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2018 DIGILAW 801 (JK)

Farooq Ahmad Gillani v. State of J&K

2018-10-16

M.K.HANJURA

body2018
JUDGMENT : M.K. Hanjura, J. Writ petitions on hand, having the akin cause of action, similar set of the facts urged, generic gravamen groused, resemblance in the reliefs supplicated and encompasses the benefits attached to the service and also punishment inflicted concerning one individual, have been, thus, clubbed together to forestall multiple, varied and inconsistent conclusions. 2. The fascicule of facts, necessitous and germane to comprehend the backdrop of the present writ petitions, based whereupon a case has been set in motion and the present legal process built, has its genesis and origin to the envisioning of the claim of the petitioner that have direct ramification on the service benefits and the career of the petitioner and also the grant of sanction for his prosecution, has ended in melancholy and uncertainty. The writ petitions are, having said so, taken ad seriatim. SWP No.859/2015 3. The facts, that emerge from the bird’s eye view of the case set up by the petitioner in the writ petition on hand, are that the General Administration Department (GAD) in the year 2012, sought grant of the sanction from the Government of India, to prosecute the petitioner, that the petitioner challenged in a writ petition, bearing SWP no.371/2012, in which this Court vide order dated 5th April 2012, directed maintaining of the status quo. It also comes to fore that the Government of India vide letter dated 19th June 2012 (Annexure P-21 to writ petition), declined granting the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. However, the State Government, as contended by the petitioner, did not furnish the actual position vis-à-vis the petitioner to the Government of India and as a consequence of which, the Government of India vide Order no.15011/01/2012-AVU-(i) dated 19th February 2013 (Annexure P-22 to writ petition) granted the sanction to prosecute the petitioner. This forced the petitioner to throw challenge to the aforesaid sanction for prosecuting the petitioner, in a writ petition, diarised and registered as SWP no.323/2013. Besides that, the petitioner also filed a contempt petition against the erring officers. The petitioner claims that the Central Government, issued an Order on 10.05.2013, keeping in abeyance the sanction granted against the petitioner. In the said order, the Government of India is said to have admitted that because of the lack of the proper information by the State Government, the sanction was granted. The petitioner claims that the Central Government, issued an Order on 10.05.2013, keeping in abeyance the sanction granted against the petitioner. In the said order, the Government of India is said to have admitted that because of the lack of the proper information by the State Government, the sanction was granted. The said sanction, according to the petitioner, therefore, did not exist and is non-est in the eye of law. The official respondents thereafter filed an application before this Court seeking vacation of the interim direction and both the matters were clubbed together and argued, and writ petition was admitted.It is averred that the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner was granted illegally in violation of the orders of this Court, which was subsequently kept in abeyance and thus same does not exist in the eye of law. And resultantly no criminal proceedings are pending against the petitioner in any court of law and the petitioner has been held to be entitled to the same treatment in the departmental inquiry as was given to the IFS officers involved in the said FIR, who had supervisory role, like the petitioner. It is claimed that after conducting the departmental inquiry, the petitioner was granted three promotions owing to his excellent service record. It is contended that the petitioner was promoted to post of the Conservator vide order dated 28.10.2010 and on the basis of his seniority and excellent service record, he is entitled to be promoted to the post of Chief Conservator of Forests (Super Time Scale 2nd ) for which purpose the process is going on, but unfortunately the Selection Committee has not considered the case of the petitioner under the pretext that the above referred to FIRs are pending against him and thus have decided to apply the sealed cover procedure against him when at this stage the petitioner deserves to be granted promotion and question of applying the sealed cover procedure does not arise. The set legal position, as stated in the writ petition on hand, is that the said FIR or the prosecution sanction cannot come in the way of the promotion of the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be denied the promotion to the post of the Chief Conservator of Forests when his junior, namely, Javeed Ahmad Panzoo, is being promoted to the said post. The petitioner claims that he has the outstanding APRs beyond 2010 and on the basis of said APRs he is entitled to be granted promotion to the post of Chief Conservator of Forests, from the date his junior, Javeed Ahmad Panzoo, has been granted such promotion. The Selection Committee is said to have decided to promote other officers and his junior Javeed Ahmad Panzoo, and the sealed cover procedure has been adopted in the case of the petitioner. The said process, according to the petitioner, is at present pending before the Government for issuance of the formal orders in favour of other batch mates of the petitioner. 4. On the strength of case set up, the petitioner has beseeched grant of direction in the name of respondents, to promote him to the post of the Chief Conservator of Forests from the date his junior has been promoted. The petitioner also solicits a direction to the respondents not to apply the sealed cover procedure in case of consideration of his promotion and promote him on the basis of his APRs and the seniority notwithstanding the pendency of the FIRs/ investigation. 5. Reply has been filed by the respondents. They insist that the name of the petitioner surfaced as an accused in connection with the case FIR nos.38 and 39 of 2009. The sanction was sought by the investigating agency from the competent authority for prosecuting the petitioner for the offences alleged to have been committed by him. However, while the matter was under consideration for according the sanction, the competent authority while deferring the decision about granting the sanction, decided to conduct the disciplinary inquiry and as a sequel whereof, the charge memo was issued, to which the petitioner filed the reply. Upon consideration of the reply submitted by the petitioner, it was decided to conduct the further proceedings in the matter prompting appointment of an enquiry officer for the purpose. According to the respondents, the enquiry officer, perhaps without conducting any formal enquiry, filed a short report in the shape of a communication, in which he did not absolve the petitioner but observed that the petitioner was guilty of the supervisory lapse in the matter. It is maintained by the respondents that the enquiry officer remarked that the criminal neglect could not be attributed to the petitioner. It is maintained by the respondents that the enquiry officer remarked that the criminal neglect could not be attributed to the petitioner. Such a remark, as said by the respondents, was beyond the mandate and the scope of the enquiry. It is also averred by the respondents that the disciplinary authority has not taken any final decision in the matter qua the so-called report of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary proceedings, which have started with the issuance of the charge memo, are deemed to continue till the final decision is taken in the matter by the disciplinary authority, either absolving the petitioner of the charges or imposing any punishment or ordering the fresh or further enquiry. Till the final decision is taken and the matter is taken to its logical end, the petitioner cannot