. The learned APP Ms. Chetna Shah appearing for the State has fervently urged that merely because the appellate Court, from the very set of evidence, could reach to other conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court, is not the ground for the Appellate Forum to interfere with the judgment and order of conviction. She has further pointed out that the prosecutrix was a very young aged minor and it is impossible for her to stand against the appellant considering her social and economic background even otherwise, it is quite unlikely for such a young girl to have raised any alarm against her own close relative who is like a fatherly figure. He has not only breached the trust of the parents but he has also abhorrently exploited a young girl who is his own niece. He was more than 45 years of age who has son who is older than the victim girl herself. He has not only breached the trust of the parents but he has also abhorrently exploited a young girl who is his own niece. He was more than 45 years of age who has son who is older than the victim girl herself. Therefore, any suggestion with regard to the consent theory also, should be deprecated. She has pointed out from the deposition of PW-11 father of prosecutrix and other evidence indicating the detailed history of narration of incident which the victim girl admitted. When the prosecution had submitted the school leaving certificate indicating her age 12 years 8 months, the ossification test is not a must. 6. Having thus heard both the sides and also having considered the material on record, at the outset, it is to be noted that it is a well laid down law that the even if two different conclusion can be arrived at from the very set of evidence, that is no ground to disturb the conclusion of the trial Court. Relevant would be refer to the following decisions of the Apex Court :- 6.1 In Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma versus State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1 , the Apex Court has held thus : "27. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal: (i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found. (ii) The Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. (iii) The Appellate Court can also review the Trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. (v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether finding of the Trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly, erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether finding of the Trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly, erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the Appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the Appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion. (vii) When the Trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of Ballistic Experts etc., the Appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the Trial Court depending on the materials placed." 6.2 In Murugesan versus State, (2012) 10 SCC 383 , the Apex Court has held thus :- "34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of which the superior judicial authority perceived to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court." 7. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court." 7. With this settled law laid down and principles, if one examines the material on record, it appears and essentially as it happens in every case of rape, there could be no other evidence but that of the prosecutrix. Plethora of judgments of this Court and the Apex Court reveal that the version of the prosecutrix alone requires to be believed and depended upon unless of course, there are circumstances which would reveal the ulterior motive for any concoction. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , has held in this regard :- "8. .....The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl of a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice........." 7.1 The Apex Court in the very case of Gurmit Singh also, reiterated this principle and has emphasized that the victim is not an accomplice of crime witness but an injured witness whose evidence deserves appreciation accordingly. 7.2 Worthwhile, it would be to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Swaroop Singh versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 14 SCC 565 , in which the Apex Court has held as under :- "15. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer to the principles laid down by this Court as to the manner in which the evidence of rape victim should be evaluated to ascertain the truth. The said decision is reported in State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh. Para 8 and 21 are relevant which read as under :- "8. ...The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. Para 8 and 21 are relevant which read as under :- "8. ...The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not over-look. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl of a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons' lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. ... 21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault - it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the judgment of the trial court as well as of the High Court, we are convinced that the judgment of the trial court does not call for interference. From what has been let in by way of evidence by the court below, the prosecurtix PW2 has spoken that she knew the appellant, that she was forcibly taken to the sugarcane bush at knife-point and was subjected to sexual intercourse against her consent. She revealed the gruesome act committed by the appellant immediately after the occurrence to Ram Singh PW 5. When she was examined by the Doctor, nothing could be traced about the presence of sperm or blood since admittedly before going to the police station, she washed herself in the well which was nearby the place of occurrence to which place she immediately went where she also reported the incident to Mr. Ram Singh Dada who was examined as PW 5. 17. The doctor who examined the prosecutrix stated clearly that the hymen of the prosecutrix was torn and ruptured." 