JUDGMENT : 1. Under the shade and cover of this revision petition and in the alternative to be treated as a petition under Section 561-A, the petitioner beseeches that the order dated 10.04.2013 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anti-Corruption, Jammu in case FIR No. 14/2005 of Police Station Vigilance Organization, Jammu titled “State Vs. Chowdhary Mohammad Hafeez & Ors” where under the petitioner has been ordered to be charged for allegedly having committed offences as are detailed in the impugned order dated 10.04.2013 read with the charge sheet dated 10.04.2013 be set aside. 2. The petitioner/accused has been arraigned on a charge of entering into a criminal conspiracy with the accused named Mohd. Ayoub and others and he while working as Tehsildar Surankote is said to have dishonestly and fraudulently by criminal misconduct and by misusing his official position committed forgery by preparing the fake documents of Faqir Mohd. Zaffar Ahmad, Mohd. Rashid and other prosecution witnesses for obtaining the relief and with the intention of cheating the Government exchequer he is said to have received relief cheques from accused No.1 and then deposited in the bank without their entitlement and is subsequently said to have withdrawn and misappropriated the same without paying them in the Hill Kaka Relief Scheme at Poonch, despite having knowledge that neither he nor those persons were entitled to the said relief, having received the same in violation of the guidelines set out by Deputy Commissioner Poonch, vide Order No. AC/N/29-30 dated 20.05.2003 and thereby he is said to have committed offences under Section 5(1)(d) punishable under section 5(2) of P.C. Act and Sections 420/471/467/468 RPC r/w Section 120- B RPC. 3. Heard and considered. 4. Shorn of the un-necessary details and looking at the charge, as has been framed against the petitioner by the trial court, it is stated that the petitioner, committed the forgery, relating to the documents, as these pertained to the prosecution witnesses named Faqir Mohd, Zaffar Ahmed and Mohd Rashid. The trial court immediately after referring to the aforesaid three names has added a further expression that reads “and other prosecution witnesses”. 5. Faqir Mohd is a prosecution Witness who by reference to the prosecution case itself is not a beneficiary. No account is alleged to have been opened in his name nor any cheque awarding relief has been issued in his favour. 5. Faqir Mohd is a prosecution Witness who by reference to the prosecution case itself is not a beneficiary. No account is alleged to have been opened in his name nor any cheque awarding relief has been issued in his favour. No payments are alleged to have been drawn in his name. Therefore the contention of the trial court, that the documents were prepared by committing forgery as far as Faqir Mohd is concerned does not hold any ground or substance. Zaffar Ahmed the other prosecution witness in whose favour a relief cheque had been drawn which was so drawn and issued by the ACR who vide an order of the Deputy Commissioner, Poonch, dated on 20.05.2003, (which is attached to the final report laid before the trial Court, at Page 59 and a copy whereof is attached as Annexure-C to the revision petition) was stated will be personally responsible to make the payments after verifying the list of the effected families. The petitioner does not in any way, in any capacity, seem to have been associated with the verification of the list of the effected families or the distribution of the relief, as was directed to be done, by the aforesaid order dated 20.05.2003 of Deputy Commissioner, Poonch. The statement of Zaffar Ahmed, prosecution witness who has been named in the charge framed by the trial court, is identical in all the essentials to the other prosecution witnesses. He has alleged that the accused Mohd Ayoub Patwari told him, that, he had to receive some relief for the receipt of which he went to the office of the petitioner herein, who, was posted as Tehsildar Surankote at that moment. It is further stated by him that he along with the Patwari named Mohd Ayoub, went to the bank, where he was asked to sign some papers and thereafter Mohd Ayoub, asked him to leave. This prosecution witness has in unequivocal terms stated that he left the bank after signing some papers. The prosecution witness has further stated in his statement that he had heard that an amount of Rs. 1,13,940/- having been released against his name in the year 2005 on account of the compensation for Hill Kaka beneficiaries, has not been received by him. The prosecution witness has further stated in his statement that he had heard that an amount of Rs. 1,13,940/- having been released against his name in the year 2005 on account of the compensation for Hill Kaka beneficiaries, has not been received by him. This in fact is the sum and substance and the gist of the allegations levelled by not only Zaffar Ahmed, but, by the other prosecution witnesses as well. The statement made by the said prosecution witness and by the other prosecution witnesses had to be scanned and appreciated, by the trial Court so as to find out whether on the basis thereof it can be concluded that the links of the petitioner can be traced out prima facie with the