ORDER: Ramesh Ranganathan, J. 1. The relief sought for, in this Writ Petition, is to declare the demand notice in Form No.IV dated 08.12.2014, for alleged arrears of Sales Tax for the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, as arbitrary, illegal, unjustified and contrary to the provisions of the APGST Act, 1957. 2. The petitioner, a proprietary concern hitherto engaged in the business of chillies, was registered as a dealer vide TIN No.28770102633. It is his case that he had paid taxes regularly till the year 2008 when the entire accounts, along with the original challans of sales tax paid by him, were gutted in the fire which broke out in Guntur Mirchi yard; he had, thereafter, discontinued his chilli business and was, as at present, not carrying on any other business; the first respondent suddenly issued a demand notice in Form No.IV on 08.12.2014 asking him to pay Rs.1,86,84,620/- as arrears of sales tax for the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006; he had, thereafter, made a representation to the 1st respondent on 22.01.2015 stating all the facts; no action was taken on the representation; instead of disposing of his representation, the first respondent was threatening him to make payment of arrears of sales tax; and on the advice that the demand notice, issued in Form No.IV dated 08.12.2014, was barred by limitation as per the APGST Act, he was invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. 3. The impugned demand notice in Form No.IV, a copy of which is filed along with the Writ Petition, is addressed to the petitioner as the proprietor of Vishnu Priya Chillies Traders. The petitioner was thereby called upon to pay Rs.1,86,84,620/-, towards arrears of sales tax due for the years mentioned in the table, within fifteen days from the date of service of the notice. The table, in the demand notice, refers to the amount due under the CST Act for the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 i.e., for a total sum total of Rs.1,86,84,620/-. The table, in the demand notice, refers to the amount due under the CST Act for the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 i.e., for a total sum total of Rs.1,86,84,620/-. In his representation dated 22.01.2015, a copy of which is also enclosed along with the Writ Petition, all that the petitioner has stated is that he had received a demand notice on 08.12.2014 calling upon him to pay Rs.1,86,84,620/- as arrears of sales tax for the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006; he had already paid sales tax for these years, and the original challans were gutted in the fire which broke out in Guntur mirchi yard in the year 2008; and he had, thereafter, discontinued his business. The petitioner requested the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to verify the sales tax payment for the relevant years, give him an opportunity of hearing, and keep the demand notice dated 08.12.2014 in abeyance till then. 4. This Writ Petition was filed on 28.04.2015. A Division bench of this Court, in its order dated 01.05.2015, took note of the submission of the Learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes that separate assessment orders were passed in accordance with law, and the said orders were served on the petitioner. At the request of the Learned Government Pleader, for grant of time to produce the record before the Court, the matter was directed to be listed after vacation. On 22.06.2015, as the Government Pleader sought further time to produce the records, a Division bench of this Court, considering the fact that auction of the petitioners properties was scheduled to be held on the same day, directed stay of auction until further orders. 5. Subsequently, by its order dated 01.12.2015, a Division Bench of this Court directed that, as no one had appeared for the petitioner on 30.11.2015, the matter be listed under the caption ‘for dismissal'. As, even on 01.12.2015, neither was the Counsel for the petitioner present nor was there any representation on his behalf, the Writ Petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. Thereafter an application was filed in WPMP No.57714 of 2016 to restore W.P. No.13560 of 2015 to file by setting aside the order dated 01.12.2015. When the WPMP came up for hearing, we made it clear that we would consider the restoration application along with the main Writ Petition. 6. Thereafter an application was filed in WPMP No.57714 of 2016 to restore W.P. No.13560 of 2015 to file by setting aside the order dated 01.12.2015. When the WPMP came up for hearing, we made it clear that we would consider the restoration application along with the main Writ Petition. 6. We had, in our order dated 04.01.2018, recorded the submission of Sri C. Ramachandra Raju that the matter be taken up on the next date to enable him to put forth his submissions in the main Writ Petition. When the matter was listed the next day on 05.01.2018 we had, at the request of Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, directed the matter to be posted after Sankranthi Vacation. On 22.01.2018, both Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. Suribabu, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes, made their submissions in the main Writ Petition and judgment was reserved on the same day. It is only on 25.01.2018, three days after judgment was reserved on 22.01.2018, that written submissions were filed by Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. 7. It is only on 25.01.2018, three days after judgment was reserved on 22.01.2018, that written submissions were filed by Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. 7. In the counter-affidavit dated 19.10.2015, filed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, it is stated that the petitioner was hitherto carrying on business of chillies; he had effected sale of chillies both within the State of Andhra Pradesh as well as outside the State; chillies were classified, under Entry 16 of the Second Schedule to the APGST Act, 1957, as taxable at the point of first purchase within the State at 4%; chillies, sold in the course of inter-state trade, was chargeable to tax at 4%; if these goods were sent outside the State otherwise than by way of sale, i.e., either as branch transfers or on consignment basis, they were not liable to tax on condition that the dealer, effecting such transfer, obtained “F” declaration forms from the respective branches, or consignment agents, and furnished the same to the assessing authority for grant of exemption while passing the assessment order; Section 6-A of the CST Act requires the dealer, claiming exemption from payment of Central Sales Tax, to furnish a declaration in Form “F” to the assessing authority; if the said declarations are not furnished before the assessing authority, such transfer is treated as an inter-state sale liable to tax under the CST Act; and the assessment of the petitioner, for the years 2002-2003 to 2005-2006, were completed by the assessing authority which resulted in a total tax demand of Rs.1,86,84,620/-. 8. 8. With respect to the assessment year 2002-2003, under the CST Act, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner had declared NIL turnover in its monthly returns filed in Form CST VI; however, at the time of finalization of the assessment, the petitioner had filed statements declaring a turnover of Rs.1,68,01,990/- representing consignment sales of chillies effected during the year, and on the said turnover exemption was claimed; however declarations, in Form F, were not filed before the assessing authority; a show cause notice dated 12.08.2005 was issued by the assessing authority proposing to subject the turnover of Rs.1,68,01,990/- to tax as the “F” declaration Forms were not filed by the petitioner; the said show cause notice was served on the petitioner on 13.08.2005; the same was received by Sri P. Masthan Rao, accountant of the petitioner Firm; as the petitioner had not filed any objections to the said show cause notice, and had not filed the “F” declaration Forms, the assessing authority had passed the assessment order on 10.03.2006 confirming the proposal contained in the show cause notice; the assessment order was served on Sri P. Masthan Rao, accountant of the petitioners firm; a show-cause notice dated 09.01.2007, for the assessment year 2003-04 under the CST Act, was served on the petitioner on 19.02.2007 proposing to subject the consignment transfer of chillies, amounting to Rs.10,62,66,911/-, to tax in the absence of “F” declaration forms; as the petitioner neither filed objections, nor sought time, nor did he file the “F” declaration Forms, the assessing authority completed the assessment by his proceedings dated 30.03.2007; the same was served by affixture on the business premises of the petitioner on 09.04.2007, as none were available at the said premises; and the demand, as per the assessment order, was Rs.1,06,26,691/-. With respect to the assessment year 2004-2005 under the APGST Act, it is stated that the assessment, for the said year, was completed by proceedings dated 17.03.2008; and the balance tax due was Rs.13,304/-. 