Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 791 (GUJ)

Maheshkumar Fakirchand Mehta v. Madhuben Kanaiyalal Patel

2018-06-27

PARESH UPADHYAY

body2018
JUDGMENT : Paresh Upadhyay, J. These two Appeals arise from the common order of the Trial Court [2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural)] dated 01.09.2016 below Applications Exh.5 and Exh. 38 in Special Civil Suit No.107 of 2010. By the impugned common order, the Trial Court has directed the parties to maintain status-quo, qua the suit property. Since the impugned order is common qua Exh.5 and Exh. 38, the same is challenged by the defendants by filing these two separate Appeals. 2. Heard learned advocates. 3. The material on record is also taken into consideration by this Court. 4. Mr. Viral Shah, learned advocate for the appellants - original defendants No. 5 to 9 has submitted that the very foundation of the suit lacks bona fide inasmuch as the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 have instituted the suit in collusion with each other. It is submitted that the defendant No.1 is the head of family, and is husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4. In all, four persons projected themselves as plaintiffs, claiming their share in the property, asserting that their share in the suit property ought not to have been dealt with by their head of family - defendant No.1. It is submitted that, on these glaring facts, the Trial Court could not have recorded that the plaintiffs have even prima-facie case. It is submitted that the interim injunction granted by the Trial Court needs to be interfered with. It is submitted that the impugned order be quashed and set aside. In support of his submission, Mr. Viral Shah, learned advocate for the appellants has relied on the following decisions. (i) Thomson Press (India) Ltd. Vs. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397 . (ii) Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705 . (iii) Rajni Tando v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar and another, (2009) 14 SCC 782 . 5. XXX XXX XXX 6. Mr. Bharat R. Pandya, learned advocate for the original defendants No. 2 to 4, has supported the case of the present appellants. He however states that, he has no further submission. 7. Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned senior advocate with Mr. 5. XXX XXX XXX 6. Mr. Bharat R. Pandya, learned advocate for the original defendants No. 2 to 4, has supported the case of the present appellants. He however states that, he has no further submission. 7. Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned senior advocate with Mr. J.R. Shah, learned advocate for the original plaintiffs - respondents No. 1 to 4 has submitted that, the Trial Court has not committed any error by granting interim injunction and no interference be made by this Court. It is submitted that the suit property could not be dealt with by the defendant No.1, since the revenue entry was based on oral contract. It is submitted that the very action of the defendant No.1 qua dealing with the suit property was illegal. It is further submitted that the present appellants have purchased the property in question during pendency of the Suit, hence they do not have any locus to challenge the impugned order. It is submitted that the power of attorney, alleged to have been given by the defendant No.1 to defendant No.2, was not a registered document and in view of the provisions of Sections 32 & 33 of the Registration Act, the same could not be a basis for further carrying out the transaction including sale deed dated 30.07.2007. It is also contended that, the attempt on the part of the appellants - original defendants No. 5 to 9, to place additional documents on record of these appeals, needs to be rejected for the reason that, it can only be done in the circumstances stipulated in Order - 41 Rule-27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that these Appeals from Order be dismissed. In support of his submissions, he has relied on the following decisions. (i) Maharwal Khewaji Trust v. Baldev Dass, (2005) AIR SC 104. (ii) A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A. Subhuraj Chettiar, (2016) AIR SC 79. (iii) Surjit Singh and others v. Gurwant Kaur and others, (2014) AIR SC 3679. (iv) Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (D) by L.Rs. And others, (2008) AIR SC 2560. (v) K.N. Aswathnarayana Setty (D) through Lrs. And others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2014) AIR SC 279. (vi) Bankey Behari v. Surya Narain @ Munno, (2004) 11 SCC 393 . (vii) Luhar Tulsidar Narsibhai v. Vrajlal Lalji Vaghela, (2007) AIR Guj. 77. 8. And others, (2008) AIR SC 2560. (v) K.N. Aswathnarayana Setty (D) through Lrs. And others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2014) AIR SC 279. (vi) Bankey Behari v. Surya Narain @ Munno, (2004) 11 SCC 393 . (vii) Luhar Tulsidar Narsibhai v. Vrajlal Lalji Vaghela, (2007) AIR Guj. 77. 8. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having considered the material on record, this Court finds as under. 8.1 The plaintiff No.1 is the wife of defendant No.1. Plaintiffs No.2 to 4 are the children of defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 is the head of family. 8.2 It is the grievance of the plaintiffs that their head of the family, had no authority to deal with the suit property, since the plaintiffs had also share in the suit property. 8.3 The suit was filed on 22.02.2010, principally challenging the sale deed dated 30.07.2007 in favour of defendants No.3 and 4, executed by defendant No.2 on the strength of power of attorney given by the head of family of the plaintiffs i.e. defendant No.1. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that it was an ingenuine document. 8.4 Along with the suit, injunction application Exh.5 was also filed, on which, the Trial Court, while issuing the process on 22.02.2010, refused to grant ex-parte injunction. 8.5 In the above factual background, in view of this Court, it is the original defendant No.1, who should be the first contesting defendant. It was not his case that, the said power was ingenuine or that the sale deed was illegal. Had that been the case, he himself would have been the plaintiff. He chose not do so. This clearly indicates that, the present suit is the sponsored litigation by the defendant No.1, through his other family members. The collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 (the head of family) is thus writ large. 