7.3 In the instant case, it could be noticed from the deposition of both the parents, (Mother PW8) Madhuben Rameshbhai Vaghri and (father PW-11) Rameshbhai Kalyanbhai Vaghri that they had five children and out of five children, two sons had died. At the time when they deposed, they had three children and the prosecutrix is the eldest of these three. Her date of birth is 02.03.1999, of course the father had admitted in the cross-examination that he had not got her birth registered with the Panchayat and when he went to the school for admitting the girl, he had entered her birth date on presumption only. Her date of birth is 02.03.1999, of course the father had admitted in the cross-examination that he had not got her birth registered with the Panchayat and when he went to the school for admitting the girl, he had entered her birth date on presumption only. She was studying in 7th standard at the time the incident in question happened and therefore it was almost before 7-8 years of the same, her birth date in the School was registered as 02.03.1999. It would not have been contemplated that she would be victim at any point of time of such crime and there may be a need of any manipulation of her birth date. 7.4 The decision in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh versus Anoop Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 773 , which speaks of determination of the age of the prosecutrix of rape deserves reference at this stage. The Apex Court has held that ossification test is not a must for determination of the age when birth certificate and school leaving certificate are available. It was the case where there were two certificates and the theory of consent was propounded by the accused. The Court referred the decision of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske versus State of Maharashtra and Another, (2013) 14 SCC 637 to hold that it is applicable in determining the age of victim of rape, which speaks about Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. 7.5 The findings and observations are reproduced as under :- "14. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of the victim of rape. 7.5 The findings and observations are reproduced as under :- "14. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:- "12(3): In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining - (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law." 15. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske as under: "Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only in the absence of alternative methods described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be sought for. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske as under: "Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only in the absence of alternative methods described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the ascertaining the age of a victim as well." This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by the school in determining the age of the prosecutrix. In paragraph 13, this Court observed: "13. In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand, there were certificates issued by the school in which the proseuctrix did her V standard and in the school leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit 54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as 20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW 11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as the admission form maintained by the Primary School, Latur, where the prosecutrix had her initial education, also confirmed the date of birth as 20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of the prosecutrix to hold that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere with the same." 16. In the present case, we have before us two documents which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16 years of age at the time the incident took place. These documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3) (b). The difference of two days in the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P/5 and P/6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct in relying on the documents. 17. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr. A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18 years. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct in relying on the documents. 17. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr. A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18 years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal Vs. State of M.P., (2004) CrLJ 3962, wherein the High Court of Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the prosecutrix and found her to be below 18 years, then keeping in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for determination of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as her certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical examination had been enclosed. 7.6 The prosecutrix herself had stated her age to be of 12 years. This version is being supported by the school leaving certificate of victim, which of course has been proved through father of the victim and it is not challenged at all either in the cross examination or subsequently before the trial Court. It has been duly exhibited and at no stage, there was any dispute of the said document or fact of age. As held in this judgment referred to herein above, the ossification test would not be necessary once the birth date is proved by way of certificate and as per the said decision also, when school leaving certificate is providing the age of victim and when there was no challenge at any point of time, there does not arise the question of doubting her age. Again also considering the parents' oral version and chronology of birth of siblings of the prosecutrix, we hold that the trial Court has rightly held the age of victim as 12 years 8 months. It is also to be remembered that the Court is dealing with the girl of 12 years and it is not the case of the appellant being tried due to technical reason where girl is averred to be a major. Moreover, relationship of appellant with the prosecutrix also cannot be lost sight of while considering such submissions. It is noticed from the version of both the parents that custody of the prosecutrix had been entrusted to maternal uncle as all of them were supposed to attend the marriage of son of her another maternal aunt. The parents were not in position to attend the marriage because of their poor financial position. Therefore, the daughter was sent with maternal uncle i.e. the appellant on 08.11.2011. The maternal aunt had insisted on prosecutrix reaching early so that she would get some help in the marriage. The appellant had left with the prosecutrix on 08.11.2011 and she returned only on 20.11.2011. The marriage was on 10.11.2011. The appellant and the prosecutrix had reached on 09.11.2011 for wedding and they had left that place on 11.11.2011 after attending the marriage. It is also confirmed by PW-9 Ramilaben Arjunbhai Parmar who is the maternal aunt at whose place, she attended the marriage. 