commission of the offences imputed to him and for which he was legally required to be charged. The petitioner herein has not been accused of having either attested any document in light of the account opening or the withdrawal of money of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses. 6. Prosecution witness Mohd Rashid also had made an identical statement as that of Zaffar Ahmed. The petitioner it is stated had attested his thumb impression on the withdrawal form. Initially the witness had denied having affixed his thumb impression on the withdrawal form. The said document i.e. the withdrawal slip had been seized in the matter and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for expert opinion. The opinion so obtained from the Forensic Science Laboratory confirmed that the thumb impression is that of Mohd Rashid himself. 7. The prosecution case against the petitioner is that thirteen prosecution witnesses, whose details and description have been given at pages 13 to 19 of the final report were shown to be the members of the effected families as per the record and were issued account payee cheques by the ACR. These figure at Sr. Nos. 02/1685, 04/1687, 06/1689, 08/1691, 09/1693, 16/1700, 19/1703, 20/1704, 24/1709, 27/1714, 31/1718, 36/1725 47/1744 of the list starting from (page 13) of the charge sheet. It is not the case of the prosecution, though initially having been alleged so, that the petitioner had opened the accounts of the thirteen persons. These figure at Sr. Nos. 02/1685, 04/1687, 06/1689, 08/1691, 09/1693, 16/1700, 19/1703, 20/1704, 24/1709, 27/1714, 31/1718, 36/1725 47/1744 of the list starting from (page 13) of the charge sheet. It is not the case of the prosecution, though initially having been alleged so, that the petitioner had opened the accounts of the thirteen persons. Evidence collected, which is part of the charge sheet, would show, that the petitioner has not been alleged to have signed any account opening form, identified any account holder or attested any document relating to account opening of the aforesaid thirteen persons. It is also not the case of the prosecution that, the petitioner had associated himself in the distribution of the relief, by way of drawal of the account payee cheques or any other act, relating to the issuance of the relief cheques by ACR Poonch. The details of the officers responsible for disbursement of relief are available at page 73 of the Police Charge sheet. Thus, the fact which is borne out from the trial Court record itself is, that, the imputations made by the trial court in the charge relating to the petitioner that he forged any document relating to the thirteen persons (prosecution witnesses as are named above) is factually incorrect. Opening of a bank account is a matter which wholly and solely is the concern of the bank and its officers/officials, who are, under law authorised/responsible to open a saving bank account which is regulated by the relevant rules governing the Banks. If, the allegation, that, it was the petitioner who had identified any of the thirteen persons before the bank or he had signed any document relating to the opening of the bank accounts in respect of the aforesaid thirteen persons had been found correct, it could have been concluded that the petitioner had a role to play in any of the acts relating to the opening of the bank accounts of the thirteen persons and not otherwise. The petitioner could be accused of any act, relating to the opening of the bank accounts had he signed any such document in facilitating the introduction of the Persons opening the said accounts, which is not the case of the prosecution. 8. The petitioner could be accused of any act, relating to the opening of the bank accounts had he signed any such document in facilitating the introduction of the Persons opening the said accounts, which is not the case of the prosecution. 8. The investigation further revealed that, out of the aforesaid thirteen persons, petitioner had attested signatures/thumb impression of 05 persons, namely; Mohd Sadiq S/o Sahib Din R/o Sanai 2) Abdul Hameed S/o Khadim Hussain R/o Samote 3) Mohd Rafiq S/o Khadim Hussain R/o Samote 4) Mohd Javed S/o Badar Din R/o Sanai 5) Mohd Rashid S/o Faiz Mohd R/o Sanai, on their withdrawal forms. The prosecution case further is that, the aforesaid 05 persons had denied having signed or affixing their thumb impressions on any of the withdrawal slips and thus had disavowed the withdrawal of money from their bank accounts. Since, the prosecution had started with the presumption that the thumb impressions and/or signatures of the aforesaid 05 persons which were admittedly attested by the petitioner in his capacity as a Tehsildar, were denied by the said persons, therefore, it was assumed that the petitioner had been remiss and callous in the discharge of his duties by falsely attesting the forged signatures/thumb impressions and hatching a conspiracy of committing the forgery of the said documents. The withdrawal slips of four persons excluding that of Mohammad Sadiq who had died by then were sent for examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory. The opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory is a part of the Final form. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that, the expert opinion confirmed that the thumb impressions/signatures of these four persons on the withdrawal slips were of the same persons. It needs to be repeated that, Mohd Sadiq S/o Sahib Din R/o Sanai, thumb impression had been attested by the petitioner on the withdrawal slip, is dead now. While he was alive his thumb impression was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for eliciting their opinion. In the background of denying their thumb impression/signatures on the aforesaid documents and later giving another twist to the story by stating, that it was the Patwari, Mohd. While he was alive his thumb impression was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for eliciting their opinion. In the background of denying their thumb impression/signatures on the aforesaid documents and later giving another twist to the story by stating, that it was the Patwari, Mohd. Ayoub who had taken them to the bank where they were made to sign certain documents appears to be the introduction of a tale which no court, much less a criminal court, that is obliged to frame the charge against a person on the frame work and bulwark of legal evidence will acknowledge and accept. The trial Court not doubt has named three persons in the charge sheet who as per him deposed against the petitioner, but their evidence does not appear to have been appreciated in the right and proper perspective to find the involvement of the petitioner in the case. 9. Risking repetition the bank opening accounts and the matters relating thereto i.e. making the deposits and the withdrawals from a saving bank account are regulated by the rules and regulations of the bank. Nothing is possible to be done in the banking business orally. No banking account can be opened orally unless and until it is evidenced by documents. No payment can be made from an account except on the basis of the documents i.e. a payment vocher. Law would not permit any oral evidence to be given against documentary evidence. Sections 91 and 99 of the Evidence Act, mandate and envision that exclusion of oral by documentary evidence is the law and not vice-versa. The only exception that can be carved out in such an eventuality where oral evidence can be allowed is when the document itself is shown to be forged or fabricated. Once the signatures/thumb impressions of the persons on the withdrawal slip are found to be, that, of the account holders there can be no occasion to state that the petitioner has committed any offence. 10. One more factor to be noticed in the case is that the prosecution had proceeded against the banking officers/officials, who under law were not only to open the account, and have opened the same, but, had made the payments also. If any explanation had to be offered on that count it had to be called from the said officers/officials of the bank. If any explanation had to be offered on that count it had to be called from the said officers/officials of the bank. They had to account for their official duties for which the petitioner could not be charged. Since, the bank officers/officials have not been arrayed as accused in the instant case for want of sanction, the petitioner has been vicariously charged for the official acts of the bank, as if it was he who was responsible or answerable for their acts of omission and commission, if any. If exclusion of the documentary evidence is allowed by oral evidence that would run in contradiction not only to the Evidence Act, (Sections 91 to 99), but it shall have adverse and blighting consequences. Banking system will crumble down and would in fact run the risk of caving in as every Tom, Dick and Harry can, after the receipt of the money, evidenced by filling the withdrawal slips/forms, put forward the plea that he did not receive the money despite having signed the withdrawal slip/form. The presumption in law is that the payment is made by the bank to the person who signs the payment slip and no oral proof contrary to the said document can be accepted. In the instant case, the statement of the prosecution witness named Mohd. Rafiq S/o Mir Baz- cashier of the bank, is that he used to make the payments to the account holder in person or else in presence of the Patwari Mohd. Ayub, the accused in the case. 11. The framing of charge, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court is not an idle formality. A criminal trial is not to be allowed to assume the character of a fishing and roving enquiry. It is not further permissible in law to permit a prosecution to linger, limp and continue on the basis of a mere hope and expectation, that, in the trial some material may be found, to implicate the accused. Such a course of action is not contemplated in the system of criminal jurisprudence that, has been evolved by the courts over the years. A criminal trial, on the contrary, is contemplated, only on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing the commission of an offence, which fact has to be proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable evidence in the course of trial against the accused. A criminal trial, on the contrary, is contemplated, only on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing the commission of an offence, which fact has