JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The main questions to be decided in this petition are whether the petitioner-company is liable to pay entertainment tax on carriage of passengers on aerial ropeway to Naina Deviji Temple under the Himachal Pradesh Entertainment Duty Act, 1968 (for short ‘Entertainment Act, 1968’), more particularly, under the amendment, which was carried vide H.P. Entertainments Duty (Second Amendment) Act, 1999 (Act No.3 of 2000) (for short Amendment Act, 1999), and also to decide whether the State Government has the competence to issue notification imposing entertainment tax on ropeway. 2. However, before answering these questions certain facts leading to filing of this petition need to be noticed. 3. The petitioner is a private limited company and is running a ropeway that connects to Naina Deviji Temple by ropeway. It is claimed that this ropeway is not concerned with any activity directly or indirectly of entertainment and only transports the pilgrims from the base of mountain to its top so as to enable them to reach the sanctum sanctorum for paying obeisance at the Temple. This activity cannot be termed to be entertainment so as to bring it within the purview of Amendment Act, 1999. It is further contended that the State of Himachal Pradesh in fact has enacted the Himachal Pradesh Ropeway Aerial Act, 1968 (for short ‘Ropeway Aerial Act, 1968) wherein there is no provision to levy any duty and, therefore, what cannot be done directly for want of any provision in the Ropeway Aerial Act, 1968, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly by making a provision in the Amendment Act, 1999. It is further alleged that as far as the entertainment duty is concerned, it is essential that the provider and the recipient of the entertainment should be ad idem where the provider shall provide and recipient shall be admitted to an entertainment. The entertainment and amusement as contemplated by Entry 33 of the List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India with regard to regulation and Entry 62 of List-II with regard to taxation does not mean subjective entertainment and amusement which a person may receive but relates to an objective one available exclusively to the person who has purchased a ticket thereof. Therefore, in these circumstances, not only is the State Legislature completely incompetent in imposing a levy on aerial ropeways in absence of powers under Entry in List-II and III to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and treating the same as entertainment, but otherwise also, if the said duty is allowed to be imposed upon the carriage provided by the petitioner-company to pilgrims thereby making it physically less taxing for them in reaching and visiting the holy shrine of Naina Deviji, it would in fact mean that a levy has been put on those persons who have purely spiritual and religious purpose in wanting to visit the holy shrine while exercising their right under Article 25 of the Constitution and, therefore, such imposition of tax is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. 4. The respondents have filed their reply wherein preliminary objections have been raised to the effect that respondents enjoy their discretion to determine which activity of amusement should be taxed and what should the manner and rate of levy. Levy of entertainment duty exclusively falls within the domain of the State Legislature and, therefore, under section 3(1) of the Amended Act, a person admitted to entertainment is liable to pay an entertainment duty. Whereas the petitioners have merely a duty to collect the levy and to deposit the same with the Government, which activity on the part of the petitioners, cannot be termed as liability to pay duty. Therefore, the Amendment Act, 1999, under challenge is not violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, thus, the writ petition being not maintainable should be dismissed. It is further averred that the ropeway is a definite source of attraction to the customers by means of providing amusement. Being an aerial sport, it provides mental diversion to the users. Thus, it constitutes entertainment or amusement within the meaning of Entry 62 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule. These very averments have been reiterated in the main reply in order to justify the levy of entertainment tax and, therefore, we need not refer to the same. 5. The petitioners have filed rejoinder wherein they have denied the averments made in the reply and reiterated those of the petition. These very averments have been reiterated in the main reply in order to justify the levy of entertainment tax and, therefore, we need not refer to the same. 5. The petitioners have filed rejoinder wherein they have denied the averments made in the reply and reiterated those of the petition. Besides that the petitioners have annexed the copy of judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the Uttrakhand High Court in three connected petitions, lead case being petition No. 1031(M/S) of 2007, in support of their contention, wherein similar provision in the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax, 1979, as is applicable to the State of Uttrakhand, was struck down by the said Court for want of legislative competence of the State. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 7. In order to decide the controversy, we have to refer to certain provisions of the Entertainments Duty Act and Ropeway Aerial Act, 1968. 