8. So far as the version of the prosecutrix is concerned in relation to the incident of rape by the appellant, she has narrated that before she went for the wedding, she had accompanied her maternal uncle (Fua). They left at 6:00 a.m. in the morning after selling scrap at Dabhoi. They went for dinner and went to watch a movie. Thereafter from Dabhoi bus stand, they went to Dakor. Since it was already evening, the appellant took a room in guest house and he had paid Rs. 120/- for the same. They stayed at a room in the guest house which the appellant had rented and there were two beds and on separate beds they both were sleeping. Thereafter from Dabhoi bus stand, they went to Dakor. Since it was already evening, the appellant took a room in guest house and he had paid Rs. 120/- for the same. They stayed at a room in the guest house which the appellant had rented and there were two beds and on separate beds they both were sleeping. She had narrated in detail as to how the appellant had approached her in her bed and demanded sexual favour and when she refused, he insisted to go ahead in his motive and her both hands were tied with duppatta on the sides of the bed and he committed rape. The victim has given every detail as to how the entire incident had happened. She was threatened of being killed if she shared the said incident with anyone. He continued to keep her with him and the next day morning, they left at 9:30 from Dakore to go to Balasinor where from Balasinor they went in rickshaw for reaching Janod. 8.1 The prosecutrix has further gave her version that he continued to be around her in the marriage and in the morning, after attending the marriage, on 11.11.2011, they left the place to go to the house of Sumitraben - sister of the appellant as there was no money to travel. That night, at her house, she slept with Sumitraben - sister of the appellant and on the next day they left from there. The appellant was asking for the bus going to Ambaji, however, they boarded the bus and she was told that the bus was going to Kevadiya. She was also threatened by him and made her sit in the bus when she questioned about their destination. In the bus, she slept and when she woke up, she realised that it was Himmatnagar, where they reached and the appellant had told her to accompany him to Idar because the appellant said that the he was having no money for going to Kevadiya. 8.2 They went to field owned by PW-7 Pankajbhai and there also she was being everyday exploited physically by the appellant who went on committing rape. When there was no possibility of his taking her to her parents by the appellant and hence, she insisted for going to them. 8.2 They went to field owned by PW-7 Pankajbhai and there also she was being everyday exploited physically by the appellant who went on committing rape. When there was no possibility of his taking her to her parents by the appellant and hence, she insisted for going to them. She was once again threatened by him to thrown her into the well and after about one week, she had spoken to her mother from the mobile phone of field owner Shri Pankajbhai. She told her mother that she was keen to join them back and her mother pleaded with Shri Pankajbhai to help her in going back. She and the appellant were paid their labour charges and they left for Ahmedabad from Idar. 8.3 After reaching Ahmedabad, they went Vadodara in a bus and from there they boarded the bus for Kevadiya Colony where the appellant got down at Tilakwada and she at Kevadiya. After speaking to mother, the family decided to lodge a complaint. 9. There is an exhaustive cross examination of this witness which she has faced without being bogged down by any of the questions put by the defence. There appears to be a consistent stand on the part of the appellant that she never raised any hue and cry during the incident and after the incident. Implicitly it appears that theory of her consent is all throughout brought into cross-examination before the Doctor also. The appellant's version was that it was the prosecutrix who had forced him for sexual intercourse with her and because of the said incidence, if she would raise hue and cry, the same would malign her and for that she was forced for physical relations with him. This also appears to be consistent stand on the part of the appellant in the cross-examination of this girl. Although in the further statement recorded, he had merely denied the incriminating evidence and at the end of such denial, he had put forth the theory of parents having concocted the story because of their greed of house which they have chosen not to vacate. 10. This Court finds from the overall version of the prosecutrix that she had been consistent in her stand, and her evidence and in the cross-examination, the defence could not point out any significant contradiction or discrepancy going to the root of the case of the prosecution. 10. This Court finds from the overall version of the prosecutrix that she had been consistent in her stand, and her evidence and in the cross-examination, the defence could not point out any significant contradiction or discrepancy going to the root of the case of the prosecution. While dealing with the evidence of the prosecutrix, more particularly, when she is of a very young age, the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh and Others reported in , has held and observed that the testimony of victim of sexual assault is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of the victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that she is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding, as held in the very decision of the Apex Court. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. The Apex Court has also held that Courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as of involving herself in the commission of rape on her. 11. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed contradictions which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, should not, unless there are discrepancies which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out the version of the prosecutrix. The Court must remember inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression. It is also coincidence that in a matter before the Apex Court, the girl was belonging to very poor village background. She was student of 10th standard, and the Apex Court held that the girl in a tradition-bound, non permissive society in India, would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect upon her chastity had occurred, being conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society of being looked down upon by the society. 12. With regard to the delay in filing the complaint, in the very decision of Gurmit Singh, the Apex Court has held that delay in filing the FIR in sexual offences, can be due to variety of reasons particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident which concern the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged, that itself should not be very fatal to the case of prosecution. 13. In case of State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh & Others, the Apex Court held this :- "8. .... It is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged, that itself should not be very fatal to the case of prosecution. 