9. With respect to the assessment year 2004-2005 under the APGST Act, it is stated that the assessment, for the said year, was completed by proceedings dated 17.03.2008; and the balance tax due was Rs.13,304/-. 9. For the assessment year 2004-2005 under the CST Act, it is stated that a show cause notice dated 14.12.2007 was issued by the assessing authority, and was served on the petitioner by affixture on 11.01.2008, as it was informed to the process server that the petitioner had vacated the business premises; as there was no response from the petitioner thereto, the assessing authority had passed a final assessment order in his proceedings dated 17.03.2008; the same was served by affixture on the business premises of the petitioner on 24.03.2008; the net turnover of Rs.5,37,20,301/- was deducted, and the tax due was arrived at Rs.34,084/-; the Deputy Commissioner, Guntur, by his proceedings dated 19.11.2009, revised the assessment order passed by the assessing authority and disallowed the set off granted by the assessing authority amounting to Rs.53,72,030/-; and, accordingly, the assessing authority had passed a consequential order dated 21.12.2009 giving effect to the revision order of the Deputy Commissioner, and had raised a demand of Rs.54,06,114/-; and the said order was served by affixture on 24.12.2009. 10. With regards the assessment year 2005-2006 under the CST Act, it is stated that the show cause notice dated 18.12.2008 was issued proposing to subject the turnover, relating to consignment sales of chillies of Rs.1,17,16,160/-, to tax; this turnover was subjected to tax at 10% in the absence of “F” declaration Forms; the said show cause notice was sent by registered post on 31.03.2009, and was also served by affixture on the business premises of the petitioner on 18.04.2009; the tax due, as per the assessment order, was Rs.11,71,616/-; and after adjusting VAT, subject to verification amounting to Rs.2,00,000/-, the balance tax due was Rs.9,71,616/-; and, therefore, the total amount due was Rs.86,84,620/-. 11. 11. It is further stated that the petitioner neither paid even a part of the amount, nor did he file any appeal; he did not also file the declaration Forms in Form F; therefore, the amount became collectable; final notice dated 14.07.2014 was issued by the Commercial Tax Officer, which was served on the petitioner on 30.07.2014, and was also sent by registered post with acknowledgment due on 18.07.2014; the notice was received by the petitioner on 21.07.2014; he filed a letter before the Commercial Tax Officer on 07.08.2014 stating that he had closed his business, and requested twenty days time to verify the same; he also requested that copies of the assessment orders be furnished; the same were handed over to the petitioner on 12.08.2014; the statement of encumbrance, on the property of the petitioner, was obtained on 29.11.2014; thereupon the Deputy Commissioner (CT), Guntur had, by his proceedings dated 04.12.2014, authorised them to proceed against the property of the petitioner under the A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, 1864; he had issued notice of attachment of property, in Form No.IV dated 08.12.2014, under Section 25 of the Revenue Recovery Act, followed by Form No.V under Section 27 of the said Act; on 22.01.2015, the petitioner filed a letter, before the respondent, stating that he had already paid the taxes due for the same years, and all the records were gutted in the fire accident; he enclosed his profit and loss for the said years; the sales tax paid, as shown in the respective profit and loss accounts related to the tax paid under the APGST Act, and did not relate to the taxes due under the CST Act; he had issued notice of sale of land in Form No.VII under Section 36 of the Revenue Recovery Act, followed by Form VII-A for the sale of landed property, duly serving the same on the petitioner; the entire arrears of tax of Rs.1,86,84,620/- are the taxes due from the petitioner which became payable on passing of the assessment orders; all transactions, and their details, were furnished by the petitioner himself at the time of assessment; and having participated in the assessment proceedings, for the respective assessment years, it was not correct on the part of the petitioner to contend that he was not aware of the arrears of taxes, and that the entire tax due had been paid. 12. 12. In the reply affidavit filed on 22.01.2018, the petitioner stated that he did not undertake inter-state sales during the period 2002-2003 to 2005-2006; as such he was not liable to pay CST; during the said period, he had only sent consignments to his agents who were outside the State and he was, therefore, entitled for exemption from payment of CST under Section 6-A of the CST Act; he had also submitted Form “F” declarations to the respondent, claiming exemption of CST during that period; the allegation of the respondent that he had not submitted Form “F” declaration forms, for the turnover of the said period, was false; he had, in fact, submitted Form “F” declarations claiming exemption of tax under Section 6-A of the Act, for the assessment years 2002- 2003 to 2005-2006; had he not submitted the Form “F” declarations for those years, the respondents would have passed assessment orders, immediately on completion of the assessment years, without any delay; there was a fire accident in the premises of his business in the year 2008, and his entire stock and all the records and accounts of his business were burnt; he had closed his business in the year 2008, as he had sustained heavy loss in his business due to the fire accident; the Commercial Tax Officer never served any show cause notice or any assessment order for the assessment years 2002-2003 to 2005-2006; Sri P. Masthan Rao, on whom the show cause notices and the assessment orders are alleged to have been served, was not his accountant, and was not known to him; the respondents had his residential address; had they issued the show cause notice, and passed assessment orders for the said period, the respondents would have sent the alleged show cause notices, and assessment orders, to his residential address; the respondent did not choose to send them to his residential address; they were well aware that he was not doing any business since 2008; the allegation that they had affixed the show cause notices, and the assessment orders of the said period, to his business premises was totally false; when he was not available in the business premises, as stated by the respondent, the alleged show cause notices, and the assessment orders, should have been sent to his residential address, or should have been sent by registered post to his residential address; the respondents were aware that he had closed his business in the year 2008; the allegation that some of the show cause notices, and assessment orders, were affixed to his business premises were false and unbelievable; the very fact that the respondents did not choose to send the alleged show cause notices and assessment orders to his residential address, proved beyond doubt that the alleged show cause notices and the assessment orders were not issued, and were not made on the date on which it is alleged to have been issued; they were created only in the year 2014, just before the demand notice, with ante-date to cover up their latches; the respondent had served the final notice dated 14.07.2014 at the petitioners residential