8. The word “entertainment” as originally defined in section 2 (d) of the Himachal Pradesh Entertainments Duty Act, 1968, which reads as under: “(d) “entertainment” includes any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race to which persons are ordinarily admitted on payment.” However, the definition, as amended by the impugned amendment, now reads as under: “2(d) “entertainment” includes any exhibition performance amusement, game, sport [“race, an aerial ropeway carrier”] to which persons are ordinarily admitted on payment; [“or television exhibition for which persons are required to make payment by way of contribution, or subscription, or installation or connection, charges, or any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever”]”. 9. Entry 62 of List-II of Schedule-7 of the Constitution recognizes ropeways as means of communication and confers legislative competence on the State to enact laws regulating such activities. Entry 13 reads as under: “13. Communications, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communication not specified in List I, municipal tramways, ropeways, inland waterways and traffic thereon subject to the provisions of List I and List III with regard to such waterways; vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles.” 10. The Entertainments Duty Act has been enacted consequent to the legislative power conferred on the State by Entry 62 of List-II, which reads as under:- “62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.” 11. The Entertainments Duty Act has been enacted consequent to the legislative power conferred on the State by Entry 62 of List-II, which reads as under:- “62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.” 11. The Government of Himachal Pradesh in order to authorize, facilitate and regulate the construction and working of aerial ropeways in Himachal Pradesh has enacted the Himachal Pradesh Aerial Ropeways Act, 1968 and admittedly there is no provision for levying of tax in the said Act. 12. By now it is well settled that List-II of Entries 1 to 44 form one group mentioning the subject on which the State could legislate but do not confine legislation, whereas Entries 45 to 63 thereof form another group and deal exclusively with what can be taxed. 13. It is equally settled that legislative Entries should be liberally interpreted and that none of the items in the List is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and each general word should be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. (Ref : United Provinces vs Atiqa Begum, AIR 1941 FC 16, Western India Theatres Ltd vs. Cantonment Board, Poona, Cantonment, AIR 1959 SC 582 , Elel Hotels And Investments Ltd Vs. Union Of India, 1989 (3) SCC 698 and Godfrey Phillips India Limited Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2005 (2) SCC 515 ). 14. List-II Entry 62 refers to the activities of indulgence, enjoyment or pleasure in that which is costly or which is generally recognized as being beyond the necessary requirement of an average member of society, which activities alone can be the subject matter of tax under List-II Entry 62 and not goods or articles of luxury. 15. In the instant case the vires of an enactment of Entertainments Duty Act is impugned on the ground that the legislation has no power to enact such enactment. Therefore, in such circumstances, the Court is to consider the true nature and character of such an enactment with reference to the power of the State Legislature to enact such a law. While adjudging the vires of such an enactment, the Court must examine the whole enactment, its object, scope and effects of its provision. Therefore, in such circumstances, the Court is to consider the true nature and character of such an enactment with reference to the power of the State Legislature to enact such a law. While adjudging the vires of such an enactment, the Court must examine the whole enactment, its object, scope and effects of its provision. If on such adjudication it is found that the enactment falls substantially on a matter assigned to the State Legislature, in that event such an enactment must be held to be valid even though nomenclature of such an enactment shows that it is beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 16. In other words, where the levy is challenged, its validity has to be adjudicated with reference to the competence of the State legislation to enact such law and while doing so it is required to find the real character and nature of levy. In sum and substance what is to be found is the real nature of levy, its pith and substance and it is in this light that the competence of the State legislation is to be adjudicated. 17. The doctrine of pith and substance means that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Legislature, it cannot be held to be ultra vires merely because its nomenclature shows that it encroaches upon matters assigned to another heading of legislation. The nomenclature of a levy is not conclusive for determining its true character and nature. (Ref: Goodyear India Ltd. & others vs. State of Haryana and another, 1990 (2) SCC 71 . 18. Now, at this stage, the Court is required to consider as to whether the object of undertaking journey by ropeway can be for entertainment or for amusement. For this purpose, we need not fall back only on the statutory definition of entertainment as reproduced above, but would be well within confine if we take assistance from external aids like dictionary etc.( Ref: M/s Geeta Enterprises and others vs. State of U.P. and others, (1983) 4 SCC 202 . 19. For this purpose, we need not fall back only on the statutory definition of entertainment as reproduced above, but would be well within confine if we take assistance from external aids like dictionary etc.( Ref: M/s Geeta Enterprises and others vs. State of U.P. and others, (1983) 4 SCC 202 . 19. In Geeta Enterprises case (supra), after quoting the expression “entertainment” as set out in the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937, the correct meaning and import of the word “entertainment was set out in the following terms: “[4] The crux of the matter is as to whether or not the show, the details of which have been described above falls within the four corners of the expression "Entertainment". Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act may be extracted thus :- "'entertainment' includes any exhibitional, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment." [5] It is true that a part of the video show was of some educational value but that by itself would be no answer to the application of sub-section (3). The definition as extracted above is extremely wide so as to take within its fold and includes the kind of show which was displayed by the petitioners in this case. [6] Before explaining the section we would like to ascertain the correct meaning and import of the word 'entertainment' (which is neither a scientific nor a technical term) as used in the popular sense or as understood in common parlance. This was held by this Court in the case of Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd, v. State of Haryana, (1979) 1 SCR 545 : ( AIR 1979 SC 300 ). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (4th Edn: vol. 2, p. 916) the word 'entertainment' has been defined thus:- "Entertainment .................for a PUBLIC OR SPECIAL Occasion"...........is an entertainment in the sense of a gathering of persons for entertainment." "Entertainment" (Small Lotteries and Gaming Act 1956 (c. 45, Section 4 (1)) included a tombola drive alone without accompanying festivities. "The monologue or patter of a comedian, even if delivered at an entertainment provided by an institution whose activities are partly educational, was held to be a "variety entertainment" within the meaning of the Section." Similarly in Words and Phrases, Judicially Defined (Vol. 2, pp. "The monologue or patter of a comedian, even if delivered at an entertainment provided by an institution whose activities are partly educational, was held to be a "variety entertainment" within the meaning of the Section." Similarly in Words and Phrases, Judicially Defined (Vol. 2, pp. 206-207) the word entertainment has been defined thus:- "Entertainment is something connected with the enjoyment of refreshment-rooms, tables, and the like. It is something beyond refreshment; it is the accommodation provided, whether that includes a musical or other amusement or not." Similarly in Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn; Vol. 14A, A 353) 'entertainment' has been defined thus:- "An entertainment is a source or means of amusement; a diverting performance, especially a public performance, as a concert, drama, or the like." "Entertainment" denotes that which serves for amusement, and "amusement" is defined as a pleasurable occupation of the senses, or that which furnishes it, as dancing, sports, or music." Likewise in Reader's Digest Family Word Finder at p. 264, 'entertainment, has been defined thus :- "Entertainment amusement, diversion, distraction, recreation, fun, play good time, pastime, novelty; pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary the word 'entertainment' has been defined at p. 757 thus:- "entertainment"- the act of diverting, amusing, or causing someone's time to pass agreeably. "Something that diverts, amuses, or occupies the attention agreeably. A public performance designed to divert or amuse." Similarly in the Concise English Dictionary by Hayward and Sparkes the word 'entertainment' has been defined thus :- "the art of entertainment, amusing or diverting, the pleasure afforded to the mind by anything interesting, amusement, other performance intended to amuse." [7] A perusal of the various shades, aspects forms and implications of the word 'entertainment' as defined in the aforesaid books clearly leads to an irresistible inference that the word 'entertainment' has been used in a very wide sense so as to include within its ambil, entertainment of any kind including one which may be purely educative. Subsection (3) itself by using the word 'entertainment' as "any exhibitional, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment" has extended the scope of entertainment to expressly include any kind of amusement, game or sport. Subsection (3) itself by using the word 'entertainment' as "any exhibitional, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment" has extended the scope of entertainment to expressly include any kind of amusement, game or sport. It cannot be disputed in the present case that by operating the video, the operator of the video pays 50 paise per 30 seconds for playing the games, sports and other kind of performances which are shown on the machine and which can be watched by interested spectators. It was vehemently argued by the Counsel for the petitioners that no admission fee is charged from viewers seeing the video. That circumstance by itself, however, cannot defuse or alter the kind of entertainment derived by the person who pays for playing the games. That he would not pay money if it did not thrill, amuse, and entertain him, is obvious. Translated into actual practice, if the operators who are from the audience play the video for one hour the amount of money collected would be Rs. 60/- and if the video is played for 3-4 hours a day, the total amount comes to Rupees 180/-, 240/- per day which is doubtless a substantial amount for showing the video by way of an entertainment because when a number of people without any admission fee enter a hall for entertainment and enjoy the games it becomes a public show and the hall where the video is played becomes a public hall and amounts therefore to a public exhibition which is squarely covered by the first limb (exhibitional) of the definition of entertainment in sub-section (3) extracted above. 