13. In case of State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh & Others, the Apex Court held this :- "8. .... The courts cannot over-look the fact that in sexual offences delay in the lodging of the FIR can be due to variety of reasons particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged........" 14. The long line of judgments that has followed thereafter, reiterates this very principle and eventually, in case of Mukesh & Another versus State For NCT of Delhi and Others, (2017) 6 SCC 1 , which is popularly known as 'Nirbhaya Case', once again the Apex Court has laid down the very law. The relevant paras read as under :- "50. Delay in sitting the law into motion by lodging of complaint in court or FIR at police station is normally viewed by the courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against an accused. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the case of the prosecution would depend upon a variety of factors. Even a long delay can be condoned if the informant has no motive for implicating the accused. 53. In the context of belated FIR, we may usefully refer to certain authorities in the field. In Ram Jag v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 201 , it was held as : "16. .... that witnesses cannot be called upon to explain every hour's delay and a commonsense view has to be taken in ascertaining whether the first information report was lodged after an undue delay so as to afford enough scope for manipulating evidence. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay in filing report of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for implicating the accused. On the other hand, prompt filing of the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness of the version of the prosecution." 54. In State of H.P. v. Rakesh Kumar, (2009) 6 SCC 308 , the Court repelled the submission pertaining to delay in lodging of the FIR on the ground that the first endeavour is always to take the person to the hospital immediately so as to provide him medical treatment and only thereafter report the incident to the police. The Court in the said case further held that every minute was precious and, therefore, it is natural that the witnesses accompanying the deceased first tried to take him to the hospital so as to enable him to get immediate medical treatment. Such action was definitely in accordance with normal human conduct and psychology. When their efforts failed and the deceased died they immediately reported the incident to the police. The Court, under the said circumstances ruled that in fact, it was a case of quick reporting to the police." 15. In the instant case, it could be noticed that the victim having reached her home after about 10 days and after she having disclosed about the incident to the parents, the FIR was lodged within two days of her reaching. It is true that since she is a minor and she is not expected to immediately rush to the police when there is poor rustic background i.e. unlikely the Court has to see that the parents had handed over the custody and it is the maternal uncle who has breached their trust and had exploited her. In such circumstances, one should also consider her mental state and therefore to expect her to reveal that what has happened and particularly when she is alleged to have specify to have been threatened by the accused, the Court finds late filing of the FIR is not at all fatal to the case of prosecution. 16. In such circumstances, one should also consider her mental state and therefore to expect her to reveal that what has happened and particularly when she is alleged to have specify to have been threatened by the accused, the Court finds late filing of the FIR is not at all fatal to the case of prosecution. 16. Although as discussed above, the law is quite emphatic that when the version of prosecutrix is cogent and trustworthy once, no corroboration is to be sought. A girl of 12 years would have no certain reason to involve herself to falsely involve the accused appellant and yet for the corroboration of her version, the prosecution had examined other witnesses and succeeded in pointing out from the evidence of PW-12 Sureshbhai Ramanlal Shah - Manager of the Guest House, where the incident had taken place that in the register regularly maintained by him, one room was rented in the name of the present appellant on the date on which they left from marriage. She had been introduced as the niece of the appellant. 17. Likewise PW-10 Sumitraben Kanjibhai Tadvi - the sister of the appellant, at whose place they had stayed one night also confirmed the date and time when the appellant had taken the girl to her place and where he had asked for the money for travelling. 18. Pw-7 Pankajbhai Bholabhai Goswami at whose farm they had stayed for about four days, is the owner of the farm, who had also confirmed their visit to his place and also his communication with the mother of prosecutrix. He also confirmed that he had paid the amount of labour charges to the appellant. Of course these witnesses confirm in the cross-examination also that the prosecutrix had not uttered a single word to them about the alleged exploitation by the appellant. It is quite understandable that a young girl aged about 12 years who is raped by her own maternal uncle, always would find it onerous to confide in others and the people of her own trust or to the immediate family member only she can trust for confiding with these details. That is why she had immediately on reaching to her place, when she met her mother and maternal aunt, she had given these details and that had resulted into lodgment of FIR. That is why she had immediately on reaching to her place, when she met her mother and maternal aunt, she had given these details and that had resulted into lodgment of FIR. It is unthinkable that for the dispute of residing in a small hut, which is also not coming on the record, of the appellant, the parents would make a young girl a pawn and lodge a false complaint of such grievous nature. The Apex Court in the case of Mukesh versus State of Chattisgarh, (2014) 10 SCC 327 , has held as under :- "14. Further, the accused has taken the defence that the prosecutrix did not call out for help, despite the fact that she had managed to free herself. However, we hold that, in the situation, where the prosecutrix was under the threat of being raped by the appellant-accused, we cannot expect her to be prudent and meticulous in her thought process. Hence, for her running away from the situation would have been the best possible thing to do at the time, therefore, not calling out for help does not mean that the appellant-accused did not commit the offence. The state of mind of the prosecutrix cannot be precisely analysed on the basis of speculation because each person reacts differently to a particular stressful situation. 15. Further, as has been repeatedly held by this Court in a catena of cases, the sole testimony of the witness (sic prosecutrix) is sufficient to establish the commission of rape even in the absence of corroborative evidence. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Iqbal v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 14 SCC 481 , which states as under :- "17. There is no prohibition in law to convict the accused of rape on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix and the law does not require that her statement be corroborated by the statements of other witnesses. 18. In Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171 , this Court has observed that even if a woman is of easy virtues or used to sexual intercourse, it cannot be a licence for any person to commit rape and it further held: "30. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the Court has reason not to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix's case becomes liable to be rejected. 31. The Court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtues/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the Court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the prosecutrix on the occasion complained of." 19. In the statements of the appellant-accused under Section 313 CrPC, only a bald statement had been made by both the appellant-accused that they were innocent. No explanation had been furnished by either of them as to why the prosecutrix had deposed against them and involved them in such a heinous crime." 18.1 The Apex Court in the case of Aslam versus State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 350 , has held as under :- "9. This Court has held that if, upon consideration of the prosecution case in its entirety, the testimony of the prosecutrix inspires confidence in the mind of the Court, the necessity of corroboration of her evidence may be excluded. This Court in Rajinder v. State of H.P., (2009) 16 SCC 69 , has observed as under :- "18. This Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh made the following weighty observations in respect of evidence of a victim of sexual assault :- 19. In the context of Indian culture, a woman-victim of sexual aggression-would rather suffer silently than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unncessary and uncalled for. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unncessary and uncalled for. But for high improbability in the prosecution case, the conviction in the case of sex crime may be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent." 18.2 The Apex Court in the case of Ganga Singh versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 , has held as under :- "11. Mr. Mehrotra is right in his submission that burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offence under Section 376 IPC and this burden has to be discharged by adducing reliable evidence in proof of the guilt of the appellant. In the present case, the prosecution seeks to establish the guilt of the appellant through the evidence of PW5, the prosecutrix. The law is well settled that the prosecutrix is a victim of, and not an accomplice in, a sex offence and there is no provision in the Evidence Act requiring corroboration in material particulars of the evidence of the prosecutrix as is in the case of evidence of accomplice. He submitted that the prosecutrix is thus a competent witness under Section 118 of the Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured witness in cases of physical violence. Keeping this principle in mind, when we look at the evidence of PW 5, we find that she has categorically stated that the appellant fell her down, covered her mouth with one hand and restricted her hands with the other hand and lifted her petticoat and committed rape on her. Keeping this principle in mind, when we look at the evidence of PW 5, we find that she has categorically stated that the appellant fell her down, covered her mouth with one hand and restricted her hands with the other hand and lifted her petticoat and committed rape on her. It is true that on her medical examination the next day, PW 9 did not find any injury on the person of PW 5, but PW 5 has explained that she fell on her back in the agricultural field which had a smooth surface and there were wheat and mustard crops in the field and this could be the reason for her not suffering injury." 19. The Court shall have to believe at this stage the version given to the Doctor by the present appellant and the Doctor also confirmed that fact that he had blamed the victim girl for this act of sexual intercourse at Dakore and thus, there is also a version of the appellant coming from the medical expert who is a neutral witness. Therefore, it is clear that his subsequent version of animosity and the concoctions is an after thought to save his skin. The Doctor, before whom the prosecutrix has been examined, of course, found no injury marks on the private parts, but, he confirms the history given by her and also the factum of her ruptured hymen and both these aspects when looked from the version put forth in the oral evidence, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the trial Court. Again, prosecution is not required to answer to each and every hypothesis of defence. 20. Apt would be to refer to the decision of Apex Court in the case of Ganesh Shamrao Andekar and Another versus State of Maharashtra, (2017) 13 SCC 187 , the Apex Court held thus : "19. So far as the argument raising possibility of commission of murder by other than the accused mentioned in the FIR is concerned, that would be a mere conjecture. This Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 , has held that the prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. This Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 , has held that the prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it can be argued that it is artificial, and where the case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is a doubtful story. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." 21. Resultantly, the judgment and order dated 18.10.2013 passed by the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2013, so far as the conviction under Section 363, 366, 376 and 506 (2) of Indian Penal Code are concerned, deserve no interference. The Sessions Court not having imposed any amount of fine, is a serious lapse, which as per the provisions of IPC otherwise is a must. However, the State has since not filed appeal nor having challenged this aspect, the judgment and order is hereby confirmed as it is. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. 22. While parting, we reiterate that if the compensation is not already given under the provision of Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Victim Compensation Scheme, 2016 to the prosecutrix by now, the same shall be assessed by the learned Principal District Judge, Kheda in accordance with Rules, and shall be awarded to the prosecutrix by way of account payee cheque within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 23. Record and proceedings be sent back to the court concerned forthwith.