Mohammed Parvez Mohammed Yusuf Ansari v. Shakeel Ahmed Mohammed Yusuf Ansari
2018-06-26
N.V.ANJARIA
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. In the proceedings of P.S.R.P. No. 01 of 2015, which was a suit instituted by the plaintiffs - respondents herein for declaration that the petitioners - defendants were not entitled for possession of the suit property, further praying for recovery of possession, the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, closed right of the petitioners-defendants to file written statement as per order dated 22nd July, 2015 below Exh. 13. Against the said order, the petitioners filed Application at Exh. 26 praying to re-open the said right and accept the written statement on record which came to be rejected by the Court. 2. It is this order of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad below Exh. 26, which is questioned in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. 3. In the Application (Exh. 26) it was the case of the petitioners - defendants that though they had appeared in the proceedings upon service of summons, since talks of settlement were going on, they could not file written statement. The learned Judge, Small Causes Court, did not accept the plea observing in the impugned order that though the matter should be tried on merits, the party has to abide by law of limitation. 3.1 Since the time limit for filing written statement in terms of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had elapsed, the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, rejected the application. 4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. H.N. Sevak for the petitioners and learned Advocate Mr. Salim Saiyed for the respondents. 5. The provision of Order VIII Rule 1 as it stands in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, after the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999, reads as under. The previous provision of Order VIII Rule 1 was substituted so as to provide that the written statement would not be permitted beyond 30 days. "1.
Salim Saiyed for the respondents. 5. The provision of Order VIII Rule 1 as it stands in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, after the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999, reads as under. The previous provision of Order VIII Rule 1 was substituted so as to provide that the written statement would not be permitted beyond 30 days. "1. written statement - The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence:- Provided that where the defendant fails to file his written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons." 5.1 Although by virtue of the above provision substituted, the powers of the Court to extent time limit for filing written statement were made limited and were so circumscribed so as not to permit filing of written statement beyond stipulated time, the Proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII contemplates that the defendants may be allowed to file written statement on such other day which may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, within 90 days. 5.2 The interpretation of the aforesaid provision was subject matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in Rani Kusum (smt.) v. Kanchan Devi (Smt.) [ (2005) 6 SCC 705 ]. The Supreme Court observed that unless compelled by the express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extra-ordinary situations in the ends of justice. It was observed that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. It was stated that the language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice.
It was observed that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. It was stated that the language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. 5.3 The Court stated thus, "It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is circumscribed by the words "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read in by necessary implication. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form." (Para 15) 5.4 It was held in Rani Kusum (Smt.) (supra) that the nature of provision of Order VIII Rule 1 and the Proviso thereof are not mandatory it is a directory provision. They do not take away the power of the Court to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed therein but the provision is in the nature of obligation on the defendant to file written statement expeditiously so that unscrupulous litigant do not while away the time. It was stated that upon satisfactory reasons furnished, departure from the rule of prescription of time limit under Order VIII Rule 1, was permissible. 5.5 The same proposition of law were reiterated in Shaikh Salim Haji Khayumsab v. Kumar [ (2006) 1 SCC 46 ] wherein it was held that negative language implying mandatory character is not the conclusive to treat the provision in question to be mandatory. The decisions in Rani Kusum (Smt.) (supra) and Shaikh Salim Haji Khayumsab (supra) was referred to in R.N. Jadi v. Subhashchandra [(2007) 6 SC 420] in which, again the construction of said procedural provision of Order VIII Rule 1 was highlighted to be directory in nature. 5.6 In Sambhaji v. Gangabai [ (2008) 17 SCC 117 ], the above legal proposition was reiterated.
5.6 In Sambhaji v. Gangabai [ (2008) 17 SCC 117 ], the above legal proposition was reiterated. In that case, the trial Court had proceeded on the premise that in terms of Order VIII Rule 1 it had no power to accept the written statement filed after 90 days. The trial Court refused to accept the written statement and did not allow the appellant - defendant to file the same at subsequent point of time. It was held that the trial Court proceeded on erroneous premise. In that case, High Court had also refused to interfere with the trial Court's order in respect of which the Supreme Court stated that grounds were indicated by the appellants in support of their plea for acceptance of written statement filed belatedly which was that they were close relatives. The Supreme Court, therefore, viewed that looking to the ground furnished, liberal approach was called for and consequently it set aside the order of the trial Court as well as the High Court. 5.7 The provision of Order VIII Rule 1, C.P.C. is indeed procedural in nature. It deals with the filing of written statement within particular limited by the defendant pursuant to service of summons. A procedural provision should not receive pedantic interpretation but must be applied so as not to defeat the substantial rights of the parties. 5.8 It is trite that in an adversarial system, no party should be ordinarily denied opportunity of participating in the process of administration of justice. A procedural rule should not operate as a snag to the substantive justice and for agitating substantive rights by the parties to the proceedings. The procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. It is said by the Apex Court that justice hurried is justice buried. 6. Adverting to the facts of the present case, request of the petitioners-defendants to accept the written statement beyond 90 days was not without any reason. They stated that they had appeared pursuant to service of summons but talks of settlement were underway between the parties. It was also stated that their social engagement further forced passage of time. If the parties to the suit were negotiating for settlement after service of summons, which ground has remained uncontroverted, it should be sufficient ground to accept the belated filing of written statement.
It was also stated that their social engagement further forced passage of time. If the parties to the suit were negotiating for settlement after service of summons, which ground has remained uncontroverted, it should be sufficient ground to accept the belated filing of written statement. The defendants could be said to have acted bona fide if such circumstances existed, because of which they proposed their written statement late. 7. In view of above reasons and discussion, the petition deserves to be allowed. Resultantly, order dated 16th March, 2017 passed below Exh. 26 in P.S.R.P. No. 01 of 2015 is hereby set aside. The trial Court shall allow the petitioners - defendants to file written statement and the same shall be taken on record. The trial of the suit shall progress expeditiously.