JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. This First Appeal under Sec. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Rule 217 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, is at the instance of the original defendants and is directed against the order passed below the Chamber Summons Exh. 36-37 in the Civil Suit No. 3117 of 2013. 2. For the sake of convenience, the appellants herein shall be referred to as the original defendants and me respondent herein shall be referred to as the original plaintiff. 3. It appears from the materials on record that the plaintiff preferred the Civil Suit No. 3117 of 2013 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad for dissolution of the partnership firm and accounts. Having regard to the main issue involved in this First Appeal, I deem it necessary to reproduce the averments made in the plaint as under: “1. That in the year 1979-1980, Shri Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel (father of plaintiff, defendant No. 2, defendant No. 3, Vishnubhai & Rameshbhai - five sons) started business in dairy product in the name and style “Shri Krishna Dairy Farm and Cold-drinks” at the rented premises (Shop No. 3) situated in ground-floor bearing Municipal Tenament No. 517-11-0166-0001-9 which is part of Margi Apartment near Old High Court Railway Crossing, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-9. 2. That the plaintiff was assisting the father in the said business and since 1985-1986, the plaintiff had been looking after the said entire business. At that time the eldest son Mr. Vishnubhai was doing his business of power-loom spare-parts at Ichalkaranji, Kolhapur, Maharashtra. The defendant No. 2, Rameshbhai Khodidas Patel was doing his own business in the name and style of Ambica Dugdhalay in Shahpur area, Shahpur, Ahmedabad. The defendant No. 3, Rajeshbhai Khodidas Patel was a minor (sic) about 17-18 years at that time and was studying. Sureshbhai was aged about 21-22 years and was studying at that time. 3. That Shri Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel died on 12-12-1999. 4. It is submitted that Shop No. 3 (part of Flat No. 4) situated the ground-floor of Margi Apartment Go-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. purchased by father Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel in his own name and after his death as per his Will the plaintiff and other four brothers became joint-owners of the said property. 5. 4. It is submitted that Shop No. 3 (part of Flat No. 4) situated the ground-floor of Margi Apartment Go-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. purchased by father Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel in his own name and after his death as per his Will the plaintiff and other four brothers became joint-owners of the said property. 5. That after the death of father Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel, all the five brothers, (sons of deceased Khodidas Chaturbhai Patel) decided to convert the said business into partnership business and they formed a partnership vide document of partnership dated 13-12-2000. In the said business, all the five brothers had equal share in the profit and loss of the said partnership. 6. It is submitted that Vishnubhai Khodidas Patel sold away his 1/5 undivided share by a registered document dated 31-3-2003 in favour of other four brothers, and therefore, other four brothers had 1/4 share each in the said property. Thereafter, Sureshbhai Khodidas Patel also sold away his undivided ¼ share in the said property by a document dated 25-7-2005 in favour of other three brothers namely plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3. In the circumstances therefore, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 became joint-owners, each having 1/3 undivided share in the said property in which business is being run. 7. It is submitted that Vishnubhai Khodidas Patel retired from the partnership vide document of retirement dated 6-8-2002 and Sureshbhai also retired from the partnership vide document of retirement dated 31-3-2005. Thus, on and from 1-4-2005, the business of the defendant No. 1 firm namely “Shri Krishna Dairy Farm and Cold-drinks” is being run by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 as partners. The business of the partnership was to be run in the above-said property which was the joint-property of all the five brothers and later on it became joint-property of three brothers namely-plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3. 8. The said business was being run smoothly till 2001. It is submitted that in the year 2001, the plaintiff met with an accident, and therefore, he was physically unable to attend the said business. Plaintiff became handicapped on account of accidental injury he received, and therefore, unable to remain personally present where business of the partnership is being run. 8. The said business was being run smoothly till 2001. It is submitted that in the year 2001, the plaintiff met with an accident, and therefore, he was physically unable to attend the said business. Plaintiff became handicapped on account of accidental injury he received, and therefore, unable to remain personally present where business of the partnership is being run. In the year 2004, plaintiff was attending to the business, but due to his bad health he was not able to do anything physically in the business, and therefore, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 told the plaintiff that he may take rest at home that they would be looking after the business of the partnership and they also told him that it would not be necessary for the plaintiff to remain physically present at place of business. They assured the plaintiff that they would faithfully do the business and also attend the same even in the absence of plaintiff. In the year 2006, the plaintiff had heart-attack and again in the year 2010, he had heart trouble. In the circumstances, therefore right from 2001 to till date, entire business of the partnership was and is being looked after by defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It is submitted that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are not at all giving any accounts of the partnership nor are they giving him his share in the profit of the partnership and they are also not at all faithful to the plaintiff to whom they had assured that they would look after the affairs of the partnership business. In the circumstances, therefore, the plaintiff has been deprived of the benefit of partnership and his share of the profit in the partnership. It is submitted that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are doing business without consulting the plaintiff and they are also maintaining the accounts in their own way without consulting the plaintiff. It is reliably learnt that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are also filing income-tax returns of the partnership business, but even copies of such returns are not supplied to the plaintiff. Balance-sheet and profit and loss accounts of the partnership are also not supplied to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has relied upon and trusted the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 as they are full brothers of the plaintiff. Balance-sheet and profit and loss accounts of the partnership are also not supplied to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has relied upon and trusted the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 as they are full brothers of the plaintiff. In the circumstances, the plaintiff had no source of income at all, and therefore, it became very difficult for him even to make his two ends meet and support his family. For sometime during his miserable condition, his wife and minor son started one small business of Cold-drinks in their own property at Bopal and struggled to maintain themselves, but wife and the minor son of the plaintiff could not run the said business, and therefore, even said business was shut down. 9. Recently, in May, 2013, the plaintiff went to the place of the suit business of defendant No. 1 and tried to get details of the affairs of the partnership business in which he is a partner, but defendant Nos. 2 and 3 forcibly drove out the plaintiff and his son out of business place and even tried to kill him. In the circumstances, police complaint was filed on 7-5-2013 and again on 6-8-2013 the plaintiff went to shop where the business is run out, they were not even allowed to enter the shop, and therefore, on 16-8-2013, the plaintiff gave another complaint in Naranpura Police Station. Even today, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are not allowing the plaintiff to enter the business premises of partnership and not even allowing him to have access to the account-books and other papers and documents relating to the partnership business and thus they are depriving the plaintiff to exercise his right as a partner and take part in the business of partnership. The plaintiff thus deprived of his benefits, as a partner. 