presume himself to have been absolved, rather the proceedings are deemed to be pending. It is asserted by the respondents that since the sanction for prosecution, consideration for the promotion, filing of the charge sheet and the order of the status quo are intrinsically connected with each other, the petitioner cannot be promoted in isolation of the other factors. SWP No.371/2012 6. In the writ petition on hand the case set up by the petitioner is that the Vigilance Organization Kashmir (VOK) registered the cases, bearing FIR nos. 37, 38 and 39 of 2003 on 15.12.2003, against all the concerned officers, including the Project Chief, the Joint Directors, the Chief Executive Officers, the Veterinary Officers, the Engineers and the officials, working in the Integrated Water Development Project, alleging therein that the mismanagement and the embezzlement had been committed in the works during the years 1999 to 2003. It is claimed that the FIR no.37/2003 was closed as not proved. Qua FIR nos.38/2003 and 39/2003, the VOK submitted its investigation reports to the Government, i.e. the GAD, for follow up action. In the final investigation report of FIR no.39/2003, the VOK recommended the grant of sanction for launching the prosecution against two officers, namely, Dr. Bashir Ahmad and Farooq Ahmad Gillani. The petitioner maintains that from the final investigation report, it is evident that the allegations about the abuse of the official position and fabricating the records of various veterinary activities, only two officers have been indicted when in terms of the FIR more than six officers were at the helm of the affairs during that period. The petitioner maintains that from the final investigation report, it is evident that the allegations about the abuse of the official position and fabricating the records of various veterinary activities, only two officers have been indicted when in terms of the FIR more than six officers were at the helm of the affairs during that period. But, as said by the petitioner, it is not untestable as to how a separate letter was issued for conducting the departmental enquiry against the four officers of the time in the said particular FIR. The petitioner maintains that the GAD vide letter dated 20.07.2007, directed the Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Forest Department, to initiate the departmental inquiry against the aforesaid four officers namely, Surjit Singh Bali IFS, Mohammad Amin Kawoosa IFS, Shamim Ahmad Khan and Subhash Chander. The petitioner claims that therebefore in the same way, a letter was issued by the GAD in FIR no.38/2003, for intiation of the departmental inquiry against five officers, which included Shri Abdul Razzaq Khan, IFS, besides the above four officers. The Forest Department, however, in their case, called a simple explanation and thereafter recommended closure of the case to the GAD and the GAD vide letter dated 31.03.2009, accepted the same and recommended closure of the cases against the aforesaid five officers. After issuance of the aforesaid orders, petitioner claims that he made a detailed representation to the Chief Secretary of the State, which was processed and the matter, at that point of time, was examined by the GAD. The legal opinion was also sought from the Law Department. The opinion was given by the Law Department and it was decided that the case of the petitioner was same and similar in nature to the case of above referred to five IFS officers and therefore, on consideration of the matter, the GAD issued an order that the petitioner being similarly situated with the aforesaid officers, deserved to be given the same treatment. According to the petitioner, it is only after obtaining the opinion from the Law Department that too thrice, that the Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Forest Department was asked to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner instead of granting the sanction for prosecution. According to the petitioner, it is only after obtaining the opinion from the Law Department that too thrice, that the Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Forest Department was asked to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner instead of granting the sanction for prosecution. By letter dated 25.05.2009, the GAD asked the Forest Department to draft the articles of charge for conducting the departmental inquiry against the petitioner, for which assistance of the Law Department was asked to be sought, and it was also conveyed that Vigilance organization had no role in that departmental inquiry. The Forest Department initiated the departmental inquiry and issued the charge-sheet in both the FIR’s on 10.09.2009. 7. The articles of charge were served upon the petitioner. The reply thereto was filed by the petitioner. On its receipt and examination, the Forest Department issued the Government Order no.441 dated 11.11.2009, appointing an Inquiry Officer, assisted by an IFS Officer, to conduct the inquiry against the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid Inquiry officer, on examination of the records available, found that the allegations levelled against the petitioner were absolutely baseless and therefore the said Inquiry Officer recommended to take similar action against the petitioner as had been taken in respect of the similarly situated officers, against whom the case had been closed by the Government. It is also claimed that after thorough consideration of the matter it was decided to close the case against the petitioner in the same way as was done in the case of other supervisory officers, therefore forwarded its decision to the GAD. The said order dated 7.1.2010 contains the decision of the Government in light of the opinion of the Law Department and in light of the report of the Inquiry Committee, whereby it was found that the petitioner is entitled to the same and similar treatment as has been done in case of the similarly situated officers. The petitioner pleads that the GAD issued the Integrity Certificate in favour of the petitioner for his consideration for reinduction in IFS Cadre, which was to be considered by the Union Public Service Commission on the recommendations of the Selection Committee and the petitioner was re-inducted in IFS Cadre on the basis of his merit, suitability and the APRs; as a consequence whereof, the petitioner was promoted as the Conservator of Forests vide Government Order no.423-FST of 2010 dated 20th August 2010. 8. 8. It is next highlighted that abruptly the GAD initiated the process for reversing the earlier decision of the then authorities and again asked the VOK to give comments. Petitioner says that there was no occasion for the GAD to seek the fresh comments because that process had already ended earlier when the Government decided to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner and in the inquiry it was found that the petitioner was not guilty and was entitled to the same treatment as was accorded to the similarly situated persons/officers and therefore, the fresh process initiated by the GAD for reopening the matter is absolutely illegal and against the law. The petitioner claims that in the fresh process, the Inquiry Committee report and the decision of the Government for conducting the departmental inquiry have been concealed and have not been brought to the notice of the competent authority by the officers concerned, which has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and non-application of mind, which act warrants quashment of the sanction to prosecute the petitioner. It is stated in the writ petition that it is settled principle of law that once the Government takes a decision as regards the conducting of the department inquiry instead of the grant of sanction, it cannot thereafter reopen the matter for granting the sanction, inasmuch as a department inquiry cannot be treated as a casual exercise and it has to be given full weightage once it is conducted. 