JUDGMENT : Pradeep Nandrajog, J. Late Shri Sohan Lal Soni was in service in the State of Rajasthan and on rendering 12 years and 8 months service submitted his resignation which was accepted and as a consequence he ceased to be in Government service. This happened way back on 9.8.1968. 2. After 29 years, in the year 1997 he filed a writ petition in this Court challenging Rule 208 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996. The two Rules read as under:- "208. Resignation, dismissal or removal for misconduct etc. (a) Resignation of the public service of dismissal or removal from it for misconduct, insolvency, inefficiency not due to age or failure to pass a prescribed examination entails forfeiture of past service. (b) Resignation of an appointment to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether permanent or temporary, service in which counts in full or in part, is not a resignation of public service. In case where an interruption in service is inevitable due to the two appointments being at different stations, such interruptions, not exceeding the joining time permissible under the rules on transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of any kind due to the Government servant on the date relief or by formal condonation under Rule 212 to the extent to which the period is not covered by the leave due to the Government servant. 25. Forfeiture of service on resignation (1) Resignation form a service or a post, entails forfeiture of past service. (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. (3) Interruption in service in a case falling under Sub-rule (2), due to the two appointments being at different stations, not exceeding the joining time admissible under the rules of transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of any kind due to the Government servant on the date of relief or by formal condonation to the extent to which the period is not covered by leave due to him." 3. On his death, legal representatives of late Shri Sohan Lal Soni have been impleaded as appellants. 4. Vide impugned decision dated 20th November, 2006 the writ petition filed by Sohan Lal Soni has been dismissed. 5. On his death, legal representatives of late Shri Sohan Lal Soni have been impleaded as appellants. 4. Vide impugned decision dated 20th November, 2006 the writ petition filed by Sohan Lal Soni has been dismissed. 5. A perusal of the two Rules, vires whereof is challenged, shows that in case of resignation from public service it entails a forfeiture of the past service. Meaning thereby, a person in Government service in the State of Rajasthan loses pensionary benefits once he resigns. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that there is no difference between a voluntary retirement and a resignation. If as per the Rules a Government servant who seeks voluntary retirement is entitled to pension, why should a Government servant who resigns from service be not entitled to pension. Extending argument further, learned counsel argued that by putting the embargo of disentitlement to pension the right of Government servant under Article 19 of the Constitution of India to change his profession would be violated. Learned counsel urged that denial of pension is a denial of life and liberty. The further extended argument is that clubbing the consequences of resignation from public service with dismissal or removal for a misconduct is arbitrary. Lastly, learned counsel relied upon the decision of a Division Bench reported as 2016(1) WLN (Raj.) 240 Jaipur Nagar Nigam, Jaipur & anr. v. Mohan Lal to urge that the contentions advanced by him have been accepted in said decision pronounced by a Division Bench of this Court. 7. Now, if the Division Bench of this Court has already pronounced upon the issue, unless we record reasons warranting the matter to be referred to a Larger Bench, we would be bound by the decision of the Division Bench, thus we deal with the decision in Mohan Lal's case (supra). 8. The decision brings out that Mohan Lal, an illiterate person, was appointed as Class-IV employee by the Municipal Board and became an employee of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation when the Corporation was formed. He had served for 32 years. He developed chronic asthma and was unable to discharge duties as a Safai Karamchari. He submitted an innocently worded letter informing the Corporation that due to old age and chronic illness he was unable to discharge duties and desired to be relieved of employment and thus was submitting a letter of resignation. 9. He had served for 32 years. He developed chronic asthma and was unable to discharge duties as a Safai Karamchari. He submitted an innocently worded letter informing the Corporation that due to old age and chronic illness he was unable to discharge duties and desired to be relieved of employment and thus was submitting a letter of resignation. 9. Noting Mohan Lal being an illiterate person and meaningfully reading the letter the Division Bench of this Court opined that Mohan Lal expressed his inability to work because of illness and wanted to be voluntarily relieved from service and thus the expression 'resignation' written by him in the letter was required to be read as one seeking voluntary retirement. Thus the observations made by the Division Bench in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the decision are misplaced by learned counsel for the appellants. The observations cannot be read to mean that unless a resignation is propelled on account of a misconduct, inefficiency or insolvency the same would not entail forfeiture of past service. 10. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants was that Rule 208 contemplates resignation, dismissal or removal and thus the words 'misconduct, insolvency and inefficiency' must qualify all three i.e. resignation, dismissal or removal. 11. The absurdity of the argument is writ large. A resignation would never be propelled by a misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency. Resignation is a voluntary act. 12. This takes us to the core issue: Whether the entailment in the two Rules qua forfeiture of past service upon resignation makes the two Rules ultra vires the Constitution, in that, a discrimination ensues between those who resign and those who seek voluntary retirement. 13. At the outset, Government servants who resign and those who seek voluntary retirement form two distinct categories and thus the question of any discrimination inter-se the two does not arise. Concededly, under the Rajasthan Rules, as is under the Rules framed by the Central Government, a Government servant who seeks voluntary retirement has to put in 20 years service. A person can resign at any time. Now, if a person who has rendered more than 20 years service would be free to choose and opt for either resignation or voluntary retirement. But a Government servant who has not rendered 20 years service and wants to leave Government employment would have to opt for resignation. 