JUDGMENT & ORDER : Vipul M. Pancholi, J. These appeals are filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the oral order dated 13.6.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.21125 of 2016 and allied matters, by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions filed by the present appellants-original petitioners on the ground that the petitioners are not having locus standi to file the said petitions. 2. The issue involved in all these appeals is similar and as the learned Single Judge has disposed off the petitions by common oral order, these appeals are heard together and are being disposed off by this common order. However, for the sake of convenience, the facts stated in Special Civil Application No.21265 of 2016 are recorded, which are as under: 2.1. It is the case of the petitioner that he was the owner and occupier of the agricultural land bearing Block No.57 of village Chhatrisa, Taluka Talod District Sabarkantha admeasuring 1- 46-00 Ha. Are. Sq. mtrs. (hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question'). The respondent no.1 is a company which is incorporated with the objective of cultivating the agricultural lands with modern techniques. It is alleged that the directors of respondent no.1 represented that they are in need of agricultural land which they want to develop and cultivate with the modern techniques. They will also provide employment to the local agriculturists of the village which will uplift their standard of living. It is also assured that the company will take services of the petitioner by giving him priority. The petitioner therefore agreed to sell the agricultural land to the respondent no.1-company at a low price. It is stated that the sale deed in favour of the respondent no.1-company came to be executed on 30.11.2009 which is also registered and revenue entry no.348 is mutated in the revenue record and is certified. 2.2 It is further stated that the Mamlatdar and ALT, Talod i.e. respondent no.2 initiated the suo motu proceedings under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tenancy Act') for the breach of Section 63 of the Act on the ground that the respondent no.1-company is not agriculturist and therefore the sale deed executed with regard to the land in question is in violation of the aforesaid provision. Respondent no.2 passed the order on 15.10.2014 and held that the respondent company being a no agriculturist, the purchase of the agricultural land in question is in violation of Section 63 of the Act and therefore the sale is declared as invalid. The land in question is forfeited and vested in the government. Respondent no.2 further directed that the amount of sale consideration shall be recovered from the seller i.e. the petitioner and the same shall be paid to the state exchequer. The respondent no.1 challenged the said order by filing appeal before the Deputy Collector vide Ganot Case No.34 of 2014. The Deputy Collector, Prantij dismissed the said appeal by an order dated 16.7.2015. The respondent no.1, therefore, filed revision application no.TEN/BA/222/15 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the said revision application by an order dated 26.9.2016 and thereby quashed and set aside the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT as well as the Deputy Collector. 2.3 The petitioners, therefore, filed the captioned petitions and challenged the order passed by the Tribunal. Learned Single Judge heard all the petitions and passed the impugned common order by which all the petitions came to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners are not having locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal and therefore the appellants-original petitioners have preferred the present appeals. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. J.V. Japee appearing for the appellants-original petitioners and learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for respondent no.1. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Japee assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge mainly on the ground that the original petitioners were party to the proceedings before the respondent authorities as well as the Tribunal and therefore the petitioners are entitled to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal. The petitioners are the aggrieved persons and therefore they can certainly challenge the order passed by the Tribunal by filing petition before this Court. However, learned Single Judge has committed an error while dismissing the petitions only on the ground that the petitioners are not having locus to file the petitions. 3.2 Learned advocate Mr.Japee would thereafter contend that the false representations were made by the respondent-company at the time of execution of sale deed that the employment will be offered to the petitioners and the company assured that they would start developing the land. 3.2 Learned advocate Mr.Japee would thereafter contend that the false representations were made by the respondent-company at the time of execution of sale deed that the employment will be offered to the petitioners and the company assured that they would start developing the land. However, no such development work has been started in the land in question. On the basis of the false representation made by the company, the petitioners decided to sell their land at the lesser price than the prevailing market rate at the relevant point of time. Thus, it is contended that the Mamlatdar and ALT has not committed any error while declaring the sale deed executed by the petitioners as invalid. It is stated that the Tribunal has wrongly considered the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent company and thereby committed an error by allowing the revision application filed by the respondent company. 3.3 At this stage, learned advocate Mr.Japee has placed on record the order dated 15.6.