9. On the edifice of the case set, the petitioner craves the indulgence of this Court in vouchsafe of the grant of a writ of certiorari, quashing the fresh proceedings initiated by the respondent no.1 for grant of prosecution sanction after closure of the matter with a direction to the respondent no.1 to prohibit from referring the matter to the Government of India for seeking prosecution sanction in FIR no. 38 and 39 and also quashment of the said FIRs in light of the decision of the Government for conducting the departmental inquiry having regard to the Inquiry Committee report on which the closure of the case was decided by the State Government. 10. 38 and 39 and also quashment of the said FIRs in light of the decision of the Government for conducting the departmental inquiry having regard to the Inquiry Committee report on which the closure of the case was decided by the State Government. 10. Reply has been filed by the respondent no.3, in which he insists that the case FIR no.37/2003 relates to the illegal appointments made in the Integrated Water Development Project while as the case FIR no.38/2003 pertains to the engineering works executed in the said Project and FIR no.39/2003 relates to bungling in the distribution of the dairy, the poultry sheep units, rams, shelter sheds, seeds etcetera. Respondent no.3 admits that FIR no.37/2003 was closed as not proved on the strength of the material collected during the course of the investigation. Likewise, FIR nos. 38 and 39 of 2003 have been closed as proved against the petitioner and other accused persons. After culmination of the investigation, both the cases were submitted to the Government for accord of sanction. It is also insisted that respondent no.3 requested the GAD to reconsider the matter on the merits of the case and grant the sanction to prosecute the petitioner and other accused persons. According to him, departmental action and investigation/ trial are two separate and distinct entities. The level of proof in both the proceedings is different. 11. Respondent no.1 in his reply has stated that he had taken up the matter with the Joint Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests and by the order dated 18th February 2013, sanction has been accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner. In such circumstances, according to him, the writ petition has become infructuous. It has been admitted by the respondent no.1 that as regards the department action, the cases of five officers, namely, Surjeet Singh Bali, Mohammad Amin Kawoosa, Subash Chander Sharma, Ab. Razak Khan, and Shamim Ahmad Khan, was referred to the Forest Department for the inquiry and on the basis of the enquiry report/ recommendations, the case FIR no.38/2003 has been closed against the said five officers. Respondent no.1 also avers that the case FIR no.39/2003 was referred to the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for opinion before sending it to the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, for prosecution sanction. Respondent no.1 also avers that the case FIR no.39/2003 was referred to the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for opinion before sending it to the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, for prosecution sanction. The Law Department has given the opinion that although a prima facie case is made out on the basis of the investigation, yet the final investigation report recommends the departmental inquiry against some officers/officials, who had been at the helm of affairs in the project and has recommended sanction for prosecution in respect the petitioner and the VOK/State Government has to subject all the officers to the same treatment, and that it is advisable for the department to accord the same treatment to all the accused persons and also have the department inquiry conducted against the petitioner. In respect of the case FIR no.38/2003, it is stated by the respondent no.1 that the Law Department has communicated and conveyed that the opinion already given qua case FIR no.39/2003 also holds good in the case FIR no.38/2003. In view of the opinions of the Law Department, the Forest Department was requested, vide communication dated 20th October 2008, to conduct the required inquiry against the petitioner and furnish the report/findings to the GAD. In response thereto, the Forest Department vide its letter dated 7th January 2010, submitted a report. The matter is said to have been taken up with the VOK as well and they made a request for grant of sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. The matter was also taken up with the learned Advocate General, who also recommended for grant of sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. As a succession whereof, the matter was taken up with the Government of India and sanction has been accorded. 12. The petitioner has filed the rejoinder, to rebut what the respondents have averred in their reply/counter affidavit. The petitioner has stated that the case FIR nos.37 of 2003, 38 of 2003, and 39 of 2003 were registered in VOK against the officers of IWDP, i.e. the Director, CEO, Shri S.S. Bali (IFS) and Khurshid Ahmad Gungoo and Hafizullah Masoodi. In FIR no.39/2003, the allegations were made against the Project Director, Shri S.S. Bali, Director, Shri M.A. Kawoosa, Dr. Bashir Ahmad and Faooq Gilani, Chief Executive Officer (petitioner). In FIR no.39/2003, the allegations were made against the Project Director, Shri S.S. Bali, Director, Shri M.A. Kawoosa, Dr. Bashir Ahmad and Faooq Gilani, Chief Executive Officer (petitioner). Insofar as FIR no.38/2003 is concerned, some further officials were also included therein and the allegations were levelled that the subordinate officials in the said IWDP had misappropriated the funds in execution of the small works in terms of the scheme as is detailed in the FIR itself. It is also vehemently stated by the petitioner that in FIR no.37/2003, the allegation was that some appointments of the close relations of Mufti Nazim and Khursheed Ahmad Gungoo had been made illegally. In the process of the investigation, the FIR no.37/2003 was recommended to be closed vide letter dated 31st March 2009. The GAD, as stated by the petitioner, sought an opinion from the Law Department. The Law Department recommended that instead of the grant of sanction for the prosecution, the departmental enquiry be conducted against the then Project Directors, the Joint Directors, the Project Chief and the Joint Director, Shri Subash Chander, when the petitioner was also the Chief Executive Officer and was a similarly situated with the said officers and therefore, it was recommended that the same treatment be given to the petitioner by conducting the departmental inquiry as had been done in the case of the above mentioned four officers. It is claimed by the petitioner that the officers, viz. Joint Director, Abdul Razak and Shamim Ahmad, were also holding the supervisory posts and in their case as well the initiation of the departmental proceedings was ordered. In terms of the order dated 31st March 2009, after conducting the departmental inquiry and after considering the inquiry report, the FIR vis-à-vis the above named five officers, was closed. The petitioner states that he, being the similarly situated, also made a representation to the Chief Secretary of the State on 18th July 2007, seeking similar treatment. The Chief Secretary is said to have directed the examination of the matter. As a compliance thereof, the GAD issued order dated 20th October 2008, directing initiation of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner as also giving the petitioner same treatment. The Chief Secretary is said to have directed the examination of the matter. As a compliance thereof, the GAD issued order dated 20th October 2008, directing initiation of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner as also giving the petitioner same treatment. By the order dated 20th May 2009, it is averred that the departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and the charge sheet along with the articles of charge was issued and served upon the petitioner. Shri Lal Chand, IFS, the