8.6 The defendant No.1 died on 05.03.2011 i.e. after more than one year from the date of issuance of process to him by the Trial Court. He did not file any written statement. This was clear invitation by him, to decide the matter against the defendants, which, in substance, would be in his own favour. 8.7 Since there was no injunction, the part of the said property, was sold by defendants No.3 and 4 (the first purchasers) to other persons, by two different sale deeds dated 30.08.2011 and 12.09.2011. This was clear invitation by him, to decide the matter against the defendants, which, in substance, would be in his own favour. 8.7 Since there was no injunction, the part of the said property, was sold by defendants No.3 and 4 (the first purchasers) to other persons, by two different sale deeds dated 30.08.2011 and 12.09.2011. At that time, Application Exh.5 was pending. 8.8 The plaintiffs thereafter filed two applications. Application Exh.35 was for joining subsequent purchasers as party defendants No.5 to 9. The same was allowed by the Trial Court at the relevant time. The same is not the subject matter at present. Application Exh.38 was filed praying for injunction against the subsequent purchasers qua the suit property. Thus, Exh.5 and Exh.38 both the injunction applications were pending before the Trial Court for few years. It is on these two applications, the Trial Court has ordered all the parties to maintain status-quo, qua the suit property. What status-quo is to be maintained by the plaintiffs qua the suit property, in the above facts, is also a question. In substance, the Trial Court has restrained the defendants No.5 to 9 to deal with the property, which they have purchased by registered sale deeds. 8.9 The issue that arises for consideration of this Court is, whether the plaintiffs can be said to have even prima facie case against any of the defendants. The record makes it clear that, the plaintiffs did not have any case against defendant No.1. If that was so, defendant No.1 can not be permitted to steer the proxy litigation against defendants No.2 or defendants No.3 and 4, through his other family members, who were projected as the plaintiffs. This Court therefore holds that, the plaintiffs did not have any case, even prima facie case, against the defendant No.1 and in turn, against the defendants No.2 to 4. The Trial Court fell in error in accepting the case of the plaintiffs, against the defendants No.2 to 4. 8.10 Having held that the plaintiffs did not have any case, even prima facie case, against the defendant No.1 and in turn, against the defendants No.2 to 4, the plaintiffs can not be said to have any case against the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants No.5 to 9. 8.10 Having held that the plaintiffs did not have any case, even prima facie case, against the defendant No.1 and in turn, against the defendants No.2 to 4, the plaintiffs can not be said to have any case against the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants No.5 to 9. Only because the defendants No.5 to 9 have purchased the suit property pending litigation, that itself is no ground to hold anything against those defendants and restrain them from dealing with the suit property. The impugned order therefore needs to be interfered with. 9. Since this Court has held, for the above reasons that, the plaintiffs can not be said to have even prima facie case, the question of examining other two parameters i.e. balance of convenience and irreparable loss, need not be examined. The contention raised by learned senior advocate for the original plaintiffs - present respondents No. 1 to 4, qua unregistered power of attorney and the authorities relied by him in support of his case, would not take the case of the plaintiffs any further. The impugned order therefore needs to be set aside. 10. It is noted that since challenge before this Court is only by the defendants No. 5 to 9, who have purchased only the part of the property which was purchased by original defendants No. 3 & 4, the impugned order of the Trial Court, which is challenged in these appeals, shall stand modified only to the extent it operates against the present appellant. The impugned order therefore needs to be quashed and set aside, qua that suit property, which is purchased by the defendants No. 5 to 9. Since the impugned order is not under challenge at the hands of the defendants No. 3 & 4, the same would hold the field qua the property which is still held by them. It is noted that, non interference in that part of the order, is not confirmation thereof and in the event the same is challenged, it may be considered on its own merits. It is noted that initially there was no restrain order by the Trial Court qua any of the suit properties and it is only by the impugned order, the restrain order has come, which is being interfered with by this Court. 11. For the reasons recorded above, the following order is passed. 11.1 Both these Appeals are allowed. It is noted that initially there was no restrain order by the Trial Court qua any of the suit properties and it is only by the impugned order, the restrain order has come, which is being interfered with by this Court. 11. For the reasons recorded above, the following order is passed. 11.1 Both these Appeals are allowed. 11.2 The impugned common order passed by the Trial Court [2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural)] dated 01.09.2016 below Applications Exh.5 and 38 in Special Civil Suit No.107 of 2010 is quashed and set aside (so far it restrains the present appellants - defendants No. 5 to 9 from dealing with the suit property). 11.3 The Applications Exh.5 and 38 filed by the original plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit No.107 of 2010 in the Court of the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) are dismissed, so far it seeks restrain order against present appellants - defendants No. 5 to 9, for dealing with the suit property acquired by them. 12. After the pronouncement of this order, Mr. J.R. Shah, learned advocate for the respondents No.1 to 4 - Original Plaintiffs has prayed for stay of this order. 13. Considering the totality, this request is refused.