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.8808 of 2018. By way of the said order, the learned Single Judge has issued the Rule and ad-interim relief is granted in favour of the state government. It is pointed out that the respondent-State has challenged the order dated 26.9.2016 passed by the Tribunal in the revision application No.TEN/BA/222/15 filed by the respondent-company. Thus, it is stated that when the state government has already challenged the orders passed by the Tribunal which was impugned in the petitions filed by the present petitioners, this Court may not consider the submissions of the parties on merits, as the learned Single Judge is seized with the matter. However, learned advocate Mr.Japee has requested that this Court may consider the aspect of locus of the petitioners as the learned Single Judge dismissed the petitions only on the ground of locus of the petitioners. 3.4 It is further submitted that as the petitioners are persons aggrieved, they can challenge the order passed by the Tribunal by filing the petitions before this Court. In support of the said contention, learned advocate has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai V/s Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, (1976) AIR SC 578 (2) Fertilizer Corporation, Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others V/s Union of India and others, (1981) AIR SC 344 (3) Dr. In support of the said contention, learned advocate has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai V/s Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, (1976) AIR SC 578 (2) Fertilizer Corporation, Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others V/s Union of India and others, (1981) AIR SC 344 (3) Dr. Meers Massey V/s Dr.S.R.Mehrotra and others, (1998) AIR SC 1153 (4) Keshabhai Panabhai Solanki V/s Dahyaji Babaji Thakor & Ors., (2012) 1 GLR 719 3.5 Relying upon the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decisions, it is urged that the learned Single Judge has committed an error while dismissing the petitions on the ground of locus of the petitioners and therefore this Court may set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the petitioners be permitted to submit their case on merits. It is submitted that as per Section 63AD of the Act, the land in question can be regranted to the petitioners and therefore the petitioners are entitled to challenge the order of the Tribunal. 4. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Shah appearing for the respondent no.1-company supported the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge and contended that the respondent no.1-company was given permission to purchase the land as per circular dated 20.9.1983 issued by the state government. By way of the said circular, "body corporate" is a person and such body corporate can purchase the agricultural land with the permission under Section 63 of the Act. It is further submitted that on 9.5.1995, Deputy Collector, Dholka granted permission to the respondent no.1-company to purchase the agricultural land. The state government challenged the said order of the Deputy Collector by filing revision application no.198 of 2008 after a period of 13 years before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. However, the Tribunal dismissed the said revision application by an order dated 19.6.2009 and therefore the permission granted in favour of the respondent no.1 to purchase the agricultural land was not disturbed. In the meantime, the respondent-state issued the circular on 23.11.1998. By way of the said circular, the state government has declared that the company cannot purchase the agricultural land. The said circular was challenged by concerned persons before this Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 14.3.2000 set aside the circular issued by the state government against which Letters Patent appeal was preferred by the state. The said circular was challenged by concerned persons before this Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 14.3.2000 set aside the circular issued by the state government against which Letters Patent appeal was preferred by the state. It is further pointed out that on 30.11.2009 the present appellant executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent no.1-company. At the time of execution of the sale deed, the respondent no.1-company was having valid permission issued by the Collector to purchase the agricultural land and the circular dated 23.11.1998 was set aside by the learned Single Judge. Learned advocate Mr. Shah has at this stage, further placed reliance upon the circular dated 2.5.2011 issued by the respondent-state government by which it is observed that the company cannot purchase the agricultural land without permission of the competent authority. It is stated that in the present case, the respondent no.1-company is having permission of the competent authority to purchase the agricultural land. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Shah has thereafter submitted that once the petitioners have sold their agricultural land by registered sale deeds and such sale deeds are not challenged by the petitioners by filing civil proceedings before the competent civil court and the petitioners have also not challenged the entries mutated in the revenue record and certified by the revenue authorities by filing separate revenue proceedings, therefore, it is not open on the part of the petitioner to contend that they are aggrieved persons. At this stage, it is further submitted that the respondent no.2-Mamlatdar and ALT has initiated the suo motu proceedings and order was passed against the respondent no.1- company. The said order came to be challenged by the respondent no.1 before the Deputy Collector and against the order passed by the Deputy Collector, respondent no.1 filed revision application before the Tribunal. No proceedings were initiated by the petitioners challenging the sale transactions contending that sale transactions are invalid and therefore when the Tribunal has passed an order in favour of respondent no.1, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that they are aggrieved persons. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Shah would thereafter contend that this Court may not accept the submission of the learned advocate of the petitioners that the respondent no.1-company has assured that they will be offered employment etc. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Shah would thereafter contend that this Court may not accept the submission of the learned advocate of the petitioners that the respondent no.1-company has assured that they will be offered employment etc. There is no reference with regard to the same in the sale deeds executed between the petitioner and respondent no.1. He would further submit that once the petitioners have pocketed the amount of sale consideration, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that the sale deed executed between the petitioners and respondent company be declared as invalid as per the provisions of the Act. 4.3 Learned advocate Mr. Shah has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah V/s State of Gujarat and Anr, (2011) 3 GLH 98 (2) Navuji Lalji Vaghela V/s State of Gujarat, (2011) 4 GLR 3636 (3) A decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in the case of Abhesinh Mohansinh V/s State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 GLH 352 (4) Patel Ratilal Maganbhai V/s State of Gujarat, (2003) 1 GLR 562 . 5. We have considered the submissions canvassed by learned advocates appearing for the parties. We have also gone through the material produced on record. It is required to be noted that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions only on the ground that the petitioners are not having locus to file the petitions and therefore the learned advocates appearing for the parties have requested that this Court may not examine the merits of the matter and consider the issue of locus of the petitioners only. We, therefore, are not examining the merits of the case. 6. From the material placed on record, it transpires that the sale deed was executed by the petitioner in favour of the respondent no.1- company on 30.11.2009. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has received the amount of consideration. The petitioner has failed to point out from the record that the assurance was given by the respondent no.1 at the time of execution of the sale deed that the petitioners will be offered employment by the respondent no.1- company. The respondent no.2-Mamlatdar and ALT suo motu initiated the proceedings under the provisions of Section 84C of the Act for the alleged breach of Section 63 of the Act. The petitioners have never challenged the transaction entered into between the petitioners and the respondent no.1-company. The respondent no.2-Mamlatdar and ALT suo motu initiated the proceedings under the provisions of Section 84C of the Act for the alleged breach of Section 63 of the Act. The petitioners have never challenged the transaction entered into between the petitioners and the respondent no.1-company. Even after the order was passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, the petitioners have not challenged the said order by filing the appeal before the Deputy Collector. It is required to be noted that the Mamlatdar and ALT has directed that the amount of sale consideration received by the petitioners is to be forfeited and the said amount is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue from the petitioners. The petitioners did not challenge the order passed by the Deputy Collector also by filing revision application before the Tribunal. Thus, when the suo motu proceedings are initiated by the Mamlatdar and ALT, the orders were passed in the said proceedings, the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved person and are having no locus to challenge the order of the Tribunal. 7. The provisions of Section 63AD came to be inserted by way of an amendment on 16.9.2015. However, the Mamlatdar and ALT passed an order on 15.10.2014 whereas the Deputy Collector has passed an order on 16.7.2015 i.e. prior to insertion of provision of Section 63AD of the Act. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that the land in dispute can be regranted in favour of the petitioners is also misconceived. 8. In the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 12 as under: "xxxx In order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person". The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent an elusive concept. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. Xxxxx" 9. We cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. However, the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. Xxxxx" 9. We cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. However, the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. In the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.)Sindri and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 23 that the question whether the person has the locus to file a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the appellants-petitioners have failed to show that they are having any legal right which has been violated and therefore this decision would also not render any assistance to the appellants-petitioners. 