to be proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable evidence in the course of trial against the accused. A cue can be had in this behalf to the law laid down in the case of “Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT OF DELHI) & another” reported in (2012) 13 SCC 614 in case titled, paragraph 21 whereof is reproduced herein below:- 21. Coming to the charges under Sections 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B IPC framed against accused S.K. Khosla, we do not find that FD Nos.22/91 and 9/92 of Canara Bank and FDS Nos.103402 and 103403 of Punjab and Sind Bank were renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra on the basis of the endorsement made on the reverse of the FD receipts by accused SK Khosla to the above effect. In fact, the said FDs were renewed on the basis of the letters addressed to the Bank by accused – Anita Mehra. However, in respect of FD No.0756223 of Vyasa Bank it appears that renewal of the aforesaid FD in the sole name of Anita Mehra was made on the basis of the Investment Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 which was signed by both Satish Mehra and Anita Mehra. The said form also contained an endorsement made under the signature of accused SK Khosla to the effect that the FD be renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra. It has been found upon investigation of the FIR and it has also been recorded by the learned trial court as well as by the High Court that the signatures of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra on the aforesaid Investment Renewal Form were old signatures and that the Investment Renewal Form had been misplaced by Satish Mehra. The particulars of Satish Mehra entered in the said Investment Renewal Form, i.e., Passport number etc. being of the expired Passport can be understood to be facts supporting the allegations made in the FIR and the conclusion of the investigating agency that the accused S.K. Khosla had used an Investment Renewal Form signed by Satish Mehra which was misplaced by him. being of the expired Passport can be understood to be facts supporting the allegations made in the FIR and the conclusion of the investigating agency that the accused S.K. Khosla had used an Investment Renewal Form signed by Satish Mehra which was misplaced by him. The signature and the endorsement made by S.K. Khosla on the said form had also been found, upon investigation, to be relatively fresh in comparison to the signatures of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra on the said form. This is an additional fact that has to receive due consideration in the process of determination of the prima facie liability of the accused S.K. Khosla under Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 12. There is no evidence that the petitioner has signed any bank opening account or that he was instrumental in distribution of the relief cheques, which was an official act done by the ACR, buttressed with the fact, that the withdrawal forms initially having been alleged to be forged, which fact was set at naught by the expert opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory which confirmed that the signatures/thumb impressions were of the same persons. The charge against the petitioner, therefore, lacks the support of evidence in any form. The prosecution, by reference to what has been said above, if allowed to continue against the petitioner, will amount to an abuse of the powers of the Court. 13. There is yet another fact, which though, had been alleged by the prosecution, but subsequently on, a close appreciation of the documents is found to be false. It is that at page 23 of the final repot it is stated that the issue register of the permits for the year 2002 and the renewal register for the year 2002-03 as also the list of the permits for the year 2002 had been destroyed by the petitioner, after he had assumed the charge of the Office of the Tehsildar Surankote in July 2003. The prosecution itself has attached the list of the permits of the year 2002 and the receipts relating to the handing over of the issue register for the year 2002 and the renewal register for the years 2002-03 dated 14.05.2003 by the prosecution witness Sugheel Kumar, who was working as Wasil Baqi Navees (WBN) in the office of Tehsildar Surankote, to Sohan Singh, accused, who was working as a Nazir at DC Office Poonch. The said receipt, dated 14.05.2003 which is a part of the record relates to the period when the petitioner was not posted as Tehsildar Surankote, which he came to be posted first in July 2003 only. The allegation thus appears to be false and that too to the knowledge of the prosecution. 14. In the background of aforesaid facts, there is no evidence on record which could be termed as capable of being read as a legal one in support of the charge framed against the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner is groundless. The FIR had been registered by the Vigilance Organization after a preliminary enquiry had been conducted. The petitioner did not figure as an accused in the FIR. The sanctioning authority had itself held an enquiry against the petitioner in which he was exonerated. The government itself accepted the enquiry report and issued the Govt. Order No. 311 Rev (Gaz) of 2012 dated 31.12.2012 exonerating the petitioner of all the allegations/charges. It is essentially in the background of there being no evidence against the petitioner, which could have resulted in he being charged for any offence, that he was exonerated. 