10. It is submitted that all the partners i.e. plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are bound to carry on business of the firm to the greatest common advantage of all and to be just and faithful to each other and also to render true and correct account and give full information of all things affecting the business of the firm to other partner and such is the express provision of law. 2 and 3 are bound to carry on business of the firm to the greatest common advantage of all and to be just and faithful to each other and also to render true and correct account and give full information of all things affecting the business of the firm to other partner and such is the express provision of law. The plaintiff is fully entitled to have access to the business and have right to get true and correct information as regards running that may be necessary for him to know like balance-sheets, profit & loss accounts and income-tax returns filed. It is also submitted that every partner has right to take part in the conduct of the business and every partner is bound to attend diligently and dutifully the conduct of the business and if any difference is arising in connection with running of the business, same can be decided and resolved by all the partners. Thus, the plaintiff has right to take part in the conduct of the business of the partnership and also he has right to attend the conduct of the business and he has also right to’ have access to all the affairs of the partnership. It is also submitted that every partner has right and access and interest in all the business of the firm. But as stated above, the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are not allowing the plaintiff to exercise his right as partner, and hence, this suit is being filed. It is also apprehended that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are maintaining the accounts as per their will and even without consulting the plaintiff. It is also learnt that even income-tax returns are filed, but they are not even shown to the plaintiff and even copies thereof are also not supplied to the plaintiff. That nature of the business is such that is mainly on each basis, daily cash is received in the course of business, but the plaintiff is not even informed about the same. The plaintiff has no knowledge as to how cash is being handled and how account is being run in the Bank. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is forced to file this suit for obtaining true and correct accounts from the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and also to have share of profit of the partnership business. The plaintiff has no knowledge as to how cash is being handled and how account is being run in the Bank. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is forced to file this suit for obtaining true and correct accounts from the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and also to have share of profit of the partnership business. The plaintiff is also praying for injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff to enter the business premises and to take part in the business of the partnership firm. 11. It is submitted that premises where business is run is of joint ownership of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and in all the Government records same is shown as such. In the circumstances, the plaintiff has right to enter the business premises situated as stated above, and also to take part in the business of partnership firm and even if it is not possible to run business of partnership, then only course for the plaintiff will be to have partnership dissolved. In the facts and circumstances, it will be just and equitable that the firm (defendant No. 1) should be dissolved. 12. The documents of partnership and all other related documents are in possession of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and all the Bank accounts, etc. are also in possession of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It is submitted that during the year 2011, some correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 has taken place and same will be referred to and relied on as and when necessary in the course of the present proceeding. 13. Cause of action for filing this suit has arisen in the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove and in the year 2013 when the plaintiff was deprived of this right to enter into business premises and take part in the business and was expelled by the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and also when he filed police complaints on 7-5-2013 and 16-8-2013 and also when the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 refused to give him access to the business and also refused to allow him inspection of the account-books and other affairs and documents of the partnership business and to look at profit and loss account and also balance-sheet. 14. 2 and 3 refused to give him access to the business and also refused to allow him inspection of the account-books and other affairs and documents of the partnership business and to look at profit and loss account and also balance-sheet. 14. The plaintiffs most respectfully prays that: (A) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm i.e. Def. No. 1 from the date of filling of present suit or from such date as may be fixed by the Hon’ble Court. For this prayer Court-Fees Rs.100/- is paid and affixed. (B) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree directing the defendants to render true and correct accounts of all the affairs of partnership firm, supported by all relevant documents like balance-sheet, profit and loss account, Bank statements, income-tax returns, etc. and to pay to the plaintiff amount due to him on account of his 1/3rd share in the partnership firm. For this prayer Court-Fees Rs.100/- is paid and affixed. (C) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their servants - their agents and anybody on behalf of defendants from obstructing or disturbing the plaintiff taking active part in the running of the business of partnership and in his joint-possession of the premises wherein partnership business is carried on. For this prayer Court-Fees Rs.100/- is paid and affixed. (D) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant and award any other relief that may be just and proper is the facts and circumstances of this case.” 4. The defendants appeared in the suit and filed their written statement Exh. 22 in details. In the written statement, the defendants denied the entire case put up by the plaintiff. The defendants denied having entered into any partnership with the plaintiff and also having executed a partnership-deed. I need not reproduce the entire written statement. However, let me reproduce the two relevant Paragraphs of the written statement: “(8) The facts contained in Paras 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plaint application and injunction application against me are not true and I do not admit the same. It has been stated by the plaintiff in Para 1 that he runs the business in the name and style of Shri Krishna Dairy Farm and Cold-drinks which is not true. It has been stated by the plaintiff in Para 1 