then Director FPF, appointed as the Inquiry Officer vide Order no.441 of 2009, conducted the inquiry against the petitioner. The petitioner states that the Inquiry Officer, after conducting the thorough inquiry and on perusal of the entire material and the record, vide report dated 19th September 2019, recommended that the petitioner had not indulged in any criminal neglect and had the supervisory role only as the Chief Executive Officer and thus, it was recommended that the Government would give the similar treatment to the petitioner as was given in the case of the above-named officers. The Forest Department is stated to have accepted the inquiry report and forwarded it to the GAD vide order dated 7th January 2010 for closure of the case. After receiving the aforesaid inquiry report, it was acted upon by the Government by granting the promotion to the petitioner against the Super Time Scale-I vide order dated 28th October 2010. The petitioner states that the prosecution sanction against the two high ranking similarly circumstanced officers was denied. The petitioner filed a writ petition, bearing SWP no.371/2012 against the respondents, when the respondents initiated the fresh process for according the sanction for prosecution against him. In the said petition, this Court vide orders dated 5th April 2012 and 20th March 2013, directed the respondents to maintain status quo. The respondents in gross violation of the said orders, requested the Government of India to accord the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. The Government of India, vide order dated 18th February 2013, accorded the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. The petitioner, thus, challenged the above-mentioned order issued by the Government of India in SWP no.323/2013. The respondents in gross violation of the said orders, requested the Government of India to accord the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. The Government of India, vide order dated 18th February 2013, accorded the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. The petitioner, thus, challenged the above-mentioned order issued by the Government of India in SWP no.323/2013. The petitioner states that he also filed a contempt petition, in which the Government of India put in attendance and stated that the interim order had been implemented vide order dated 10th May 2013, withdrawing the sanction for prosecution granted against the petitioner and as a consequence whereof, the contempt was closed as settled. The petitioner alleges that the Government of India had not, in fact, withdrawn the sanction but kept that in abeyance and because of the said reason the petitioner was denied the promotion to the post of Chief Conservator of Forests in the year 2015, when the process was initiated, in which they had applied the sealed cover procedure against the petitioner. The petitioner was, thus, forced to file a writ petition, diarised and registered as SWP no.859/2015, in which this Court vide order dated 5th May 2015, directed the respondents not to apply the sealed cover procedure qua the promotion of the petitioner because he was entitled to be promoted in light of the paragraph 06 of the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman. And accordingly, the petitioner was promoted to the post of the Chief Conservator of Forests on the basis of the recommendations of DPC. The petitioner also asserts that he is holding the post of the Chief Conservator of Forests, but his promotion order has been kept subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 13. It is canvassed in the rejoinder that the petitioner is entitled to be given the same treatment as has been given in the case of S/Shri S.S.Bali, Project Chief, M.A.Kawoosa, Project Chief, S.M.Khan, Joint Director, S.C. Sharma, Joint Director, Abdul Razaq Khan, Joint Director, who have been exonerated because of having the supervisory role in the matter. The Law Department has also given the opinion as is reflected in the order dated 20th October 2008. The Law Department has also given the opinion as is reflected in the order dated 20th October 2008. The petitioner also contends that the respondent department has already refused to grant the sanction against the aforementioned officers and has directed conducting of the departmental inquiry against them. On the basis of the same preposition, the Government ordered conducting of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner instead of granting the sanction by giving him the similar treatment on the basis of the opinion of the Law Department and the departmental inquiry was conducted, as such, against him, which was acted upon and the petitioner was promoted to the Super Time Scale-I, in the year 2010 after conclusion of the inquiry, when the GAD gave him clearance for the promotion. He states that the department could not conceal the said material fact and cannot initiate fresh process for the grant of sanction against the settled principles of law as has been laid down by this Court in a number of cases. SWP No.323/2013 14. The facts as narrated in this petition are more or less similar to the one raised in SWP no.371/2012, therefore, need no recapitulation. The petitioner implores grant of writ of certiorari quashing the Order bearing no.15011/01/2012-AVU-(i) and the Order no.15011/01/2012-AVU (ii) dated 18th of February 2013. 15. Reply has been filed by the respondents in opposition to the instant writ petition, furnishing the same side of story as has been given in the Reply filed by them in opposition to other writ petitions and therefore, need no iteration. 16. Likewise, the petitioner has also filed the Rejoinder in the present writ petition, strenuously rebutting the submissions made by the respondents in their Reply. 17. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter. 18. History and geography of the present case need no ingemination aiming at to bump off long-windedness. FIRs, discoursed above,were lodged against a number of officers. With the exception of the petitioner, all others have been given estimable exit and exoneration. Such practice is always deprecative. For that matter law is at galore. Such act on the part of the respondents is, thus, discriminatory. 19. Three FIRs, in the present case, led to exhorting the sanction for prosecution of various in-service State Government officials, including the petitioner. Such practice is always deprecative. For that matter law is at galore. Such act on the part of the respondents is, thus, discriminatory. 19. Three FIRs, in the present case, led to exhorting the sanction for prosecution of various in-service State Government officials, including the petitioner. In respect of rest of the officers, barring petitioner, initiation of the departmental action was recommended by VOK. A decision vide letter no.GAD (Vig) 06-SP/2007 dated 31st March 2009, from the desk of the Deputy Secretary to Government, GAD, was conveyed to the Commissioner of Vigilance, J&K, Srinagar, that the cases against the five officers, who are similarly situated with the petitioner, be closed. This disparity and special treatment, ostensibly, ought to and had forced the petitioner to represent to the Chief Secretary of the J&K State and urge parity. The same treatment, when the Law Department was approached, was also asked to be given to the petitioner. As is borne out from the communication bearing no.GAD (Vig)33-SP/2007 dated 20th February 2008, the Law Department of the J&K State unequivocally made it clear to the respondents to subject all the officers to the same treatment and advised to accord the same treatment to all the persons and also have the departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner. Formal enquiry against the petitioner was put into motion. The petitioner partook in the enquiry and submitted a befitting reply. By Government Order no.441-FST of 2009 dated 11th November 2009, an Inquiry Officer was appointed. He, after the thorough inquiry, categorically vide his communication dated 19th December 