15. In order to find out the powers of the Court and under what circumstances these can be exercised, the case of Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT OF DELHI) & another, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 614, is of the important wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- “The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually comes on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused”. 16. In another case titled State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy& Ors., reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 , which also assumes significance in the context of the decision of the instant petition, the following has been held at Paras 7 and 10:- “07. The second limb of Mr. Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that: "If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted there-with, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this be-half, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called "Trial Before a Court of Sessions". It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be re-corded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is of is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that:- "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." In the, exercise of this whole some power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the; ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the, ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the, legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. 10. On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal. D.D. Ghadigaonkar and Century, Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of flaming charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. In Vadilal Panchal's case (supra) section 203 of the old Code was under consideration, which provided that the Magistrate could dismiss a complaint if after considering certain matters mentioned in the section there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding with the case. To art extent section 227 of the new Code contains an analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. To art extent section 227 of the new Code contains an analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for' the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the: basis of which a conviction can-be said reasonably to be possible”. 17. Before parting I would like to deal with an objection raised by the Learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that the petition of the petitioner is not maintainable in the present form which has been aptly answered in the law laid down in the case of “Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation” bearing Criminal Appeal Nos. 1375-1376 of 2013 decided by the Apex Court of the Country on March 28, 2018 which is clear in content and lucid in details and deals with the subject at Para 37 which is reproduced below verbatim et libertim:- “36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered............” 18. Inherent power, given the above discourse, vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C corresponding to Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C as it applies to the state of J&K is based on the principle and object of the advancement of the justice. In case the solemn process of the Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt. In case the solemn process of the Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). Judicial process is a solemn proceeding, which cannot be allowed to continue where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused and the High Court for that matter this Court will not hesitate in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding under Category 03 as enumerated in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which reads thus:- (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 19. Based on the holistic consideration of the facts and circumstances summarized in the foregoing paragraphs, the present case appears to be one where Category 03 of the illustrations given in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) is clearly applicable. 20. Having regard to what has been said and done above, I think that there is necessity to exercise jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. Hence, the order dated 10.04.2013, passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anti-Corruption, Jammu, in case FIR No. 14/2005 of Police Station Vigilance Organization, Jammu, titled “State Vs. Chowdhary Mohammad Hafeez & Ors” whereby the accused has been charged for the commission of offence under section 5(1)(d) punishable under section 5(2) of P.C. Act and Sections 420/471/467/468 RPC r/w Section 120-B RPC, to the extent of the petitioner is set aside, as a corollary to which the charge-sheet filed against the petitioner in the aforesaid case is also quashed. 21. Record be sent down along with the copy of this order.