that he runs the business in the name and style of Shri Krishna Dairy Farm and Cold-drinks which is not true. In fact, the respondent’s deceased ancestor had been doing the business in the name of Shri Krishna Dairy. There is no dispute about keeping the said property on rent by the deceased Khodidas Chaturdas Patel. It is not true that the plaintiff alone used to assist the deceased Khodidas Chaturdas Patel in the business. All his heirs used to assist him in the business. It is not true that Vishnubhai has his own business of spare-parts of power-looms in Kolhapur. In fact, the said business was owned by the deceased Khodidas Chaturdas Patel which was managed by the elder son Vishnubhai. It is not true that Rameshbhai Khodidas Patel has his own business in the name of Ambika Dairy Farm in Shahpur area in Ahmedabad. In fact, Rameshbhai was looking after the said business as family member which was originally owned by the deceased-Khodidas Chaturdas Patel. The plaintiff should clearly prove the submissions made regarding the Respondent No. 3 and Sureshbhai through documentary evidences. There is no dispute with regard to the fact mentioned in Para 3 that Khodidas Chaturdas Patel died on 12-12-1999, and before his death he executed the Will. Therefore, the fact of Paras 1, 2, 3 and 4 against me is not true and I do not admit the same. (9) The facts narrated in Para 5 of the plaint application and the injunction application against me is not true and I do not admit the same. It has been stated by the plaintiff in the said Para that he does the business in partnership, which is in fact, is not true. The plaintiff has not produced any supportive evidence in that regard which itself shows as to upto what extent the plaintiff avers false facts before the Court. Therefore, the fact of Para 5 against me is not true and I do not admit the same.” 5. I take notice of the fact that Exh. 22 is a composite reply filed by the defendants to both the plaints as well as to the injunction application filed by the plaintiff. 6. Therefore, the fact of Para 5 against me is not true and I do not admit the same.” 5. I take notice of the fact that Exh. 22 is a composite reply filed by the defendants to both the plaints as well as to the injunction application filed by the plaintiff. 6. It is not in dispute that at the time when the suit came to be filed, the partnership-deed was not produced along with the other documents. As the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff came to be declined, the plaintiff came before this Court by filing Appeal From Order on 21st August, 2015. For the first time, before the High Court in the proceedings arising from the Appeal From Order, the plaintiff produced the original partnership-deed duly signed by both the defendants as well as by the plaintiff himself. The Appeal From Order came to be disposed of by this Court vide order dated 7th August, 2015 in the following terms: “1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties for final disposal of the Appeal From Order. This Appeal From Order is filed by the original plaintiff, whose Notice of Motion applications Exhs. 6 and 7 for interim injunction came to be rejected by the trial Court by the impugned order dated 20-4-2015. Plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are real brothers. Defendant No. 1 is a partnership firm, of which the plaintiff along with other defendants claims to be the partner. The plaintiff has filed the said suit for the prayers inter alia for dissolution of partnership, for taking accounts and for permanent injunction against his participation in the partnership business. Pending such suit, he prayed for interim injunction against the defendants not precluding him in his active participation in the business. 2. The trial Court, by the impugned order, rejected such applications observing that the relief is in nature of mandatory relief and that the suit would be barred under Sec. 69(1) of the Partnership Act, since the firm is not registered. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused documents on record, it would appear that the trial Court has not examined any other aspects of the matter except for requirement of registration. Prayers being in the nature of taking accounts and dissolution of the partnership firm, surely, in view of sub-sec. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused documents on record, it would appear that the trial Court has not examined any other aspects of the matter except for requirement of registration. Prayers being in the nature of taking accounts and dissolution of the partnership firm, surely, in view of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act, embargo against maintainability of the suit contained under Sec. 69(1) in case of an unregistered partnership firm would not apply. The trial Court, not having examined any other aspects of the matter, it would be appropriate to remand the proceedings for fresh consideration. Whether the plaintiff has made out any case for grant of interim relief, be it in the nature of mandatory or preventive, is a question which needs to be judged on the basis of materials brought on record by both sides. I would leave the trial Court to undertake such exercise. While doing so, I also take note of the stand of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 that eventually, the issue, being one between the brothers, they are open to any amicable resolution. 4. In the result, Appeal From Order to this limited extent is allowed. Order of the trial Court is set aside. Notice of Motion applications Exhs. 6 and 7 shall be decided afresh and expeditiously, keeping all contentions of both sides open.” 7. It appears that no sooner the deed of partnership came to be produced by the plaintiff, then the defendants preferred an application Exh. 37 under Sec. 8 of the Arbitration Act, with a prayer that as there is an Arbitration Clause in the deed of partnership, the dispute between the parties should be referred to an arbitrator. The Additional Principal Civil Judge, City Civil Court No. 2, Ahmedabad adjudicated the application Exh. 37 filed by the defendants, and by order dated 21st October, 2016, rejected the same. 8. The impugned order passed below the Chamber Summons Exhs. 36-37 is extracted hereunder: “(1) The undersigned has taken over the charge as Additional Principal Judge on 1-8-2016. As the matter was heard by me as Chamber Judge, parties have jointly passed a pursish vide Exh. 42 to transfer the matter to this Court, and therefore, this matter is placed before this Court by the Registry. 36-37 is extracted hereunder: “(1) The undersigned has taken over the charge as Additional Principal Judge on 1-8-2016. As the matter was heard by me as Chamber Judge, parties have jointly passed a pursish vide Exh. 42 to transfer the matter to this Court, and therefore, this matter is placed before this Court by the Registry. (2) This is an application filed by defendants to refer the matter to an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act’). (3) It is submitted by defendants that the suit is filed by plaintiff for dissolution of partnership firm and also for accounts. It is further submitted by defendants that along with the plaint, plaintiff has submitted an injunction application and the said application was rejected by this Court on merits. Being aggrieved by the said order, plaintiff rushed to the Hon’ble High Court and the Hon’ble High Court directed this Court to re-hear the injunction application. It is further submitted by defendants that before the Hon’ble High Court, plaintiff has produced a copy of partnership-deed of defendant No. 1 firm and it has come to the knowledge of defendants that there is an arbitration clause in the said partnership-deed, and therefore, prayed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator. (4) The plaintiff has filed his reply vide Exh. 39 and contended that the defendants have filed their written statement at Exh. 22, and therefore, this application is required to be rejected. The dispute raised by plaintiff is beyond the jurisdiction of arbitration clause. Existence of partnership-deed