address, instead of affixing it to the then premises of his business; if the respondent had issued the show cause notice, and had passed the assessment orders, they should have sent it to him at his residential address; the allegation of the respondent that the show cause notices, and the assessment orders of those years, were affixed to the premises of his business was totally false and untenable; when the respondents knew he was not doing business since 2008, because of the fire accident, it was highly unbelievable that the respondents had affixed the show cause notice, and the assessment orders of those assessment years, to the then premises of his business; as the assessment orders, alleged to have been made, were made behind his back and were not served on him, the assessment orders, of the years 2002- 2003 to 2005-2006, were not valid assessment orders in the eye of law, void and non-est in law; they were not binding on the petitioner; and the alleged assessment orders were barred by limitation, under Section 9 of the CST Act read with Section 14 of the APGST Act, as they were not passed within a period of three years from the assessment year. 13. Elaborate oral submissions were made, and written arguments were filed, by Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Sri S. Suri Babu, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes, put forth his submissions on behalf of the respondents. It is convenient to examine the submissions made by Learned Counsel on either side under different heads. I. WERE SALES WITHIN THE STATE TREATED AS INTER-STATE SALE? 14. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the assessing authority was claiming general sales tax from the petitioner, in respect of the value of the consignment sent by him to his agents in other States; this should be treated as sales within the State, for which the petitioner has already paid sales tax under the APGST Act; the petitioner has not made any inter-State sales during the years 2002-03 to 2005-06 and, as such, he is not liable to pay central sales tax for those years; he had only sent consignments to other States, to be delivered to his agents, during the years 2002-03 to 2005-06, which is not inter-State sale under Section 6-A of the CST Act; the respondents were claiming central sales tax from the petitioner in respect of sales within the State for which, admittedly, the petitioner had already paid sales tax under the APGST Act; and treating sales within the State as inter-State sales, on the sole ground that the petitioner had not submitted Form-F declarations as required under Section 6-A of the CST Act, is illegal. 15. While sale of goods within the State was taxable, for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2004-05, under the A.P.G.S.T. Act, and for the assessment year 2005-06 under the AP VAT Act, inter- State sale of goods i.e sale of goods from one State to another is alone taxable under the CST Act. Section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act relates to burden of proof in case of transfer of goods claimed otherwise than by way of sale. Section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act relates to burden of proof in case of transfer of goods claimed otherwise than by way of sale. Under sub-section (1) thereof, where any dealer claims that he is not liable to pay tax under the CST Act in respect of any goods, on the ground that the movement of such goods from one State to another was occasioned by reason of transfer of such goods by him to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, as the case may be, and not by reason of sale, the burden of proving that the movement of those goods was so occasioned shall be on that dealer and, for this purpose, he may furnish to the assessing authority, within the prescribed time or within such further time as that authority may, for sufficient cause, permit, a declaration, duly filled and signed by the principal officer of the other place of business, or his agent or principal, as the case may be, containing the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority, along with evidence of the despatch of such goods; and if the dealer fails to furnish such declaration, then, the movement of such goods shall be deemed, for all purposes of the CST Act, to have been occasioned as a result of sale. 16. Sub-section (2) of Section 6A stipulates that, if the assessing authority is satisfied after making such inquiry as he may deem necessary, that the particulars contained in the declaration, furnished by the dealer under sub-section (1), are true and that no inter-State sale has been made by the dealer he may, at the time of, or at any time before, the assessment of the tax payable by the dealer under the Act, make an order to that effect and thereupon the movement of goods to which the declaration relates shall be deemed, for the purpose of the CST Act, to have been occasioned otherwise than as a result of sale. 17. 17. Rule 12(5) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules 1957 stipulates that the declaration, referred to in Section 6-A(1) of the CST Act, shall be in Form F. Form F, the declaration to be issued by the transferee in triplicate, requires, among others, the name of the issuing State, the officer issuing it, and the date of issue to be specified, as also the name and address of the person to whom it is issued along with his registration certificate number. The said Form is required to contain the name of the transferor to whom the certificate is issued and his registration certificate number, and to also certify that the goods, transferred as per the details given in the said Form, has been received and duly accounted for. 18. Transfer of goods by a dealer from his place of business in one State to his own place of business in another State, or from one State to his agent in another State, is not by way of sale and is, therefore, exempt from tax on fulfillment of the conditions stipulated in Section 6-A of the CST Act. As proof that the despatch of goods, from one State to another, is not by way of inter-State sale, but is either a branch transfer, or a mere consignment of goods, the dealer, who has transferred the goods, is required to submit, to his assessing authority, the declaration in Form-F. It is only if such a declaration is submitted would the dealer be entitled to claim exemption from tax, under the CST Act, on such transfer of goods. Failure to furnish the declaration in Form-F would result in such transfer of goods, from one State to another, being treated as an inter-State sale liable to tax, at the prescribed rate, under the CST Act. 19. As is evident from the assertions in the counter-affidavit, the petitioner has been separately subjected to tax both under the APGST Act and the CST Act. The demand notice, impugned in the Writ Petition, was issued for non-payment of tax under the CST Act for the four year period i.e. 2002-03 to 2005-06. 19. As is evident from the assertions in the counter-affidavit, the petitioner has been separately subjected to tax both under the APGST Act and the CST Act. The demand notice, impugned in the Writ Petition, was issued for non-payment of tax under the CST Act for the four year period i.e. 2002-03 to 2005-06. It is evident from the show-cause notices issued, and the assessment orders made under the CST Act, enclosed along with the counter-affidavit, that the petitioner was assessed to tax under the CST Act for his failure to submit the declarations in Form-F as proof that the goods were despatched outside the State on consignment to his agent. Payment of sales-tax by the petitioner, under the APGST Act, is on the sale of goods within the State and not for transfer of goods outside the State. It is evident, from the aforesaid orders, that the sales made by the petitioner within the State were not subjected to tax as inter-State sales, and it is only the consignment of goods, from the State of Andhra Pradesh to another State, which were treated as inter-State sales on the failure of the petitioner to submit Form-F declarations. The contention that intra-State sales were treated as inter-State sales is, therefore, not tenable. II. ARE THE ASSESSMENTS BARRED BY LIMITATION? 20. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the claim of the respondents, for recovery of alleged arrears of CST, is barred by limitation under Section 9 of the CST Act r/w. Section 14 of the APGST Act; the assessment order, under the CST Act, should be made within a period of three years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates; the assessment orders were not made within the period of three years, for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06; it is ex-facie evident that the alleged assessment orders, for the years 2003-04 and 2005-06, were admittedly made after a lapse of three years; and, as such, they are barred by limitation. 21. Section 9 of the CST Act relates to levy and collection of tax and penalties. 21. Section 9 of the CST Act relates to levy and collection of tax and penalties. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 stipulates that, subject to the other provisions of the CST Act and the rules made thereunder, the authorities, for the time being empowered to assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State, shall, on behalf of the Government of India, assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of tax, including any interest or penalty by such a dealer under the CST Act, as a tax or interest or penalty payable under the general sales tax law of the State; for this purpose, they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales tax law of the State; the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, provisional assessment, advance payment of tax, registration of the transferee of any business, imposition of tax liability on a person carrying on business or the transferee of, or successor to, such business, transfer of liability of any firm or Hindu undivided family, to pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or partition of such family, recovery of tax from third parties, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, refunds, rebates, penalties, charging or payment of interest, compounding of offences and treatment of documents furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly. 22. In so far as the CST assessment orders, passed with respect to the years 2002-04 to 2004-05, are concerned it is the provisions of the State Law i.e the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 which would apply in determining whether the assessment orders, for these years, are barred by limitation. Section 14 of the APGST Act relates to assessment of tax and under sub-section (1) thereof, if the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under Section 13 is correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer on the basis thereof; but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess, to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer. 23. 23. Assessment, under Section 14 of the APGST Act, is required to be made within a period of three years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates. As the period, for making assessment under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act, is three years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates, and expiry of the assessment year 2002-03 is on 31.03.2003, the three year period, for making assessment under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act, would expire only on 31.03.2006. Likewise, for the assessment year 2003-04, the assessment is required to be made within three years of its expiry i.e. on or before 31.03.2007. Similarly, for the assessment year 2004-05, the assessment is required to be made on or before 31.03.2008. In the present case, CST assessment for the year 2002-03 was made on 10.03.2006, for the assessment year 2003-04 on 30.03.2007, and for the assessment year 2004-05 on 17.03.2008, all of which were well within the period of limitation of three years prescribed under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act. The submission of Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the assessment orders are barred by limitation does not, therefore, merit acceptance. 24. The Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 came into force on 01.04.2005 and consequently, in view of Section 9(2) of the CST Act, it is the provisions of the A.P. VAT Act which is the applicable State law for the assessment year 2005-06. Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act stipulates that the prescribed authority may, based on any information available or on any other basis, conduct a detailed scrutiny of the accounts of any dealer and where any assessment, as a result of such scrutiny, becomes necessary, such assessment shall be made within a period of four years from the end of the period for which the assessment is to be made. Even for the CST assessment year 2005-06, the assessment order was passed on 18.04.2009 well within the four year limitation period prescribed under Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act. Even for the CST assessment year 2005-06, the assessment order was passed on 18.04.2009 well within the four year limitation period prescribed under Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act. From the copies of the assessment orders for the years 2002- 03 to 2005-06, filed by the respondents along with their counter- affidavit, it is evident that the assessment orders, made for these four years, are within the period of limitation prescribed, for making assessment, both under the APGST Act and the AP VAT Act. III. SHOULD THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION BE COMPUTED TILL THE DATE OF PASSING THE ASSESSMENT ORDER OR TILL THE DATE THEY ARE SERVED ON THE DEALER? 25. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that an assessment order is made and completed only after service of the assessment order on the assessee, and not merely by writing the assessment order and keeping it in the file of the assessing authority; the assessment orders were not served on the petitioner as required under law; and, in so far as the assessment orders, of the years 2002-03 and 2004-05 are concerned, even though the assessment orders are dated within the period of three years, they are also barred by limitation as they were never served on the petitioner, much less within a period of three years. 26. As noted hereinabove the prescribed period of limitation, for passing an assessment order under the CST Act for the three year period 2002-03 to 2004-05, is, in view of Section 9(2) of the CST Act, governed by the provisions of Section 14(1) of the APGST Act. For the assessment year 2005-06 the period of limitation for passing an assessment order under the CST Act is, on a conjoint reading of Section 9(2) of the CST Act and Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act, four years. As noted hereinabove all the assessment orders were made before expiry of the three year/four year period stipulated under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act and Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act. The limitation prescribed is for an assessment order to be made, and not for it to be served. 27. As noted hereinabove all the assessment orders were made before expiry of the three year/four year period stipulated under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act and Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act. The limitation prescribed is for an assessment order to be made, and not for it to be served. 