2009, made it clear that there was no material evidence on record to show that the petitioner had indulged in any criminal neglect. He also said that so far as the prima facie allegations against various officials/officers levelled were concerned, the petitioner would be liable only to the extent of the supervisory lapses to the extent of his role as the then Chief Executive Officer, IWDP, Rambiara, heading the team of the sectoral officers drawn from the various departments, like Forests/ Agriculture/Horticulture/ Engineering / Veterinary / Animal Husbandry etcetera. It was recommended to the Government to consider taking the similar action against the petitioner as had been taken against the other officers, found guilty of the supervisory lapse in the same cases. The Forest Department conveyed the inquiry report to the GAD. 20. It was recommended to the Government to consider taking the similar action against the petitioner as had been taken against the other officers, found guilty of the supervisory lapse in the same cases. The Forest Department conveyed the inquiry report to the GAD. 20. The J&K State Cabinet took a Decision bearing no.247/22/2010, according sanction to the promotion of four IFS Officers to the Above Super Time Scale-II (PCCF); promotion of seven IFS Officers to the Above Super Time Scale-I (APCCF); promotion of twenty-four IFS Officers to the Super Time Scale-II (CCF); and promotion of thirty-six IFS Officers to the Super Time Scale-I (CF). Notwithstanding the aforesaid allegations of supervisory lapses, levelled against the petitioner, he figures amongst the IFS Officers, granted the promotion to the Super Time Scale-I (Conservator of Forests). The petitioner figures at the Serial no.30 as a promotee to the post of the Conservator of Forests. The aforesaid Cabinet Decision was disclosed and put in black in white vide Government Order no.423-FST of 2010 dated 28th October 2010. Not only this, therebefore by the Government Order no.232-FST of 2010 dated 28th May 2010, sanction was also accorded to the release of the Selection Grade of Rs.14300-18300 (pre-revised) in favour of the petitioner on regular basis that too with effect from 1st January 2008, which signifies that whatever the allegations levelled against the petitioner had been buried as having no foundation. 21. Worth to be seen is that in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966, read with Sub-Regulation (1) of the Regulation 9 of the Indian Forest Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1966, a Notification dated 27th July 2010, was issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, appointing with immediate effect as many as four officers of the State Forest Service of the Jammu & Kashmir, including the present petitioner, to the Indian Forest Service on the basis of the Select List of 1999 and allocated them to the Jammu & Kashmir Cadre of Indian Forest Service under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Indian Forest (Cadre) Rules, 1966. This exercise cannot be said to have been taken by the Government of India in a random. 22. This exercise cannot be said to have been taken by the Government of India in a random. 22. The Ministry of Environment & Forests (AVU Division), Government of India, vide its letter dated 19th June 2012, categorically emphasised upon the GAD that the question of granting the sanction to prosecute the petitioner could not be considered as it would amount to contempt of the Court. However, it appears that despite pendency of the case(s) before this Court, the Order dated 19th February 2013 had been obtained for prosecution of the petitioner. To avert the contempt proceedings, by the order dated 10th May 2013, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, kept in abeyance the aforesaid sanction for prosecution granted vide order dated 19th February 2013. 23. It is not impertinent to mention here that it is not in dispute that the sanctioning authority, at one point of time, refused the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner and others. A feeble attempt is, however, made to insist that before obtaining the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner from the Government of India, the matter got inquired by the J&K State Government and that the decision to grant the sanction was obtained only after the opinion from the Law Department and learned Advocate General was secured. The argument of the respondents that the learned Advocate General has given a detailed opinion in the matter and on the basis whereof as also on the basis of the advice given by the Law Department, to accord sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, is specious. First of all, once a matter is pending before the court of law, the legal opinion or advice given and in the present case heavily relied upon by the respondents, have no legal sanctity in law. When a matter is pending before the court of law, the opinion furnished by the standing counsel of a department, or say by the learned Advocate General or the Assistant Solicitor General, would tantamount to beguiling, juggling and also hoodwinking the Court. 24. In the present case, after lodgement of thecases/FIRs, the Law Department was contacted. It opined to conduct the departmental inquiry instead of granting the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. 24. In the present case, after lodgement of thecases/FIRs, the Law Department was contacted. It opined to conduct the departmental inquiry instead of granting the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. Following this advice, by Office Memorandum dated 19th September 2009, the petitioner was asked to submit the written statement of defence or else the inquiry against him would be held at his back (ex parte). The statement of imputation and articles of charges were also served upon the petitioner. He submitted a verbose reply, addressing all the concerns and questions raised against him. This was followed by the appointment of the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer did not fasten the petitioner with any criminal liability and instead recommended parity. He made it clear that the petitioner is a similarly situated and cannot be discriminated, for, once the other similarly circumstanced officers had been exonerated, the petitioner cannot be singled out and disallowed the same treatment. All that was contemplated and undertaken by the respondents leads to an irresistible conclusion that different yardsticks cannot be adopted by the respondents. The sanctioning authority, while exercising the powers with which it is clothed under the relevant rules, performs a solemn act and has been said to be placed in a position of a sentinel at the door of the criminal courts in order that no malicious prosecution may pass the corridors of the court of justice. The sanctioning authority, or for that matter the respondents herein, is to be alive to the fact that the criminal prosecution has potential of putting in peril the dignity, standing, reputation and credibility of not only the public servant but also his family members as has been often said by the Supreme Court. 25. It is to be kept in mind that the sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. Therefore, it is not an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act, which affords protection to the government servant against the frivolous prosecution. Further, it is a weapon to discourage the vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent, though not a shield for the guilty. 26. In the present case, initially the sanction was refused to be granted for prosecution of the petitioner and at that time the record and material was taken note of by the sanctioning authority. Further, it is a weapon to discourage the vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent, though not a shield for the guilty. 