20. A tax under Entry 62 List II of the Seventh Schedule may be imposed not only on the person spending on entertainment but also on the act of a person entertaining or the subject of entertainment. It is well settled by now that such tax may be levied on the person offering or providing entertainment or the person enjoying it. (Ref: State of W.B. and others vs. Purvi Communication (P) Ltd. and others, (2005) 3 SCC 711 ). 21. Evidently, the only precedent on the subject is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of High Court of Uttrakhand in Writ Petition No. 1031 (M/S) of 2007, titled as Usha Breco Limited and another Vs. (Ref: State of W.B. and others vs. Purvi Communication (P) Ltd. and others, (2005) 3 SCC 711 ). 21. Evidently, the only precedent on the subject is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of High Court of Uttrakhand in Writ Petition No. 1031 (M/S) of 2007, titled as Usha Breco Limited and another Vs. State of U.P., upon which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 22. The Court therein was dealing with the identical situation where entertainment tax had been imposed upon the aerial ropeway operator under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979, applicable to the State of Uttrakhand, even though there was no provision in the same, like in the instant case, in the United Provinces Aerial Ropeways Act, 1922, i.e. applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh. 23. The petitioner therein had established that the ropeway was only to facilitate the transportation of the pilgrims for visit to Mansa Devi and Chandi Devi temples. The pilgrims after having Darshan of the above temples would board the ropeway to return to the lower terminals. It was in this background that it was urged that there was no question of tax on pilgrims for having Darshan of religious temples of Mansa Devi and Chandi Devi. The sole purpose of their visit to the hill top was pilgrimage and even otherwise there was no source of entertainment available at the top hill. Accepting this contention learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by concluding as follows: “In view of discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, the State has competence in view of Entry-13 of List-II of Schedule-7 of Constitution of India which recognizes ropeways as a means of communications and confers legislative competence on the States to enact laws regulating such activity. The United Provinces Aerial Ropeways Act, 1922 is in force in State of Uttarakhand also as it was in force in the State of U.P. by the enactment. Amendment if any could be made for imposing any type of tax under that Act. As on today the said Act does not contain provision to impose the entertainment tax on ropeways. The power under U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 was enacted consequent to the Legislative powers conferred on the State by Entry 62 of List –II of Schedule-7 of Constitution of India. As on today the said Act does not contain provision to impose the entertainment tax on ropeways. The power under U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 was enacted consequent to the Legislative powers conferred on the State by Entry 62 of List –II of Schedule-7 of Constitution of India. The learned Entertainment Commissioner has imposed the entertainment tax considering the ride of rope-ways as an amusement. The finding of learned Commissioner on this issue is totally perverse finding and the State Government instead of making amendment in the United Provinces Aerial Ropeways Act, 1922, issued the impugned notification in exercise of power under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 and added sub-clause (b) in clause-5 of impugned notification dated 6-9-2010, making a provision of 20% tax of each payment for admission over rope-ways. This notification dated 6-9 2010, was issued without legislative competence under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979, and in any view of the matter, as discussed above, on the rope-way cannot be said to be amusement under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979. Thus, for the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, it is quite clear that the State Government has no competence to impose entertainment tax on the ropeways installed at Chandi Devi and Mansa Devi Temples under the provision of Section 2 (g) of U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 and the Notification dated 6-9- 2010, so far as making provision of 20% tax of each payment for admission over ropeway, under sub clause (b) of clause 5 has been issued without legislative competence. Therefore, the Notification No. 58/2010/XXVII(9)/ Mano.kar-28/2009, dated 6th September, 2010, is quashed in respect of sub-clause (b) of clause-5 and rope way is treated to be deleted from the said Notification as no tax under the head ‘entertainment’ is payable on ropeway.” 24. We have gone through the aforesaid reasoning but find it difficult to concur with the same for more than one reasons. 25. In this State, one of the first ropeways established was in a resort known as “Timber Trail Resorts”. The ropeway was established only and only for the purpose of entertainment as it took the passengers from the hotel to a hill top and then brought them back and for this purpose considerably hefty amount towards the journey, i.e. ticket charges was charged and is still being charged. 26. The ropeway was established only and only for the purpose of entertainment as it took the passengers from the hotel to a hill top and then brought them back and for this purpose considerably hefty amount towards the journey, i.e. ticket charges was charged and is still being charged. 26. Not only this, even currently there are number of ropeways running in the State which are only a source of “entertainment” as the thrill and experience of travelling in Gandola of a ropeway is far different from the ordinary modes of communications/ transportation like, roads, bridges, tramways, inlays water ways, ferry etc. Such amusement and entertainment is not confined to the State of Himachal Pradesh but is available in majority of the hill States, including Uttrakhand and Jammu and Kashmir. 