27. Inordinate delay in serving the assessment order may legitimize the presumption that the order was not passed on the date on which it is purported to have been passed, (Vamshi Art Printers Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad v. Commercial Tax Officer, Basheerbagh Circle, Hyderabad,[2007] 44 APSTJ 50 ; Ushodaya Enterprises Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, A.P., Hyderabad, 1998 (3) ALT 96 = [1998] 111 STC 711 (AP) [FB] ; State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Ramakishtaiah & Co., Khetmal, [1994] 93 STC 406 (SC) ; Santhosh Builders v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes), (2013) 57 VST 55 (AP) = 2011 Law Suit (AP) 1158 and where the order is communicated, much beyond the period prescribed for exercising a statutory power, and there is no explanation from the authority why it was so delayed, it may justify an inference that the order was not made on the date it was purported to have been made, and could have been made only after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. (M. Ramakishtaiah & Co.,[1994] 93 STC 406 (SC); Santhosh Builders, (2013) 57 VST 55 (AP) = 2011 Law Suit (AP) 1158). The fact, however, remains that the petitioner has not even urged, in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, that the assessment orders were belatedly served on him. Except to contend that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur had not taken any action on his representation dated 22.01.2015, and the demand notice in Form-IV dated 08.12.2014, calling upon him to pay Rs.1,86,84,620/- as arrears of sales-tax for the four years i.e. 2002-03 to 2005-06, was barred by limitation as per the APGST Act and as per the judgments of this Court and the Apex Court, the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition makes no mention of the assessment orders not having been served on the petitioner, or of its having been served on him belatedly. 28. 28. In the absence of any such plea, in the writ affidavit, it would be wholly inappropriate for us to undertake an examination of whether or not service of the assessment orders on the petitioner was belated, as the respondents could not have rebutted these contentions, in the counter-affidavit filed by them earlier. In this context, it is necessary to note that there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a Writ Petition. While in a plaint, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a Writ Petition not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. When a point, which is ostensibly a point of law, is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition. If the facts are not pleaded, or the evidence in support of such facts, is not annexed to the writ petition, the Court will not entertain the point. (Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana)., (1988) 4 SCC 534 29. Much less adducing any proof of the assessment orders having been served belatedly, the petitioner has not even pleaded as such in the affidavit filed by him in support of the Writ Petition. It would be wholly inappropriate for us, in the present case, to examine, even in the absence of a plea in this regard in the writ affidavit, whether there was belated service of the assessment orders necessitating an inference being drawn that the assessment orders were either ante-dated or were passed after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act and Section 21(4) of the AP VAT Act. IV. IS PASSING ASSESSMENT ORDERS, AT THE FAG END OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION, ILLEGAL? 30. IV. IS PASSING ASSESSMENT ORDERS, AT THE FAG END OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION, ILLEGAL? 30. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, even assuming that the assessment orders were made on the dates as alleged by the respondents, for the years 2002-03 and 2004-05, they were made just at the fag end of the limitation period of three years; if the petitioner had really not submitted the Form-F declarations, claiming exemption from payment of CST under Section 6-A of the CST Act, there is no explanation why the respondents kept quiet for a long period of three years for making the assessment orders; the assessment orders, for the four years i.e 2002-03 to 2005-06, were made with an abnormal delay without any explanation for the delay; if the assessing authority had passed the assessment order with abnormal delay only for one assessment year, and had passed assessment orders for the other three assessment years without delay, it was understandable; and the assessment orders, for all the four years, were made with abnormal delay of three years. 31. The period of limitation, for passing an assessment order under Section 14(1) of the APGST Act, is three years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates. Likewise an assessment under Section 21(4) of the A.P. VAT Act is required to be made within a period of four years from the end of the period from which the assessment is to be made. As long as the assessment order is within the period of limitation, stipulated in Section 14(1) of the APGST Act and Section 21(4) of the A.P. VAT Act, it matters little whether these assessment orders were passed immediately after the end of the assessment year/assessment period, or at the fag end before expiry of the period of limitation. As long as the assessment order is within the period of limitation, stipulated in Section 14(1) of the APGST Act and Section 21(4) of the A.P. VAT Act, it matters little whether these assessment orders were passed immediately after the end of the assessment year/assessment period, or at the fag end before expiry of the period of limitation. Since the assessing authority is empowered by law to make an assessment even at the fag end of the period of limitation, and before its expiry, the question whether he should have passed the assessment order immediately after the end of the assessment year, or at the fag end of the period of limitation, are not matters for examination in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the assessing authority is entitled to pass an assessment order any time after the end of the assessment year/assessment period and before expiry of the period of limitation. Even otherwise, any explanation which the respondents could have given for not having passed the assessment orders earlier was only if any such a contention had been raised in the Writ Petition (affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition) and, since no such contention has been urged in the Writ affidavit, this Court would not be justified in interfering with the impugned demand notice, based on such a contention urged for the first time in the reply affidavit, as the respondents did not have the opportunity of rebutting such allegations in the counter-affidavit filed by them earlier. V. ARE THESE ASSESSMENT ORDERS VOID AND LIABLE TO BE IGNORED? 32. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that these assessment orders, which were not served on the petitioner, are void and non-est in the eye of law and are liable to be ignored; and the contention of the respondents, that the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the assessment orders, has no legs to stand. 33. It is not in dispute that the validity of the assessment orders made under the CST Act, for the years 2002-2003 to 2005-2006 non-payment of which necessitated the impugned demand notice to be issued, have not been subjected to challenge in this Writ Petition. 33. It is not in dispute that the validity of the assessment orders made under the CST Act, for the years 2002-2003 to 2005-2006 non-payment of which necessitated the impugned demand notice to be issued, have not been subjected to challenge in this Writ Petition. The question which necessitates examination is whether, even in the absence of a challenge to the assessment orders, the demand notice, for payment of central sales tax in terms thereof, can be set aside on the ground that the assessment orders are void and non-est in the eye of law or that it should be ignored as a nullity. 34. In a case of illegality any taxpayer may have recourse to the special procedure provided by the law within the stipulated time limit, but where ultra vires acts are concerned there is always the remedy to have the Courts declare it an absolute nullity. (Dechne v. City of Montreal, (1894) A.C. 640 ; Toronto Railway Co. v. Corp. of Toronto, [1904] A.C. 809 ; Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Ville de St-Michel, [1924] A.C. 185 ; Donohue Bros. v. La Malbaie, [1924] S.C.R. 511 ; Trudeau v. Devost, [1942] S.C.R. 257 ; Immeubles Port Louis Itee v. Lafontaine (Village), (1991) 1 SCR 326, 1991 CanLII 82 (SCC) ). Acting ultra vires, and acting without jurisdiction, have essentially the same meaning, although in general the term "vires" has been employed when considering administrative decisions and subordinate legislative orders, and "jurisdictions" when considering judicial decisions, or those having a judicial flavour. (De Smith, Woolf and Jowelh Judicial Review of administrative Action: Fifth Edition; Campaign for Housing and Tenural Rights (Chatri), Hyderabad v. Govt. of A.P., 2010 (2) ALD 789 ). 