26. In the present case, initially the sanction was refused to be granted for prosecution of the petitioner and at that time the record and material was taken note of by the sanctioning authority. Second time, when the impugned sanction for prosecution has been accorded, the same record and material was available with the sanctioning authority, which was available to it at the earlier time when it refused to accord sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. Consideration of the material implies application of mind. Therefore, the order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the Court by leading the evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same. If the sanction order on its face indicates that all the relevant material i.e. FIR, disclosure statements, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and other materials on record, were placed before the sanctioning authority and if it is further discernible from the recital of the sanction order that the sanctioning authority perused all the material, an inference may be drawn that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law. This becomes necessary in case the Court is to examine the validity of the order of sanction, inter alia, on the ground that the order suffers from the vice of total non-application of mind. [Vide: Gokulchand Dwarkadas Moraka v. King, AIR 1949 PC 82; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 124; Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., AIR 1979 SC 677 ; State through Anti- Corruption Bureau, Govt. of Maharashtra v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, AIR 1996 SC 1910 ; State of Punjab v. Mohd Iqbal Bhatti (2009) 17 SCC 92 ; Satyavir Singh Rathi, ACP v. State, AIR 2011 SC 1748 ; andState of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain, (2013) 8 SCC 119 ]. 27. It is pertinent to mention here that the impugned sanction for prosecution of the petitioner has been granted without considering all the relevant material, including the opinion of the Law Department and, therefore, the impugned sanction for prosecution against the petitioner, is bad in law. 27. It is pertinent to mention here that the impugned sanction for prosecution of the petitioner has been granted without considering all the relevant material, including the opinion of the Law Department and, therefore, the impugned sanction for prosecution against the petitioner, is bad in law. The law is settled that the consideration of the material implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie unveil that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and the other material placed before it. It has to be proved in every case that the material was placed before the authority and the mind was applied. If the sanctioning order, ex facie disclosed that all the relevant material was placed before it and it is further discernible that all such material has been perused, an inference can be drawn that the sanction has been granted in accordance with law. 28. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Svt. 1989 (1933 A.D.), which deals with the prosecution of the Judges and the Public Servants for the offence alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, lays down that no court shall take cognizance of such offences except with the previous sanction either of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. 29. Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, however, contains a special provision for sanction for the prosecution for a few specific offences, including the offence punishable under Section 161 RPC. It provides as under: “6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 or section 167-A of the State Ranbir Penal Code, Samvat 1989 or under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. (b) in the case of any other person of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (b) in the case of any other person of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (c) in the case of person who is or has been a member of the Council of Ministers other than the Chief Minister, or the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister; (d) in the case of person who is or has been a Chief Minister or the Governor; (e) in the case of a person who is or has been a member of either House of the State Legislature of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or the Chairman of the Legislative Council, as the case may be. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (I) should be given by the Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given the Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed; (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Samvat 1989- (a) no finding sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of any error, omission or irregularities in. the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of Justice has in fact occasioned thereby; (b) no Court shall stay the-proceeding under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error. Omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of Justice; (c) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any enquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether any error. Omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of Justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether any error. Omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of Justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation: For the purposes of this section- (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 30. Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, thus, places a bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offences specified in Subsection (1) against the Public Servants unless the prosecution for those offences has been sanctioned either by the Central Government, if the person who has allegedly committed the offence is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union Government and is not removable from his office except with the sanction of the Central Government, or by the State Government if that person is employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government. 31. Subsection (2) of Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, envisions that a “public servant” means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the State Ranbir Penal Code and shall include a person who is or has been a member of either House of the State Legislature or a member including a Minister of the State of the Council of Ministers or every person who is or has been under the employment of the Government whether on permanent, temporary or work-charge basis or every officer, servant or member, by whatever name called, of a Corporation or of a corporate or other body which is established by or under an Act of the State Legislature or of the Parliament in force in the State. “Public Servant” under the provisions of Section 21 of the Ranbir Penal Code, Svt. “Public Servant” under the provisions of Section 21 of the Ranbir Penal Code, Svt. 1989, denotes a person falling under any of the descriptions following namely: First.- Every Civil servant of the State; Second.- Every Commissioned Officer in the military, naval or air force of India; Third.- Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of anybody of persons, any adjudicatory functions; Fourth.- Every officer of a Court of justice (including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner) whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court; and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties; Fifth.- Every juryman, assessor or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or public servant; Sixth.- Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority; Seventh.- Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement; Eighth.- Every officer of Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice or to protect the public health, safety or convenience; Ninth.- Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of [the Government] or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of [the Government] or to execute any revenue-process, or to investigate or to report on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of [the Government] or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of [the Government], or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of [the Government], and every officer in the service or pay of [the Government], or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty; Tenth.- Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district; Eleventh.- Every servant under the Government of India who is posted, and when he is performing his legitimate duties, within the State; Twelfth.- Every servant of the Department of Devasthan; Thirteenth.- Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election; Fourteenth.- Every officer or servant employed by a Municipal Committee, Town Area Committee, Notified Area Committee, Panchayat, Co-operative Society or Co-operative Bank whether for the whole or part of his time, and every member of such committee, society or bank; Fifteenth.- Every officer or servant, and every member (by whatever name called) of a corporation engaged in trade or industry or of any other autonomous body which is established by an Act of the State Legislature or of a Government company as defined in any law for the time being in force in the State. Sixteenth.- Every officer or servant including medical or paramedical staff of the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences Srinagar. 32. The word “public servant” used in Section 21 of the Ranbir Penal Code is, therefore, of a wider amplitude and is not used in the sense in which a servant is defined in the statutory rules or in Section 126 of the State Constitution. With the broadening of the dimensions in the present democratic setup, the Government has also entered in the commercial field and that by itself will not mean that any employee or an officer of a government undertaking would not be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code. But if the “public servant” is not an employee of either the Central Government or the State Government, sanction is not to be given by the authority competent to remove him from the office held by him. 33. Once a person, against whom the prosecution is to be launched, is found to be covered by the definition of the public servant and the requirement to that extent is satisfied, the next question whether he is to be prosecuted or not is considered either by the Central Government or by the State Government and if the person is neither the employee of the Central Government nor of the State Government, the question of sanction is considered by the person who is competent to remove him from the office held by him. 34. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is clarificatory in nature inasmuch as it provides that if any doubt arises whether the sanction is to be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, it shall be given by the appropriate Government or the authority, which was competent to remove that person from the office on the date on which the offence was committed. This rule is a departure from the normal rule under which the relevant date is the date of taking cognizance, as laid down by the Supreme Court in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay AIR 1984 SC 684 . 35. This rule is a departure from the normal rule under which the relevant date is the date of taking cognizance, as laid down by the Supreme Court in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay AIR 1984 SC 684 . 35. From a perusal of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it would appear that the Central or the State Government or any other authority (depending upon the category of the public servant) has a right to consider the facts of each case and to decide whether the public servant is to be prosecuted or not. Since the Section clearly prohibits the Courts from taking cognizance of the offences specified therein, it envisages that the Central or the State Government or the other authority has not only the right to consider the question of the grant of sanction, it has also the discretion to grant or not to grant the sanction. 36. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 , it was pointed out that:- “The sanction to prosecute is an important matter, it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seen to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case.” 37. In Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor AIR 1945 FC 16, it was pointed out that the sanction under the Act is not intended to be, nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to the sanction should be observed with complete strictness. In Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor AIR 1945 FC 16, it was pointed out that the sanction under the Act is not intended to be, nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to the sanction should be observed with complete strictness. The Supreme Court in State through Anticorruption Bureau, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, (1996) 4 SCC 472 , while considering the provisions of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, held that one of the guiding principles for the sanctioning authority would be the public interest and, therefore, the protection available under Section 6 of the Act cannot be said to be absolute. 38. It is to be kept in mind that the sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act, which affords protection to the government servants against the frivolous prosecutions. [See: Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 ]. 39. Sanction is a weapon to ensure the discouragement of the frivolous and vexatious prosecutions and is a safeguard for the gullible but not a shield for the guilty. 40. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, the material and the evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies the application of mind. The order of the sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all the relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. [See also: Jaswant Singh vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 12 ; State of Bihar & Anr. vs. P. P. Sharma, 1991 Cr. L. J. 1438 (SC)]. 41. Since the validity of the “sanction” depends on the applicability of the mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and the evidence collected during the investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether the prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant the sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration, as has been seen in the present case the impugned sanction for prosecution of the petitioner is pregnant with extraneous considerations inasmuch as the sanctioning authority has made use of the same material that was taken into consideration when it earlier refused to grant the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. If it is portrayed that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution. Same is true in about the present case. The sanctioning authority, while sanctioning the prosecution by the impugned sanction order, has remained oblivious to the fact that it had earlier declined and refused to grant the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner and even there had been a departmental inquiry against the petitioner, in which the inquiry officer categorically recommended to give the same treatment to the petitioner as has been given to similarly situated person. Respondents cannot be heard saying that the other officers were not similarly situated and only petitioner is to be made fall guy and the similarly situated persons are to be given honourable exit. The impugned sanction, in that view of matter, suggests and portrays confliction and confusion in issuance thereof. Having said so, impugned sanction is bad in the eye of law and liable to be quashed, as such. 42. It is imperative to mention here that indubitably the judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. It is equally well settled that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. 