11. In the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Meera Massey, the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was with regard to anomalies and illegalities in the procedure adopted by the University in making selection and regularizing the various posts in contradiction to the Acts, Statue and Ordinances. The concerned petitioner was Professor of History in the same University and he was genuinely concerned to rectify the wrongs without any personal animosity against anyone. The same was not for any person gain. It was neither politically motivated nor for publicity. In such facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the petition challenging the appointment of lecturer in the University, professor in the same University has locus standi to file the petition. However, this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case. 12. In the case of Keshabhai Panabhai Solanki, the issue before the Division Bench was with regard to suspension of Sarpanch. The District Development Officer exercised the powers under Section 59 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993. On the facts of the said case, it was held that when subject matter raises issue about suitability of incumbent in public office and where order is challenged on the ground that it is contrary to law, it is not proper and just to allow locus standi to be an impediment. On the facts of the said case, it was held that when subject matter raises issue about suitability of incumbent in public office and where order is challenged on the ground that it is contrary to law, it is not proper and just to allow locus standi to be an impediment. However, this decision would not render any assistance to the appellants in the facts of the present case. 13. In the case of Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah, the Division Bench of this Court followed the decision rendered in the case of Navuji Lalji Vaghela and thereafter observed in paragraph 23 as under: "23. Even if now, so far as the three classes as explained by the Supreme Court are concerned, the only class which the appellants herein may be able to invoke is that the contract if it is illegal by statute in the interest of a particular class of persons of whom seller of the land is one, then as per this contention, the seller is relieved of the consequences of an illegal contract into which he has entered and the maxim of pari-delicto will not apply. We are afraid it is not as easy as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants to accept this because if restoration of possession is to be made at the instance of the seller of the property, then the seller will have to establish before the competent court that when the transaction of sale was entered into, it was disclosed by the seller to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority before entering into the registered sale deed was required and inspite of the same, the purchaser has at his own risk agreed to purchase the land without permission of the competent authority. If the purchaser establishes that the seller of the property has withheld this information from the purchaser and has made the purchaser to believe that on account of sale transaction, the rights and titles of the seller are fully conveyed and he would become the absolute owner of the property, the court may decline the relief to the seller for declaring the sale as illegal or void. If the seller establishes that the seller himself as well as the purchaser, both were under the bonafide mistake that the permission of the competent authority for sale is not required, then in the given case, the court keeping in view the intent of the legislature may declare the transaction of sale as invalid. But, in those circumstances also the court may decline the equitable relief of restoring the possession back to the seller and even if the court decides to restore the possession back to the seller, the court may also put the seller on condition of repaying the sale consideration and the compensation also if circumstances so demand. All these questions of facts can only be examined in the proceedings of civil suit." 14. In the case of Navuji Lalji Vaghela, the Division Bench of this Court observed in paragraph 4 as under: "4. We are of the view that the position of law is very clear. Firstly, to maintain a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, the party aggrieved must show that any of his fundamental rights or any other legal rights have been infringed and thereby the party is aggrieved by such infringement. Who can be said to be "a person aggrieved"? One of the meanings is that "a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision", if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved, if a legal burden is imposed upon him. Can it be said that the appellants would fall within the words "person aggrieved" or "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest". On the contrary, this is an appeal by persons who are trying to take advantage of their own wrong. The maxim: "Nulluys commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is very much applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The maxim: "Nullus commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is one of the salient tenets of equity. The maxim: "Nulluys commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is very much applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The maxim: "Nullus commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is one of the salient tenets of equity. The appellants cannot secure the assistance of a court of law for enjoying the fruit of their own wrong." 15. In the case of Abhesinh Mohansinh, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed and held in paragraph 7 as under: "7. In my view, restoration is one of the option to avoid forfeiture of the land otherwise the land is forfeited/confiscated to the State Government even as per the order of the Mamlatdar. Further, so far as the authority under the Act is concerned, the Revenue Tribunal ultimately has concluded in favour of the purchaser respondents No.2 to 4 and the transaction is not held as void or illegal and the proceedings initiated by the Mamlatdar and the Assistant Collector thereafter and the order passed by the Collector thereafter are quashed and set aside by the Revenue Tribunal which itself is the authority under the Act. Therefore, when the authority under the Act has held the transaction as valid, it hardly lies in the mouth of the seller who is party to the transaction to contend that the transaction be declared invalid, more particularly, when he has enjoyed the benefit of the transaction by pocketing the consideration long back and he has lost the remedy even by filing civil suit or declaration that the transaction is null and void or illegal. The remedy of getting back the land which is not permissible directly, cannot be allowed to be done indirectly by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the distinction as sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner is ill-founded and is of no help to the petitioner." 