35. It needs no emphasis that even a void order, or a decision rendered between the parties, cannot be said to be non-existent. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter-parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word void is not determinative of its legal impact. The word void has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal, and can be avoided. (State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). Mere use of the word void is not determinative of its legal impact. The word void has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal, and can be avoided. (State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). The court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 ; Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, (2004) 1 SCC 287 ; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706 ). 36. The only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. An order, even if not made in good faith, is still capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity, and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. (Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edn., 1994; Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1956) A.C. 736, 769-770 : (1956) 2 W.L.R. 888 ; F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (1975) A.C. 295 ; Lovelock v. Minister of Transport, (1980) 40 P & C.R. 336 ; M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). Even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible, there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. (M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). 37. Even if a decision is void or a nullity, it remains in being unless and until some steps are taken before the courts to have it declared void. (Lovelock, (1980) 40 P & C.R. 336). Even if an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, it however subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved. (Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31; M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved. (Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31; M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). If a court acts without jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i.e., an appeal would lie to the court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction (Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 ; M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435 ). 38. As the assessment orders made under the CST Act, for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06, do not bear the brand of invalidity upon its forehead, it is only if necessary proceedings are taken to challenge these orders can they be quashed. These assessment orders would remain as effective as the most impeccable of orders till then. While an order without jurisdiction can be subjected to challenge even in collateral proceedings, other orders, even if they be otherwise illegal, can only be questioned on a direct challenge thereto. In either event the order, which is alleged to be void and non-est, must be subjected to challenge, and be declared as a nullity by a competent Court. The petitioner has chosen not even to subject the assessment orders to a collateral challenge in the present writ proceedings where the validity of the demand notice, issued for recovery of tax determined in these assessment orders, is alone under challenge. In the absence of any challenge thereto, the contention, that these assessment orders are liable to be ignored as a nullity, does not merit acceptance. The assessment orders would, unless and until they are declared as void by this Court, continue to remain in force. VI. CAN FACTUAL PLEAS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT, BE EXAMINED IN WRIT PROCEEDINGS? 39. The assessment orders would, unless and until they are declared as void by this Court, continue to remain in force. VI. CAN FACTUAL PLEAS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT, BE EXAMINED IN WRIT PROCEEDINGS? 39. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the petitioner had submitted Form- “F” declarations to the assessing authority, as required under Section 6-A of the CST Act, to the effect that the consignments sent by him to other States, during those years, was mere transfer of goods to his agents, without there being any inter-State sale; satisfied with the Form-F declarations submitted by the petitioner, the assessing authority did not pass any assessment orders for payment of central sales tax for those years; because of the fire accident, which took place in his business premises in the year 2008, the petitioner had closed his business to the knowledge of the respondents; the entire records, and accounts of the business of the petitioner, were burnt in the fire accident; the crucial fact of the case was that the assessing authority had the residential address of the petitioner, which is evident from the fact that the final notice dated 14.07.2014 demanding the alleged arrears of CST, as well as the demand notice dated 08.12.2014, were sent to the petitioners residential address; the assessing authority ought, therefore, to have sent the show-cause notice; and the assessment orders, to the residential address of the petitioner when, admittedly, the petitioner had closed his business in the year 2008, and nobody was available at the previous business premises of the petitioner from the year 2008; no reasons are forthcoming as to why the assessing authority chose to affix the show-cause notices, and the assessment orders, on the business premises instead of sending them to his known residential address; in the absence of any explanation the alleged affixture, of the show-cause notices and the assessment orders on the business premises of the petitioner, is a blatant lie; alleged affixture of the show-cause notices and the assessment orders of the years 2003-04 to 2005- 06, at the business premises of the petitioner, is invented by the respondents to cover up their lapse in not serving the show-cause notices and the assessment orders on the petitioner; that apart, after closure of the business of the petitioner in the year 2008, the previous business premises of the petitioner is no longer his business premises; and the respondents cannot, therefore, contend that they had served the show-cause notices, and the assessment orders, on the petitioner by way of affixture on the business premises of the petitioner. 40. Learned Counsel would further contend that the allegation that the show-cause notice and the assessment order for the year 2002-03 were served on Sri P. Masthan Rao, allegedly the accountant of the petitioner, is totally false; the said Sri P. Masthan Rao is in no way connected with the petitioner, and is not known to the him; when the petitioner has specifically denied, in his reply affidavit, that the said Sri P. Masthan Rao is a stranger, and is in no way concerned with the petitioner, the burden lies on the respondents to establish that the said Sri P. Masthan Rao is his employee; the respondents failed to produce any evidence to establish that he is the employee of the petitioner; and, in the absence of any such proof, service of the show-cause notices, and the assessment orders, of the year 2002-03 on Sri P. Masthan Rao is not a valid service on the petitioner in the eye of law. 41. Sri S. Suribabu, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes, would submit that the petitioner had never, at any time before filing the reply affidavit on 22.01.2018, contended that the show cause notices, and the subsequent assessment orders, were not properly served; in his letter dated 07.08.2014, the petitioner had sought twenty days time to verify, and had requested for copies of the assessment orders to be furnished to him; the same were handed over to him on 12.08.2014; even in his letter dated 22.01.2015, except stating that he had already paid the taxes due, for the years 2002-2003 to 2005-2006, the petitioner has not stated that the assessment orders were not served on him earlier or that Sri P. Masthan Rao was not known to him; and no such contention has been urged in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. 42. 