43. The broad guidelines for quashing of the criminal prosecution have been laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The Supreme Court has sumptuously considered the scope and ambit of the Section 482 Cr. P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the context of quashing the proceedings in the criminal investigation. After noticing the earlier pronouncements, the Supreme Court enumerated certain categories of the cases by way of illustration, where the power under the Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. Paragraph 102, which enumerates the seven broad guidelines and categories of the cases where the power can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 Cr. P.C., are extracted as follows:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 44. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devenderappa and another, 2002 (3) SCC 89 , had an occasion to consider the ambit of the Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court has laid down that the authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority, so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent the abuse. It has further held that the Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that the initiation/ continuance thereof amounts to the abuse of the process of the Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. Following was laid down in the paragraph 6:- “6......All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quand olexa liquidalicuiconcedit, concederevidetur et id sine quo res ipsaeesse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 45. Further in the paragraph 8 following was stated:- “8.....Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 45. Further in the paragraph 8 following was stated:- “8.....Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ).” 46. In Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 (14) SCC 244 , the Supreme Court was considering the challenge to the order of the Madras High Court. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of the law and the allegations were unfounded. The prosecuting agency contested the petition, taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses commission of the alleged offences and, therefore, it is not a case which needed to be allowed. The High Court accepted the case of the prosecution and dismissed the application. The Supreme Court after referring to the judgment in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), held that the case fell within Category 07. The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings. 47. In another case of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai 2008 (8) SCC 232 , the Supreme Court relied on Category 07 as laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra). In the above case the Allahabad High Court had dismissed an Application for quashing the proceedings under Section 494, 120-B, and 109 IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In the above case the Allahabad High Court had dismissed an Application for quashing the proceedings under Section 494, 120-B, and 109 IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After noticing the background facts and parameters for exercise of the powers under Article 226 and Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Supreme Court has held that Article 226 and Section 482 Cr. P.C. do not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the extraordinary and inherent powers which the Court possessed. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The Courts, therefore, have the extraordinary and inherent powers apart from the express provisions of the law, which are necessary for the proper discharge of the functions and the duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine, which finds the expression in the section, which merely recognises and preserves the inherent powers of the High Courts. All the courts, whether the civil or the criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of the administration of justice on the principle quand olexa liquid alicui concedit, concede revidetur id sine quo res ipsaesse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). 48. While exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, though spacious, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Article itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration, of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of the justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court, it be noted, has power to prevent the abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action, which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Authority of the court exists for advancement of the justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court, it be noted, has power to prevent the abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action, which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, the Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that the initiation/continuance thereof amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. An aggrieved party can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being the extraordinary jurisdiction and the vastness of the powers naturally impose considerable responsibility in its application. All the same, the High Court has got power and sometimes duty in appropriate cases to grant reliefs, though it is not possible to pinpoint what are the appropriate cases, which are to be left to the wisdom of the Court exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Vide: Km. Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. and others (2014) 4 SCC 453 ]. 49. The powers, as noticed above, possessed by the High Court, are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent/discretionary power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether the factual or the legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without the sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary/ discretionary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary/ discretionary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 ; Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1 ; and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, AIR 2006 SC 1937 ]. 50. The discretionary and inherent powers, in light of the above discourse, given to the High Court is with the purpose and object of advancement of the justice. In case the solemn process of the Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra). The judicial process is a solemn proceeding, which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of the oppression or harassment. When there is material to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court or for that matter this Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the proceeding under Category 1, 3 & 5as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra), which is to the following effect:- “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 51. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 51. Based on the holistic consideration of the facts and circumstances summarised in the foregoing paragraphs, the present case appears to be one where Categories 01, 03 and 05 of the illustrations given in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) are clearly applicable. 52. Having regard to what has been said and done above, the writ petitions on hand are allowed on the following lines: (a) FIR no.38/2003 and FIR no.39/2003 P/S VOK, are quashed and as a corollary Order no.15011/01/2012-AVU-(ii) and Order no.15011/01/2012-AVU-(ii) dated 18th February 2013, are also quashed. (b) The departmental inquiry as also proceedings, if any, initiated by respondent no.1 for grant of prosecution against petitioner in connection with cases, bearing FIR no.38 and 39, are quashed; (c) The respondents shall consider the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Chief Conservator of Forests from the date his junior has been promoted with all consequential benefits attached and incidental thereto, if not already granted; 53. Disposed of.