16. In the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai, the Division Bench of this Court has held in paragraph 15 as under: "15. When we considered the aforesaid submissions of Mr.Shelat seeking declaration that the transaction of sale is void in a writ petition and that the possession of the land should be restored back to the appellants, Mr. In the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai, the Division Bench of this Court has held in paragraph 15 as under: "15. When we considered the aforesaid submissions of Mr.Shelat seeking declaration that the transaction of sale is void in a writ petition and that the possession of the land should be restored back to the appellants, Mr. A.J. Patel appearing for the respondent No.3 had drawn our attention to the judgment of this court in the case of Ratnaprabhabai, D/o Hirojirao Naranrao Mane vs M/s Tulsidas V.Patel, (1982) 2 GLR 213 where in the question of exercise of powers by the court under Article 227 of the Constitution against the order of the lower authority rejecting to set aside the sale on account of permission not obtained of the competent authority and initiating proceedings under section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act was considered by this court and this court held that "the petitioner who is a transferor and party to sale would never be said to be aggrieved party which would entitle him to carry the matter in appeal when the State has chosen not to challenge the order of the Mamalatdar under the said Act." It was further observed that "the position of such petitioner who has pocketed the money long back and is trying to catch at a straw and is practically indulging in the policy of dog in the manger by seeing that the hanging sword of the litigation lingers on so that at some future time the purchaser may come round and may give some added financial advantage to the petitioner by way of bargain and if the present proceedings are kept pending such oblique intention of the petitioner may get fructified". It was observed that "the court obviously can not be a party to such a design." At this stage, Mr. Shelat had tried to distinguish the judgment in the aforesaid case of this court by contending that it was a case under section 84C of the Act where the purchaser is not going to get back the land and the land would vest with the State Government. However, we do not agree with the distinction sought to be made by Mr. However, we do not agree with the distinction sought to be made by Mr. Shelat because the position would remain the same that this court would not be a party to the malafide design on the part of the sellor who has voluntarily entered into sale transaction and has pocketed money long back and has allowed the transaction to continue for a period of more than 16 years." 17. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it is clear that when the seller has pocketed the amount of consideration and if he has lost the remedy even by filing civil suit or declaration that the transaction is null and void and illegal, the remedy of getting back the land which is not permissible directly, cannot be allowed to be done indirectly by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is further clear that the concerned petitioner who is transferor and party to sale would never be said to be aggrieved party which would entitle him to carry the matter in appeal when the state has chosen not to challenge the order. It is further clear from the aforesaid decisions that to maintain the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the party aggrieved must show that any of his fundamental rights or his legal rights have been infringed and thereby the party is aggrieved by such infringement. What is meaning of person aggrieved is also discussed. 18. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid decisions, if the facts as stated hereinabove are examined, we are of the view that the respondent no.2-Mamlatdar and ALT suo motu initiated the proceedings under the provisions of Section 84 of the Act for alleged breach of Section 63 of the Act. The petitioners have never challenged the sale transactions entered between them and the respondent no.1-company. The order passed by Mamlatdar and ALT was not challenged by the petitioners before the Deputy Collector. Similarly, the order passed by the Deputy Collector was not challenged by the petitioners before the Tribunal. The petitioners have not initiated any civil proceedings for cancellation of sale deeds nor they have initiated any revenue proceedings for cancellation of mutation entries made in the revenue record. The petitioners have pocketed the amount of sale consideration. 19. Similarly, the order passed by the Deputy Collector was not challenged by the petitioners before the Tribunal. The petitioners have not initiated any civil proceedings for cancellation of sale deeds nor they have initiated any revenue proceedings for cancellation of mutation entries made in the revenue record. The petitioners have pocketed the amount of sale consideration. 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error which requires interference in these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed. Consequently, all the connected civil applications also stand dismissed. 20. At this stage, it is made clear that as the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions only on the ground of locus of the petitioners, we have also not examined the merits of the matter.

Parshotambhai Dhanjibhai Patel v. Shivganga Farms Pvt. Ltd.