was very much within the knowledge of defendants. It is further contended by plaintiff that despite existence of arbitration clause, present defendants chosen to contest the suit, and therefore, power under Sec. 8 of the Act cannot be invoked. Present plaintiff has filed the present case on the grounds that plaintiff and defendants are partners, other partners of partnership firm have retired and plaintiff and defendants remain partners in the existing firm. It is further contended that while filing written statement, defendants have taken all the defences and without making any prayer for referring the issues to an arbitrator, and therefore, Sec. 8 of the Act cannot be invoked. (5) Heard Mr. K.N. Sheth, learned Advocate for defendants and Mr. S.J. Thaker, learned Advocate for plaintiff. (6) Mr. It is further contended that while filing written statement, defendants have taken all the defences and without making any prayer for referring the issues to an arbitrator, and therefore, Sec. 8 of the Act cannot be invoked. (5) Heard Mr. K.N. Sheth, learned Advocate for defendants and Mr. S.J. Thaker, learned Advocate for plaintiff. (6) Mr. Sheth has argued that it is an admitted fact that partnership firm exists and plaintiff and defendants are partners of the said firm. When the matter before the Hon’ble High Court was taken up for hearing, plaintiff has produced the said partnership-deed, and at that time, it has come to the knowledge of defendants that there is an arbitration clause in partnership-deed. It is further argued that Para 19 of the said partnership-deed deals with disputes between the parties and it may be referred to arbitration, and therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction and prayed to allow this application. (7) Mr. Thaker for plaintiff has argued that defendants have filed their written statement vide Exh. 22. After filing written statement, defendants cannot claim protection of Sec. 8 of the Act. This is a suit for dissolution and the partnership is at will. Plaintiff has filed this suit for dissolution, and therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaint. It is further argued that Sec. 8 of the Act is very clear. Parties to the suit to raise the said issue before filing of written statement. (8) This is a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts. Short facts of the suit are one Khodidas Chaturdas Patel, father of parties, had started in’ 1979-1980 in a rented premises being Shop No. 3 situated at Railway Crossing, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad. Thereafter, deceased K.C. Patel has purchased the said property. After the death of K.C. Patel, plaintiff and other four partners became joint-owners of the property. Heirs of deceased K.C. Patel decided to convert the said business in partnership firm and a partnership-deed was executed on 13-12-2000. Thereafter, two brothers namely Vishnubhai and Sureshbhai sold their shares to remaining partners and on 1-4-2005, the plaintiff and defendants remained as partners. Up to 2001 business was being turn smoothly. In 2001, plaintiff met with an accident. Thereafter, he suffered heart-attack and from 2001 to 2010 being a handicap and was physically unable to attend the said business. Thereafter, two brothers namely Vishnubhai and Sureshbhai sold their shares to remaining partners and on 1-4-2005, the plaintiff and defendants remained as partners. Up to 2001 business was being turn smoothly. In 2001, plaintiff met with an accident. Thereafter, he suffered heart-attack and from 2001 to 2010 being a handicap and was physically unable to attend the said business. Two remaining partners thereafter refused to enter plaintiff in business premises, and therefore, this suit. (9) This is an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, which reads as under: “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement: (1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject to an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. (2) The application referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-sec. (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.” (10) Considering the above provisions of law, the defendants, by filing written statement, have raised all the disputes, which amounts to waiving their right to invoke the arbitration clause. Section 8(1) provides that in a judicial proceedings, parties must make an application to refer the matter to an arbitrator not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. In view of the above, it is prima facie on record that this application is a subsequent application of defendants after filing their written statement, and therefore, this application does not sustain. Hence, I pass the following order: ORDER: The Chamber Summons Exhs. 36-37 is hereby rejected and accordingly stands disposed of. Costs to be cost in the Clause.” 9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application filed by the defendants under Sec. 8 of the Arbitration Act, the defendants are here before this Court with the present First Appeal under Sec. 37 of the Act, 1996. 10. Mr. Costs to be cost in the Clause.” 9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application filed by the defendants under Sec. 8 of the Arbitration Act, the defendants are here before this Court with the present First Appeal under Sec. 37 of the Act, 1996. 10. Mr. Mehul S. Shah, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-original defendants vehemently submitted that the Court below committed a serious error in rejecting the application Exh. 37 filed by the defendants. He would submit that indisputably, when the written statement came to be filed by the defendants, the document of deed of partnership was not on record. It was not produced by the plaintiff along with his plaint. The defendants had no idea at all about such partnership-deed though they being the signatories to such partnership-deed. It is only when the Appeal From Order came to be filed by the plaintiff before this Court along with the same, the document of deed of partnership came to be produced for the first time. It is on that day, the defendants came to know that there is a deed of partnership duly, signed by them. According to Mr. Shah, the defendants realised for the first time that in the partnership-deed, there is an arbitration clause, and in such circumstances, the defendants preferred the application Exh. 37 under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996. According to Mr. Shah, it cannot be said, as held by the Court below, that the defendants waived their right to invoke Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 and get the dispute referred to an Arbitrator. Mr. Shah would submit that although the defendants filed a detailed written statement to the plaint as well as to the injunction application of the plaintiff, yet having come to know that there is a partnership-deed and the partnership-deed contains an arbitration clause, it was within their right to invoke Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 and ask the trial Judge to refer the dispute to an Arbitrator. Mr. Shah submitted that even otherwise, the impugned order passed by the Court is erroneous in law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 11. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Sunit Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff. According to Mr. Mr. Shah submitted that even otherwise, the impugned order passed by the Court is erroneous in law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 11. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Sunit Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff. According to Mr. Shah, no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Court below in rejecting the Chamber Summons Exhs. 36-37. According to Mr. Shah, the entire case put forward by the defendants is dishonest. Mr. Shah would submit that in the detailed written statement, the stance taken by the defendants is that no such partnership exists between the parties and at no point of time, any partnership-deed came to be executed duly signed by the parties. In fact, according to Mr. Shah, the entire case put up by the plaintiff came to be denied in toto. The defendants pretended as if they were absolutely oblivious of the partnership business and the deed of partnership. According to Mr. Shah, no sooner the plaintiff produced the original partnership-deed duly signed by the parties, then the defendants realised that they were in a fix. According to Mr. Shah, it is very hard to believe that the defendants came to know about the execution of the partnership-deed only when the same was produced by the plaintiff, and more particularly, when they were the signatories in the document. The defendants should not be permitted now to turn around and say that the dispute be referred to an arbitrator having once filed a detailed written statement and thereby having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 12. Mr. Shah submitted that the production of a document by the plaintiff at a later stage, will not revive the right of the defendants to file an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 having filed a detailed written statement. The proof of the original partnership-deed by the plaintiff could be said to be in respect of the evidence. If the defendants had no idea with regard any deed of partnership, as asserted in the plaint, then before filing a detailed written statement, they could have asked the Court to call upon the plaintiff to produce the document on record. 13. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. If the defendants had no idea with regard any deed of partnership, as asserted in the plaint, then before filing a detailed written statement, they could have asked the Court to call upon the plaintiff to produce the document on record. 13. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-original plaintiff submitted that there being no merit in this First Appeal, the same may be dismissed. 14. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. 15. On the contentions urged, the following points arise for the consideration of this Court: (1) Whether the defendants had submitted their first statement on the substance of the dispute before filing a plaint under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996? (2) Whether it is permissible in law for the defendants to file an application under Sec. 8 of the 1996 after submitting their first statement on the substance on the ground that when the written statement came to be filed, the deed of partnership was not on record and they came to know about such deed of partnership and the arbitration clause contained therein only when the suit came to be produced by the plaintiff before the High Court? (3) Whether the defendants could be said to have waived their right of preferring the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by filing a detailed written statement denying the entire case of the plaintiff? (4) Whether the Court below committed any jurisdictional error in rejecting the Chamber Summons Exhs. 36-37? 16. The provision contained in Sec. 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 delineates the “extent of judicial intervention” by declaring that “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time-being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part”. The power to refer the parties to arbitration - where there is arbitration agreement - is provided for in Sec. 8, which being at the core of the controversy at hand, must be taken note of as under: “8. The power to refer the parties to arbitration - where there is arbitration agreement - is provided for in Sec. 8, which being at the core of the controversy at hand, must be taken note of as under: “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement: (1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject to an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. (2) The application referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-sec. (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.” 17. A careful analysis of Sec. 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would show that the following conditions are required to be fulfilled before the Court can refer the matter to arbitration: (a) the dispute between the parties should be subject-matter of an arbitration agreement; (b) one of the parties to the suit should apply for referring the parties to arbitration; (c) the application should be filed on or before submitting first statement on the substance of the dispute, and (d) the application should be accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or its certified copy. 18. In the case before this Court, the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, having not been filed on or before filing of the written statement, but having been filed after the written statement had been filed, one of the prerequisite conditions for referring the parties to the arbitration under Sec. 8 of the Act, does not stand fulfilled in this case. 19. It is pertinent to mention here that the provision contained in Sec. 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was amended with retrospective effect from 23rd October, 2015 by Act No. 3 of 2016. 19. It is pertinent to mention here that the provision contained in Sec. 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was amended with retrospective effect from 23rd October, 2015 by Act No. 3 of 2016. Prior to its amendment, the said sub-section read as under: “(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.” 20. It is trite that where a dispute is referable to arbitration, the parties cannot be compelled to take recourse to the remedy in Civil Court (Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel, AIR 2007 SC 1517 ). It is further settled that the language in Sec. 8 is peremptory in nature, and therefore, in cases where there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, it is obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement and nothing remains to be decided by the Court in the original action after such an application is made except to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. (P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju (dead), 2000 (4) SCC 539 ). 21. It is, at the same time, equally true that mere existence of arbitration clause in agreement would not automatically bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. For such purposes, the forum, where a prayer is made for such reference to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the agreement from which the cause of action arises, would be obliged to examine and choose the appropriate course of action in light of the afore quoted provision of Sec. 8. 22. There is no dispute as to the meaning of the words “first statement on the substance of the dispute” used in Sec. 8(1) of the Act, either before or after amendment. 22. There is no dispute as to the meaning of the words “first statement on the substance of the dispute” used in Sec. 8(1) of the Act, either before or after amendment. In the context of civil suit, such expression obviously would mean the “written statement” required to be filed in terms of the provision contained in Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.)- But, for the purposes of proceedings before other judicial authorities or forums where the Code of Civil Procedure may not strictly apply, it would mean and include the response (or reply) filed by the party against whom action is brought to explain his defences. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Company, AIR 2006 SC 2800 , the Supreme Court observed that this expression must be contra-distinguished with the expression “written statement”. It implies submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority, and therefore, what is needed is a finding on the part of judicial authority that the party has waived his right to invoke the arbitration clause. If an application is filed before filing the first statement on the substance of the dispute, the party cannot be said to have waived his right or acquiesced himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. 