14. A person can resign at any time. Now, if a person who has rendered more than 20 years service would be free to choose and opt for either resignation or voluntary retirement. But a Government servant who has not rendered 20 years service and wants to leave Government employment would have to opt for resignation. 14. Since the vires of the Rules have been questioned with reference to cases of voluntary retirement and because we have held that Government servants who resign and those who seek voluntary retirement form different categories, the question of vires of the Rules being declared ultra vires does not arise. That apart, we find that the issue is no longer res integra. 15. Concerning Reserve Bank Pension Regulation, 1990, in the decision reported as (2004) 9 SCC 461 Reserve Bank of India & anr. v. Cecil Dennis Solomon & anr., the Supreme Court rejected the argument that since the resignation and voluntary retirement involved voluntary acts the two had to be treated alike. In Para 10 and 11 of the decision it was observed as under:- "10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions "superannuation", "voluntary retirement", "compulsory retirement" and "resignation" convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Thus both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it an only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retrial benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as there was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the employer. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as there was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the employer. In Union of India v. Gopal Chand Misra it was held in the case of a judge of the High Court having regard to Article 217 of the Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of his own violation, chooses. But where there is a provision empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer can exercise the power. 11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam while the Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his wish, there is a corresponding right of the government servant to voluntarily retire from service. Voluntary retirement is a condition of service created by statutory provision whereas resignation is an implied term of any employer-employee relationship." 16. In the decision reported as (2004) 4 SCC 412 UCO Bank & ors. v. Sanwar Mal the Supreme Court rejected the argument that forfeiture of past service in a case of resignation would amount to penalty. In para 9 it was observed as under:- "9. ...The word "resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment (sic is the same) but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions "resignation" and "retirement" have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. Under the Regulations, the expressions "resignation" and "retirement" have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship between voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting resignation vis-a-vis voluntary retirement and acceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations disqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claiming pension, the respondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees. The view we have taken in support by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon. Before concluding we may state that Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the fund. Such employees have received their retiral benefits earlier. The Pension Scheme, as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence, there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The Pension Scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criterion, the Scheme disentitles such category of employees as are out of it." 17. The Pension Scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criterion, the Scheme disentitles such category of employees as are out of it." 17. In the decision reported as (2005) 8 SCC 325 Union of India & ors. v. Braj Nandan Singh, examining Rule 26 of the CCA Rules which are para materia Rules at hand, inasmuch as, the said Rules also required resignation as entailing forfeiture of past service, in paragraph 5, the Supreme Court held as under:- "5. *** *** *** *** Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, Sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned Counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement to pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded form the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) an (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision shall be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. The language of Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) an (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision shall be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the learned Counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 Sub-rule (1) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as qualified in Rule 49. The said rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement." 18. The case law is clear. Government servants who resign from service and those who seek voluntary retirement are two separate and distinct classes and therefore the effect of consequences of their relinquishment of service by the two modes can be entirely different. While cessation of service brought about in both the methods is traceable to the voluntary act of the Government servants, the consequences are regulated by separate Rules. A resignation can be tendered irrespective of the period of service rendered by the employee, but in the case of voluntary retirement the employee has to serve for a number of years prescribed. Whereas resignation depends upon the discretion of the employer, voluntary retirement upon completion of qualifying service is right of the Government servants. Different yardsticks and criteria are applied in cases of resignation vis-a-vis voluntary retirement and its acceptance. If a Government servant on his own decides to resign knowing the consequences of forfeiture of past service, such forfeiture cannot be considered as one imposing penalty. 19. The argument that the Rule infringes Article 19 of the Constitution is absurd. The Government servant is free to choose any profession if he so desires, but after either resignation or seeking voluntary retirement as the case may be. 20. Affirming the view taken by the learned Single Judge, the writ appeal is dismissed.