ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the applicants as well as Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1. 2. Notice has been served on the respondents as it appears from the Registry’s note dated 23.02.2018. 3. This is a petition under Order XLI Rule 3A of the CPC for condoning the delay of 377 days in presenting the appeal. According to the report of the Stamp Reporter, delay is of 377 days [but it has been wrongly shown in the cause title as delay of 335 days]. The said delay is created a statutory bar in preferring the appeal from the judgment and decree respectively dated 29.09.2016 and 06.10.2016 delivered in M.S. 07 of 2015 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dharmanagar, North Tripura. 4. The applicants have averred that they had no documents for effecting contesting the suit filed by the respondent No.1, as the documents of the firm named and styled as M/S Chapala Brick Industry were removed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 to his personal custody. The bank had initially refused to supply the copy of the statement of banking transaction of the said firm but after the decree was delivered the applicants with the help of the son of the first partner (Sri Sourav Bhowmik) could convince the Bank Manager. The reason for denial of the bank transaction was that the said account was closed and got out of the normal channel of the bank. However, the new Manager of the said bank furnished a copy of the statement to the applicants and the applicants could discover that huge amount was “defalcated” by the respondent No.1 as the attorney of the firm. On discovery of such fraudulent act, the applicants instituted a suit being T.S. 29 of 2017 for realization of a sum of Rs.59,14,000/-. 5. The respondent No.1 filed the suit, being Money Suit No.07 of 2015 for realization of his remuneration and other expenses which he had incurred. The said suit was decreed for realization of Rs.7,50,580/-. The applicants, as the defendants, could not successfully resisted the said claim. They had so failed for want of the valuable records. 5. The respondent No.1 filed the suit, being Money Suit No.07 of 2015 for realization of his remuneration and other expenses which he had incurred. The said suit was decreed for realization of Rs.7,50,580/-. The applicants, as the defendants, could not successfully resisted the said claim. They had so failed for want of the valuable records. According to the applicants, on scrutiny of the bank statement it appeared that a sum of Rs.59.14 lakhs was taken out of the bank for personal benefit of the respondent No.1. The applicants in want of the bank statements could not locate that fraudulent act of the respondent No.1 and as consequence, thereby could neither raise the claim for set-off or the counter claim. Even if the decretal amount was admitted by the applicants, the suit could not have been maintainable as the amount that respondent No.1 has parked unauthorisedly is much larger than what he sought by filing the said Money Suit. 6. However, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel did not leave any space left untraverse for making the statement that all these are mere thought in the aftermath. This is the epitome of fraud. The applicants want to introduce those documents which expose the fraud by filing a fresh appeal against the judgment and decree dated 06.10.2016 passed in M.S.04 of 2017. The applicants are determined to introduce those bank transaction documents and get the matter reheard. 7. The decree was issued on 06.10.2017, but as the applicants have serious financial constraint and substantively for lack of proper records, could not file any appeal immediately thereafter. 8. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the applicants has stoutly contended that the un-appealed decree would be a premium to fraud. That apart, the applicants are not wholly responsible for the said delay as they depended on the other person who did not properly guide them after getting the bank transaction statement in the month of September, 2017. When the applicants briefed the counsel for taking steps for filing the appeal, suddenly the counsel had to leave for Silchar having news of the said demise of his mother. Thereafter, the vacation started. The counsel remained away from the station for a considerable time and he returned on 02.01.2018 and immediately drafted the appeal and it was ready for filing on 04.01.2018. But the certified copy of the judgment was not there. Thereafter, the vacation started. The counsel remained away from the station for a considerable time and he returned on 02.01.2018 and immediately drafted the appeal and it was ready for filing on 04.01.2018. But the certified copy of the judgment was not there. When the certified copy was received on 09.01.2018 the said appeal was filed but after the statutory period as described by the Limitation Act, 1963. According to the applicants there is a delay of 377 days and they have given the explanation in the manner as stated above. 9. The respondent No.1 filed one objection against the petition for condonation of delay. In the objection the respondent No.1 has contended that M.S. 07 of 2015 was decreed for a sum of Rs.7,50,580/- out of the total claim of Rs.15,27,229/-. The respondent No.1, the plaintiff in that Money Suit, being M.S. 07 of 2015 being aggrieved, preferred an appeal being RFA No.27 of 2016 in the court of the District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar. The respondent No.1 filed an appeal, being RFA 27 of 2016 and put the decree in execution by filing an application, being Ex(M) 01 of 2017. As an emergency measure, the applicants approached the execution court to stay the execution of the said decree under Order XXI, Rule 29 of the CPC which provides that where a suit is pending in any Court or of a decree which is being executed by such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. But as it transpires from the averment made by the respondent No.1 that by an order dated 02.05.2017 the executing court passed an order declining to execute the decree awarded the sum of Rs.7,50,580/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the institution of the suit. 10. The said order had been challenged by the respondent No.1 by filing a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being CRP 36 of 2017. The said order has been set aside by this court by the order dated 17.08.2017 with direction to the Execution Court to proceed with expedition. 