23. Noticeably, as a result of the amendment there are three major changes in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 8. It is now permissible for a person claiming through or under the defendants to claim the benefit of the arbitration clause. The amendment intends to negate the effect of any judgment or order or decree to the contrary. The third effect of the amendment pertains to cut-off date by which the application under Sec. 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be presented. Before the amendment, such cutoff date was indicated by the words “not later than when submitting (his first statement on the substance of the dispute)”. Under the amended law the words used are “not later than the date of submitting (his first statement on the substance of the dispute)”. 24. Before the amendment, such cutoff date was indicated by the words “not later than when submitting (his first statement on the substance of the dispute)”. Under the amended law the words used are “not later than the date of submitting (his first statement on the substance of the dispute)”. 24. Having regard to the plain meaning of the words employed in the pre-amendment on account of arbitration agreement clause contained in Sec. 8(1), it appears that the party resisting on account of arbitration agreement the jurisdiction of the forum where the action is brought was permitted to apply for a reference to arbitration even while submitting his reply or written statement. Plainly read, the words “when submitting” would ordinarily imply that such a move under Sec. 8(1) could come simultaneous to the filing of the written statement. It arguably could follow that if the written statement were filed and yet simultaneously the defendant was seeking the parties to be referred to arbitration (under the arbitration agreement), the submission of the written statement could not be construed as a waiver of the right to do so, not the least submission, or surrender, or acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the Court where the, lis was brought. 25. Thus, the third amendment to Sec. 8(1) whereby the existing words “not later than when submitting” have been substituted by “not later than the date of submitting” are of some import. Under the amended law, the defendant is now required to invoke the arbitration clause and apply to the Court for a reference thereunder by moving an application, but not required to file his written statement or any answer to set out his statement on the substance of the dispute. Rather, the submission of the written statement or reply indicating his (first) statement on the substance of the dispute may be construed as waiver of the right to seek reference to arbitration, or even as submission to or acquiescence of the jurisdiction of the Court where the action has been brought by the claimant (the plaintiff). The amended provision of Sec. 8(1), however, sets out a limit to the period within which such application invoking the arbitration agreement must be presented. It is this limitation period which is indicated by the words “not later than the date of submitting”. 26. The amended provision of Sec. 8(1), however, sets out a limit to the period within which such application invoking the arbitration agreement must be presented. It is this limitation period which is indicated by the words “not later than the date of submitting”. 26. In Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, AIR 2003 SC 2252 , Supreme Court, while interpreting Sec. 8 of the Act, inter alia, observed as under: “Further, the matter is not required to be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal, if- (1) the parties to the arbitration agreement have not filed any such application for referring the dispute to the arbitrator; (2) in a pending suit, such application is not filed before submitting first statement on the substance of the dispute; or (3) such application is not accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof.” 27. It is true that in the above-referred case, the application under Sec. 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, appears to have been filed before the written statement was filed, and therefore, the question as to whether such an application can be filed after the written statement has already been filed, did not directly come up for consideration in this case, but the above-referred observations made by the Court do support the view that such an application cannot be filed after the first statement on the substance of the dispute has been filed by the applicant. 28. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd., AIR 2006 SC 2800 ], the Supreme Court considered the scope of Sec. 8 of the Act in details. In the case before the Supreme Court, a suit seeking permanent injunction against blacklisting the defendant or terminating the contract was filed. The trial Court directed the parties to maintain status quo. The appellants/defendants sought time to file written statement. They also filed a rejoinder to the counter-affidavit of the application for injunction, wherein they took a specific plea that the subject-matter of the suit being covered by arbitration agreement, it was not maintainable. On 7th June, 2002, they filed an application under Sec. 8 of the Act which was rejected by the trial Court on the ground that the process of the suit had already begun and the defendants had already entered into a defence of the suit, and had thereby, subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. On 7th June, 2002, they filed an application under Sec. 8 of the Act which was rejected by the trial Court on the ground that the process of the suit had already begun and the defendants had already entered into a defence of the suit, and had thereby, subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. A revision application filed by the defendants having been rejected by the High Court, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that under Sec. 8 of the Act, the power to refer the dispute for arbitration has to be exercised, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. The Court referred to its decision in Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, 1982 (2) SCC 499 , where it had opined that the interlocutory proceedings are only incidental proceedings to the main proceedings, and therefore, any step taken in the interlocutory proceedings does not come within the purview of the main proceedings. The Court then inter alia observed as under: “36. The expression “first statement on the substance of the dispute” contained in Sec. 8(1) of the 1996 Act, must be contra-distinguished with the expression “written statement”. It employs submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority. What is therefore needed is a finding on the part of the judicial authority that the party has waived its right to invoke the arbitration clause. If an application is filed before actually filing the first statement on the substance of the dispute, in our opinion, the party cannot be said to have waived its right or acquiesced itself to the jurisdiction of the Court. What is, therefore, material is as to whether the petitioner has filed his first statement on the substance of the dispute or not, if not, his application under Sec. 8 of the 1996 Act, may not be held wholly unmaintainable. In Paras 38 and 39 of the judgment, the Supreme Court inter alia observed as under: 38. xxx In view of the changes brought about by the 1996 Act, we are of the opinion that what is necessary is disclosure of the entire substance in the main proceeding itself and not taking part in the supplemental proceeding. 39. By opposing the prayer for interim injunction, the restriction contained in sub-sec. xxx In view of the changes brought about by the 1996 Act, we are of the opinion that what is necessary is disclosure of the entire substance in the main proceeding itself and not taking part in the supplemental proceeding. 39. By opposing the prayer for interim injunction, the restriction contained in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 8 was not attracted. Disclosure of a defence for the purpose of opposing a prayer for injunction would not necessarily mean that substance of the dispute has already been disclosed in the main proceeding. Supplemental and incidental proceedings are not part of the main proceeding. They are dealt with separately in the Code of Civil Procedure itself. Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with supplemental proceedings. Incidental proceedings are those which arose out of the main proceedings. In view of the decision of this Court in Food Corporation of India, the distinction between the main proceeding and supplemental proceeding must be borne in mind. In Para 42 of the judgment, the Court inter alia observed as under: “42. Waiver of right on the part of a defendant to the lis must be gathered from the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the instant case, the Court had already passed an ad interim ex-parte injunction. The appellants were bound to respond to the notice issued by the Court. While doing so, they raised a specific plea of bar of the suit in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Having regard to the provisions of the Act, they had thus, shown their unequivocal intention to question the maintainability of the suit on the aforementioned ground”.” 29. In Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. S.B.I. Home Finance Ltd., 2011 (5) SCC 532 , the scope of Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court. The few relevant observations are extracted-hereunder: “24. The High Court has held that filing a detailed counter-affidavit by a defendant setting out its case, in reply to an application for temporary injunction, should be considered to be the submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute; and that the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, having been filed subsequent to filing of such first statement on the substance of the dispute, the appellant’s prayer for referring the parties to arbitration cannot be accepted. The question therefore is whether filing a counter to an application for temporary injunction can be considered as submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute? 25. Not only filing of the written statement in a suit, but filing of any statement, application, affidavit filed by a defendant prior to the filing of the written statement will be construed as ‘submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute’, if by filing such statement/application/affidavit, the defendant shows his intention to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and waive his right to seek reference to arbitration. But filing of a reply by a defendant, to an application for temporary injunction/attachment before judgment/appointment of Receiver, cannot be considered as submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute, as that is done to avoid an interim order being made against him.” “29. Though Sec. 8 does not prescribe any time-limit for filing an application under that Section, and only states that the application under Sec. 8 of the Act should be filed before submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute, the scheme of the Act, and the provisions of the Section clearly indicate that the application thereunder should be made at the earliest. Obviously, a party who willingly participates in the proceedings in the suit and subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Court cannot subsequently turn round and say that the parties should be referred to arbitration in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Whether a party has waived his right to seek arbitration and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, depends upon the conduct of such party in the suit. 30. When plaintiffs file applications for interim relief like appointment of a Receiver or grant of a temporary injunction, the defendants have to contest the application. Such contest may even lead to appeals and revisions where there may be even stay of further proceedings in the suit. If supplemental proceedings like applications for temporary injunction on appointment of Receiver, have been pending for a considerable time and a defendant has been contesting such supplemental proceedings, it cannot be said that the defendant has lost the right to seek reference to arbitration. If supplemental proceedings like applications for temporary injunction on appointment of Receiver, have been pending for a considerable time and a defendant has been contesting such supplemental proceedings, it cannot be said that the defendant has lost the right to seek reference to arbitration. At the relevant time, the unamended Rule 1 of Order 8 of the Code, was governing the filing of written statements and the said rule did not prescribe any time-limit for filing written statement. In such a situation, mere passage of time between the date of entering appearance and date of filing the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, cannot lead to an inference that a defendant subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Court for adjudication of the main dispute. 31. The facts in this case, show that the plaintiff in the suit had filed an application for temporary injunction and appointment of Receiver and that was pending for some time. Thereafter, talks were in progress for arriving at a settlement out of Court. When such talks failed, the appellant filed an application under Sec. 8 of the Act before filing the written statement or filing any other statement which could be considered to be a submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute. The High Court was not therefore justified in rejecting the application on the ground of delay.” 30. Thus, what is discernible from the above-referred decisions of the Supreme Court is that whether a party has waived his right in any manner to seek arbitration and pleaded himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, would depend upon the conduct of such party in the suit. 31. In Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation of India, 1990 (2) SCC 68 , the Supreme Court considered the effect of the expression “a step in the proceeding”. The case before the Supreme Court was one under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Court observed: “6. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, has received the consideration of this Court in State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, 1974 (1) SCR 31 : AIR 1973 SC 2071 , (ii) Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer, 1983 (1) SCR 95 : AIR 1982 SC 1302 : 1982 (2) SCC 499 and more recently in General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., 1987 (4) SCC 137 . v. Renusagar Power Co., 1987 (4) SCC 137 . It may be noted that the expression a step in the proceeding” which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, is not every step taken by him in the suit. It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed. It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit. The step must have been consciously taken with a view, to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on the merits. In General Electric Co. case, 1987 (4) SCC 137 , this Court after considering the previous decisions observed: “.......thus a step the proceeding which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit or submission to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. The step must be such as to manifest the intention of the Party unequivocally to abandon the right under the arbitration agreement and instead to opt to have the dispute resolved on merits in the suit. The step must be such as to indicate an election or affirmation in favour of the suit in the place of the arbitration. The election or affirmation may be by express choice or by necessary implication by acquiescence. The broad and general right of a person to seek redressal of his grievances in a Court of law is subject to the right of the parties to have the disputes settled by a forum of mutual choice. Neither right is insubstantial and neither right can be allowed to be defeated by any manner of technicality. The right to have the dispute adjudicated by a Civil Court cannot be allowed to be