27. Why we have taken judicial notice of the running of the ropeways in the State and adjoining States is because of the fact that the petitioner on pointed query from this Court has conceded that to reach Naina Devi Temple Complex, the mode of communication/ transportation earlier to the ropeway was by road and the same is still being used till date. Therefore, it is not on account of compulsion that one has to travel in the Gandola that is used in aerial ropeway, but it is on account of entertainment and amusement of travelling in a Gandola that one opts to travel by aerial ropeway. It is also conceded that travelling by a Gandola of aerial ropeway is far more expensive to the Naina Devi hill top and back than travelling by bus or taxi. 28. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we have no difficulty in concluding that the aerial ropeway of the petitioner is providing entertainment and, therefore, the only question that remains for consideration is whether in the absence of any provision in the H.P. Aerial Ropeway Act, the State by amending the Entertainments Duty Act can recover the same. 29. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, only Entries 45 to 66 of the Seventh Schedule are those that can be taxed. 29. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, only Entries 45 to 66 of the Seventh Schedule are those that can be taxed. The Aerial ropeway Act was enacted to authorize, facilitate and regulate the construction and working of aerial ropeways in Himachal Pradesh without there being any provision of levying tax of the instant kind, whereas on the other hand, the Entertainments Duty Act was enacted to provide for levy on entertainment duty in respect of admission to public entertainments. 30. Therefore, the mere fact that no amendment was made in the Aerial Ropeway Act and the amendment was made in the Entertainments Duty Act is inconsequential as the entertainment duty in respect to admission to public entertainment could only be taxed under the Entertainments Duty Act, as such, we find it expressly difficult to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge of High Court of Uttrakhand, who only on the basis that no amendment had been carried in the United Provinces Aerial Act, 1922 had quashed the amendment. 31. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue that all the items as enumerated in the definition of entertainment have to be read ejusdem generis and would place strong reliance upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court contained in paras 75 to 77 of Godfrey Phillips case (supra), wherein it was observed as under: [75] Where two or more words are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from and are qualified by each other, the meaning of the general word being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. As said in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn. P. 289. "words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and their content are derived from their context. " [76] Put in other words the included words may be clarificatory or illustrative of the general word. As said in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn. P. 289. "words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and their content are derived from their context. " [76] Put in other words the included words may be clarificatory or illustrative of the general word. Thus in U. P. State v. Raja Anand (1967) 1 SCR 362 , while construing Art. 31a (2) as enacted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 the relevant excerpt of which reads as : "31a (2) in this article (a) the expression 'estate' shall in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that are and shall also include (i) (ii) (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agriculture labourers and village artisans; this Court said: "in our opinion the word "including" is intended to clarify or explain the concept of land held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. The idea seems to be to remove any doubts on the point whether waste land or forest land could be held to be capable of being held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. " [77] In the present context the general meaning of 'luxury' has been explained or clarified and must be understood in a sense analogous to that of the less general words such as entertainments, amusements, gambling and betting, which are clubbed with it. This principle of interpretation known as 'noscitur a sociis' has received approval in Rainbow Steels ltd. v. C. S. T. (1981) 2 SCC 141 , at page 145, although doubted in its indiscriminate application in State of Bombay v. Hospital mazdoor Sabha : AIR 1960 SC 610 . In the latter case this court was required to construe Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act which read: "section 2 (j) provides that 'industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." 32. In the latter case this court was required to construe Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act which read: "section 2 (j) provides that 'industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." 