42. The contentions that the petitioner had submitted “F” declaration forms to the assessing authority as required under Section 6-A of the CST Act, the assessing authority did not pass any assessment orders for those years, the petitioner closed his business in 2008 to the knowledge of the respondents, because of the fire accident the entire records and books of accounts of the petitioner were burnt, the respondents were aware of his residential addresses when they passed the assessment orders, the respondents claim to have served the assessment orders by affixture only to cover up their lapse in not serving the show cause notices and the assessment orders on the petitioners, and the previous business premises of the petitioner is no longer his business premises, are all factual statements, which could have rebutted by the respondents in their counter-affidavit only if they had been asserted in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. As noted hereinabove, these contentions have been urged for the first time in the reply affidavit dated 22.01.2018, which was served on Sri S. Suribabu, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes on the same day, and were handed over across the bar to the Court just before commencement of arguments, in the main Writ Petition, on the very same day i.e., 22.01.2018. As these contentions were urged for the first time in the reply affidavit, the respondents did not have the opportunity to rebut the same and, as held by the Supreme Court in Bharat Singh, (1988) 4 SCC 534 such a plea, not raised in the Writ Petition, cannot be entertained. 43. In this context it is necessary to note that if, as is now contended before us, the petitioner had closed his business in 2008, he ought to have complied with the requirements of Rule 53(a) of the A.P.G.S.T. Rules, 1957 which stipulates that if, at any time a dealer discontinues or sells or otherwise disposes of the whole or any part of any business carried on by him, the dealer or, if he is dead, the legal representative shall notify the fact to the assessing authority concerned within 30 days thereafter. There is no plea either in the writ affidavit, or even in the reply affidavit, of the petitioner having complied with the conditions stipulated in Rule 53(a), and of having intimated the assessing authority that he had discontinued his business. There is no plea either in the writ affidavit, or even in the reply affidavit, of the petitioner having complied with the conditions stipulated in Rule 53(a), and of having intimated the assessing authority that he had discontinued his business. The contention that Sri P. Masthan Rao was not authorized to receive the assessment order has also been urged for the first time in the reply affidavit. Rule 54(3) of the A.P.G.S.T. Rules, 1957 stipulated that, every dealer liable to tax under the Act, shall send to the assessing authority a declaration in Form-XXIX, specifying the name or names of the person or persons who are authorized to receive notices, orders etc, on their behalf under the Act; and all notices, orders etc. received by such person or persons shall be binding on the dealer. Form-XXIX is the declaration notifying the persons authorised to receive notices, orders etc. under the A.P.G.S.T. Act and requires the name of the person, his status and relationship with the dealer and his specimen signature to be furnished in the said Form and the said Form is required to be signed by the dealer. Both the writ affidavit and the reply affidavit make no reference as to the name of the person, whom the petitioner had intimated the assessing authority, as being authorized to receive the assessment order in his behalf. 44. In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that, in reply to the final notice issued by the Commercial Tax Officer dated 14.07.2014, the petitioner had filed a letter before the Commercial Tax Officer on 07.08.2014 stating that he had closed his business; he had requested twenty days time to verify the same, and had requested that copies of the assessment orders be furnished to him. It is also stated, in the counter- affidavit, that they were handed over to the petitioner on 12.08.2014. These averments in the counter-affidavit have not been denied in the reply affidavit. It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner had copies of the assessment orders with him, when he filed the Writ Petition on 27.04.2015. Nothing prevented him from either questioning the validity of the assessment orders or raise these factual pleas, which have now been urged in the reply affidavit, in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner had copies of the assessment orders with him, when he filed the Writ Petition on 27.04.2015. Nothing prevented him from either questioning the validity of the assessment orders or raise these factual pleas, which have now been urged in the reply affidavit, in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. As these contentions, which are factual in nature, are urged for the first time in the reply affidavit dated 22.01.2018, the very day on which Writ Petition was finally heard and judgment reserved, they cannot be examined as the respondents could not have rebutted these factual assertions in the counter-affidavit filed by them much earlier. VII. IS THE DEMAND NOTICE VITIATED BY MALAFIDES? 45. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, if the assessing authority had passed the assessment orders on the dates they were alleged to have been made, he would have served the assessment orders on the petitioner then and there, or atleast within a reasonable time, and could have been made a demand, for recovery of the alleged arrears, within a reasonable period of one year; the long silence of the assessing authority, and his abruptly demanding that the petitioner pay the alleged arrears of CST after a lapse of 11 years, speaks volumes about the foul play of the respondents; there is no explanation from the respondents as to why they kept quiet for a long period of 11 years, for demanding the alleged arrears of CST; and in the absence of any explanation for the long delay, the demand of the respondents should be treated as totally malafide, illegal and unsustainable. 46. As shall be detailed hereinabove, the period of limitation prescribed under the APGST Act and the APVAT Act is for passing an assessment order, there is no period of limitation prescribed for recovery of the amount assessed to tax, and the provisions of the A.P. Revenue Recovery Act are applicable for such recovery. The contention that since the respondents are seeking to recover arrears of sales tax by way of a demand notice, eleven years after the expiry of the assessment years 2005-2006, the said demand notice is vitiated by malafides is not tenable. 47. The contention that since the respondents are seeking to recover arrears of sales tax by way of a demand notice, eleven years after the expiry of the assessment years 2005-2006, the said demand notice is vitiated by malafides is not tenable. 47. Neither the assessing authorities, nor any officer or employee of the Commercial Taxes Department, have been arrayed as a respondent eo nominee in the Writ Petition. As held by the Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260 a plea of malice can only be examined when the person, against whom malice is alleged, is arrayed as a respondent eo nominee in the writ petition and, in his absence, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Court to record any finding as to whether or not the order, impugned in the writ petition, was vitiated by malafides. This contention, regarding the assessment order being vitiated by malafides, is only to be noted to be rejected. 48. The charge of malafide is more easily made than established. It is the last refuge of a losing litigant (E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N, (1974) 4 SCC 3 ; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 448 ; Ajit Kumar Nag v. GM(PJ), Indian Oil Corpn, (2005)7 SCC 764 ; and Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 8 SCC 418 ). Vague allegations of malafides are not enough to dislodge the burden resting on the person who makes the same, though what is required in this connection is not proof to the hilt. The abuse of authority must appear to be reasonably probable. (Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 ). There has to be strong and convincing evidence to establish allegations of malafides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition. The presumption under law is in favour of the bonafides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. (Chandra Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292 ; First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, (2002) 4 SCC 160 ). 