10. The said order had been challenged by the respondent No.1 by filing a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being CRP 36 of 2017. The said order has been set aside by this court by the order dated 17.08.2017 with direction to the Execution Court to proceed with expedition. The applicants filed Title Suit on the fundamental ground of fraud being T.S. 29 of 2017 and for realisation of Rs.59,14,000/- by the appropriate decree. The respondent No.1 has further contended that the basic cause for the delay being non-availability of the documents cannot be accepted. No judicial action can support the fraud and as such, the element of fraud may be accepted as the sufficient cause for condoning the delay, so that the substantive justice can befall over the dispute. 11. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel has submitted that this court may not condone the delay, as there is no explanation at all. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has further submitted that at one point of time, the respondent No.1 was terminated and for recovery of the arrear salaries, vehicle charges and other expenses the respondent No.1 had instituted the suit. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has submitted that the explanations are so slipshod that this court cannot rely on them for purpose of condoning that huge delay. 12. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has in support of his contention placed reliance on three decisions of the apex court. In Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 , the apex court while giving an workable definition of the expression “sufficient cause” has enunciated as under: “23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.” Further has enunciated that: “What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” [Emphasis added] 13. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has with great emphasis submitted that negligence on the part of the applicants is writ large on the face of the records. To take such submission further, reference has been made by Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel to Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , where the apex court has observed that the person seeking the delay, has to place reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay. There is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 14. Finally Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has placed further reliance on B Madhuri Goud vs. B. Damodar Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 693, where the apex court has to a great extent deliberated on the term “sufficient and satisfactory explanation”. It has been observed in the said report that the Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. It has further enunciated that the expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts apply the law in a meaningful and substantive manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay, but over the years Courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay. 15. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel while drawing his submission to its end has stated that the delay has not been at all explained in the case in hand and as such even under the liberal approach the delay cannot be condoned. That apart, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has submitted that the applicants were sitting in the fence and laid all sorts of defence, but the trial court was not moved a bit. He has urged this court to reject this petition for condonation of delay as filed by the applicants. 16. In the rejoinder, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel has submitted that fraud vitiates everything and the court cannot co-exist with fraud. While adding further Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has submitted that from the order dated 25.10.2017 passed in the execution proceeding being Ex(M) 01 of 2017, it would be apparent that the applicants have expressed their willingness to make payment of the decretal amount and for that purpose, urged for a short adjournment. Making such solemn declaration in the court, they have turned around to approach this court, by filing an appeal which is however barred by limitation. 17. This is a very unusual circumstance. Discovery of important documents has surfaced. That discovery exposes an incidence of fraud, according to the applicants. 18. Making such solemn declaration in the court, they have turned around to approach this court, by filing an appeal which is however barred by limitation. 17. This is a very unusual circumstance. Discovery of important documents has surfaced. That discovery exposes an incidence of fraud, according to the applicants. 18. This court have keenly scrutinized the records and finds that two widows whose interest are at stake could not properly project their case for want of documents or for their ignorance where such documents were maintained. In such circumstances, when by raising specific plea of fraud the applicants have instituted a suit, being T.S. No.29 of 2017 on the very ground of exercising fraud on them, this court is of the view that without scuttling the procedure by rejecting the prayer for condonation, this court should allow them a chance to place the records for purpose of consideration by the court. It cannot be denied, however, that the explanation as made in this case, has been made very casually. The sufficient cause contributing to the delay would have placed more elaborately to enable the court draw its own inference without making a swiveling act for finding out the causes for condoning the delay. Having observed thus, the said delay is condoned. In the result, this petition stands allowed.