defeated by vague or amorphous miscalled agreements to refer to ‘arbitration’. On the other hand, if the agreement to refer to arbitration is established, the right to have the dispute settled by arbitration cannot be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds.” 7. In the application filed by the defendants in this case, they only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement. In the application filed by the defendants in this case, they only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement. It was not stated that they would file the written statement. They never took any other step submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the case on merits. The right to have the dispute settled by arbitration has been conferred by agreement of parties and that right should not be deprived of by technical pleas. The Court must go into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken. The Court must examine whether the party has abandoned his right under the agreement. In the light of these principles and looking to the substance of the application dated January 4, 1985, we cannot form an opinion that the defendants have abandoned their right to have the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the written statement.” 32. What is discernible from the above-noted decision of the Supreme Court, is that the expression “a step in the proceeding” which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, and is not every step taken by him in the suit. It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed and further, it is for the Court to examine whether the party has abandoned his right under the agreement, and for that, the Court should look into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken. 33. What is necessary for this Court to look in the matter on hand is the question of waiver. To put it in other words, whether the defendants could be said to have waived their right to get the dispute adjudicated through an arbitrator by filing an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996. 34. According to the learned Counsel for the defendants, there is no waiver in the present case. No sooner the defendants came to know about the existence of the arbitration clause in the arbitration deed, then they preferred the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 for referring the dispute to the arbitrator. This stance of the defendants, in my view, is not only tenable in law, but also lacking in bona fide. No sooner the defendants came to know about the existence of the arbitration clause in the arbitration deed, then they preferred the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 for referring the dispute to the arbitrator. This stance of the defendants, in my view, is not only tenable in law, but also lacking in bona fide. I have more than a fair idea about the written statement filed by the defendants. The written statement is in details. The entire case put by the plaintiff came to be denied by the defendants. The defendants denied that there ever existed a partnership between the parties and that there was a partnership-deed in writing duly signed by them. I take notice of the fact that the partnership-deed is dated 13th December, 2000. The defendants are admitting their signatures in the partnership-deed. The suit came to be filed in 2013. It is very hard for this Court to believe that the defendants, within a period of one decade, would forget about the partnership and the execution of the partnership-deed. It appears to me having regard to the materials on record that the defendants consciously submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by filing a written statement denying the existence of any partnership and the document of deed of partnership. The defendants appears to have taken a chance, but later, when the partnership-deed came to be produced, they realised that there was no escape thereafter. I am at one with Mr. Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that as the plaintiff had not produced the partnership-deed along with the plaint, the defendants could have called upon the plaintiff to produce the partnership-deed on record, and more particularly, when there is a reference in the plaint of the partnership-deed being executed between the parties. Having once denied the entire case of the plaintiff, more particularly, the existence of the partnership and the partnership-deed, later on the production of the document by the plaintiff, the defendants are not entitled to invoke Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996. 35. The facts of this case are quite peculiar. In such circumstances, I have concentrated only on the issue whether the party seeking reference to the arbitration has waived his right to invoke the arbitration clause. 35. The facts of this case are quite peculiar. In such circumstances, I have concentrated only on the issue whether the party seeking reference to the arbitration has waived his right to invoke the arbitration clause. In my view, having regard to the conduct of the defendants, it could be said without any hesitation that they waived their right to invoke the arbitration clause by filing a detailed written statement denying the factum of partnership. 36. Waiver is a question of fact and as explained by the Supreme Court, the same should be inferred on the basis of the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. In my view, if the Court accepts the contention that an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 can be filed even after the first statement of substance of the dispute between the parties has already been filed, then this would not only be any contrary to the express provisions of law, but would also defeat the very purpose behind stipulating that such an application needs to be filed not later than submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. If such an application is entertained after filing of the first statement, it would be possible for a party to the suit to first allow the trial to proceed by not filing the application by the stage stipulated in the Act, and then come to the Court at a much later stage when the trial is substantially complete and seek reference of the dispute to arbitration. No one can dispute that a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit after application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, but this would be subject to the application otherwise being in conformity with the requirement of the said Section. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted on account of an arbitration agreement between the parties. It is ousted because of an application filed under Sec. 8 of the Act provided it otherwise confirms to the requirements laid down in the Section. 37. In the case on hand, on production of the partnership-deed, the defendants were left with only one option either to proceed with the suit having filed a detailed written statement disclosing their defence or prefer an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 invoking the arbitration clause. 37. In the case on hand, on production of the partnership-deed, the defendants were left with only one option either to proceed with the suit having filed a detailed written statement disclosing their defence or prefer an application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996 invoking the arbitration clause. Having realised that on production of the deed of partnership, the entire defence in the written statement filed by the defendants would miserably fail, the defendants opted and took a chance to prefer the application under Sec. 8 of the Act, 1996. 38. In such circumstances referred to above, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Court below was justified in law in rejecting the Chamber Summons Exhs. 36-37. In my view, there is no error apparent on the face of the impugned order warranting any interference in this First Appeal. 39. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 40. In view of the disposal of the First Appeal, the connected Civil Application would not survive and the same is disposed of.