32. What is the principle “ejusdem generis” has recently been considered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 265/2017 titled as Kuldeep and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 13.7.2017 and it was held as under: Ejusdem generis “4. Let us first understand what is this principle of ejusdem generis (noscitur a soccis), on which much emphasis has been laid down by the petitioners. Scanning through several decisions rendered by different Benches (Constitutional or otherwise, of the Supreme Court of India), over a period of time, one finds inter alia, the following principle to be laid down:- (a) Application of maxim ejusdem generis, (noscitur a soccis) may be treacherous unless the “societas” (the fact or condition of being associated for a common purpose – Oxford) to which the “socii” (keeping company with another – Oxford) belongs, are known. The risk may be present when there is no other factor except contiguity to suggest the “societas” [Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and another vs. State of U.P. and others, (2005) 2 SCC 515 ) (A Five Judge Bench]. (b) For invoking the principle there must be a distinct genus or category running through the bodies already named. [Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal and others, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (A Five-Judge Bench)]. (c) Where two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from and are qualified by each other, the meaning of the general word being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. [Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. (supra)]. (d) It is merely a rule of construction and cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. [Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. (supra)]. (d) It is merely a rule of construction and cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful that the such rule applies.[The State of Bombay and others vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC 610 ]. (e) When general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, then general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but only a permissible inference, in the absence of an indication to the contrary. [Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni @ Moopil Nayar vs. The States of Madras and Kerala and others, AIR 1960 SC 1080 (A Five Judge Bench) and Maharashtra University of Health Sciences and others vs. Satchikitsa Prasark Mandal and others, (2010) 3 SCC 786 ]. (f) The said doctrine, cannot be invoked in cases where the intention of the Legislature is clear and free of ambiguity. [The Corporation of the City of Nagpur vs. Its employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 ]. (g) What needs examination is whether: (i) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (ii) The members of the enumeration constitute a class; (iii) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) A general term follows the enumeration; and (v) There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. [Jage Ram and others vs. State of Haryana and others, (1971) 1 SCC 671 and Grasim Industries ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297 ]. (h) If a list or string or family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.[ M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India and another, (1989) 2 SCC 458] (i) The rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment. [State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan, (1955) 2 SCR 868]. [State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan, (1955) 2 SCR 868]. (j) The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility between specific and general words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous. [Satchikitsa Prasark Mandal and others (supra)]. 33. It is more than settled that as a general rule when two different words are used by a statute, prima facie one has to construe different words as carrying different meanings. Even though at sometime two different words are used in one and the same statute to convey the same but i.e. exception rather than the rule. The word “entertainment” has to be understood in the contest that was intended by the legislature with respect to the Entertainments Duty Act, keeping in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted. The provisions of the Act thus have to be construed to achieve the purpose of its enactment. The Court has to adopt constructive approach not contrary of attempted object of the enactment. The Court must examine and give meaning to the said words, in view of the statute of which it is a part, construing the context of the subject of the said statute. Therefore, the word “entertainment” should be given the widest possible import. 34. As already observed above, there is no provision in the H.P. Aerial Ropeway Act to levy tax or duty as this Act only authorizes to facilitate and regulate the construction and working of aerial ropeways in Himachal Pradesh, whereas on the other hand, Entertainments Duty Act has been specially enacted by the State under Entry 62 of List-II for imposition of taxes and duties on entertainments. 35. The aerial ropeway is providing entertainment and, therefore, in such circumstances, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot be pressed into service to defeat the dominant statutory purpose of the entertainment tax. Merely because it is the aerial ropeway, it does not mean that it can only be taxed under the Aerial Ropeway Act and not under the Entertainments Duty Act. 36. Even otherwise, the definition of “entertainment” as originally defined and even thereafter it was amended would show that the same deals with all different aspects of entertainments like exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race or lastly aerial ropeway. 36. Even otherwise, the definition of “entertainment” as originally defined and even thereafter it was amended would show that the same deals with all different aspects of entertainments like exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race or lastly aerial ropeway. Thus, once each one of the words carries a separate and distinct meaning then obviously, the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be invoked. 37. Having said so, we find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.