49. While exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court should not readily accept the charge of malus animus laid against the State and its functionaries. (Chandra Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292 ; First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, (2002) 4 SCC 160 ). 49. While exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court should not readily accept the charge of malus animus laid against the State and its functionaries. The burden to prove the charge of malafides is always on the person who moves the court for invalidation of the action of the State and/or its agencies and instrumentalities on the ground that the same is vitiated due to malafides. The Court should resist the temptation of drawing dubious inferences of malafides or bad faith on the basis of vague and bald allegations or inchoate pleadings. (Jasbir Singh Chhabra v. State of Punjab, (2010) 4 SCC 192 ). Challenge to the demand notice, on the ground of malafides, must, therefore, fail. VIII. IS A SINGLE DEMAND NOTICE FOR FOUR ASSESSMENT YEARS, AND ITS BELATED ISSUE, ILLEGAL? 50. (Jasbir Singh Chhabra v. State of Punjab, (2010) 4 SCC 192 ). Challenge to the demand notice, on the ground of malafides, must, therefore, fail. VIII. IS A SINGLE DEMAND NOTICE FOR FOUR ASSESSMENT YEARS, AND ITS BELATED ISSUE, ILLEGAL? 50. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the demand notice was issued, in the year 2014, after a lapse of 11 years; had the assessing authority made the assessment orders, on the dates alleged to have been made, he would have issued a demand notice to the petitioner, for payment of CST separately for each year, immediately after making the assessment order; normally the assessing authority issues demand notice immediately after writing the assessment order; in the present case, the assessing authority had issued a single demand notice, for recovery of CST for all the four years, in the year 2014, instead of issuing a separate demand notice, for payment of CST for each assessment year, immediately after the alleged assessment orders were passed; inordinate delay in issuing the demand notice, non-issuance of demand notice for each year immediately after the assessment orders of each year was passed, and issuance of a single demand notice for recovery of CST for all the four years with inordinate delay, creates a strong suspicion that the assessing authority did not make the assessment orders, for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06, on the dates alleged to have been made; all the four assessment orders were written by the assessing authority only in the year 2014, in which year he had issued the demand notice; all the assessment orders were ante-dated; there is no explanation for not issuing the demand notices separately for each assessment order, and for the inordinate delay of 11 years in issuing the demand notice for recovery of CST for all the four years; and, in the absence of any explanation in this regard, this Court should draw adverse inference, against the respondents, that the assessment orders were ante-dated with a malafide intention to recover time barred CST from the petitioner. 51. Section 16(1) of the APGST Act requires the assessed tax to be paid by the dealer in such manner, and within such time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of service of the notice of assessment as may be specified in such notice. 51. Section 16(1) of the APGST Act requires the assessed tax to be paid by the dealer in such manner, and within such time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of service of the notice of assessment as may be specified in such notice. Failure on the part of the dealer to pay the tax, as assessed, would enable recovery of the said amounts as arrears of land revenue; and, consequently, Section 17(c)(1) confers the power of a Collector, under the A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, on the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of recovery of any amount due under the Act. Likewise, under Section 22(1) of the AP VAT Act, the tax assessed under the said Act shall be payable in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed. Rule 25(5) of the AP VAT Rules, 2005 stipulates that the assessing authority shall serve upon a VAT dealer an order of the tax assessed in Form VAT 305, and the VAT dealer shall pay the same within the time and manner specified in the notice. Form VAT 305 stipulates that the amount of tax, as specified in the order, shall be paid within thirty days after receipt of the order, and failure to make payment would result in recovery proceedings being initiated. Section 25 of the AP VAT Act stipulated that, if the tax assessed is not paid by a dealer within the time specified there for, the whole of the amount, then remaining unpaid, may be recovered as if it were arrears of land revenue. 52. While the aforesaid provisions of the APGST Act, and the AP VAT Act, place an obligation on the dealer to pay the tax within the specified time, and confers power on the competent authority to recover the tax due as arrears of land revenue, neither has any provision, which prescribes any period of limitation for issuing a demand notice for recovery of the tax assessed earlier, been brought to our notice, nor do these Acts and the Rules made thereunder prohibit any demand notice being issued for more than one assessment year. As noted hereinabove, the assessment order for the assessment year 2002-03 was made on 10.03.2006, for the assessment year 2003-04 on 30.03.2007, for the assessment year 2004-05 on 17.03.2008, and for the assessment year 2005-06 on 18.04.2009. As noted hereinabove, the assessment order for the assessment year 2002-03 was made on 10.03.2006, for the assessment year 2003-04 on 30.03.2007, for the assessment year 2004-05 on 17.03.2008, and for the assessment year 2005-06 on 18.04.2009. The final notice dated 21.07.2014 was issued just a little more than five years after the assessment orders were passed for the assessment year 2005-06 on 18.04.2009, and therefore the contention that the demand notice was issued after 11 years is factually incorrect. 53. In the absence of any statutory requirement in this regard, the contention that a common demand notice, for four assessment years, cannot be issued, does not merit acceptance. It is only on an assessment being made, and the tax liability determined, can a demand be raised for payment of the assessed tax. As no demand could have been raised even without an assessment order being passed, the contention that the period of four years should be computed from the end of the assessment year, and the demand notice was issued 11 years thereafter, is not tenable. The contentions that, since the demand notice was issued in 2014 for the tax due for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2005-06, the assessment orders are ante-dated, there is no explanation for not issuing the demand notices separately for each assessment year and for the inordinate delay of 11 years in issuing the demand notice for recovery of CST, are urged for the first time in the reply affidavit dated 22.01.2018 filed by the petitioner, and since these contentions, which are not pleaded in the writ affidavit, could not have been rebutted by the respondents in their counter-affidavit filed earlier, these contentions cannot be examined in these Writ proceedings. IX. CONCLUSION: 54. As none of the contentions urged, by Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in challenge to the validity of the demand notice, merit acceptance, the Writ Petition must be, and is accordingly, dismissed. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, shall also stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.